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Synopsis: 
The adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(AFCHPR) on 17 June 1981 by the O. A. U. Assembly of Heads of 
States and Government is, singly, the most significant act in the 
field of Human Rights protection in Africa. The Charter entered 
into force on 21 October 1986. These developments have inspired 
the Commission of this thesis. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the promotion and protection of 
human rights in Africa in three main areas, namely, 
historical/cultural perspectives, national and regional legal regimes 
for the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first Chapter 
explores the historical and cultural background of human rights in 
Africa. The examination of the socio-legal issues raised in this area 
serves as a useful backdrop in appreciating the difference between 
the African notion and western notion of human rights. The impact 
of the traditional African concept of human rights on the AFCHPR is 
also explored. 
The second Chapter examines the evolution of the OAU with 
particular emphasis on the relevance of human rights considerations 
in the resume of events proceeding its formation. An analysis of 
the Charter of the OAU and the functions of its principal organs is 
also undertaken with a view to establishing their relevance to the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 
Chapter three examines the concept of self-determination in Africa 
as pursued by both the UN and the OAU, including an analysis of 
the strategies of both organisations towards the notion of socio- 
economic self-determination. 
Chapter four explores the issues of ethnicity, racism and apartheid 
as obstacles to the protection of human rights on the continent. An 
evaluation of the solutions to these problems is undertaken, with 
specific regard to economic and diplomatic sanctions against racist 
regimes and legality of military and financial assistance to liberation 
movements. 
The protection of human rights in the constitutions of African States 
is examined in Chapter five. The compatibility of the human rights 
provisions in national constitutions vis-a-vis the AFCHPR is also 
considered. 
In Chapter Six, we undertake an examination of the evolution of the 
regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights 
in Africa. The relevance and impact of existing international and 
regional human rights procedures to African States is also examined. 
A legal analysis of the AFCHPR as well as its socio-political 
implications is undertaken in Chapter Seven. 
The concluding Chapter is an appraisal of the state of human rights 
in Africa today. It also profers solutions to problems raised during 
the course of this research. 
The effectiveness of the emerging African legal regime for the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples rights will ultimately 
depend upon the cohesion of national, regional and international 
human rights measures. This thesis thus attempts to chart a course 
through the labyrinth of national, regional and international legal 
instruments for the protection of human rights with particular 
reference to Africa. 
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Chapter One 
Theoretical, Ideological and Cultural Perspectives of Human Rights 
(a) Introduction 
In examining theoretical perspectives of human rights we should take 
heed of the caveat of Javolenus that "Omnis definitio periculosa est" 
which is as relevant to the definition of human rights as any other legal 
concept whether as a purely legal phenomenon or a social phenomenon. 
This caveat is underlined by Lloyd who maintains that "it must be 
remembered that choices will be Influenced by personal Ideologies and 
attitudes of the chooser, whether for instance he favours capitalism or 
socialism, or whether for instance, his general outlook is religious or 
positive. Thus linguistic recommendations may be activated consciously 
or subconsciously, by such underlying premises. It must be born in 
mind that even behind the most apparently technical of rules there may 
be lurking deeply held social or political philosophies" 
1. 
Thus it will become evident in our examination of theoretical, ideological 
and indeed cultural perspectives of human rights that different meanings 
are given to human rights, in different ideological and cultural systems. 
This lack of universal concurrence as to the meaning of human rights, 
human dignity and freedom is due, no doubt to the diverse economic, 
political, social and cultural experience of the various regions of the 
world. However, the apparent universal subscription to the concept of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as prescribed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights has not foreclosed the agitation for the 
reappraisal of the conceptions of human rights. 
-------------------- 
1 D. Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence, 2nd ed. (London Stevens & Sons) 1965, p. 32 
2 
An examination of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reveals that 
its provisions are founded upon the western concept of political liberty 
and democracy, inclusive of property rights in contradistinction to socio- 
economic rights and egalitarianism2. The Universal Declaration has been 
regarded as a document based on the assumption that western values are 
paramount and should be extended to the non-western world3. Despite 
these criticisms, the significance and Influence of the Universal 
Declaration has not waned. The Charter of the OAU as well as the 
constitutions of many African States expressly subscribe to the principles 
of the Universal Declaration4. In order to appreciate the universal 
acknowledgement of the principles of the Universal Declaration a brief 
spectral summary of the human rights activity In historical perspective is 
necessary. 
Evidence of such activity long before the advent of the Universal 
Declaration, can be found in the Babylonian Laws (in the reigns of 
Urukagina of Logash, 3260 BC, Sargan of Akkad, 2300 BC, and 
Hammurabi of Babylon, 1792-1750 BC) 
5 
as well as in the Assyrian Laws 
(those inscribed on the nine day tablets in the reign of 
Tiglath-Pileser I, 111-1077 BC) 6 and in the Hittite Laws (especially 
those ascribed to the reign of King Telepinus, 1516-1486 BC) 
7. The 
-------------------- 
2 
A. Pollis & Peter Schwab, "Human Rights: A Western Construct with 
Limited Applicability" in A. Pollis & P. Schwab (eds) Human Rights: 
Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. (Preager. New York) 1979 p. 8 
3 Ibid 
4 See Chapter Five on the Relevance of National Constitutions in the Protection of Human Rights in Africa at p. 72. 
5 For a collection of these laws, see G. Driver and J. Miles, The Babylonian Laws (Oxford 1968) 
6 See G. Driver and J. Miles, The Assyrian Laws (Oxford 1935) 
7 For a collection of these laws, see E. Neafield, The Hittite Laws (Oxford, 1951) 
3 
Dharma of ancient India (Vedic Period: 1500-500 BC) 
8 
and the 
jurisprudence of Lao-Tse (b. 604 BC) 
9, 
and Confucius (circa 550-478 BC) 
in ancient China prescribed laws for the protection of human rights. 
The citizens of the city-state of ancient Greece enjoyed many rights 
including freedom of speech (isogoria), equality before the law 
(isonomia), the right to vote (J us suffragii ) and the right of access to 
justice (jus actionis). Similar rights were prescribed by Roman Law 
under "jus civile". 
An examination of the history of the evolution of human rights reveals 
that most of the significant revisions in the nature and scope of human 
rights have generally resulted from socio-political upheavals. 
The important revisions including the Great Charter of the Liberties of 
England or the Magna Carta (1219)10, Statutem det allagio non 
cocendendo (1217), the Petition of Rights, the Instrument of 
11 12 
Government13, the Habeus Corpus Act (1679)14, the Bill of Rights 
8 A. Basham, The Wonder that was India, 3rd rev. ed. (Oxford 
University Press 1968) 
9 A. Waley, The Way and Its Power, The Study of the Tao Tse Te Ching 
(Oxford, 1934) 
10 
After being defeated the King of France in 1214, King John had this 
Charter imposed on him by the prelates, earls and barons of his realms 
on the meadows of Runnymeade near Staines (Surrey) 
11 Edward I gave this Statute to the English people, he also convinced 
representatives of farms and counties to the Parliament 
12 Parliament presented this petition to Charles I, who sanctioned it on 7 
June 1628. The King was subsequently tried and beheaded. 
13 This instrument gave supreme authority to Oliver Cromwell as Lord 
Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland. 
14 Enacted by Charles II on 26 May 1679, this was officially titled An Act for the Better Securing the Liberty of the Subject and the Prevention of Imprisonment beyond the Seas. 
4 
(1689)15, the Constitution of the United States (17 September 1787), and 
16 the Declaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen" (26 August 1789) 
Human rights provisions have since this "Declaration" been included in 
the constitutions of most countries of the world, irrespective of 
ideological barriers. Western nations17 as well as Eastern bloc 
countries18 including the Soviet Union19 have subscribed to notions of 
human rights in their respective constitutions. Similarly, the newly 
independent States of Africa and Asia20 have included provisions 
regarding human rights in their respective constitutions. 
In recent times, the quest for an adequate theory of human rights has 
been beleaguered by the ideological war that has persisted between the 
Socialist and Capitalist camps. In describing the polarity of the two 
arguments Schnieder states that: 
"If, for some, the system of economic exploitation hiding, 
according to them, behind the facade of Liberal Democracy is 
in total contradiction to human rights, for others, the so 
called liberation of the proletariat and the development 
towards real humanity in the Communist sense are really a 
-------------------- 
15 Officially titled "An Act for Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject and the Settling of Succession of the Crown", enacted on 16 
December 1689. 
16 La Fayette, who supported the cause of the Americal colonies for 
independence, Introduced this declaration in the French "Assemblee 
Constituante" in July 1789. 
17 For Instance the Belgian Constitution of 1831, the French Constitution 
of 1946, and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 in 
J. Verzjil. Human Rights in Historical Perspective 6 (1955) p. 59-71 
18 For instance, see the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic of 1960 and the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
19 Peselj "Recent Codifications of Human Rights In Socialist Constitutions 
in Howard Law Journal Vol 11 (1965) p. 342, See also, Bermann "Human 
Rights in the Soviet Union, Howard Law Journal, Vol. 33 (1965) p. 333- 
20 George "Human Rights In India" in Howard Law Journal, Vol. 11 (1965) 
p. 291 
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pretext leading to slavery and to the establishment of 
totalitarian power of party and state to whthe rights of 
the individual are exposed without protection-'. 
While the above statement reflects the ultra-capitalist view of communism 
and vice versa, in reality the historical experience of each camp has 
moulded the human rights concept unique to them. Therefore arguments 
representative of many African scholars advocating a preference for "a 
socialist society - where the transfer of real power to the majority 
creates a much more solid foundation for greater democracy and human 
rights"22 in our opinion, avoids the concrete realities of the societies of 
Africa. 
The efficacy of a human rights theory depends upon the extent to which 
it reflects a given societies cultural, economic and ideological experience. 
The wholemeal application of foreign theories to the unique contents 
should be reassessed. The aim of this chapter is to examine the 
jurisprudence of human rights with a view to Understanding the struggle 
of man for human rights. 
Other methodology shall involve the dialectical approach which will focus 
on the interconnectedness and interdependence between the various 
facets of social existence. The dialectical method proceeds by theories 
23 
anti-theories and synthesis and is suitable to our appraisal of the 
21 Peter Schneider "Social Rights and the Concept of Human Rights" in 
D. D. Raphael (ed) Political Theory and the Rights of Men (Bloomington, 
Indian University Press) 1967 p. 81 
22 Osita Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems 
(Macmillan, Lagos, Nigeria, 1984), p. 3. See Claude Ake "The 
Congruence of Political Economies and Ideologies in Africa" In P. C. W. 
Gurkind and I. Wallerstein (eds) The Political Economy of Contemporary 
Africa (Beverley Hills, Sage Publications) 1976 p. 198. 
23 T. F. McCarty, J. B. Maine, S. P. Marks and L. Sivois (under the 
supervision of Karel Vasak) Human Rights Studies in Universities (Paris, 
Unesco) 1973 p. 82. 
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evolution of human rights. This method should explain the confusion 
inherent in the naturalist, positivistic and normativistic conceptions of 
human rights that still exist today in various formulations. It should also 
explain the lacuna in the sociological school which still retains elements 
of the positivistic theory of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
In identifying a theory of human rights which reflects the material 
conditions of a given society we reject the techno-juristic conception of 
law and order which is purely restricted to the legal aspects of a social 
phenomenon. 
We shall thus adopt the dialectical method which will emphasise the 
relevance of the material being conditions of men, their cultural relativity 
and the establishment of an equitable and just social order. Since the 
realisation of human rights cannot be considered outside historical and 
structural contexts we shall also examine the concept of human rights in 
the pre-colonial traditional Africa: An analysis of the human rights in 
Colonial Africa will also be undertaken as a vital backdrop to the 
analysis of the struggle for self-determination of the continent. 
(b) Jurisprudence of Human Rights 
One of the most significant of the numerous conditions affecting the 
international community's future in securing the protection of human 
rights may be described as that of simple intellectual confusion24. The 
source of this confusion must be the lack of consensus among the 
proponents of jurisprudential theories of human rights. The schools of 
jurisprudential thought include the theological, natural law, positivist, 
historical utilitarian, social science, realists and variants thereof. 
24 M. McDougal, H. Laswell and L. Chen. Human Rights and World 
Public Order (New Haven' Conn. Yale University Press) (1980) p. 63 
A 
7 
The common denominator of all these theories is the compelling need to 
provide a justification for human rights. Human rights represent 
demands or claims which individuals or groups make on society, some of 
which are protected by law and have become 'lex lata' and while others 
remain aspirations to be achieved in the future. Consequently, the 
juridicalization of human rights is necessary because in its absence, 
individuals would merely be appealing to moral doctrines and public 
opinion when their rights are encroached upon by the State, rather than 
invoking established laws designed to protect them from such excesses. 
(i) Natural Law 
Western conceptions of human rights were derived from Greco-Roman and 
Judaeo-Christian traditions which asserted both rights and duties as 
expounded in the "natural law" arguments. 
The classical conceptions of natural law were predicated on elementary 
principles of justice which were right reason. Cicero believed that true 
law is right reason In agreement with nature which is valid for all 
nations and all times and from whose obligations we cannot be freed by 
senate or people, God being the author, propagator and enforcer of this 
law25. The theory of Natural Law as law of land which conferred certain 
Immutable rights upon individuals was emphasised by Thomas Aquinas26; 
Natural Law, according to him, is part of divine law which is discernable 
by reason. However, Aquinas concept of good tolerated slavery as just, 
-------------------- 
25 
Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Republica. De Legibus De Republica, Book 
II, IV, 379-85, V 383-87 (C. Keyes trans. 1952) 
26 Heale, A Catholic View of Human Rights: A Theoristic Reflection, in 
A. Rosenbaum ed. The Philosophy of Human Rights (Westport Conn. Greenwood Press) 1980 p. 87-97 
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although unlike Aristotle27, he denied that any man was by nature a 
slave since Gods grace is distributed uniformly. 
The link between natural rights theory and modern human rights was 
established by John Locke who believed in a state of nature where men 
and women were at freedom to determine their actions and at freedom to 
set up political autonomy which upheld natural rights of life, liberty and 
property28. Natural rights theory has made significant contributions to 
the development of human rights in that it emphasises freedom and 
equality as a fountain from which other human rights naturally flow. 
However reservations have been expressed about the suitability of 
natural law as a criteria of determining norms of human conduct. 
Firstly, the theory is based upon either the absolute belief in God or the 
belief in the innate being of man. However such convictions, though 
desirable, are not universally upheld29. Secondly, that the natural 
rights theory is founded upon the universability and immutability of 
basic postulates which neglect cultures and social diversity of human 
beings. Thirdly, that a normative principle for human rights cannot be 
-------------------- 
27 Aristotle, The Politics Book IV Chapter 14. Aristotle explained the 
need for authority and restrained freedom. In emphasising the idea of 
justice he believed that slaves were excluded from its applications 
because they are not equal to free men, slavery was a natural institution 
since some people are by nature slaves thus being less discerning and 
capable 
28 
Raymond Polin "The Rights of Man in Hobbes and Locke" in D. D. 
Raphael (ed) Political Theory and Rights of Man (MacMillan. London) 
1967, p. 20-21 
29 During the conference that was held in review the drafting of the 
Universal Declaratin of Human Rights, the proposal to edify human rights 
by bringing it under the protection of Divinity or by reference to the 
Divine origin of man was rejected. The USSR observed that the attempt 
was tantamount to imposing one nations faith on others, and that the Declaration must not contain theological affirmations given the separations 
of Church and State in numerous countries and furthermore that the 
Declaration must not include questions meant to be reached by each individual for himself which indeed is one of the rights protected by the Declaration in the form of the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (Article 18). See the Proceedings of the Third Committee 90-126 UN Doe A/C 3/SR 95-100 (1948). 
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based on a postulate that human rights are owed to man because of the 
very fact that he is man. Thus, the postulate wrongly presumes the 
universality of human nature and conduct. The potential for such an 
end may exist but it cannot be assumed. Fourthly, that the multiplicity 
of norms set as a basis for natural rights are as many as the natural 
30 
rights theorists 
The main difficulty therefore with the naturalist logic relates to the 
vagueness of the names and ambiguity of the mandate. These difficulties 
left numerous legal philosophers disenchanted with the natural rights 
theory31. However, in recent times there has been a re-emergement of 
natural rights theory. The renaissance of the naturalists rights logic 
has led to considerable agreement among the theorists to formulate the 
concept of a minimum definition of what it means to be human in 
32 
society. 
The influence of the renaissance of rights theory on international law is 
reflected in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which states that: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world... ". Similarly, 
-------------------- 
30 For instance, for natural law as morals: Dabin (b. 1889); as 
deontology: d'Entreves (b. 1902); as related to sociology: Se Iznick 
(b. 1919); as ethical jurisprudence: Cohen (1880-1947); as relativity of 
rights and restraints: Chroust (b. 1907); as sence of Injustice: Cahn 
(1906-1964). For natural law theories generally see Leo Straus, Natural 
Rights and History, (the University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 1971. 
31 
This disaffection is reflected in the oft-quoted criticism of natural 
rights, by Jeremy Bentham: "Right is a child of law; from real laws come 
real rights, but from imaginary law, from "laws of nature" come imaginary rights... natural rights Is simple nonsense: natural and impresciptible rights, rhetorical nonsence, - nonsense upon stilts". For 
a study of J. Bentham's critique of natural rights theory see Hart "Utilitarianism and Natural Rights" Tulsa Law Review Vol 53 1979 663 
32 Oldfrom, "Essence and Concept in Natural Law Theory", in Law and Philosophy 1964, p. 239 
10 
article 1 of the Declaration states that: "All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood" 
The implication of these provisions is that there are some inherent rights 
of the individual that must be protected in all organized societies. 
Further practical evidence of modern invocations of the naturalist theory 
is reflected in Tanzanias justification for its role in overthrowing the 
Amin regime in Uganda. The barbaric practices of the Amin regime 
caused such universal outrage that Tanzanians violation of Uganda's 
sovereign rights were overlooked and Tanzania's actions were justified on 
naturalist and humanitarian grounds. During the Nuremberg trials of 
1945, although the judgements were set in the framework of positive law, 
they derived their validity from public consensus that the Nazi leaders 
had acted in defiance of naturalist logic33. The influence of the natural 
law theory is also evident in the American Declaration of Independence 
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens34. Thus, 
despite its initial demise, the natural law theory has been resuscitated 
with various attempts to rationalise its basic philosophy. This revival is 
not unconnected with the inadequacy of positive law, based on 
technisms, in resolving social problems. 
(ii) The Positive School 
The emergence of the positive school of law was a reaction against the a 
priori and metaphysical basis of natural law, which had failed to explain 
the basis of law in an increasingly complex society. The positive 
movement secularized the concept of law by withdrawing it from the realm 
-------------------- 
33 
Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (Holmes and 
Meier/London) p. 44. 
34 L. Henkin "Right Here and There" In Columbian Law Review Vol 81, 
No. 8 (1981) p. 1591-1594. 
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of supernatural35. The predominant theory since the peace of Westphalia 
has been associated with the "will" of the sovereign state. Consequently 
one of the major influences of current human rights theories is the 
classical theory of legal positivism. The positivists view assumes that all 
authority stems from what the state and its officials have prescribed. 
Thus since the notion of rights evolved within the context of domestic 
political struggles the source of human rights are contained only in the 
enactments of a framework of law with the corresponding sanctions of the 
State. The State can, therefore, enhance the protection of human rights 
by using Its Institutions and procedures to the optimum benefit of the 
individual. 
The contribution of positivism to the development of any system of rights 
in Intentional law Is reflected in the existence of human rights 
conventions and treaties. These instruments were created by States to 
form part of the system of international law and are thus evidence of 
positive collection of rights. Legal Positivism reduces law to a matter of 
36 
commands, rules and norms 
The major drawbacks in the positivist theory are basically predicated 
upon the distinctions made between that the law 'is' and what the law 
"ought to be". The philosophical division between the legal system and 
ethical or moral foundations preclude a progressive development of the 
law37. For Instance, the morally abhorrent apartheid policies of South 
Africa are based on positive law. This major defect In positivism affects 
4 
----------------- -- 
35 D. Lloyd. Introduction to Jurisprudence (Stevens, London) 1972, 
p. 79. 
36 H. L. A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" 
Harvard Law Review 71, (1955) p. 593. E 
37 J. J. Shestack "The Jurisprudence of Human Rights" In T. Meron, (ed) 
Human Rights In International Law: Legal and Policy Issues. (OUP; 
Oxford) 1984 p. 80.1 
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the desirability of the theory as a normative basis for human rights, 
especially as the State can justify the application of inhuman laws as the 
basis of legal positivism. 
Neo-Positivists like Professor H. L. A. Hart have revised the philosophy to 
create a criteria, for the Invalidation of government laws, based on the 
standards that have been recognised and accepted by the community38. 
The major standards being the (natural)/equal right of all people to be 
free39. The neo-positivist recognition of concepts of natural rights may 
lead to the gradual acceptance of aspects of morality as the basis of 
Invalidating laws. However, in the absence of such an acceptance, the 
gulf between the positivists logic and naturalist logic will remain. 
In practical terms, positivism has served the reinforcement of juridical 
ideas of equality of states and the sanctity of treaties. The sanctity of 
sovereign states, mutually respective of each others prerogatives 
necessarily preclude any missionary attempt to intervention for 
humanitarian purposes40. Consequently the positivist or statist theory 
connotes the realisation of human rights or a substantial part thereof, 
through the internal dynamics of domestic politics. We therefore, submit 
that positivism being a self sufficient model of commands, rules or norms 
cannot serve as an adequate theory for the fundamental *rights of man. 
This summation is underlined by the inability of the concept to look 
beyond the limited framework of pure law for the solution of societal 
problems. 
-------------------- 
38 
H. L. A. Hart op cit p. 593. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Richard Falk o cit p. 36. 
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(iii) The Socialist Concept of Law and Human Rights 
The socialist theory of human rights recognizes human rights as those 
which have become part of a positive legal system. Vyshinskii defines 
law as "the aggregate of rules of conduct or norms, yet not of norms 
alone, but also of customs and rules of community living confirmed by 
the state authority and coercively protected by that authorityºº41 Thus, 
the State prescribes the rights and duties of citizens and institutions in 
accordance with the consciousness, interest and will of the dominant 
class. The law, in the socialist context, expresses the requirement of 
economic development only after they have been recognized and 
42 formulated as political demands of the state. 
Marxist philosophies, similarly accept law has the machinery of the ruling 
class backed by coercive force of the state with the aim of protecting 
and developing social relationships and arrangements, advantageous and 
acceptable to the dominant class43. Modern Communist doctrine has 
followed this theory and the practice of Eastern bloc states reflect the 
transitional stage of socialism under which the state and ruling party 
must play a major part in transforming society. According to Marx, 
"Law can never be more highly developed than the economic structure 
and the social state of culture caused by it"44. Consequently Marxist 
theory regards human rights and evolution thereof, as ultimately 
determined by the economic, political, moral and cultural conditions of 
society. Marxist theory lays emphasis on the economic infrastructure, on 
which the evolution of law as the superstructure depend. This theory 
therefore, precludes the existence of individual rights based on the state 
-------------------- 
41 Quoted in M. Fawovskyi "Soviet Political Thought" in D. Lloyd op cit, 
p. 672. 
42 Marx/Engels, Works Vol 3, p. 539; Marx/Engels, Works Vol 19, p. 21. 
43 M. Fawovskyl; op cit. p. 672. 
44 Marx/Engels op cit Vol-19, p. 21 
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of nature which is prior to the State; only legal rights exist and these 
are predicated upon the fulfilment of obligations to society. 
The main reservation on the socialist conceptualization of rights is based 
on the dogma that the State cannot formulate laws for whose 
implementation the conditions have not matured and that the artificial 
acceleration of social transformation with the aid of law will lead to 
havoc45. Some Soviet scholars do not assign primary significance to the 
law and believe in the development of an ethical system to change 
Russia's 'cold and formal' laws that have little beneficial influence on 
46 
society and paralyse mans noblest impulses. 
The Soviet approach to human rights reveals an inherently inadequate 
theory that does not provide a normative standard which secures State 
recognition of the individuals security against its power. The practice 
of communist States in their quest for societal goals often leads to the 
suppression of civil and political rights. 
The impact of socialism on human rights has been In form of evolving the 
concept of economic and social rights47 and their subsequent Inclusion In 
the international human rights instruments. The paradox here Is that, 
despite the recognition of economic and social rights by socialist and 
communist States, socialist theorists still maintain that laws cannot be 
utilised for the acceleration of social transformation. Evidently, these 
-------------------- 
45 
V. Chkhikvadze, The State, Democracy and Legality in the USSR: 
Lenins Idea Today (Moscow, Progress Publishers) 1972. pp. 41-42. 
46 Alexander Solhenitsyn's speech at Harvard University on June 8 1978. 
New York Times June 9 1978. 
47 These rights were first officially proclaimed in the 1918 "Declaration 
of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Peoples" adopted by the All 
Russian Congress of Soviets and later codified In the Soviet Constitution 
of 1936 and 1977. See E. H. Carr "The Rights of Man" In Human Rights: 
Comments and Interpretations (New York: UNESCO Columbia University 
Press) 1949, pp. 19-20. 
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arguments are directed towards the civil and political rights as opposed 
to social and economic and social rights. 
We subscribe to the view that human rights can only become a reality if 
political and economic rights are inextricably woven into the fabric of 
society48. 
The recent attempts to formulate and to an extent introduce African 
Socialism has failed due to two basic factors. Firstly, it is clear that 
Marxism did not address itself to the problems of transition from neo- 
colonial economy's to socialism49. Consequently, there exists a confusion 
among African socialists over the method to achieve African Socialism. 
One approach deems it necessary to develop the productive forces under 
capitalism before transition to socialism can be achieved. Another method 
advocates the instant recourse to socialism without necessarily developing 
capitalist productive institutions50. The approach sought by some 
African scholars advocates the demolishing of all developed capitalist 
51 
socio-economic formations as well as the entire African capitalists class 
Secondly, the existing theories of African Socialism are defective In that 
they fall to take cognisance of Africa's triple heritage namely indigenous 
----------------- -- 
48 Susan E. Heuman "A Socialist Conception of Human Rights: A Model 
from Pre-Revolutionary Russia" in A. Pollis & P. Schwab; Human Rights: 
Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (Praeger: London) 1979, p. 46. 
49 M. Palmberg "Anti-Imperialism or Pro-Imperialism: Is There a Place 
for Non-Capitalist Development? " In K. M. Jyrkti (ed) The Mechanism of 
Neo-Colonialism (Finnish Peace Research Association: Proceedings of the 
Nordic Seminar, 1974) p. 115. 
50 See J. K. Nyerere Ujamaa: Essays in Socialism (OUP Nairobi) 1968. 
51 O. Eze The Legal Status of Foreign Investments in East African 
Common Market, (Geneva - Institut Universitaine de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales/Leiden, Sijthoff) 1975 Chapter 2. 
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traditions, Westernisation and Islamization52. The efficacy of any theory 
or institution 'imported' into Africa is predicated upon its capacity to 
bridge the gap between contemporary circumstances and ancient values 
and ancestral traditions. 
In practice, the predilection of several African scholars for socialism has 
influenced the adoption of the dogma by many regimes. This has 
invariably led to the suppression of certain fundamental human rights at 
the alter of the socialist ideology of the State. In the final analysis, 
socialism does not provide an adequate theory for the protection of the 
individual and the positive fulfilment of his needs. 
(iv) Sociological Jurisprudence and Modern Theories 
The approach of sociologists towards evolving a theory of human rights 
is based on the principle of "social engineering". The aim is to achieve 
an equitable protection of interests among prevailing moral sentiments 
and the subsisting social and economic conditions. 
Roscoe Pound proposed the universal recognition and protection of human 
ants, human demands and social interests through politically organised 
society with minimal sacrifice to the totality of interests53. The 
sociological school does not however address itself to the critical role 
played by the state in its interaction with the other competing interests 
in society54. Although the sociologists suggest a catalogue of "individual 
interests" in need of protection and provide empirical basis for the 
survey of rights, the theory has been criticized for not addressing the 
-------------------- 
52 
Ali A. Mazrui; The Africans: A Triple Heritage. (BBC Publications, 
London) 1986 p. 70. 
53 Alan Hurt, The Sociological Movement in Law (The MacMillan Press, 
London) 1978 pp. 11-30. 
54 Ibid 
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issue of priority of rights. Thus the anthropocentric theorists have 
55 
suggested an order of priority of "anthropocentric needs of planetary 
existence with justice" as the basis of the theory of human rights56 
The anthropocentric theory is based on the fulfilment of human rights 
with justice. Thus whereas other sociological theories are in need of a 
philosophy, the anthropocentric school is predicated on justice. 
Although the 'justice' is not defined by the anthropocentric theorists, an 
examination of John Rawls theory of justice 
57 
reveals that the latters 
principles of justice are arranged In a hierarchy that Is apparently 
incompatible with the formers priority of needs. Rawls principle of 
justice gives priority first to liberty, whereas, the anthropocentric 
theory regards liberty as secondary to the primary needs of survival and 
economic rights. However a reconciliation between these ostensibly 
conflicting priorities may be achieved by subscribing to Rawls' 
"difference principle" which is based on the egalitarian concept of 
distributive justice or social justice under which Individual liberty may 
be limited to further common good. 
-------------------- 
55 
S. P. Sinha "The Anthroprocentric Theory of International Law as a 
Basis for Human Rights"; Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law Vol 10, (1978) p. 497. 
56 The anthropocentric needs are classified as Primary Needs of air, 
food, water, procreation and the preservation of life; and the secondary 
needs of economic settlement, cultural enrichment and the achievement of 
intangible values such as freedoms and liberties. See S. P. Sinha Ibid. 
57 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, Clarendon) 1971 p. 187. For 
an analysis of Rawls theory see Scanlan, 'Rawls Theory of Justice'. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1973) p. 1020. 
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Without prejudice to the emerging modern human rights theories58 and 
the continuing tension between liberty and equality, we subscribe to the 
notion that a human rights theory should be predicated on the fulfilment 
of man's needs of his existence based on social justice59. By utilizing 
efficient empirical methods of sociological research, human needs can be 
adequately determined, unlike a priori theories and other analytical forms 
of jurisprudence. 
Secondly, an efficient human rights theory must produce a basis for the 
priority of rights and moral preferences as acknowledged by the social 
policy. 
Thirdly, such a theory should accommodate cultural relativity. We do 
not subscribe to the notion of culture as a universal Idea embodying 
universal and absolute value with its corollary being the adoption of a 
universal human culture as an absolute concept. It should be 
emphasised that the indiscriminatory application of liberal western or 
socialist theoretical conceptions of human rights to African countries is 
unrealistic60. The cultural relativist approach does not insulate social 
policies from the recognition of international human rights norms. In 
evolving, prescribing and applying the principles of international human 
rights adequate consideration should be given to the cultural relativity of 
-------------------- 
58 
These schools include: the Utilitarian School which emphasizes a 
maximixing and collectivizing principle that requires governments to 
maximise the total sum of the happiness of all their subjects as 
propounded by Jeremy Bentham. The main reservation regarding the 
utilitarian principles is that an individuals welfare and desires may be 
sacrifised for the increase in the aggregate satisfaction of welfare. 
Also, see the value-policy oriented approach based on the protection of 
human dignity as proposed by Professors McDougal, Laswell and Chen, 
In Human Rights and World Public Order (1980) op cit 
59 Some western jurists have criticized the social justice theory of human 
rights as too Inclusive. See J. Donnelly "Human Rights and Natural 
Rights. Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 4 (1982) p. 405. 
60 A. Pollis and P. Schwab "Human Rights: a Western Construct with 
Limited Applicability" in A. Pollis and P. Schwab (eds) op cit 
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man. This approach does not reduce the fact that all peoples have a 
keen sense of injustice in an indisociable blend of reason and empathy6l 
Consequently there is a need for international law to adopt a 
functionalist approach to the fulfilment of specific values and needs of 
individuals. 
Fourthly, human rights from an anthropocentric (viewpoint) are 
ontological in character and relate to man in historicity. In other words, 
human beings regardless of their culture were not transhistoric 
impersonal beings but dynamic individuals in the evolution of history. 
Therefore given the differences in historical experience and contemporary 
conditions, what was "natural" evolution in the west may not appear so 
62 "natural" in the developing world. 
The foregoing appraisal of some of the main theories of human rights has 
revealed that each one has certain apparent Inadequacies. While most of 
these theories have contributed to the development of human rights, they 
have failed to provide an acceptable conceptualization of human rights In 
the contemporary context. 
One's inclination Is towards a cross-cultural theory demonstrative of the 
naturalist, sociological, anthropological and justice theories. Eclectic 
though it may seem, this theory Is predicated upon the satisfaction of 
man's needs based on human dignity and social justice and development. 
This conceptualization recognises that all societies acknowledge the need 
to protect the human dignity Inherent In man. Thus, to preserve mans 
dignity, it is essential to fulfil his basic needs for subsistence. The 
concern for social justice and development as reflected in the theory, Is 
61 Edwin Cahn, TheSence of Injustice; An Anthropocentric View of Law 
(New York, New York University Press, 1949) pp. 22-27. 
62 A. Pollis and P. Schwab op cit p. 14. 
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based on the belief that it will enhance the recognition of protection of 
human rights, increase universal participation, encourage the provision 
of basic services and infrastructure through the recognition of economic 
and social rights, and provide adequate and vital procedures for the 
redress of wrongs against individuals and groups. 
A normative theory that encapsulates the foregoing characteristics will to 
a large extent provide the basis for accommodating the largely 
contrasting cultural and ideological conceptions of human rights. 
In the absence of a universally acknowledged normative theory of human 
rights, it is pertinent to address the need at least for a common 
consensus on what should constitute the minimum content of human 
rights. 
The content of international human rights spans several categories: civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural. In the human rights protection 
system there are: - 
a) Rights which ought to be enjoyed by all individuals 
independent of legislation. 
b) Rights that are not yet enjoyed but are accepted as ideals to 
be achieved, and 
63 
c) Limits on individual, group and government activities, 
While it Is not possible or necessary to define "human rights" as a 
collective term, there are however, minimal elements that are generally 
accepted as constituting the core of human rights. These elements are 
63 See generally: Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights in the Unites States 
and the World Community (Oxford University Press: New York) 1970. 
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embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is normally regarded as the 
pivot of the international system for the protection of human rights since 
it provides for human rights that are acknowledged by the international 
community. 
Essentially, the Universal Declaration reflects certain universally 
acknowledged principles. Although some provisions of the Declaration 
allow for flexible interpretations to suit particular ideological or socio- 
political views65, other provisions like those pertaining to personal 
freedoms do not allow for broad interpretations. 
From a jurisprudential standpoint, the Universal Declaration draws 
inspiration not only from the natural doctrine, but also from the 
positivist concept66. Ideologically, although the Declaration 
accommodates aspects of the socialists concepts of human rights, the 
Western Liberal doctrines of human rights are rather more extensively 
incorporated therein. A comparison between the socialist and western 
liberal concepts of human rights was achieved by the Declaration. 
Therefore, the Declaration is essentially a catalogue of principles 
characteristic of the systems of European civilisation and culture. 
----------------- -- 
64 Egun Schwelb "The International Court of Justice and the Human 
Rights Clauses" AJIL (April 1972) pp. 337-351. 
65 See articles 22 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
Ian Brownlie Basic Documents in International Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford) 1981. 
66 Third preambular paragraph of the Universal Declaration states that 
"it is essential that these rights should be protected by the rule of law". 
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Although most of these principles are not exclusively European67, the 
Declaration does not reflect African socio-cultural values and rules which 
considerably influence social relations and doctrinal concepts in the 
region. 
The following rights are generally considered to be the content of 
western notions of human rights. These rights which are mainly civil 
and political include: 
1) The right to life; 
2) protection against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; 
3) equality within the law; 
4) the right to effective remedy for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted (an individual) by the 
constitution or by the law; 
5) the right of fair trial; 
6) the right to leave and return to ones country; 
7) the right to nationality; 
8) the right to seek asylum; 
9) the right to property; 
10) freedom of thought. conscience and religion; 
11) the right to liberty. 
The content of economic, social and cultural rights evolved mainly by 
Eastern European statutes include the right to: 
-------------------- 
67 The fact that all African states have consistently subscribed to the 
principles of the Universal Declaration confirms this view. Adherence to 
the Declaration was reiterated in a solemn declaration issued by the OAU 
to mark its Tenth Anniversary in 1973. See the preamble and article 2 
(b) of the Charter of the OAU: (Appendix II post). See also Person 
Yves "L'OUA ou une deciennie d'epreuvres pour 1'unite". Revue Francais 
d'Etudes Politigue Africalnes No. 93 (Sept 1973) pp. 26-30. 
23 
1) work; 
2) equal pay for equal work; 
3) leisure and rest; 
4) a standard of living adequate for health and well-being of 
individuals and their families. 
5) equal accessibility to education on the basis of merit; 
6) freely participate in the cultural life of the community; 
7) a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms can be fully realised. 
The conservative western scholars recognise only the civil and political 
rights of individuals as human rights properly so called. According to 
this view human rights are concerned with what can and must be 
honoured now, not with what right is desirable to provide for In the 
future. The relegation of economic and social rights by conservative 
scholars on the basis that it would be impracticable to provide for them, 
cannot be justified. Firstly, the social and economic rights including the 
right to subsistence are as significant as civil and political rights68. 
Both groups of rights have a universal scope since the everyone is 
entitled to them, despite differentiations in the obligations imposed69. 
Secondly, we subscribe to the view that there is no general difference 
between both groups of rights whether based on their significance or on 
the scope of their correlative obligations. The Issue of priority of 
human rights cannot be determined solely on the basis of the stated 
group of rights since their significance may indeed vary as much within 
-------------------- 
68 Tom Paine. The Rights of Man (Everyman edn. London, Dent. 1969) 
p p. 246-56. 
69 The difference between civil and political rights and economic and 
social rights have been predicated upon the fact that the former can be 
held against everyone while the latter Imposes duties only on 
governments. Ibid. 
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the groups70. 
Furthermore the distinction between negative and positive rights does not 
provide an adequate criteria for determining the relative importance of 
human rights. For instance, the negative civil and political right to 
security for life may require a framework of "positive" measures - such 
as effective policing - before the right can be adequately enjoyed. On 
the other hand, the perceived positive right of subsistence may only 
require a "negative" measure - such as the removal of interference - in 
order to allow a person to provide for himself71. The absence of a 
universally acknowledged right to subsistence can be attributed to the 
western socio-economic and legal system, Influenced by schools 
advocating the primacy of civil and political rights that takes subsistence 
for granted. This attitude and the exploitative effects of the world 
financial system on Africa has fuelled the prevailing view in Africa that 
economic and social rights should take preference over civil and political 
rights. 
The Third World is regarded in some quarters as the crucible in which 
global consciousness of human rights is moulded because it is the centre 
of the anti colonial and development process in which the two streams of 
individualistic and social human rights flowing from the two worlds 
meet72. Alternative definitions of the core of human rights have thus 
been proferred by human rights specialists, sensitive to the ideological 
dualism in our world. 
-------------------- 
70 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign J" Policy (Princeton, Princeton University Press) 1980. p. 7. 
71 Ibid p. 35-45. f 
72 Fouad Ajami, Human Rights and World Order (New York Institute for 
World Order) 1978, pp. 28-29. Peter Berger "Are Human Rights 
Universal? " Commentary 64, No. 3 September 1977 No. 60-63. 
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Fouad Ajami in his monograph for the world order models project 
combines these concepts in his four sets of concerns to achieve "maximum 
feasible concerns": 
1) The right to survive hence the concern with the war system 
and nuclear weaponry. 
2) The right not to be subjected to torture. 
3) The condemnation of apartheid; It is acknowledged that other 
societies violate racial equality but South Africa is blatant 
and officially sanctioned and codified racism is particularly 
intolerable. 
4) The right to food73 
This view sees rights as both Inherent in the Individual and socially 
derived by development. Political freedoms are not possible without 
initial social development and conflicts are resolved in terms of the 
welfare of the society. However, the fault with Fouad Ajamis appraisal 
is that he does not seek a philosophical or legal foundation for his 
proposals; secondly his model does not seek to relate to the alleviation of 
man's misery in the poor societies of the Third World. 
Socialism and the control of individual rights in the interest of the 
whole, is increasingly becoming generally acceptable in the Third 
World74. In prescribing the minimum content of human rights such 
commentaries exclude the right to property, regarding it as a capitalist 
notion75. It is further suggested that principles should be classed 
------------- 
73 Ibid at p. 28. 
74 Richard Falk "Comparative Protection of Human Rights in Capitalist 
and Socialist Third World Countries", Universal Human Rights 1,2 
(April-June) 1979. R. Falk agrues that socialism is the appropriate 
ideology for development of the Third World. p. 28. 
75 Ibid at p. 26 URt"Oby 
Nary 
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under the "facilitative human rights" principle of self-determination as 
opposed to being regarded as inherent human rights. It is thus stated 
that "the acquisition and use of property cannot be said to be something 
that is inherent in a person. Since the appearance of peoples 
democracies, the specifically individualistic emphasis implied that the 
76 
right to property can no longer be said to be happily accepted" 
The validity of the above argument is questionable. From all evidence, 
the establishment of socialist democracies (albeit authoritarian or 
dictatorships) imply that the right to liberty and the freedoms of 
conscience, expression and assembly are no longer inherent rights. 
Furthermore, the principle of self-determination is based on the dynamics 
of choice and consent, inherent factors which are virtually non-existent 
in so called "peoples democracies". Indeed, the African Charter on 
Human & Peoples Rights does not support the foregoing argument since it 
77 specifically provides for the right to property. 
It is therefore submitted that the practice of identifying the minimum 
contents of human rights cannot ignore that the legal obligations of 
States under various international and regional human rights treaties. 
With regard to African States, the minimum content of human rights 
should consist of the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, without 
prejudice to the International Human Rights Instruments which each State 
has ratified. 
Consequently, in Identifying the minimum content of human rights the 
basic civil and political rights, and social and economic rights 
76 HWO Okoth-Ogendo National Implementation of International 
Responsibility, East African Law Journal Vol. 10 (1974) p. 3- 
77 Article 14, AFCHPR. 
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particularly the right to subsistence should be recognised. Thus the 
right to life, for instance, will be deprived of its meaning unless it is a 
right to subsistence as well as to security. We thus propose to maintain 
this standpoint on the basic interdependence and interrelation of rights 
throughout this thesis. 
Admittedly, the fulfilment of some of the rights protected by these 
instruments, especially the social and economic rights, will depend upon 
the ability of the states to provide for them. In relation to the civil and 
political rights, K. Vasak observes that the protection of such rights 
cannot be appreciated without taking into account the objective conditions 
created by the underdevelopment of the African Countries. 
78 
Such arguments assume that there are inherent conditions in Africa that 
inhibit the effective protection of human rights on the continent. Such 
conditions include the oft-misconceived factor of the absence of the 
notion of human rights in traditional pre-colonial African societies, the 
retrogressive and repressive effects of colonial institutions in Africa - 
ethnicity, racialism, and militarism. In the following section we propose 
to examine the nature of the traditional African legal systems with a view 
to establishing the existence of the notion of human rights and human 
dignity in traditional Africa. 
----------------- -- 
78 K. Vasak "Les Droits De L'Homme Et L'Afrique (Pour une Convention 
des Droits de L'Homme)" Revue Juridigue et Politigue (April-June 1967) 
p. 274. 
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(c) Human Rights in Pre-Colonial Traditional Africa79. 
The purpose of the analysis is to examine the concept of human rights in 
pre-colonial traditional African societies, establish its authenticity and 
reasons why it differs from the western liberal and eastern socialist 
concepts of human rights. Furthermore, the examination of human rights 
in the traditional African context should help us appreciate the rationale 
of the authors of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(AFCHPR) in capturing the essence of traditional African values80. 
Due to the dearth of legal material available in this field, our method of 
research has been based primarily on deductions from anthropological, 
historical and other non-legal materials that reflect the level of social 
formations and consequently the evolution of African legal system. We 
have also attempted to derive the actual content of human rights in 
traditional Africa by analysing the customary laws and practices of 
selected African ethnic groups and societies. We have found it 
necessary to examine some colonial legislations and practices that either 
confirmed or abrogated practices that existed before and during colonial 
rule in Africa with a view of assessing the level of human rights 
protection in traditional Africa. 
The preponderance of recent African anthropological and historical 
treatises reveal that traditional African societies had different systems of 
authority and administration of justice, social structures and religious 
beliefs and practices. Nevertheless, these structures enhanced social 
harmony and political equilibrium within their respective social units. 
79 By pre-colonial-traditional Africa, we are referring mainly to the 
period before 1830 when European interest in Africa consisted mainly of 
slave trading posts, Portugese enclaves and provision outposts. The 
French annexation of Algeria in 1830 was the first European claim to land in Africa. 
80 The fourth preambular paragraph of the ARCHPR reaffirms "The 
virtues of the historical tradition and the values of African civilization 
which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples rights". 
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Although Africa is inhabited by polyethnic societies, there are similarities 
in essential matters as reflected in the customary laws of the Yorubas, 
Bantus, Sudanese, Ashantis and Kongolese. 
81 
Nineteenth century western writers on Africa were sceptical about the 
existence of laws on the continent. They could not distinguish between 
law and custom. Legal, moral and religious rules were regarded as 
"interwoven into a single texture of customary behaviour"82. Modern 
anthropologists were however able to ascertain the existence of legal 
systems among the 'primitive' peoples of Africa83. The controversy over 
the existence of legal systems in traditional Africa may to some extent be 
seen as one between lawyers and sociologists and anthropologists. For 
instance, Elias84 took Evans-Pritchard to task over the latter observation 
that "in the strict sense, the Nuer had no law"85. However, further 
reading of Evans-Pritchard does not imply that the Nuer were a lawless 
people86. The difficulty here seems to be the apparent absence of 
coincidence in the formal criteria for defining law, between the purists 
and the anthropologist. While Evans-Pritchard's denial of the existence 
of law among the Nuer was based primarily on the absence of formal 
judicial institutions, Elias' view is predicated on the definition of law as 
"87 the body of rules which are recognized as obligatory by its members 
-------------------- 
81 
T. O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester 
University Press, 1956) p. 3. 
82 D. Lloyd op cit p. 566. 
83 See M. Gluckman, The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern 
Rhodesia (Manchester University Press, 1967). 
84 T. O. Elias, op cit p. 31-32. 
85 E. Evans-Pritchard. The Nuer (London OUP) 1940 p. 162. 
86 Ibid p. 168. 
87 T. O. Elias op cit p. 55. 
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The main source of African law is custom. Custom prescribes the rules 
of inheritance, the obligations of kinship, marriage rules, compensation 
due for killing a man and so forth. Therefore, the subscription to and 
the acceptance by the majority of the members of a community of such 
rules suffices to regard them as laws. 
African societies with centralized political systems tended to have a more 
developed body of legal principles and judicial techniques than those with 
more or less rudimentary political organisations. In the former, there 
were usually hierarchically graded courts ranging from the smaller chiefs 
to the Kings Court, with well defined machinery for the due enforcement 
of judicial decisions. In the latter, rules rather than rulers, functions 
rather than institutions characterize their judicial organisation88. 
Furthermore, the efficacy of rules was more profound In atomized or 
simple societies. Highly exact rules were more prevalent in simple 
societies than in sophisticates ones, because such exactness operated to 
maximise social efficiency over 'primitive' conditions. 
89 
It is submitted that whether African societies were centralized or 
atomised, they invariably met three necessary ingredients or universal 
aspects of law, namely: rules, procedures of inquiry or adjudication and 
modes of redress or enforcement. Indeed C. K. Meek contends that: 
"The mentality of 'primitive' peoples does not differ from our 
own, as any European knows who has lived in close quarters 
with 'natives'. It is not to be expected therefore that their 
norms of conduct should diverge very profoundly from ours. 
And so, what are crimes and torts to us are for the most 
part crimes or torts to them... their 'gentlemen' ours and 
-------------------- 
88 Ibid p. 30. 
89 Richard A. 'Posner "A Theory of Primitive Society with Special 
Reference to Primitive Law" Journal of Law and Economics (1980) vol 23: 1 
p. 31. 
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ours theirs"90 
Many western commentators have used their own institutionalised systems 
and laws as a universal yardstick for measuring or validating African 
values and rules, and finding no similarities between the two systems, 
condemn the latter as inferior or even non-existent. Regrettably, this 
attitude has permeated into the sphere of human rights in Africa. 
Representative of this approach is J. Donnelly who states that "human 
rights, in the sense in which Westerners understand the terms - namely, 
rights (entitlements) held simply by virtue of being a human being - are 
quite foreign to Africans - approaches to human dignity91. He argues 
further that most non-western cultural and political traditions lack not 
92 
only the practise of human rights but the very concept. 
If we are to accept human rights as values and attributes which are 
Inherent in men and women by virtue of their membership of the human 
race, Donnelley's approach Is faulted. Although this argument Is based 
on the natural law conceptions of human rights, Donnelly believes In the 
referral of human rights to strict established norms of positive law. In 
any case, an examination of the traditional African customary values and 
rules will reveal that both naturalist and positivist notions underline the 
African concept of human rights. 
-------------------- 
90 C. K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe (London, OUP; 
1937) p. xiii. 
91 Jack Donnelly "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic 
Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights. American Political 
Science Review (1982) Vol. 76(2) p. 303. 
92 Ibid 
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As a general rule, in traditional Africa. human rights existed within the 
context of the social group93. Whereas in the European context, human 
rights are encapsulated in a catalogue of principles essentially favouring 
the individual against groups to whom they are opposed94. Thus person 
had in traditional African society is intelligible only in the group and not 
against it, unlike in the west, individualism is expressed against the 
group. Herein lies one of the main differences between traditional 
African and Western conceptions of human rights. The African 
conception derives its validity from each societies acceptance and 
observance of basic principles and social values. 
One of the early proponents of the view that concern for rights was part 
of the pre-colonial experience of Black Africans was Gboboh Cuguano of 
Ajumaku (now Ghana). In his work published two years before the 
French Revolution, the writer said of Africans taken away from Guinea 
that their "freedom and rights were so dear to them as those principles 
are to other people... " and as regards the Ethiopians the "freedom and 
liberty of enjoying their own privileges burn with a much zeal and 
fervour as in any other inhabitant of the globe°95 
Cuguano's observation reflects the fact that the law of freedom is 
universal, as much as it underlines the existence of that insatiable urge 
by man to undermine his fellow man. 
-------------------- 
93 
E. Zvogbo "A Third World View" in D. Kammers and A. Loescher 
(eds) Human Rights and American Foreign Policy (1979) p. 92-93. 
94 Lakshman Marasinghe "Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in 
Africa" in C. E. Welch and R. I. Meltzer (eds) Human Rights and 
Development in Africa (State University of New York Preps, Albany) 
1984; p. 33. 
95 Cited In Thomas L. Hodgkin "The relevance of Western Ideas for New 
African States" In J. Roland Pennock (ed) Self-Government In 
Modernizing Nations (Englewood Cliffs M. J.: Prentice-Hall) 1964 p. 51 
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Although the majority of African societies were communal and egalitarian, 
the continent had its fair share of feudal socio-political formations which 
produced tyrannical rulers who suppressed the rights of their subjects. 
The Kiganda system of Baganda, now part of Uganda, probably 
exemplifies traditional African feudalism. The Kabaka, was the absolute 
ruler controlling every sphere of life. However, history reveals that 
many a Kabaka were killed by the Baganda in defence of their rights and 
96 freedoms 
Furthermore, some traditional African societies perpetuated practices that 
violated human rights. These practices include slavery, human sacrifice, 
trial by ordeal, stocks for offenders, killing of twins under the 
superstitious belief that they were purveyors of ill-luck. There was the 
"OSU" system, among the Ibos, which was a caste system epitomized by 
the untouchables. 
However, the dynamism of traditional African society has ensured the 
evolution of traditional laws that have either completely eradicated or at 
lease discouraged most of these practices. In this regard, Davidson 
states that: 
"Borrowed as they often were from many currents and cross- 
currents of thoughts that had fertilized and deepened 
civilizations elsewhere, African peoples had moved by their 
own dynamic of advance, found their own way forward, 
worked out their own solutions. Stubbornly, slowly, they 
had gone across the lonely years. Only where slave trade 
made its worst ravages were they altogether stopped and 
their achievement renggred sterile; and much of the far 
interior was spared... " 
96 Lateef Adegbite, "African Attitudes to the Protection of Human 
Rights" International Protection of Human Rights (Proceedings of the 7th 
Nobel Symposium, Oslo, September 25-27 1967) p. 70 
97 Basil Davidson, Old Africa Rediscovered (London, Longman Group 
Ltd) 1970 p. 255. 
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The conception of human rights in traditional Africa derives its validity 
from a set of social values intrinsic in basic principles upheld by a 
substantial majority of a given society. These principles are reflected in 
the customary laws and practices of the given societies. Our research in 
the field of human rights protection in pre-colonial traditional Africa 
reveals the following rights were recognised98; 
(i) the equality of man 
(ii) the right to life 
Oll) freedom to receive justice 
(iv) freedom of thought, speech and beliefs 
(v) freedom of associations and 
NO freedom to enjoy property 
These rights and freedoms were based upon the principles of "respect"99 
and "participation" 100, they therefore existed mostly within the collective 
context. The rationale for the traditional African concept of human 
rights Is social harmony in which both individual and collective rights 
are recognized. The individual's rights are Inter-woven with his duties 
and functions in the society. The emphasis placed on duties and the 
-------------------- 
98 Keba Mbaye comes to a similar conclusion In listing the human rights 
that existed in pre-colonial Africa, namely: the right of life, freedom of 
expression, freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of 
movement, the right to work and the right to education. However 
Professor 0. Eze has questioned the validity of Mbaye's claim that the 
rights to life and the right to work and other freedoms existed under 
feudal African socio-political systems. See Keba Mbäye "Organisation De 
L'Unite' Africalne", "Les Dimensions Internationales Des Droits De 
L'Homme", Paris UNESCO, 1978, pp. 652-4. See also O. Eze, Human 
Rights in Africa op cit p. 12-13. 
99 Africant place a very high premium on "respect" for elders and 
societal norms, values and beliefs. The AFCHPR specifically Imposes the 
duty on the Individual to "respect his parents" and "to preserve and 
strengthen positive African values" - Article 29(1)and(7). 
100 The "participation of all members of the society was an essential 
attribute of the traditional system. Because the Individual Is absorbed 
in the group. See Keba Mbaye op cit p. 650-1. 
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rights of the collective ensures the conceptual contradistinction between 
western notions and traditional African notions of human rights. This 
fact does not however diminish the existence of human rights in 
traditional Africa. 
To borrow a passage from the Privy Councils pronouncement in the 
celebrated case of : 
Re Southern Rhodesia: 101 
"Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organisations 
that their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are 
not to be reconciled with the Institutions or the legal ideas of 
civilized society... On the other hand there are Indigenous 
peoples whose legal conceptions, though differently developed 
are hardly less precise than our own. When once they have 
been studied and understood they a% 2no less enforceable than rights arising under English Law" 
Indeed, it is difficult to find any class of individuals lacking both in 
103 rights and duties under African law We thereby propose to establish 
the existence of the foregoing list of rights in traditional Africa by 
examining some traditional customs, values and practices in Africa. 
(i) Equality 
It Is pertinent to ascertain the exact position of the individual in 
traditional African society because only through such a course can we 
assess the extent of his rights and duties. 
101 (1919) AC 211. 
102 Ibid p. 233-4. 
103 A. N. Allot "Legal Personality in African Law" M. Gluckman (ed) 
Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law. (OUP. London) 1969 
p. 184. Professor Allot states that even slaves were rarely rightless and 
In some societies like the Hausa, they could become generals or 
administrators. Among the Ashanti injuries to slaves were actionable by 
the master or even by the slave himself against the master. p. 184. 
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African societies were basically communes. The observance of equality of 
individual members of the community was evident. However individual 
rights and duties vary within the type of social organisation and the 
degree of cohesion already achieved. 
In societies with a hierarchical system, where political organisation was 
relatively well developed, much as there were tendencies for some kings 
of chiefs to be despotic and circumscribe the rights of individuals, 
abuses of power were checked by carefully devised mechanisms. The 
Ashanti's of Ghana provide an example of a political system characterised 
by checks and balances which maintained procedures for removing rulers 
who violated the laws -of the land and disregard the rights of the 
104 
people 
The system of clans and kinship groups also maintained the equality of 
members and protected their rights. Among the Bari of Sudan, for 
instance, a chief who acted arbitrarily would be checked by members of 
his own family or clan105 It is therefore evident that individuals in 
traditional African communities had the right to select their leaders and 
depose them through methods specifically evolved to ensure equality and 
protect individual dignity and welfare. 
In less politically organised and atomised ethnic societies, equality of 
individuals was more pronounced. It should however be noted that 
equality here, is viewed from the context of each kindred group or age 
group. For example, among the Isos, members of each kindred or age 
group had equal rights and performed similar duties. The age-grade 
organisation was based on the social significance of seniority since elders 
-------------------- 
104 K. A. Busla, Africa in Search of Democracy (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger) 1967; p. 112. 
105 C. K. Meek op cit p. 198. 
37 
were regarded as the guardians of social values of morality. The 
concept of the age group ensured the spirit of brotherhood and equality 
within the society. 
Nevertheless, according to J. Nyerere, traditional societies were not 
devoid of inequalities; the African statesman contends that: 
"There was not complete equality; some Individuals within the 
family and some families within the clan and tribe could own 
more than others, but in general they acquired this through 
extra efforts of their own and the social system was such 
that in time of need it was available to all. Inequalities 
existed but they were tempered by comparable family or 
social responsibilities and they could never become gross and 
offerjfive to social equality which was the basis of communal 
life" 
The position of women vis a vis men in the traditional African context 
has been consistently portrayed as slavish and depressed 
107. This view 
ignores the social, economic and political roles women play in Africa. 
The pre-eminence and predominance of women was secured in matrilineal 
and matrilocal systems of kinship in Africa. Communalism in its essence, 
prescribes duties for individuals within each constituent unit irrespective 
of gender. Although certain roles were reserved for women depending 
on the prevailing social norms. 
The major role of women in most traditional communities was in the 
preservation of the family, therefore, the values which almost all 
societies attach to this role is reflected in the specific rights enjoyed by 
women. Customary law guaranteed the most rights for women in divorce, 
for instance where marriage breakdowns are issues for negotiations 
-------------------- 
106 Julius Nyerere op cit p. 108. 
107 United Nations Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian 
Affairs, Law and Status of Women in Togo: Discrimination of Women in 
Togo (Prepared by Dagadzi, 1977) p. 295. 
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between two families108. 
It must be conceded that the treatment of the woman sometimes goes 
against the grain of equality, however it has been observed that "her 
treatment is one thing, her legal status another, her capabilities and 
extent of her labours belong again to a distinct categoryº"109 
Consequently, the status of the woman in traditional African society is 
respected by virtue of the role she plays which more often than not is 
deemed equally important, if not more than the males. 
In the area of property rights, the rights of women or indeed men to 
property In land arises from and Is maintained by the fulfilment of 
obligations to others In society110, These obligations, however derive 
from membership of the society. For example access to land can only be 
denied on account of loss of membership of a given society. Viewed from 
this standpoint, the argument that traditional African societies exclude 
women from accruing or Inheriting land cannot be a symbol of Inferior 
status or in anyway a form of chauvinism. 
The principle of equality is further exemplified in the status of children 
born out of wedlock in some African customs. The children born out of 
wedlock have equal rights as those born in wedlock. A Nigerian High 
Court in Phillip v Phillip 
ill 
was asked to determine the question of the 
rights an "illegitimate son" under Yoruba Customary Law. The court 
108 Rhoda Howard "Womens Rights in English Speaking Sub-Saharan 
Africa" C. E. Welch and R. Meltzer (ed) Human Rights and Development 
in Africa. op cit R. Howard is of the opinion that despite the existence 
of other customs affecting the personal freedoms of women In marriage. 
many women prefer to live under those customs. 
109 R. M. Lowrie "Primitive Society" (London: Routledge) 1912, p. 178. 
110 Max Cluxman, Ideas In Barotse Jurisprudence (Yale University 
Press) 1965. 
111 Phillip v Phillip, 18 Nigerian Law Reports 102. 
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held that upon intestacy, of the deceased father, under Yoruba 
Customary Law, an illegitimate son can succeed to his father's property 
equally with the legitimate sons. Furthermore, research has also 
established that the traditional societies of Ethiopia hardly knew 
112 discrimination against illegitimate children 
Traditional African custom applies the concept of equality to the 
treatment of aliens. However the prerequisite is that the stranger or 
alien must have been introduced to the head of the clan or community 
and must have resided with his host for a reasonable period within which 
his decorum must justify suitability for membership of the group113 
When he meets the criteria, he becomes a member of the group and is 
automatically subject to the laws and customs as well as the privileges 
and responsibilities of the group114 Traditional African humanitarian 
115 values underlined the treatment accorded to refugees 
In summation, it is evident that every individual in traditional African 
community is born with a certain status relative to all members of his 
community. This is not a personal status as obtains in an individualistic 
society and does not connote rank, but reciprocal obligations and 
benefits which he incurs as a member of the community. The customary 
rules and norms were applied to maintain equality of members of each 
community. An analysis of the existence of specific rights in traditional 
-------------------- 
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Brun-Otto Bryde The Politics and Sociology of African Legal 
Development. (Alfred Metzner Verlag GmbH: Frankfurt am Main: 1976) 
p. 113. 
113 T. 0. Elias op cit p. 106. 
114 C. Mojekwu, International Human Rights: The African Perspective, 
J. L. Nelson and U. M. Green (eds) International Human Rights: 
Contemporary: Issues (Publishing Group New York) 1980 p. 87. 
115 G. O. Oguntomisin and Toyin Falola "Refugees in Yorubaland in the 
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p. 175. 
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African Communities will reveal the equal protection of membership 
rights. 
(ii) The Right to Life 
As in all spheres of the traditional African socio-economic life, the 
community is responsible for protecting and maintaining the life of the 
group. Consequently the community maintains respect for the right to 
life of its members by ensuring the observance of customary rules and 
values which punish the arbitrary deprivation of life. 
Although homicide is generally regarded as a crime in traditional Africa, 
the customary laws and practices prescribed varying penalties for such 
offences. 
Among the Iteso of Uganda for instance, blood money is payable by the 
offender to the heirs of the person killed in all cases of homicide in 
which the offender is not executed 
116 Similarly, the Baganda of 
Uganda settled most homicide or murder cases by the imposition of fines; 
and they hardly imposed the death sentence 
117 
In his study of the Bemba of Zambia, A. L. Epstein observed that: 
"The life principle is a sacred value which finds its highest 
embodiment in the whole human person, which ought not 
therefore to be diminished, save in special circumstances. It 
is this basic postulate... which accounts for the overriding 
concern that the [Bemba traditional] courts display In regard 
to physical violence to the person, and leads to the principle 
that one is liable In damages for any act which has as a 
-------------------- 
116 J. Lawrence, The Iteso (London: OUP) p. 257. 
117 J. Roscoe The Baganda: Their Customs and Beliefs (London: 
MacMillan) 1911; p. 266-7. 
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direct consequence the diminishing of another person, even 
though the aE18itself may have been prompted by that others 
prior wrong" 
The right to life is deeply rooted in the traditions of the Ibo of Nigeria. 
The right to life is predicated here, as in other communities on 
traditional religious beliefs. Among the Ibo, the act of murder was an 
offence against Ala119 and consequently it was the responsibility of the 
whole community to see that steps prescribed by custom are taken to 
purify the earth of such abomination120. The act of suicide was also 
121 
condemned and abominable offence among the Ibo 
The Ashanti of Ghana regarded murder and suicide as "oman Akyi wadie" 
which literally translated means "th ings hateful to the tribe". Such acts 
were regarded as sins or taboos of which the central authority was 
bound to take swift official notice in order to avert the vengeance of 
certain supernatural powers upon those whose primary duty It is to 
protect their interests and punish the infringement of time honoured law 
122 
and custom. 
The customs of the Nuer123, Basuto124 and Kamba125 reflect their sacred 
respect for life. 
-------------------- 
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A. L. Epstein, Injury and Liability in Africa: Customary Law in 
Zambia, in Max Gluckman (ed) Ideas and Procedures in African 
Customary Law (London: OUP) 1969, p. 293. 
119 Ala (The Earth Diety) is one of the high gods worshipped by the 
Ibos. 
120 C. K. Meek op cit p. 203-9. 
121 Ibid p. 213. 
122 R. S. Rattray: Ashanti Law and Constitution (London OUP) 1929, 
pp. 294-296. 
123 P . P. Howell, Manual of Nuer Law, (London OUP) 1954, pp. 69-70. 
124 M. Ashton, The Basuto (London OUP) 1952 pp. 253-6. 
125 D. J. Penwill, Kamba Customary Law (East African Literature 
Bureau - Nairobi) 1951, p. 78-80. 
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The foregoing examination of customary rules and practices establishes 
the fact that respect for life in traditional Africa is governed not only 
by negative rules but by positive responsibilities to respect life. 
Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that the establishment of the right to 
life merely requires legislation against murder126. However, positive 
aspects of the concern for human life are revealed in the existence and 
development of traditional health care institutions which were 
127 
supplemented by psychological dependence on some form of deity. 
The duty to respect and preserve life is based ab initio on human 
dignity and fortified by the communitarian spirit, customary law and the 
sociological sanctions of the supernatural, religious and other 
metaphysical forces. It has indeed been observed by some 
anthropologists that the dwindling respect for life in some African 
128 
communities is due to contacts with western civilization. 
(iii) The Right to Receive Justice 
The right to receive justice is one of the main pillars of traditional 
African society. The protection of this r ight was ensured by customary 
laws and well defined rules procedure for settling disputes. The notion 
of due process of law as a corrolary of the right to receive justice is 
adequately reflected in indigenous laws. Professor Gluckman's testimony 
is very instructive: 
-------------------- 
126 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Politics (Cambridge 
University Press) 1086, p. 12. 
127 O. C. Eze "Right to Health as a Human Right in Africa" In 
Proceedings of Workshop on "Right to Health as a Human Right" (ed) 
R. J. Dupuy (Sijthoff and Noordoff, Alphen aan den Rijn) 1979, p. 80. 
128 C. Dundas "Native Laws of Some Bantu Tribes of East Africa" 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1921) p. 51. 
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"African Legal Systems... are founded on principles of the 
reasonableness of man, responsibility, negligence, direct and 
circumstantial evidence etc. African judges and laymen apply 
these principles lgg2ially to a variety of situations in order 
to achieve justice" 
Justice is achieved through the application of customary rules, 
procedures of inquiry and adjudication, modes of redress and 
enforcement. Since the existence of customary laws is not in doubt, the 
right to receive justice is thus predicated upon the existence of efficient 
procedures of inquiry and adjudication and adequate modes of redress 
and enforcement. 
There were two main types of socio-political systems in traditional Africa. 
Firstly, societies with hierarchical or centralized authority which 
130 
possessed administrative and judicial institutions Secondly, the 
atomized societies with decentralized authority which lacked both 
131 administrative machineries and constituted judicial institutions 
Anthropological research on centralized societies like the Haya132, 
133 134,135 Sukuma, Lozi and Tswana reveal the existence of courts - 
properly so called - which had chiefs (judges), assessors, and expert 
witnesses. These institutions possessed detailed rules of procedure and 
systems of appeal that guaranteed the right of the individual to receive 
justice. 
-------------------- 
129 Dr. Max Gluckmans article to "The Observer" July 15,1951. 
130 For instance, the Sukuma, Haya, Lozi and Tswana ethnic groups. 
131 For example, the Arusha, Tiv and Ibo ethnic groups. 
132 M. Cory and M. M. Hartnoll; Customary . Law of the Haya (Lund 
Humphries for the International African Institute) 1945, pp. 236-241. 
133 M. Cory, Sukuma Law and Custom (London OUP) 1953 pp. 9-11. 
134 M. Gluckman The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern 
Rhodesia, (Manchester University Press) 1955; pp. 6-15. 
135 I. Schapera; A Handbook of Tswana Laws and Custom (London: 
OUP) 1938 pp . 279-283 . 
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In the atomized or acephalous societies such as the Arusha136' Tiv137 
138 
and Ibo, less formal procedures for dispute settlement were employed. 
They adopted the moot method which was simpler, more arbitral and 
conciliatory than the formal procedures of centralized societies. 
139 Similarly, in some centralized societies, the informal or arbitrative 
mode of procedure was adopted. 
Accessibility to the forms of justice or courts were hardly impeded by 
140 formal requirements of fees for hearing cases 
The rules of adjudication in most traditional African societies - both 
centralized and atomised - observed the principle of 'audi alteram 
artem'. For instance, according to a popular Yoruba idiom "wicked and 
Iniquitous is he who decides a case upon the testimony of one party to 
it". The right to legal representation was also available in most 
141 
societies lt must however be emphasized that legal representation 
did not vitiate the conciliatory approach to dispute settlement because 
the "champions at law" were not paid advocates of independent litigants 
-------------------- 
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Kegan Paul) 1963, pp. 188-203. 
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P. Bohannon, Justice and Judgement among the Tiv, (OUP London) 
1957, pp. 160-169. 
138 M. M. Green, Ibo Village Affairs (Sidgewick and Jackson, London) 
1948, pp. 206-110. 
139 J. M. Beattie "Informal Judicial Activity in Bunyoro" Journal of 
African Administration (Ministry of Overseas Development) Vol. 9 No. 4 
pp. 118-195. 
140 According to Bruno Gutmann, among the Chagga of Kilimanjaro, no 
fees were paid at Lower Courts. However in appeal to the Chiefs Courts 
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Gutmann, Das Recht de Dschagga (Munich 1926) (English Translation by 
A. M. Nagler, Human Relations Area Studies Files - New Haven; Yale University Press) pp. 529-530. 
141 T. O. Elias op cit p. 240-41. 
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but legal guardians142 
Despite the absence of modern technical rules of evidence and a trained 
judiciary, most judgements were based primarily on the merits of the 
143 
case and the application of customary rules of evidence It is 
interesting to note that most customary rules of evidence disregard 
144 hearsay 
The execution of decisions was probably more effective in centralized 
societies where the existence of the institutionalized military and 
administrative machinery ensured the enforcement of the will of the 
community as expressed in judgements. The enforcement of the decisions 
of presiding elders in the informal forums of atomized societies were 
dependent mainly on social coercion through the family, clan or age 
145 
grade 
The informal or arbitral method of administration of justice was the 
dominant practice in traditional Africa and was essentially predicated on 
the preservation of peace and homogeneity of Interest. The right to 
receive justice was guaranteed in traditional African communities because 
crimes and civil wrongs were in general regarded as disturbances to the 
social to the social equilibrium and treatment was therefore concerned 
fundamentally with restoring the 'status quo ante'. 
-------------------- 
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(iv) Freedom of Though, Speech and Beliefs 
These freedoms existed in traditional African societies and in forms not 
dissimilar to western notions. These societies protected the right to 
participate in debates, discussions, and in the taking of decisions by 
146 
consensus Lord Hailey describes the position thus: 
"African sentiment attached special importance to the due 
observance of the procedure by which all members of the 
community concerned are able to have some 19ice in determining issues which are of major interest to it" . 
The Ashanti of Ghana provide an example of a political system 
characterized by fora where discussions were open and those who were 
148 in opposition had no fear of "being punished for their stand" 
It is oft stated that freedom of thought in traditional societies was 
restricted by the influence of myths and the supernatural149 We 
believe that, myths and rituals are symbolic values that uphold the social 
order and encourage thought as opposed to obedience exacted by the 
secular sanction of force. Furthermore it has been observed that 
"myths, dogmas, rituals and beliefs make the social system intellectually 
tangible and coherent to an African and enable him to think and feel 
150 
about it" 
-------------------- 
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Y. Khushalani "Human Rights in Africa & Asia" Human Rights Law 
Journal Vol. 4 No. 3 1983 p. 418. 
147 Lord Halley "Hative Administration in British Territories" Part IV 
London HMSO 1951 p. 2. 
148 K. Busia op cit p. 112. 
149 E. S. Hartland Primitive Law (London Methuen) 1924 p. 138. 
150 M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (OUP, 
London) 1940, p. 17. 
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The freedom of expression was basically recognised in traditional 
societies. Among the Yorubas, for instance, the freedom of expression 
was assumed subject to social norms of courtesy and respect for elders. 
Some scholars have identified the "principle of respect" for elders as a 
very real limitation to the freedom of speech among the Yorubas151, We 
submit that the principle of respect is, strictly speaking, not a 
restriction on the freedom of speech, rather it is a normative factor 
facilitating the freedom, through the usage of customs and non- 
derogatory language particularly when addressing elders. The principle 
of respect curtails the potential abuse of the freedom of speech and not 
the freedom itself. Thus the principle does not preclude criticism of the 
policies or actions of elders however such criticism must avoid 
discourteous or deprecating language. 
In traditional societies, free speech was exercised publicly and at large 
community meetings, chiefs' courts and privately at family council 
meetings152. Limitations to freedom of speech were rare except in 
circumstances where statements threaten the social equilibrium. In such 
cases, the issue was subject to the adjudication or conciliatory 
procedures of the community, which in any event accords the person 
summoned an opportunity to justify his statement. 
We can therefore deduct from the foregoing that the limitations on 
freedom of speech in modern societies do not differ radically from those 
of tradit ional African communities. It has been acknowledged elsewhere, 
that the significance of freedom of expression in pre-colonial African 
societies is enhanced by the concer n for civil liberties and political 
-------------------- 
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L. Marasinghe "Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights In Africa" In 
C. E. Welch and R. Meltzer (eds) Human Rights and Development in 
Africa (State University of New York Press: Albany) 1984, p. 37. 
152 K. Busaa op cit p. 22-30. 
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153 rights which was an integral part of those communities 
The freedom of belief was more widely expressed in the political field 
than in the religious context. Adherence to the common religion of a 
community was not coerced by the legal machinery but by mystical forces 
154 Therefore non-believers in the prevailing religious practice in a 
given community are not coerced to worship but are left to the dire 
consequences of the supernatural. Where a particular community or 
ethnic group has a variety of gods, demi-gods, totems and tutelary 
spirits, individuals clearly had the freedom of belief or choice of 
155 
religion . 
In the socio-political context the traditional society was basically 
communal and no important decision affecting the community as a whole 
could be taken without a prior debate in public assemblies which were a 
156 common feature of indigenous African systems Decisions could not be 
taken without some form of prior consultation with counsellors or other 
representatives of people, especially elders who were the repository of 
wisdom and tradition. This practice was one of the main characteristics 
of atomised societies, such as the Basuto, Kamba and Ibo. In 
Basutoland for Instance, customary legislation took place at public 
meetings called 'pitso' to which all adult males were summoned for general 
-------------------- 
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Thomas L. Hodgkin, The Relevance of Western Ideas for New African 
States J. R. Pennock (ed) Self Government in Modernizing Societies 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey Prentice-Hall) 1964 p. 53. 
154 K. S. Carlston Social, Theory and African Tribal Organizations: The 
Development of Socio-Legal Theory (University of Illinois Press, Chicago) 
1968 p. 108. 
155 Keba Mbaye Background paper to The United Nations Seminar on the 
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discussions157. The dynamics of democracy was fully accepted and 
recognised, thus the distribution of power was made easier by the 
observance of the freedom of expression. 
Freedom of expression in traditional communities therefore had its 
corollary in the right to participate in the political system. The failure 
of many a colonial government to recognise the existence of these rights 
158 in the traditional society context gave rise to many problems 
With regard to the traditional socio-political institutions and practices, 
the colonial administrators may no doubt have been discouraged because 
they constitute an "extraordinarily complex pattern of reciprocal 
interaction between the rulers and the ruled, permitting each element 
considerable leverage for influencing the behaviour of the other"59. 
However, the labyrinth of customary laws and practices can be unfolded 
to reveal the existence of the basic freedoms of thought, expression and 
belief which ensure social harmony and the efficacy of the political 
process, and establish cogniscability of legislative decisions in traditional 
African societies. 
-------------------- 
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M. Ashton The Basuto (London, Stevens) 1953 Ashton provides 
several examples of 'pitso' decisions including the 1888 prohibition of 
marriage (cattle) payment; pre 1840 abolition of death penalty for theft, 
and legal execution for sorcery. p. 216. 
158 For instance the 1927 Ibo womens riot in the colonial Eastern 
Protectorate of Nigeria was due partly to the imposition of an artificial 
channel of Native Courts operated by "Warrant Chiefs" arbitrarily 
appointed by the Colonial Administrators. According to Dr. Meek (then, 
the Anthropologist to the Colonial Government of Nigeria) the riots could 
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expression" C. K. Meek op cit p. ix. 
159 R. F. Weisfelder "The Decline of Human Rights in Lesotho: An 
Evaluation of Domestic and External Deterrents" A Quarterly Journal of Opinion Vol. 6 (Winter 1976) p. 22. 
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(v) Freedom of Association 
Freedom of association was recognised and protected in traditional 
African communities as reflected in the variety of associations which 
flourished. These associations include cultural societies, age groups160, 
occupational and trade associations, and those protecting occult 
161 
practices 
The freedom of association was much more significant in the context of 
kinship and family systems. The community recognised the right to 
associate freely within ones kinship group and also protected the freedom 
of inter-kinship and inter-ethnic group associations. The existence of 
this medium is evidenced by the practice of inter-community marriages. 
The limitations on the freedom of association appear mainly in the context 
of matrimonial customs. For instance when a couple enter into an inter- 
community or inter-ethnic marriage, the woman is endowed with the 
"nationality" of her husbands ethnic group with all the attendant rights 
and duties. Although the woman is allowed dual nationality as it were, 
the husband is not permitted to assume his wifes nationality even in 
matrilineal societies where he resides with the wifes community162. A 
widow has limitations placed on her freedom of association as far as 
remarriage is concerned. Most customs in Africa limit the widows choice 
of partner to her deceased husbands family. The rationale of this 
practice Is based on the social imperative to maintain strong and unified 
-------------------- 
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C. K. Meek op cit p. 196. See also P. C. Lloyd "Agnatic and 
Coagnatic Dessent Among the Yoruba" Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute I (New Series, 1966) p. 484. 
161 For a study of ancestral cults among the Ibos, see C. K. Meek op cit 
p. 61. Similarly K. S. Cariston describes the existence Ogboni Cult among 
the Yorubas as serving important social, political and judicial functions. 
K. S. Carlston op cit p. 178. 
162 S. N. C. Obi, Modern Family Law in Nigeria (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell) 1966. 
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extended family structures and the need to protect the widow and 
children. 
The practice of betrothal of girls and the imposition of high bride prices 
(dowries) establish further restrictions on the freedom of association and 
the freedom to choose marriage partners. 
Thus, with the exception of aspects of matrimonial custom, the freedom 
of association was by and large respected and promoted in traditional 
Africa. 
(iv) Freedom to Enjoy Property163 
The freedom to enjoy property was guarded and observed in traditional 
Africa with respect to both personal chattels and immovable property. 
However, the existence of the right to ownership of property and its 
incidents as perceived in western legal philosophy does not exist. The 
nature of the right to enjoy property depends firstly, on the type of 
property involved and secondly on the type of community concerned. 
Consequently, in the course of our examination, we propose to show a 
distinction between landed property on one hand and other property. 
(a) Land 
Individual interest in land was community based, however, this does not 
necessarily imply the existence of "communal ownership" of land. Our 
contention is based on the fact that "communal ownership" implies the 
absence of individual rights in land. The term communal ownership as 
defined in English Law may not be apt to describe land holding in 
Africa. 
163 We find the title "Freedom to Enjoy Property" appropriate and 
suitable to reflect the aspects common to the various ramifications of 
mass relations to property In traditional Africa. Some of these 
ramifications are not necessarily on all fours with Article 17 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "everyone has 
the right to own property alone as well as in association with others". 
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The term "ownership" is a "nomen genera lissimum", which term can 
differ depending on the context in which it is used. The common 
feature of all English Law statutory definitions shows that the "owner" 
can alienate the fee simple, appropriate the rent and enjoy the profits 
without reference to anyone164 The owner can thus create degrees of 
lesser interests which are invariably encumbrances on the title of the fee 
simple holder. Consequently any holder of a subordinate interest or 
estate is not the owner of land. The Common Law did not regard land 
as a subject of absolute ownership by the Kings subjects, but only of 
tenure, absolute ownership being in the crown165 
African customary law of tenure is devoid of land holding comparable to 
166 the English concept of fee simple absolute in possession. The plenary 
dispositive rights which the term "ownership" under English Law Implies 
is alien to customary land tenure. Some anthropologists have observed 
that 'communal ownership' can often be resolved into clusters of specific 
rights which groups and individuals hold over a piece of land, its uses 
167 
and its products 
-------------------- 
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See S. 189(i) of the Housing Act 1957; S. 4 of the New Towns Act 
1965 and S. 22 of the Town and Country Planning Act UK. 
165 John Saunders, Words and Phrases Legally Defined (London 1969) 
Vol. 4 p. 61. 
166 T. O. Elias The Nature of African Customary Law, op cit p. 164. 
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In many hierarchical societies with centralized institutions, the King or 
chief has no legal right of ownership over land. He holds land on behalf 
168 
of the whole community in the capacity of a caretaker or trustee only. 
In the atomized or loosely structured societies, paramount title in land is 
generally vested in artificial legal persons of indigenous law. Natural 
persons are however, selected or elected to represent and act on behalf 
of these legal persons. 
Thus in both types of societies, family land is not owned by any single 
member including its head, or chief; and no member has the right to sell 
169 
such land without the consent of every adult member of the family. 
In view of the foregoing observations, the question must be asked as to 
the nature and extent of the rights held by individuals under the canopy 
of group administration. 
As earlier alluded to, individual interest in land is community based. 
Consequently as a general rule, an individual, whether he is a subject of 
a hierarchical society or a member of an atomized community, or kindred 
group or family, derives his enjoyment of rights in land from the group. 
The justification for this rule is based on the notion of land as a 
community clan or family asset and resource, an ancestral heritage that 
-------------------- 
168 See the Privy Council decisions in the following cases: 
AmoduTijanni V Secretary. S. Nigeria (1921) 2AC, 399; Sunmonu V 
Disu Raphael (1927) AC. 881 at pp. 883-4, and Sobhuza II V. Miller 
(1926) AC 518 at p. 525. In his stody of Ibo land holding, Meek 
observes that ownership of lands which are sacred or taboo is vested In 
deities or spirits, while the ownership of' farmland is vested in the 
village, kindred or extended family. C. Meek op cit p. 100-101. 
169 The West African Court of Appeal (WACA) highlighted the 
significance of this customary law in Yoruba traditions and applied it in 
the following cases: 
Buralmo v Gbamgbove (1940) Nigerian Law Reports p. 139; Adedubu v 
Makanjuola, West African Court of Appeal 10 (1948) p. 33. See also 
Onasanya v Shiwoniku (1960) Western Region Nigeria Law Reports p. 166. 
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should be preserved for posterity and to which no individual can lay an 
absolute claim. 
However, customary land law recognizes and protects individually created 
wealth of which land is an indispensable asset. Under the traditional 
system, land can be acquired exclusively by the individual in the 
following circumstances. Firstly, where land involved is family land, an 
individual as a member of the family can inherit a share of family land as 
beneficial part-owner, with perpetuity of tenure, and all incidents but 
absolute power of disposition 
170. A similar interest in land may be 
acquired by an Individual where land is granted to him as a gift by a 
family. Secondly where an individual takes some uncultivated and 
unoccupied virgin land and makes it productive, he cannot be deprived 
171 
of it and he can pledge it or transmit it to his children 
A further feature of the recognition of individual interest in land is that 
the Individual is regarded as the owner of everything he has erected or 
cultivated on the land, even in circumstances were the ultimate title 
remains in the owning group. Communal Interest In land is qualified as 
long as the individual continues to utilize the land and no-one including 
172 the community or family may deprive him of the land. 
-------------------- 
170 T. O. Elias Ibid p. 166. In his study of the Tallensi of Ghana, K. S. 
Carlston observes that property fell into two categories: partrimonial 
rights and individual rights. In the case of the latter, the individually 
acquired property belonged to the individual subject to the rights of his 
father. In the former context, property belonged to the lineage and not 
to the individual but its holder was free to use it but not dispose of it - 
K. S. Carlston op cit p. 101. 
171 C. K. Meek op cit p. 101; See also T. O. Elias Nigerian Land Law and 
Custom (Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1953, p. 143. 
172 Several West African Court of Appeal decisions have upheld the 
customary practice that where an individual continues to work or use an 
unappropriated piece of land, no-one has a right to alienate the land 
without his consent. See Quarm v Yankah 1930, WACA 80; Azuma v 
Fiscian (1955) 14 WACA 287; Golihtly v Ashrifi (1955) 14 WACA 676; 
Ohimen v Adjei (1957) 2 WALR 275; Kankrah v Ampofoah (1957) 2 WALR 
303. 
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The individuals interest in land is therefore qualified, in the main, by 
customary rules of disposition and inheritance. The rationale for this 
qualification is that rights over land in traditional Africa are 
transgenerational, thus excluding the possibility of withholding access to 
future members of the society. 
It must however be emphasized, that although the foregoing principles of 
customary laws of tenure are representative of most African traditional 
173 societies, variations do exist 
With regard to the freedom of women to enjoy property in traditional 
communities, womens interests in land has often been portrayed as 
limited at best or even non-existent at worst174. This view has been 
predicated on the arguments that traditional rules of inheritance normally 
exclude women and that they are excluded from the process and power of 
allocation by men. The apparent exclusion of women from the power to 
allocate land is based on the recognition of the need to balance the 
monopoly that women exercise over the process of production, the 
pattern of consumption and the disposal of surplus. Although the 
traditional rules of inheritance in patriarchal societies restricts the 
inheritance of women in land175, in matriarchal societies the interests of 
men in land is virtually non-existent. 
-------------------- 
173 
For instance the interests of individuals in land amongst hunting 
communities differ from those in agricultural and pastoral communities. 
See M. Gluckman "Property Rights and Status in African Traditional 
Law", in M. Gluckman (ed) Ideas and Procedures in African Customary 
Law (OUP, London) 1969, p. 253. 
174 Ester Boserup, Womans Role in Economic Development (George Allen 
& Unwin, London 1970). 
175 In his study of the Ibos, C. Meek, observes that although women 
cannot Inherit, land they may be assigned the use of a piece of land by their father or husband. In the latter case, they can transmit land to their male children, but if they have no children, the land reverts to the husband or the husbands Inheritor. C. K. Meek, op cit p. 203. 
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In the light of the foregoing, how can we therefore define the 
individuals interest under traditional land tenure? 
The individuals interest in land has been described as a "possessory" 
right or title, a usufructuary title, or a "proprietory occupancy". 
These titles do not exactly reflect the characteristics of the individuals 
interest in land. The term "possessory" title is defective, firstly 
because almost any acquisition of interest in land involving occupation is 
a kind of possession; secondly, the occupier simply enjoys a degree of 
use; thirdly, the term "possessory title" gives the wrong impression in 
that the holder is subject to a tenancy-at-will. 
The individuals interest cannot be described as "proprietary" because his 
interest does not carry the characteristic of absolute power of disposal of 
the fee simple owner of land in English Law. 
The term "Usufructuary title" is often misleading in its application. 
While the usufruct in civil law implies the right to enjoy the property 
vested in another for life only, the customary law interest is inheritable 
and continues until it is abandoned. Furthermore, the Individual under 
customary land tenure rules holds no rights comparable of transmission 
as the Roman concept of usufruct suggests. 
Although these attempts at discovering a suitable nomenclature for the 
individuals interests in traditional African land tenure may assist in 
appreciating the nature of the interest, we submit that the application of 
preconceived Common Law and civil law ideas fail to reflect the true 
nature of land holding in traditional Africa. 
The freedom of the individual to enjoy landed property in traditional 
African communities is founded upon his concurrent right to enjoy access 
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to and usage of land, including the right to exclusive use of allocated 
family land and the right to appropriate uncultivated land. The power 
of disposition is however subject to communal or family approval. 
(b) Other Property 
The "right to own property" is probably more apt a description with 
respect to the individuals Interest in personal chattels than his interest 
in land under traditional African custom. Elias has observed that the 
relationship between the owner and the thing owned is one of "absolute 
dominion" unaffected by the competing claims of the family or community 
which in the case of land almost regularly limit the individuals power of 
disposition 176 
The individual is entitled to exclusive right over whatever is self 
acquired and as we have seen, this also applies to uncultivated and 
unappropriated land. The significance of the right to own property is 
underlined by the heavy penalties provided for theft 
177, 
which is not 
unlike the penalty of death hitherto provided by English criminal law for 
theft. 
It has also been observed that in some of traditional African communities. 
all chattels acquire the personality of the possessor178. This extended 
personality notion illuminates the existence of individual rights to 
property under customary laws, the rationale of which is the need to 
protect the community from the seeds of mistrust. 
-------------------- 
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T. O. Elias The Nature of African Customary Law, op cit p. 178. 
177 For instance, among the Ibo of the Isu community, a thief caught 
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p. 217; see also K. S. Carlston op cit p. 133. J. H. Drisberg "The LanRo: 
A Nilotic Tribe of Uganda" (London: T. Fisher Unwin) 1923 p. 235. 
178 C. S. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (London Methuen) 1952 p. 208, 
p. 249. 
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It should however be noted that the individuals right to own property 
was restricted by the concept of "legal theft" that obtained in some 
societies. Legal theft, allowed a kinsman or family member to take the 
belongings of his relation without necessarily exposing himself to the 
charge of theft179. The rationale for this concept is that the family, 
kinship or lineage, being the basis of communal existence, cannot be 
allowed to be destroyed by the degradation of a delinquent individual. 
Although this concept is arguably an incursion into the right of 
individual ownership of property, the preponderance of African customs 
reveals that the individual right to acquire and own personal chattels are 
generally respected and protected in most traditional communities. 
An Overview 
The foregoing examination of the concept of human rights reveals that it 
was not a phenomenon confined only to Judeo-Christian traditions, but 
that human rights existed In pre-colonial traditional African societies. 
However the conception of a right as a legal claim which an individual 
can sanction against his state or community, as it were, does not always 
prove true in the traditional African structure. In the African context, 
individual rights were recognised and protected within the community as 
opposed to the scenario where the Individual enforces his claims and 
demands against his community and others. The harmonious existence of 
individual and collective rights is predicated on the foundation of kinship 
of the family and clan, and moral codes fortified by legal and religious 
sanctions. 
These customary rules and practices reflected concern for rights, 
democratic institutions and the rule of law in a sense relative but not 
exactly In syncopation with western notions. Individual rights were 
-------------------- 
179 M. Gluckman 'Property Rights and Status in African Traditional Law' 
op cit p. 259. 
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exercised within the framework of the legitimate concerns of the 
community. 
A study of traditional African law has suggested that "distributive 
justice, in the social economic spheres is the cardinal principle that is 
shared by most Africans"180. Consequently, one of the basis of the 
African concept of human rights is the notion of distributive justice. 
However, it has been argued elsewhere that since classical theorists of 
distributive justice, such as Plato, Burke and Bentham did not expressly 
relate human rights on that basis, distributive justice and human rights 
are separate Issues181. We submit that distributive justice and human 
rights are not mutually exclusive concepts but inter-related182. 
Distributive justice implies the protection of rights of individuals through 
giving to each his own. The fact that the Individual rights are 
protected on the basis of communal or group membership in traditional 
communities underlines the significance of the group or community as the 
vehicle through which distributive justice is achieved. 
One of the major differences between the concept of human rights in 
traditional African societies and the Western concept is that the former is 
fundamentally based on ascribed status. The content of an Individuals 
rights is dependent on the membership of a particular social unit. 
Furthermore, the European liberal conceptualization of human rights is a 
departure from the traditional African concept which latter concept places 
emphasis on collective or group rights. The European concept of the 
-------------------- 
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Asmaron Legesse "Human Rights in African Politican Culture" in 
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182 See Charles R. Beitz "Economic Rights and Distributive Justice in Developing Societies" World Politics 53.3 (April 1981) p. 321-346. 
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nation-state and attendant ideas of sovereignty and impersonal authority 
were evolved from the peculiar socio-political circumstances of the 
region. Thus these impersonal structures were deemed necessary to 
accommodate and control peoples of different ethnic, social and cultural 
origins within the western nation-state. Traditional African communities 
or 'cultural-nations' controlled kinship groups within their cultural 
boundaries. A cultural nation governed through familial chiefs and 
elders who shared authority with the community at large. Thus while 
the western concept emphasises the freedom of the individual and his 
right to detach himself from the group, the African conception stresses 
the right of the individual to become part of the group. Secondly, in 
western thought, law takes precedence over morality while in African 
conceptions, morality based upon communal consensus takes precedence 
over formal rules of law. 
The essence of traditional moral values was the preservation of kinship 
ties of the clan, age group and other social units. These values were 
indeed recognised by the colonial rulers who incorporated some of them 
into legislation. For instance, under the Nigerian Workmens 
Compensation Ordinance, where money is due to a workman, it is 
provided that distribution to members of his family will be "according as 
the family is based on the paternal or the maternal system" 
183 
Furthermore, gratuities due to a deceased soldier can be distributed to 
his relations "according to the rules of kinship" of his tribe or if a 
184 Muslim "in accordance with Mohammedan (sic) lawºº. 
We have attempted to establish that traditional African societies observed 
the respect for equality, the right to life, right to receive justice, 
-------------------- 
183 S. 3. Workmens Compensation Ordinance (Nigeria). 
184 S. 103. Royal West African Frontier Force (Nigeria Regiment) 
Ordinance. 
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freedom of thought, speech and beliefs, freedom of association and the 
freedom to enjoy property. These rights and freedoms were assured 
through the imposition of both positive and negative customary values 
and rules. Group and collective rights were recognised as well as 
individual duties to the community. Distributive justice was one of the 
main basis of the concept of human rights and members of the community 
shared wealth and assumed responsibilities towards one another and to 
the community. 
All these values are not yet fully reflected in international human rights 
instruments. The African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights has 
taken most of these traditional values on board, not only by recognizing 
the "historical traditions and the values of African civilizations"185 but 
by Incorporating specific rights and duties reflecting these values186 
Our examination of the concept of human rights in traditional African 
societies has endeavoured not to gloss over some inhuman practices that 
obtained in the past and which were eliminated in the main by the 
dynamic development of customary laws. These violations can be 
understood in the context of the contradictions of human rights across 
history. Such an appraisal would not exclude western practices such as 
slavery, colonialism, fascism, which were hardly regarded as violations 
during the relevant periods. Lately economic practices such as the 
primitive accumulation of wealth on private and public basis are justified 
as effective prescriptions for general economic growth despite their 
obvious negative effects on the socio-economic rights of others. Herein 
lies the thrust of our argument linking distributive justice with human 
rights, otherwise referred to as the right to development. 
-------------------- 
185 APCHPR, preambular paragraph 5. 
186 See Chapter Seven post. 
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The foregoing analysis has attempted to clarify the traditional African 
concept of human rights despite the reservations of some academics. 
Adamantia Polllis for instance states that "the effort to clarify the 
different notions of human rights, their philosophic, historical, and 
institutional roots, seem to put a relativistic view on human rights and to 
187 the futility of enforcement by any international or regional body" 
We submit, to the contrary, that the appreciation of the contextual 
notions of human rights enhances the promotion and protection of human 
rights. The universality of many basic human rights cannot be denied, 
however the effective implementation of these rights have been prevented 
because, in certain regions such as Africa, the role of the individual in 
society has not been fully appreciated. In Africa, for instance, the 
recognition of individual duties and collective rights is Intertwined with 
the effective protection of individual rights and the achievement of social 
justice. 
The incorporation of some of the traditional notions of human rights in 
the AFCHPR should ensure a more effective human rights protection 
regime than hitherto experienced on the continent. 
Indeed, the political instability and economic depression that now exists 
in Africa has been attributed mainly to the policies and structures 
established by European colonial administrators and also their oblivious 
attitude to traditional African socio-political institutions and values. The 
effect of colonialism on human rights in Africa shall be examined 
presently with a view to establishing whether colonial practices were 
indeed a total negation of human rights. 
-------------------- 
187 A. Polfis Liberal, Socialist and Third World Perspectives on Human Rights (New York Praeger) 1982 p. 22. 
63 
(d) Colonialism and Human Rights in Africa 
The history of Western European contacts with Africa can be traced 
back to the beginnings of the slave trade in the 17th Century. This, 
most horrifying human haemorrhage in the history of man, disintegrated 
numerous African peoples and profoundly traumatized many an African 
society. 
Apart from the unspeakable suffering which befell the population as a 
result of the slave trade, it also provoked incalculable consequences for 
the economic and political development of Africa. The destruction and 
confusion it bred opened up gaps through which gushed colonization and 
its consequent impact on the history of Africa. Both the slave trade and 
colonization were to refashion the basis of development of the African 
continent towards a dependence upon Europe and integration with the 
world capitalist system. 
The 1885 Conference of Berlin defined the rules for the partition of 
Africa thus setting the grounds for the effective colonization of Africa. 
The effect of the Berlin Conference was to bury imperialist rivalries by 
burying the fundamental rights of African humanity. 
In the comparative study of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, E. Harmassi 
distinguishes three types of colonialism: "total colonialism" (Algeria) 
which destroys the indigenous social system completely, "segmentary 
colonialism" (Morocco) which manipulates traditional forces, and 
"instrumental colonialism" (Tunisia) which develops and modernises the 
indigenous society in the interest of the metropole188. Most African 
countries came under the influence of a cocktail of these colonial 
strategies. It has, however been observed that the main aim of the 
-------------------- 
188 Elbaki Hermassi Leadership and National Development in North 
Africa: A Comparative Study. (Berkleley: 1972) p. 57 
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colonisers was to transform the indigenous communities into replicas of 
western nation states189. In so doing, the colonisers greatly 
oversimplified the complex systems of authority, justice and social 
administration of Africa; and thus gradually distorted and destroyed 
them. 
It must however be emphasized that, much as the colonisers imposed 
their own systems of administration, the economic and social systems 
installed were not meant to be replicas of the European systems but were 
moulded towards meeting the needs of the metropolis. For instance, the 
system of education they established was geared towards the liberal arts 
tradition rather than technical or scientific. The colonial education 
system thus produced a new African elite which was to a large extent 
dislodged from the realities of African cultural traditions. 
Colonization also brought about the alienation of traditional religion and 
thus contributed to social instability. It has also contributed to the 
insecurity which lies at the root of contemporary African leadership 
crises through the existence of colonial bureaucratic structures and the 
duality of life which is manifest in the religious, political, economic and 
cultural sphere of present day Africa. 
One of the lasting consequences of colonization is the economic structures 
imposed. In traditional society, sophisticated systems of social welfare 
existed but since the advent of colonialism there has been a marked gap 
between the rich and the poor. The complete collapse of the traditional 
social formation has been averted by the existence of the extended family 
-------------------- 
189 
L. Pye Aspects of Political Development (Boston; Little Brown & Co; 
1966) p. 87; see also C. Mojekwa "International Human Rights: The 
African Perspective" in J. L. Nelson & U. M. Green (eds) International 
Human Rights: Contemporary Issues (Human Rights Publishing Group: 
New York 1980) p. 87. 
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social welfare system. Colonialism represented the brutal dispossession 
of rural communities, creation of Indigenous reserves to provide an 
abundant and cheap workforce, and heavy tax demands to oblige the 
Africans to work on farms and plantations. In extreme cases, colonial 
manpower problems were solved by forced labour190. For instance 
colonial legal instruments were used indirectly to guarantee the employer 
services of native workers. Breach of contract and insubordination by 
the native employee was treated as criminal offences under British 
191 Colonial Master and Servant Laws 
It is pertinent to state that these practices were in utter disregard for 
the Treaty of Versailles. These inhuman labour policies were based on 
the colonial view that Africans cannot be motivated to work except by 
coercion192. However, comparative research on labour policies in Africa 
has proved that using incentives were a much more effective means to 
providing for an adequate supply of determined and qualified labour193 
Colonialism can hardly be said to have been protective of human rights 
194 in Africa For the most part, colonial regimes were authoritarian and 
-------------------- 
190 During the years of King Leopolds private rule in the Belgian 
Colonies (Congo) (1885-1908) explicit authorization was given to use force 
of arms to procure labour, J. Davies, African Trade Unions (Harmsworth 
Press) 1966 p. 36. 
191 In Ghana (Gold Coast) see Ordinance 8/1893 (as ammended through 
1919, Laws of the Gold Coast 1922 Cap 77) S. 29. In Kenya see 
Ordinance 4/1910 (as amended through 1926 Laws of Kenya 1926 Cop 139) 
SS. 47-49. In Tanganyika see Ordinance 32/1923 (as amended through 
1946, Laws of Tanzania 1946) SS. 35 & 36. 
192 Joan Davies, African Trade Unions, op cit p. 36. 
193 John F. Weeks "Wage Policy and the Colonial Legacy: A Comparative 
Study" in Journal of African Studies Vol. 9 p. 361. 
194 See Frantz Fannon, The Wretched of the Earth (Penguin, London, 
1968); Ngugi wa Thiongo, Petals of Blood (London, Heineman, 1977) and Detained (Nairobi, Heineman, 1977). 
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repressive. There were no bill of rights195 and the law was used to 
coerce, regulate, tax and deter rather than facilitate the emergence of 
"indigenous interest articulation", dissent and the use of the legal 
system to resolve disputes196 Colonial law was used to perpetrate 
preventative detention, censorship and ancillary practices. The judges 
who were part of the colonial bureaucracy operated a system of rule by 
law rather than of law. 
In the social context, the system of indirect rule and its corollary "legal 
pluralism" (the retention of customary law where not displaced by 
colonial law) polarized the rural populace from urban sectors of the 
African society. While the rural populace conducted their affairs by 
custom which usually involved the settlement of disputes through informal 
processes or in local customary court, the common law system was only 
useful and available to the elite who engaged in modern commercial 
transactions. The impact of the common law system was felt by the rural 
people only when they had to face sanctions of taxation or the criminal 
process which were authoritarian in nature. Quite congenital to colonial 
rule was the philosophy that stressed the "natural inequality of man", 
"the rightness" of a hierarchical structure of society, in which the 
197 "irrational majority" would submit to the authority of a "rational few" 
-------------------- 
195 
It is noteworthy that although the UK endorsed the European 
Convention on Human Rights to apply to some of its colonies, it could 
not be invoked by the Inhabitants of these colonies. 
196 J. C. N. PAUL, "Human Rights and Legal Development: Observations 
on Some African Experiences" in J. C. Tuttle (ed) Internatinal Human 
Rights (Law and Practice) 1978, p. 26. See also M. B. Hooker, Legal 
Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press) 1975. 
197 T. L. Hodgkin, op cit p. 51. 
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In Francophone Africa, the basis of French colonialism was that of 
political and cultural assimilation. Although the French appreciated that 
the application of French laws 'en suite' to African colonies was 
impracticable, they only recognized the customary and Islamic laws that 
were not "contrary to the principles of French civilization". This 
blanket policy led to the abolition of inhuman practices such as 
witchcraft and slavery and also modified and abrogated customary laws 
198 especially in the area of family law 
The French colonial policy that created legal distinctions between 
Africans with "statut civil Francais" (French civil status) and Africans 
with "statut contumier" (customary status) infringed the principle of 
equality. Africans In Francophone colonies experienced the suppression 
of traditional rights of participation in their established local socio- 
political systems. Freedom of movement was restricted through the 
confinement of native workers to work camps. 
In the Belgian colony of the Congo, the suppression of human rights was 
vivid199 The alliance between the state and private enterprise to 
exploit the Congo without due regard to the basic dignity of the local 
inhabitants was undertaken with the express authority of King Leopold 
who declared that "the Congo has been and would have been but a 
personal undertaking. There is no more legitimate or respectable right 
than that of an author over his own work, the fruit of his labour... My 
rights over the Congo are to be shared with no one, they are the fruits 
-------------------- 
198 
J. W. Salacuse. An Introduction to Law in French Speaking Africa 
Vol-1 Africa South of the Sahara (Charlottesville, Virginia, The Michie 
Co. Law Publishers, New York) 1969 p. 60. 
199 Crawford Young "Colonial Rule Through Direct Rule: The Belgian 
Model" in W. Cartey & M. Kilson eds The African Reader: Colonial Africa (New York, Vantage Books) pp. 87-88. 
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200 
of my struggles and expenditure" 
Although King Leopold's control over the Congo was cut off by the 
Belgian Parliaments Colonial Charter of 1908, due largely to protests in 
the USA and Europe, no significant reform was undertaken thereafter, 
until independence in 1960. 
In Anglophone Africa, the basis of the colonial philosophy may be 
summed up in Lord Lugards statement: 
"there, then, is the true conception of the Inter-relation of 
colour - complete uniformity of Ideals, absolute equality In 
the paths of knowledge and culture, equal opportunity for 
those who strive, equal admiration for those who achieve; In 
matters of social and racial, a separate path, each pursuing 
his own interested traditions, preserving his own race purity 
and race pride, equality in thin spiritual, agreed 
divergence in the physical or material" 
Lord Lugards statement is basically a reflection of the segregationalist 
policy of separate but equal development. The statement is an apparent 
contradiction of the notion of equal opportunity. 
The Native Authorities Ordinance202 of Nigeria established the indirect 
rule system of administration which empowered the colonial government to 
appoint local Intermediaries arbitrarily and endowed the latter with the 
obligation to maintain order and good government. Indirect rule, thus 
led to the infusion of more powers on local chiefs who abused these 
powers beyond the bounds that would have been unacceptable in 
-------------------- 
200 
Quoted in Ruth Slade "King Leopolds Congo" (London, Oxford 
University Press) 1962 p. 174. 
201 Lord Lugard "The Dual Mandate In British Tropical Africa" (Hamden, 
Conn, Action Books 1965) p. 5. 
202 Native Authorities Ordinance (Nigeria) 1953. 
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traditional African societies203 
The British Colonial Administration subjected all native laws and customs 
to the text of the "repugnancy rule , 
204. Thus any customary law or 
practice that was in the opinions of the judiciary contrary to "natural 
justice, equity of good conscience" or any colonial law was thus 
abolished205. While this rule led to the abolition of some practices such 
as slavery, osu system206, witchcraft, the infanticide of twins207, it also 
led to authoritarianism and racial discrimination208. According to Read 
"colonial rule was essentially authoritarian and even the introduction of 
English law as the basis for local legal systems did not result in the 
colonial subjects enjoying the full rights of liberty, due process, free 
speech and the rest which the common law is said to guarantee the 
Englishman himself"209 
-------------------- 
203 M. Crowther - West Africa Under Colonial Rule (Lond, Hutchinson 
1968) p. 198. 
204 
Cap 211 of 1948 Laws of Nigeria, S. 19 states that "Nothing in this 
ordinance shall deprive the courts of the right to observe and enforce 
the observance, or shall deprive any person of the benefit of any native 
law or custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity or good 
conscience or incompatible either in terms or by necessary implication 
with any ordinance or rule. . . made under ordinance 
for the time being in 
force in the territory". 
205 T. W. Bennet "Conflict of Laws: The Application of Customary Law 
and the Common Law in Zimbabwe" Vol. 30 (1981) ICLQ p. 59. 
206 Osu were slaves offered to dieties for the purpose of appeasement. 
See C. A. Oputa "Crime and the Nigerian Society" In African Indigenous 
Laws (eds) T. O. Elias S. N. Nwabara & C. O. Akamgbo. (Enugu, 
Government Printer 1975) p. 48. 
207 Ibid p. 12. 
208 Y. Ghai & J. P. W. B. McAuslan "Public Law and Political Change in 
Kenya" (Nairobi OUP) 1970 pp. 407-8. 
209 J. Read op cit. 
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In the economic field, the British colonisers practised forced labour210 
and trade unions were not allowed to exist211. Exploitation of the 
economic resources of the colonies for the benefit of the metropolis was 
perpetuated by the colonial administrators. The colonial state neither 
assumed obligations for the economic development of the colonies nor 
made allowances for a limited range of social welfare provisions for the 
212 indigenous. 
Such was the intervention of colonialism which was more effective in 
destroying indigenous African structures than its culture. Colonialism 
was essentially antithetical to human rights. The only voices that 
protested the excesses of colonialism were missionary groups and 
213 
nationalist movements 
The states that evolved and perpetuated colonial policies were In direct 
contravention of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, particularly Article 1 which states that "The subjection of 
peoples to alien domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of the 
fundamental human rights... ". This provision was a major catalyst to 
demand for self-determination on the African continent. The right to 
self determination both in its external and internal dimensions was denied 
to the colonized peoples. 
-------------------- 
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Roger G. Thomas. "Forced Labour In British West Africa: The Case 
of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 1906-1927" in Journal of 
African History 14 (1974) p. 74-103. 
211 A. T. Nzula, I. I. Potekhin and A. Z. Zusmanovich Forced Labour in 
Colonial Africa (London: Zed Press 1979) p. 119. 
212 Rhoda Howard "Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of 
Implicit Comparisons" in Human Rights Quarterly 1984 p. 172. 
213 E. A. Brett Colonialism and Underdevelopment In East Africa: The 
Politics of Economic Change (1919-39) (London Heineman) 1973 p. 171. 
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Human rights, self determination and Africanism or African Unity were 
the major goals of African nationalist movements. In the following 
chapter we propose to examine the institutional evolution of the OAU, its 
impact on the promotion and protection of human rights on the continent 
and its efforts towards dismantling institutional and legal obstacles to 
human rights protection in Africa. 
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Chanter Two 
The Evolution of the OAU 
The OAU represents a realisation of the myth of Pan-Africanism. The 
idea of Pan-Africanism was conceived at the end of the 19th Century and 
evolved as a manifestation of fraternal solidarity among Africans and 
peoples of African descent. 
' 
What is Pan-Africanism? It is difficult to define comprehensively for the 
simple reason that it has assumed different meanings and orientations at 
various stages in its evolution2. The wider view of this movement is 
probably what may be described as "Pan-Negroism"3 i. e. the re- 
proclamation of the rights of the blackman despite his experience of 
racial oppression; colonialism and his history of slavery. The second 
narrower definition adopts the political approach which views pan- 
Africanism as a quest for continental unity through political cooperation4. 
What may be described as "proto"- Pan-African ideas evolved as a 
response to the slave trade, slavery and racial discrimination in the New 
World. This broader view of Pan-Africanism as an emotional expression 
by self educated or mission educated protagonists of common African 
descent found its first platforms of expression at the Pan African 
Conference in 1900. The Conference passed resolutions which focused on 
Africa and appealed to the world to stop the exploitation of Africa and 
-------------------- 
1 George Padmore, Pan Africanism or Communism, (London, Dobson 1955) 
pp. 117-18. 
2 Jabez Ayodele Langley, West African Aspects of Pan African Movements 1900-1945. PhD Thesis, The University of Edinburgh 1963 p. 14. 
3 B. A. Duncke, The Rule of the OAU in African Conflicts MSc Thesis, 
University of Edinburgh 1974. 
4 I. Geiss "Notes on the development of pan-Africanism" in Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria (Vol. III No. 4) June 1967 p. 719 at p. 720. 
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grant "responsible government" as soon as possible to Africa and the 
West Indies. 5 
The first Pan-African Congress held in 1919 embraced a variety of 
themes, one of which was the right of colonized peoples of Africa to self 
determination, their right to their own lands, their rights not to be 
exploited by investment capital. Nevertheless, the Congress adopted a 
lengthy resolution which was silent on the right of Africans to 
independence6. Compared with the 1900 Pan-African Conference this was 
a retrogressive resolution. However it is conceivable that the prevailing 
climate in Africa was of total economic and political subjugation by the 
Imperial powers and "outright demands for self government and 
independence would have been hopelessly premature. "7 
Resolutions for Self Government did not emerge until after the Fourth 
Pan-African Congress of 1927 in New York8. However, It was not until 
the Fifth Pan-African Congress in 1945 that the movement became more 
politicized and the lead finally taken by Africans9. One of the more 
striking resolutions was the Congress's "demand for Black African 
autonomy and Independence so far and no further that it Is possible In 
this one world for groups and peoples to rule themselves subject to 
inevitable world unity and federation"10. The significance of the 1945 
Congress was the demise of the pan-Negro characteristics of the Pan- 
-------------------- 
5 Geiss, op cit, p. 750. 
6 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (New York, 
1963) p. 29. 
7 Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa: Search for a New Society, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1967) p. 63. 
8 The earlier Congresses were the 1921 London and Brussels Congress 
and the 1923 London and Lisbon Congress. 
9 J. Woronoff, Organising African Unity (Metuchen N. J., 1970) p. 23. 
10 V. B. Thompson, "Africa and Unity, (London 1969) p. 59. 
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African Movement. Duncke states this conference "saw the end of the 
pan-Negro movement based on racial solidarity, and established a new 
goal of the unity of the African continent as a whole, including non- 
Negro people"11 
With the end of World War II came the wave of nationalism which engulfed 
Africa. The Egyptian resolution of July 23rd, 1952 gave African 
nationalism a revolutionary impetus despite the fact that there was a gulf 
between the Arab states of North Africa and the sub-Saharan states12. 
The Pan-African movement split into units of nationalist movements to 
continue the struggle for self determination and independence within 
their respective territorial units in Africa. We therefore share Dunke's 
opinion that both Pan-Africanism and African nationalism are 
13 
manifestations of the same general urge towards unity and freedom. 
By 1958 several African colonies had been granted independence. The 
necessary corollary of this was the realignment of the Pan-African 
movement. The movement was re-established on a "doctrine of 
continental exclusiveness implicit in the very composition of the OAU" 
thus relinquishing Its intercontinental origins14. The geopolitical barrier 
that existed between the North African States and the sub-Saharan 
states was partially scaled by the first All African Peoples Conference of 
------------------- 
11 
Duncke, op cit p. 17. 
12 F. C. O'Kaye, International Law and the New African States, (London, 
1972) p. 121. 
13 
o cit p. 29. 
14 All Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana (London, 1966) p. 182. 
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Independent African States which was held in 1958 at Accra, Ghana 
15 
This conference was attended by the then eight independent African 
states, namely Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia 
and the United Arab Republic16. Thus the presence of Anglophane, 
Francophane as well as Arab African nations was clearly a manifestation 
of the determination to forge regional unity between countries with 
different colonial and cultural legacies. The convening of the conference 
may be attributed to the efforts of Nkrumah17 despite the fact that his 
plan for a summit meeting of the Heads of State was not successful. 
Apart from Nkrumah and Liberia President Tubman, no other country 
was represented by its Head of Government. 
Despite Nkrumah's charisma and domination of this conference, the 
participating states endorsed the formation of regional groupings which 
should not be prejudicial to the ultimate goal of Pan-Africanism. 
Furthermore, they condemned colonialism and racialism and supported 
African liberation movements in their struggle for freedom and 
independence18. This latter resolution stemmed from the United Arab 
Republic's sponsored motion which was inspired by the war of liberation 
which was then raging in Cammeroon and Algeria. 
-------------------- 
15 The main objectives of the conference were (I) To consider means of 
safeguarding the political independence and sovereignty of participating 
states, (ii) to formulate the mutual policy of extending assistance to 
dependent African territories in the attempt of the attainment os self- 
government, (iii) to discuss problems of common interest and to 
strengthen mutual understanding. 
16 Carol A. Johnson, "Political and Regional Groupings in Africa, In 
International Organisation, Vol. 16, No. 2,1962, p. 426. 
17 Nkrumah had written that "African nationalism was not confinedto the Gold Coast - th new Ghana. From now on it must be Pan-African 
nationalism, and the ideology of African political consciousness and African political emancipation must spread throughout the whole 
continent": see Nkrumah, Ghana (London, Nelson, 1956) p. 290. 
18 Paul A. Thorpe, Regional International Organisations: Structure and Functions (St. Martins Press, New York 1971) p. 48. 
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The institutional or organizational machinery which was evolved during 
the conference was fragile. The Conference of Independent African 
States was to be held every second year. In between these meetings, 
States were to maintain links through their respective permanent 
representatives at the United Nations. However, should disputes arise 
between African states, they were to be referred to the ad-hoc meetings 
of foreign ministers or experts19. The conference may, therefore be 
viewed as a "limited tangible success , 
20 because there was no inclination 
by the participating States to sacrifice their dearly won independence by 
creating a feasible regional machinery that may disapprove of the policy 
of a sovereign state or advise it to fulfil pledges made on the alter of 
African unity. 
The second Conference of Independent African States was held on June 
15th 1960 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The spirit of compromise was all 
pervasive as the sessions. Consequently decisions were reached by 
consensus on decolonization, African foreign policy, economic, social and 
cultural objectives, despite the ideological camps which had emerged. 
The struggle between the federalists and the functionalists culminated in 
the failure of the second Conference to adopt a genuine framework for 
African Unity. 
The federalists view (otherwise known as the radical view) and that held 
by Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekon Toure of Guinea was that political 
integration was the solution to achieving continental unity and total 
emancipation of Africa21; this faction also believed in the establishment 
of a United States of Africa with, the Joint African High Command as its 
-------------------- 
19 
C. A. Johnson, op cit, p. 428. 
20 
J. Woronoff, op cit, p. 85. 
21 Duncke op cit, 30,32. 
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military force. On the other hand the functionalists believed that unity 
could only be achieved gradually by strengthening economic and cultural 
relationships between States. The functionalists believed in the 
preference of State sovereignty over that of African Unity22. 
The atmosphere of the second Conference can be gleaned from the 
exchange between the Ghanaian representative Ako Adjel and Alhaji 
Maitama Sule from Nigeria. Adjei Insisted on "the complete political union 
of African states" while Alhaji Sule maintained that the idea of forming a 
23 Union of African States was premature. 
It is therefore not surprising that the conference adopted the very 
delicately worded resolution on "Promotion of African Unity" which stated 
that "the Conference of Independent African States (LIAS) requests the 
President of the CIAS to address a communication to the Heads of these 
States to initiate consultations through diplomatic channels with a view to 
promoting African Unity"24. The resolution reveals that the 
functionalists were the majority. The second conference was the last 
meeting of independent African states for some years to come. 
However, while the Conference of Independent African States were 
meeting, a parallel All African Peoples Conference (AAPC) was taking 
place in which representatives of peoples who had not as yet gained 
independence also participated. A close examination of the participants 
and decisions taken at African Peoples Conferences shows that they were 
very different from those of the Conference of Independent African 
States. The first Conference of African Peoples held at Accra, Ghana 
-------------------- 
22 Ibid. 
23 Keesing's Contemporary Archives; Vol. XII; 1959-60, p. 17554. 
24 Reprinted in C. Legum, op cit, p. 152. 
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between 5th-13th December 1958 involved the participation of 200 
representatives from 50 African political parties, trade unions, student 
movements, and other organisations25. 
Secondly, the resolutions adopted by the (AAPC) were more radical than 
the mild toned CIAS ones. In its resolutions on "Frontiers, Boundaries 
and Federations", it stated "that the conference (a) endorses Pan- 
Africanism and the desire for unity among African peoples; (b) declares 
that its ultimate objective is the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free 
African States. The (AAPC) also resolved that the objective of unity 
could be achieved by means of regional federations provided that they 
"should not be prejudicial to the ultimate objectives of a Pan-African 
26 Commonwealth by hardening as separate entities". 
The AAPC also took several practical or organizational decisions, notably 
to set up a permanent secretariat in Accra. The aims of this body were 
to "accelerate the liberation of Africa and the development of a feeling of 
Pan-African solidarity", to "pave the way for the eventual creation of 
the United States of Africa". 
27 
The tone of the (AAPC) resolutions became more radical at the Second 
Conference in January 1960 at Tunis and at the Third Conference held in 
March 1961 at Cairo. The Leadership Committee elected by the Tunis 
Conference included Ahmed Benmendjd of Algeria and Patrice Lumumba of 
Congo, names which amply testify to the resolutely anti-imperialist spirit 
of the conference. This spirit manifested itself in the special resolutions 
passed on Algeria which called for "the recognition of The Provisional 
-------------------- 
25 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, Vol. XII, 1959-60 p. 16612. 
26 
Reprinted in C. Legum, op cit, p. 230. 
27 Phillipe Decraene, Le PanafrIcanisme, Que Sais-Je? (Paris, PUF) p. 52. 
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Government of the Algerian Republic (G. P. R. A. ) by all African states, 
the creation of a volunteer brigade, regular contributions from the 
budgets of African states and the withdrawal of all black troops 
committed to the Algerian conflict by the French Republic"28. On the 
other hand, the Second CIAS which had met earlier In August 1959 at 
Monrovia had refused to recognise nay. support the GPRA which was 
then leading the Algerian peoples colonial struggle under the aegis of the 
29 National Liberation Front. 
The AAPC resolutions at its 3rd conference In March 1961 at Cairo 
approved the use of force to eliminate Imperialism, denounced UN 
Intervention in Congo and called for the Independence of Portuguese 
colonies30. Despite the unanimity that characterized the AAPC 
resolutions, they lacked any form of coercion to ensure their 
implementation by Independent African States. Only Nkrumah and Sekou 
Toure granted full support to the AAPC, and this did not endear them 
3 l. to the hearts of their fellow statesmen 
Consequently, we agree with J. Woronoff32 that despite Its more 
pragmatic program, the AAPC was actually less effective than the CIAS 
in conducting Inter-African relations. However, It must be recognized 
-------------------- 
28 
Mid, p. 53-54. 
29 Elenga Mbuyinga, Pan Africanism or Neo-Colonialism? The Bankruptcy 
of the OAU (Zed, London, 1982) p. 42. 
30 P. Decraene, op cit. p. 55. 
31 C. Hoskyns, Pan-Africanism and Integration" In A. Haziewood, 
African Integration and Disintegration (London Publishers, 1967) p. 363. 
32 J. Woronoff. o2 cit, p. 89. 
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that the AAPC's endeavours to conduct and determine inter-African 
relations on the basis of political organisations, independent of State 
action was more of a success 
33 
The Congo crisis and the Algerian struggle for independence led to a 
polarisation of attitudes amongst the independent states. This emergence 
of regional groupings amongst African states was probably unavoidable 
considering the different colonial experiences of these states. This 
development was probably encouraged by the metropolitan powers, Great 
Britain and France, both of whom expected to retain some sort of 
influence over their former colonies. 
Three main organisations preceded the formation of the OAU. They were 
the African States of the Casablanca Charter (Casablanca Group) 
34, the 
African and Malagasy Union [U. A. M. ] (the Brazzaville Group) 
35 
and the 
36 
Organisation of Inter-African and Malagasy States (Monrovia Group) 
These Groups represented the radical, conservative and moderate 
37 
opinions on African unity respectively. 
33 IW Zartman, International Relations In the New African, (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966). 
34 The Casablanca Group was established on 7 January 1961 and was 
composed of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, U. A. R., Algeria, Morocco and Libya. 
35 The Brazaville Group was formed on 12 September 1961 and was 
composed of Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Brazaville, Gabon, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal and the Upper Volta. 
36 The Monrovia Group was formed on 30 January 1962, following a 
preliminary conference in Monrovia on 12 May 1961, and was composed of 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Togo. 
37 J. Mayall, "African Unity and the OAU" in Yearbook of World Affairs, 
27 1973 pp. 110-33 at p. 112. 
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The UAM was the first group to emerge as "une organisation de 
cooperation politique, une union d'Etats"38. It should be observed that 
the common bond of language and a shared colonial experience had 
encouraged them to cooperate in an exploration of mutual concern for 
their economic and foreign policy. At a meeting of the Brazzaville states 
held on 27 March 1961 at Yaounde, Cameroon, the African and Malagasy 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation (Organisation Africaine et Malgache 
de Co-operation Economique) (OAMCE) was established to coordinate 
economic cooperation39. The members of the Brazzaville Group were 
united by "ideological sympathies and common objectives rather than 
regional proximity"40. The main rationale behind their policies was the 
desire to maintain cordial links with France. According to C. Hoskyns 
"there was no commitment, even in the distant future, to African unity, 
and no support for liberation movements"41. Although the U. A. M. 
Charter presents the organisation as a union of independent and 
sovereign states to which all independent African States were eligible for 
membership, the organisation remained restricted to French-speaking 
African States42. The main objectives of the UAM was to organise co- 
operation among member States with a view to maintaining and promoting 
solidarity, collective security, development in various fields and peace in 
43 Africa and the world at large 
38 Guy Feuer, "Les Conferences Africaines et 'Organisation de la 
Communaute Africo-Malagche d'expression francaise" in Annualre Francais 
de Droit International, Vol. VII 1961, p. 767. 
39 
A. J. G. M. Sanders, International Jurisprudence in African Context, 
(Butterworths, London 1979), p. 104. 
40 C. Hoskyns, Pan Africanism and Integration op cit p. 364. 
41 C. Hoskyne, Ibid p. 364. 
42 A. J. G. M. Sanders op cit p. 105. 
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Meanwhile, the Casablanca group had adopted the Casablanca Charter44 
which provided for the establishment of a supra-national African 
Consultative Assembly which would hold periodic sessions and would 
consist of representatives of every African State. The Charter also 
provided for three permanent functional committees. The African 
Political Committee comprising the Heads of State or their 
representatives, which was charged with the responsibility for co- 
ordinating the general policies of the various African States; the Charter 
established an African Economic Committee and the Cultural Committee 
with the latter body composed of Ministers of Education and the former 
comprising Ministers of Economic Development, The Joint African High 
Command was also instituted. 
An examination of the Casablanca Charter reveals that is shares the same 
aims and goals as those of the Charter of the African and Malagasy 
Unions with the notable exception that the latter charter did not make 
provision for a Joint African High Command. In practice, the UAM 
States were basically inward-looking and defensive while the Casablanca 
group was militant and determined to spread its influence in Africa and 
45 
abroad 
To prevent further regional polarization, some of the newly independent 
States namely, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone46 organised a conference in 
Monrovia, Liberia on 8 May 1961 ostensibly to discuss the Algerian and 
Congolese crises. However, the conference, which was attended by 
twenty-two of the then twenty-seven independent African States, was 
44 The Charter was adopted at the meeting of Casablanca states held in Casablanca, from 3 to 7 January 1961. 
45 C. Hoskyns op cit p. 365-366. 
46 These independent states were termed "The Monrovia Group" of 
moderate states. 
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confronted with an agenda designed to explore the means of establishing 
a "universal" organisation as opposed to "partial organisations"47. The 
conference agreed that membership was open to all independent African 
states and observer status was granted to several liberation 
movements48. The conference adopted several resolutions which, in the 
main, called for the establishment of a regional machinery for political 
and economic cooperation in Africa. It established a provisional 
secretariat which would be responsible for preparing a draft charter of 
the proposed Inter-African and Malagasy Organisations (IAMB) to be 
submitted to the second meeting of the group scheduled to be held on 25 
January 1962 at Lagos, Nigeria. The conference also agreed on basic 
principles to govern the relationship between African States, viz, (1) 
absolute equality of states, (2) non interference in the internal affairs of 
states, (3) respect for territorial integrity, (4) the inalienable right to 
political independence, (5) peaceful settlement of disputes and (6) the 
49 
promotion of cooperation among member states. 
The consensus reached provided the basis for the Lagos draft Charter. 
The draft Charter provided for three principal organs: 
(a) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
(b) Council of Ministers, and 
(c) General Secretariat as the central administrative organ of the 
organisation. 
-------------------- 
47 C. Hoskyns, "Trends and Developments In the OAU", in Yearbook of 
World Affairs, 1967, p. 166.167. 
48 Paul A. Thorpe, Regional International Organisations: Structure and 
Function, (St. Martin Press, New York 1971) p. 48. 
49 T. O. Elias "The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity In, The 
American Journal of International Law (1965) Vol. 59, p. 244. T. O. Elias then the Attorney General of Nigeria was The Chairman of the Legal and Political Committee of the Conference. 
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Furthermore, the draft Charter incorporated the principle of settlement 
of disputes between contracting states by peaceful means. 
The Charter did not come into force because of the reluctance of the 
'radical' Casablanca group. The reluctance of the Casablanca group, 
thus stunted the progress toward the establishment of a truly regional 
organisation50. It is to be noted that, at the Lagos Conference, 
strongly worded resolutions were adopted affirming the principle of the 
right of all peoples to self determination, and condemning apartheid in 
South Africa, the colonial wars in Algeria and Angola and all forms of 
colonialism in Africa. 
The achievement of Algeria's Independence in June 1962 and the end of 
the Congo conflict January 1963 created a conciliatory atmosphere among 
the three groups; Casablanca, Brazzaville and Monrovia. The two main 
issues that had split the factions had thus been removed51. Ethiopia 
and the members of the moderate group of states proposed an alternate 
African Conference to reconcile the differences that existed amongst the 
groups. The conference was held in Addis Ababa on 23 May 1963 and in 
attendance were thirty African Heads of State and Government52. The 
conference was preceded by a preparatory meeting of foreign ministers 
which considered three draft Charters, namely, the Casablanca Charter, 
-------------------- 
50 N. J. Padelford, The Organisation of African Unity, Journal of 
International Organisation Vol. 18,1964 pp. 521-522. 
51 J. Mayall op cit, p. 114. 
52 The thirty independent African states that attended the conference 
were: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo-Brazaville, Congo-Leopoldville, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, Tanganyika, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic and Upper Volta. Morocco sent an observer. The Togolese President Grunitzky 
was refused membership. 
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the Lagos Charter and the Ethiopian draft Charter53. The meeting of 
foreign ministers did not reach a definite agreement and it was finally 
54 
resolved to submit the Ethiopian draft "as a basis for discussion" 
The Conference for Heads of State and Governments, eventually adopted 
a Charter of the Organisation of African Unity having regard to the 
collective efforts of the participating states which had common interests 
in regional peace, security, liberty, economic cooperation and in finding 
55 
solutions to African problems 
The foregoing discourse reveals that the Pan-African movement was not 
only a continental unification force, but also a champion of the rights of 
Africans in an epoch marked by racial oppression, colonialism and 
economic subjugation. Some of the major advocates of Pan-Africanism, 
notably George Padmore, Nkrumah, Dubois and Jomo Kenyatta, had long 
before the grant of independence to the majority of African States shown 
concern for human rights. At the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in 
Manchester in 1945, where the first conscious effort was made to 
establish a link between human rights and the crusade against colonialism 
on the one hand and between Pan-Africanism and human rights on the 
other, they called for the abolition of all racial discrimination, for 
freedom of expression, of the press and assembly and for compulsory 
education up to the age of sixteen56. These rights were pursued during 
that era in order to facilitate the struggle against colonialism especially 
-------------------- 
53 I. Wallerstein, The Early Years of the OAU: The Search for 
Organisational Pre-eminence; Journal of International Organisation, Vol. 20 
1966, p p. 774-775. 
54 J. Woronoff op cit p. 128. 
55 P. Duncan Towards Unity in Africa, Journal of Foreign Affairs 
Vol. 42,1964 pp. 267. 
56 Karel Vasak "Problems Concerning the Setting Up of Regional 
Commissions on Human Rights, with Special Reference to Africa", 
Background paper for United Nations Seminar on the Establishment 
Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special Reference to Ai 
Cairo, 2-15 September 1969, SO 216/3(17) 1969 p. 11. 
rica. 
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as they typified the rights denied to the colonised peoples57. Thus, 
concern for human rights was a recurring theme throughout the Pan- 
African movement. 
We now propose to analyse the legal framework of the OAU Charter, 
including its aims, objectives and organs with a view to establishing its 
relevance to human rights. 
(b) Human Rights and the OAU Charter 
The OAU Charter was signed in Addis Ababa on 26 May 1963 by 31 
member states and entered into force immediately. The main Issue that 
had delayed the establishment of the OAU - whether the Institutions 
should be union of states or an association of independent units - was 
resolved in favour of the latter. However this conclusion was not 
achieved without acrimony. 
During the Addis Ababa Conference immediately preceding the signing of 
the OAU Charter, Nkumah stated that: 
"African Unity is above all a political Kingdom which can be 
gained by political means. The social and economic 
development of Africa will come only within the political 
kingdom, not the other way round. The United States of 
America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were the 
political decisions of revolutionary peoples before thgW became 
mighty realities of social power and material wealth" 
-------------------- 
57 
James Read "Bill of Rights in The Third World, Some Commonwealth 
Experiences", in Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, (ed. Prof. Dr. Herbert Kruger), 1. Heft 1, Quartal 1973, p. 29. 
58 Quoted in Chimelu Chime, Integration and Politics Among African 
States (Scandinavian Institute of African Studie; Uppsalla 1977) n. 7, 
p. 185. 
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This last stand taken by Nkrumah representing the federalist position 
was overwhelmed by the moderates/functionalists group which was in 
majority at the conference. President Tsiranana of the Malagasy 
Republic summarized the functionalists positions thus: 
"We intend to conserve the total sovereignty of our states... 
I should underline that our adhesion means, by the same 
token, a rejection of a formula for a federation of African 
States because federalism presupposes a surrender of a large 
part of national sovereignty. Similarly we would reject a 
confederal formula seeing that the authority we superimpose 
on the States might imposg9 demands which would be 
unacceptable for certain of us" 
An examination of the OAU Charter betrays the strong mood of African 
States to jealously safeguard their hard won independence. However, 
the OAU Charter reveals the awareness of the responsibility for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 
The preamble of the OAU Charter of which great care and time was 
devoted reflects this awareness. Almost half of the time spend on 
considering the Charter as a whole had been devoted to the preamble 
above60. The preamble opens with a recital of the principle of the 
Inalienable right of all peoples to self determination, freedom, equality, 
justice and dignity in order to promote co-operation among African 
peoples based on mutual understanding and transcending ethnic and 
national differences. 
-------------------- 
59 Ibld, p. 188. 
60 T. O. Elias, "The Charter of the OAU" American Journal of International Law, 59,1965, p. 246. 
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Further the preamble reaffirms the adherence of state parties to the 
principles of the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as a "solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation 
61 
among states 
Some commentators have criticized this verbal allegiance to the western 
inspired Universal Declaration of Human Rights as unrealistic because it 
ignores the peculiarity of the African continent particularly her cultures, 
tradition and values62. We submit that the recital is a recognition of the 
existence of basic universal minimum standards of human rights which 
should be observed. Furthermore, taking the preamble of the OAU 
Charter as a whole, the cumulative impression is that the founding 
fathers must have been convinced that adherence to the Charter of the 
OAU and the Universal Declaration Is consistent with the "common 
determination to promote understanding and collaboration among (African) 
States"63 and the "responsibility to harness the natural and human 
resources of (Africa) for the total advancement of (Africans) In spheres 
of human endeavour"64. These stipulations can be said to have always 
expressed an ideological if not judicial purpose which respect human 
rights. 
All independent African States are members of the United Nations and 
the OAU. By acceding to the Charters of these organisations they have 
voluntarily assumed responsibility for the respect of human rights65 
-------------------- 
61 The 8th Preambular OAU Charter, See Appendix II. 
62 
O. Aluko "The Organisation of African Unity and Human Rights" 
Roundtable 282 July 1981, pp. 234-44. 
63 The 4th Preambular Paragraph, OAU Charter. 
64 Ibid 3rd Preambular Paragraph. 
65 See Address of the OAU Secretary-General to the Meeting of Experts Preparing the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Dakar, Senegal 28 Nov-8 Dec 1974, p. 4. 
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The Universal Declaration has been universally acknowledged as valid 
international law. Saario and Cass state that "as new nations have 
referred to it or incorporated it Into their constitutions or fundamental 
law, as national judicial decisions have cited it approvingly, and as it 
has been acknowledge by or incorporated into a wide range of 
international conventions, declarations and recommendations, its 
justifiable principles at least have been elevated with considerable 
authority to status of customary international law"ss. Furthermore, 
Professor Humphrey lends support to this view by stating that "whatever 
its drafters may have intended, (the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights) is now part of the customary law of nations" and therefore 
67 binding on all states. 
The reference to the Universal Declaration in the preamble of the OAU 
Charter, strictly speaking does not impose any obligations on OAU 
member states, because preambular provisions, whether In treaties or 
domestic legal instruments, are not usually legally binding. However, 
the preambular reference to the Universal Declaration does establish the 
basis for the positive provisions that are embodied in the Charter. 
Some of the provisions of the "purposes" of the OAU are consecrated to 
human rights. One of the main "purposes" of the organisation is the 
promotion of "international cooperation having due regard to the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"ss. 
The reference to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration denotes 
not merely the adherence of Member States to the principles contained in 
-------------------- 
66 Saario and Cass, The United Nations and the International Protection 
of Human Rights: A Legal Analysis and Interpretation. 7 California, 
Western International Law Journal (1977) p. 596. 
67 J. P. Humphrey, The Implementation of International Human Rights 
Law, 24 NYLSC Review (1978) p. 32. 
68 Article II (1)(e) OAU Charter. 
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these instruments but also to the awareness of the African States of the 
need for international cooperation in practical terms69. The OAU 
Charter also requires Member States "to coordinate and intensify their 
collaboration and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of 
Africa"70 and "eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa"71. It can 
thus be established that the OAU expects its members to protect human 
rights guaranteed in the UN Charter and as especially expounded in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We must, however, hazard that 
this expectation does not necessarily amount to an obligation on OAU 
Member States to promote and protect human rights. Indeed, the 
emphasis on sovereignty in the OAU Charter and the fanaticism with 
which the OAU has defended the doctrines of territorial sovereignty - 
even in the face of near genocide instructive of this view72. The 
obligation on OAU Member States to promote and protect human rights 
arises not out of the "purposes" provisions OAU Charter per se but from 
their status as signatories to the UN Charter and or the Universal 
Declaration. Not unlike the provisions of the preamble, the "purposes" 
provisions are generally not regarded as imposing any legal obligations 
on parties to a treaty. 
The principles or articles of faith of the OAU are contained in Article III 
of the Charter which affirms the following principles: 
(1) The sovereign equality of all Member States; 
(2) Non-interference in the Internal affairs of States; 
(3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each 
-------------------- 
69 Elias o cit p. 247. 
70 Article II (1)(b) OAU Charter. 
71 Ibid Article II (1)(d). 
72 H. W. U. Okotu Ogendo "National Implementations of International Responsibility, East African Law Journal Vol. 10,1974, p. 11. 
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State and for its inalienable right to independent existence; 
(4) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration; 
(5) Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political 
assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part 
of neighbouring States or any other States; 
(6) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African 
territories which are still dependent; 
(7) Affirmation of a policy of nonalignment with regard to all 
blocs. 
The principle of the sovereign equality of all OAU Member States, 
restates the position of the UN Charter, Article 2(1) of which states that 
the U. N. O. "is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all Its 
Members "? 3. The main rationale for the OAU provision was the desire of 
larger members to allay the fears of the smaller states in the context of 
74 the prevailing spirit of unity and solidarity. 
Ancillary to the principle of the sovereign equality of OAU Member States 
Is the principle of non-interference In the Internal affairs of states. 
This latter principle is similar to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which 
prohibits UN intervention in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state. 
In his interpretation of the issue whether human rights matters are 
within the domestic jurisdiction of States, Professor Rateb delineates 
three approaches namely: 
_ 
-------------------- 
73 
Article 2(1) UN Charter. 
74 
T. O. Elias op cit p. 248. 
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(a) Those who recognise the power of the State concerned to 
exercise its own sovereign decision in a disputed question; 
(b) Those who believe that the competence of deciding on 
admissibility of an objection (incidental plea) belongs to the 
body against which objection is directed; 
(c) Those who do not directly uphold the power of the United 
Nations bodies to take a decision in the matter, but who 
attach the main importance to the term 'intervene' applied to 
Article 2, paragraph 7, and are of the opinion that the 
intervention of which this Article speaks refers only to 
peaceful non-coercive intervention of the United Nations in 
the domestic affairs of a Member State without the consent 
75 
or against the wish of that State. 
The UN on its part, has often asserted jurisdiction over a wide range of 
matters especially those of human rights. The rationale for this can be 
found in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in 
the Certain Expenses case which states that; 
"... when an Organization takes action which warrants the 
assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of 
the stated purposes of the United Nations, the, presuption 
is that such action is not ultra vices the organisations" . 
Therefore, the OAU can take action on human rights in furtherance of 
"international cooperation having due regard to the UN Charter and the 
77 Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 
-------------------- 
75 
A. Rateb, Background paper prepared for the United Nations Seminar 
on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights, Cairo 2- 
15 September 1969, p. 8-9. 
76 I. C. J. Reports 1962 p. 151; See also Louis B. Sohn "Recent Cases on United Nations Law" (1963) p. 37. 
77 Article II (1)(e) OAU Charter. 
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However, it may be argued that the relevance of the interpretations of 
the UN provision is limited since the OAU provision differs in two major 
respects. Firstly, whereas the UN provision forbids 'intervention", the 
OAU provision adopts a broader term in outlawing "interference". 
Secondly, while the UN provision reserves to States matters "essentially" 
within their domestic jurisdiction, the OAU Charter exclusively reserves 
to states matters within the ambit of their internal affairs. 
Consequently, due to the wider scope covered by the OAU Charter 
provision, human rights issues may fall within the ambit of matters 
within the domestic jurisdiction of Member States. Thus some scholars 
contend that human rights promotions and protections are limited to 
inter-state co-operation under the OAU Charter. 
78 
On the other hand, it is evident that since the OAU Charter only 
imposes obligations of non-interference upon Member States and not upon 
the organisation itself79, nothing estopps the OAU from taking action on 
human rights issues in furtherance or in fulfilment of its stated 
purposes. In this context, Article 15 the Charter of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) provides that "no state or group of states has 
the right to intervene directly or indirectly in the internal or external 
affairs of any other state". Therefore, the OAS principle prohibits all 
forms of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements80. 
However, international instruments impose obligations upon State Parties 
to refrain from threats to peace and, above all, to respect principles of 
human rights. Therefore it is submitted that the OAS cannot evade its 
-------------------- 
78 O. Eze Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems (MacMillan, 
Nigeria) 1984, p. 199. 
79 Onyeonoro Kononu "Secession and the Right of Self-determination: An 
OAU Dilemma" Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 12,1974, p. 371. 
80 Marjorie Whiteman "Digest of International Law" Vol. 5 1963, (Department of State Publication, Washington DC 1971), p. 463. 
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responsibility to observe these obligations and act if investigations reveal 
that international peace or human rights are violated. 
An analysis of the OAU Charter reveals that it allows for exemptions to 
the rule of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member state. 
Justice Elias has however, asserted that the principle of non-interference 
is an absolute prohibition81. If this is so, what do we make of Article 
III (7) of the OAU Charter which is an "affirmation of a policy of non- 
alignment with regard to all blocs , 
82. Dr. B. Akinyeml contends that 
"The fact that this article (III (7) l does not impose a limitation on the 
foreign policy alternatives available to Member States and to the extent 
that foreign policy is to a large extent determined by domestic affairs of 
83 
Member States... " the principle of non-interference is not sacrosanct. 
Furthermore, the UN in its articulation of Article 2(7) of its Charter 
applies the principle that any action which furthers the realisation of the 
purposes of the organisation can not be ultra vices the organisation. 
Applying this principle to the OAU, it is evident that the OAU Charters 
reaffirmation of adherence of its Members to the Charter of the UN and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights implies that human rights 
promotion and protection Is one of the purposes of the OAU. Thus OAU 
Member States being members of the UN have an obligation to promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
-------------------- 
81 
T. O. Elias Africa and the Development of International Law (Oceana 
Publications Inc. 1972) p. 127. 
82 Article III (7) OAU Charter. 
83 Bolaji Akinyemi "The Organisation of African Unity and the Concept of 
Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of Member States" British 
Yearbook of International Law (1972-73) p. 398. Despite the fact that 
many OAU Member States support the policy of non-allignment, several 
States do not effectively pursue the policy. See Adekunle Ajala "The 
OAU and Non-Alignment" Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.?. 
1981, No. 1&2, p. 116. 
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religion84. Thus OAU Member States cannot rely on the OAU Charter or 
any other treaty to violate the human rights that the UN Charter 
recognises. This submission is based on the presumption that the OAU 
is a regional arrangement within Article 52 of the UN Charter. 
According to T. O. Elias, the reference to the UN in both the Preamble 
and Article III of the OAU Charter is an indication that OAU Member 
States regard their organisation as falling within the category of regional 
arrangements envisages in Article 52(1) of the UN Charter85. 
Furthermore H. Levie contends that there is an implied acceptance that 
OAU's authority is subject to the obligations to which its members have 
agreed under the UN Charter and acts as such as a limitation on its 
legitimate functions. 86 
Gross violations of human rights have been consistently viewed. by the 
UN as matters of international concern since they violate international 
obligations of the delinquent State (under the UN Charter) and they 
cause international friction. A study of UN practice shows that for 
these reasons, human rights violations cannot be regarded as matters 
encapsulated by domestic jurisdiction clauses. Thus the attempt to 
confine human rights Issues to the domestic jurisprudence domain by 
reference to Article 111(2) of the OAU Charter, though plausible, is 
nevertheless handicapped by the obligations assumed by the States as UN 
Members and also by the practice of the UN. 
Although the scope of the human rights obligations of States under the 
-------------------- 
84 
The provision of Articles 1(3); 55(c) and 56 of the UN Charter impose 
obligations on all UN Member States to promote respect for and 
observance of human rights. 
85 T. O. Elias "The Charter of the OAU" American Journal of International Law 59,1965, p. 247. 
86 Howard S. Levie "Some Constitutional Aspects of Selected Regional Organisations -A Comparative Study" Colonbia Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 5, p. 64. 
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UN Charter remains unsettled, the meaning of "human rights and 
fundamental freedoms" is generally determined by reference to the 
catalogue of rights proclaimed in UN human rights instruments, especially 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which most African states 
subscribe. Since its adoption, by the General Assembly in 1948, the 
Universal Declaration has been increasingly viewed as having achieved a 
measure of legal significance in spite of the clear original intention not to 
regard it as imposing legal obligations87. This view is predicated upon 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which 
permits the application of "international custom, as evidence or a general 
principle accepted as law" and "the general principle of law recognized 
by civilized nations"88. Furthermore, several international fora on 
international law have declared that the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights has become part of customary international law89. The 
Declaration has also been viewed as setting forth "general principles of 
international law"90 and binding on all States whether they are members 
of the UN or not91. It is therefore our submission that the Universal 
Declaration is now part of the law of nations and thus binding not 
because it was adopted by the General Assembly, but for other reasons 
including subsequent events and the emergence of a juridical consensus 
-------------------- 
87 In his dissenting opinion in the South West Africa Cases (Second 
Phase), Tanaka J. states that although not binding in itself, the 
Universal Declaration constituted evidence of the Interpretation and 
application of the relevant Charter provisions. I. C. J. Reports 1966 
pp. 288-293. 
88 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,1945 
Article 38,59. Stat. 1055 T. S. No. 993. 
89 For instance, see Montreal Statement of Assembly for Human Rights 
reprinted in 9. International Commission of Jurists at 94,95 (1968); and 
also the International Conference on Human Rights, Proclamation of Tehran; UN Doc. ST/HRI; UN Doc. A/Conf. 32/41 1968. 
90 Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company (Belgium v Spain) 1970 ICJ, 3,303 (Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun). 
91 Professor J. P. Humphrey, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character" B. G. Ramcharan (ed) Human Rights After Thirty Years (Martin us/Nijhoff Hague, 1979. 
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endorsed by the practice of states. 
Most African States subscribe to the Universal Declaration in addition to 
reaffirming the Declaration in the OAU Charter. Thus since OAU 
Member States have assumed international obligations relating to human 
rights under the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration, disputes 
among them regarding these obligations are certainly matters of 
international rather than domestic concern. Consequently, the provision 
of Article 111(2) of the OAU Charter which established the principle of 
"non-interference in the internal affairs of states" cannot prevent one 
OAU Member State from asking another to live up to its international 
obligations in the matter of human rights. 
The third principle of the OAU establishes "the respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity for each state and for Its inalienable right to 
independent existence"92. This principle is an extension of the two 
preceding principles since It guarantees the inviolability of the territory 
of each Member State by forbidding any act on the part of another State 
which is calculated either to deprive that other State of its existence as 
a polity or which in any way impedes the exercise of its prerogatives or 
attributes of sovereignty. The UN equivalent of this policy is enshrined 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which states that; "All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political Independence of any state or 
in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". 
Unlike the UN Charter, the Charter of the OAU does not make- provision 
for an institution akin to the UN Security Council, where major powers 
may exercise exclusive votes on matters of war and peace. This was a 
-------------------- 
92 
Artlcle 111 (3) OAU Charter. 
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deliberate act on the part of the OAU's founding fathers to prevent the 
emergence of power blocs on the continent. The OAU Charter adopts a 
"one State, one vote" formulae93, in comparison to the weighted voting 
formula currently adopted by the EEC and some UN Specialised Agencies, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Finance 
Cooperation (IFC). 
The fourth main principle of the OAU is that of the peaceful settlement 
of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration94. With 
a view to effecting the peaceful settlement of disputes, Article XIX of 
the OAU Charter provides for the establishment of a Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which Is one of the four principal 
institutions of the OAU. An appraisal of the Commission shall be 
undertaken very shortly. Article III(4) of the OAU Charter is 
comparable to Article 33(1) of the UN Charter which requires "the 
Parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security shall first seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other 
peaceful means of their own choice". It is however evident that the OAU 
Charter does not envisage the settlement of disputes by judicial means. 
It is arguable whether other institutions or agencies can participate in 
the resolution of African disputes under the auspices of the UN. The 
position depen ds upon the view one takes regarding the issue of whether 
the OAU Is a regional arrangement or agency within Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter. We subscribe to the view that the OAU is a regional 
-------------------- 
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Article XIV OAU Charter. 
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99 
arrangement94 and thus perceive no obstacles to the participation of 
extra-OAU agencies in the resolution or settlement of African disputes. 
However, the practice of the OAU and indeed the UN has been one of 
"try OAU first". This approach implies that whenever a serious problem 
of a basically regional character defies all peacemaking efforts of the 
OAU, the UN organ(s) would in the appropriate manner organis e moral 
and political support for such efforts and if necessary play a 
complimentary diplomatic role. 
The "try OAU first" approach or principle, finds support in Article 
52(2) of the UN Charter which requires UN Member States that are also 
members of regional organisations to make every effort to achieve 
peaceful settlement of local disputes before referring them to the 
Security Council. An examination of OAU efforts in the resolution of 
various conflicts reveals that the OAU has established undisputed 
jurisdiction as a body of first instance, but that in spite of its lack of 
success in many cases, no concerted attempt has been made to seek 
solutions through the UN95. Moreover, in the instances when disputes 
were brought to the UN, the Security Council did not as required by 
Article 34, conduct an Investigation and recommend any method of 
adjustment other than a regional one, nor did it propose appropriate 
terms of settlement under Article 37. For instance, after the Congo 
Crisis In 1964 the Security Council made it clear that is regarded the 
OAU as a regional arrangement by stating that it was "convinced that 
the OAU should be able in the context of Article 52 of the Charter of 
the UN to help find a peaceful solution to all the problems and disputes 
-------------------- 
94 
Rose M. DSa The Relationship Between the UN and the OAU in the 
Fields of International Peace and Security, and of Economic and Social 
Development, Ph. D. Thesis University of Birmingham, 1983, pp. 24-25. 
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B. Andemicael (ed) Regionalism and the United Nations. Part II 
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affecting peace and security in the continent of Africa"96. However, 
this has not affected the role of the UN Security General in providing 
diplomatic assistance in the settlement of African disputes97. Indeed the 
UN Secretary General has on various occasions taken diplomatic 
initiatives as a matter of duty before OAU organs could meet and discuss 
them. 
It is pertinent to refer to the equivalent provision of the OAS Charter 
which provides for the submissions of all disputes between American 
States to the peaceful procedures of the OAS before being referred to 
the UN Security Council98. The OAS Charter thus differs from the OAU 
Charter as far as the former specifically provides for the settlement of 
disputes within the procedures of the OAS before being referred to the 
Security Council. 
In pursuit of its stated purposes, the OAU Charter consecrates In the 
fifth principle, "the unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of 
political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of 
neighbouring States or any other State"99. The Incorporation of the 
condemnation of political assassinations and subversive actions were a 
response, firstly, to the assassination of President S. Olymplo of Togo in 
January 1963 in a coup d'etat and secondly, to the constant complaints 
by some Member States that other States within the OAU were fuelling 
100 
subversive activities against duly constituted authorities. 
96 UN Security Council Resolution 199 (164) of December 30 1964. 
97 B. Andemicael and D. Nicol "The OAU: Primacy in Seeking African 
Solutions within the UN Charter" In Y. El-Ayouty and W. Zartman (eds) 
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Furthermore the OAU Charters unreserved condemnation of political 
assassinations highlights the awareness of Member States of the need to 
protect the right to life, albeit betraying the anxiety of the Heads of 
State for their self-preservation. 
The sixth OAU principle imposes on the organisation and the Members 
States the duty of absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the 
African territories which are still dependent. In this regard, the 
Preamble to the Charter of the OAU lays the foundation by emphasising 
the determination of the OAU "to fight against neo-colonialism in all its 
forms". It will be recalled that one of the purposes of the UN Charter 
as expressed in Article 1(2) Is "to develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self 
determination of all peoples". The principle of self determination has 
been a permanent item on the agenda of the UN since its inception. By 
virtue of Resolution 421(V) of December 4,1950, the UN General 
Assembly recognized that "the right of peoples and nations to self- 
determination is a fundamental human right". The most significant trend 
towards the recognition of the principle of self-determination as a legal 
right was the 1960 Declaration of the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples101 The representatives of African States 
at the UN played a significant role in the formulation of this Declaration 
which established a 13 member committee with a view to supervising the 
102 implementation of the Declaration 
The OAU, in pursuance of the principle, established a Liberation 
Committee with headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The Committee 
-------------------- 
101 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 4 December 1960. 
102 
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was charged with the responsibility of providing and coordinating 
financial assistance for all African Liberation Movements which are 
struggling for the political independence of their territories. The OAU 
Liberation Committee suffered from the lack of cooperation from several 
African States and problems of internal organisation. The extent of the 
Committee's problems is reflected in the sharp criticism levelled against it 
by the Ghanaian daily, The Spark which accused the Committee of 
"exceeding its mandate for planning the strategy of the liberation 
struggle; surrendered powers of vital points to individual African States 
without authority, [has] shown little concern in its budget for the 
liberation struggle, disregarded secrecy by revealing its military 
intelligence"03 
Several African States refused or neglected to contribute to what had 
hitherto been voluntary sums to the Committee. In response, the 1964 
Cairo Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Government 
decided that all OAU Member States should contribute a compulsory 
minimum sum to the Committee based on the formulae of payments to the 
UN. The legality of the military and financial contributions to Liberation 
Movements will be addressed in Chapter Four. 
At the level of the UN, the African State representatives actively 
pursued the principle of the total emancipation of African territories from 
colonial domination. Towards this end they endeavoured to secure the 
legitimacy of armed struggle against colonial powers in order to achieve 
the legal recognition of Liberation Movements. Consequently, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2189 on 13 December 1966 which 
reaffirmed "the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial 
rule to exercise thought of self determination and independence" and 
-------------------- 
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urged "all States to give material and moral assistance to national 
liberation movements' in colonial territories104. Despite the apparent 
success of African States in establishing universal opprobrium against 
colonialism and apartheid, the enforcement of resolutions by them has 
been poor. In the Rhodesian affair, for instance, the OAU Member 
States were preoccupied with safeguarding their sovereignty and were 
reluctant to interfere in a matter which was regarded as within the 
sovereign authority of the United Kingdom105. Furthermore, despite the 
zeal and determination of some of the OAU Members, the problems of 
legitimacy, resources and operational competence posed obstacles to the 
goal of total emancipation of the African territories which were 
dependent. We propose to address these problems in the following 
Chapter on Self Determination. 
The seventh basic principle of the OAU is the affirmation of the policy of 
106 
nonalignment with regard to all blocs, The same principle is 
expounded in the OAU Solemn Declaration on General Policy as follows: 
"In order to help reduce the tension between blocs, we have 
subscribed to the policy of nonalignment and to give meaning 
to this commitment, we have expressed our deep desire to 
see Africa rid itself of all foreign military bases and stand 
aloof from any military alliances and from armaments 
race" 
It is the foreign policy of most OAU Member States that absolute 
-------------------- 
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neutrality must be maintained in their relations with both Eastern and 
Western powers. The policy of nonalignment was first declared by the 
late Jawaharlal Nehru of India and implies the avoidance of involvement 
108 In the cold war between the so called free and unfree worlds 
Despite the avowed determination of most African States to maintain a 
policy of nonalignment the existence of financial and technical aid from 
both East and or West weakens the resolve of some States to maintain the 
policy. In recent years, the mounting Third World debt crises has 
forced several African States to adopt Western economic models in order 
to stay creditworthy. However deliberate and well-conceived the non- 
alignment programme may be, it can only succeed on the basis of a 
reformed regional economic model based on self-reliance. 
It is significant that out of the seven basic Principles examined, four are 
clearly in defence of sovereign rights of Member States as prescribed by 
the Monrovia Group of African States. The first principle being the 
sovereign equality of Member States, was a rejection of the Pan- 
Africanist view that there were too many unviable and unjustifiably small 
sovereign states in Africa. Only two principles appear to be concessions 
to the Casablanca Group, namely, the dedication to liberate the 
dependent territories and the declaration of adherence to the principle of 
nonalignment. The assiduity of the OAU founding fathers to protect 
both sovereignty and equality of States is reflected in the principles 
109 enunciated in the OAU Charter. 
108 T. O. Elias "The Charter of the OAU" op cit p. 250. 
109 K. Mathews 'The Organisation of African Unity' In D. Mazzeo (ed) 
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The Charter of the OAU embodies relevant provisions relating to 
"economic, social and cultural rights" amongst its purposes110, The 
Preamble of the OAU Charter proclaims the desire that all African States 
should unite to assume the welfare and well-being of their peoples 
Furthermore, Article 11(2) lists six fields112 in which OAU Member States 
shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies towards the goals 
set in Article II(1) which include the promotion of international 
cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the UN and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights113. It is pertinent to observe 
that the OAU Charter in requiring Member States to coordinate and 
harmonize their general policies in the six fields, omits the specific field 
of human rights. The partially redeeming factor here, according to 
T. O. Elias, is that these categories "do not exhaust all the possibilities 
of continental endeavours towards the attainment of unity and solidarity 
among the peoples of Africa"114, or indeed the protection of their 
rights. The adoption and coming into force of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights by OAU Member States supports this view. 
With regard to harmonization of policies in the specified fields, 
Considerable emphasis has been laid on the field of economic cooperation. 
Sub-regional economic organisations have arisen out of the post-colonial 
heritage (such as the West African Economic Community [G. E. A. O. ] or 
110 B. G. Ramcharan "Human Rights in Africa, Wither Now? " University 
of Ghana Law Review Vol. XII (1975) No. 2, p. 91. 
111 Preambular Paragraph 9, OAU Charter. 
112 OAU Member States are required by Article II (2) to harmonize and 
coordinate their general policies In the following fields: (a) political and diplomatic cooperation; 
(b) economic cooperation, including transport and communications; (c) educational and cultural cooperation; 
(d) health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; 
(e) scientific and technical cooperation; and (f) cooperation for defence and security 
113 Article II (1)(e) Ibid. 
114 T. O. Elias The Organisation of African Unity op cit p. 247. 
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the Customs and Economic Union of Equatorial Africa [U. D. E. A. C. ]), or 
as a result of initiatives of the UN Economic Commission for Africa 
[E. C. A. ] (such as the Economic Community of West African States 
[E. C. O. W. A. S. ], and the Eastern African Preferential Trade Area 
[P. T. A. ] or in response to particular sub-regional needs (such as the 
115 S . A. D. C. C. ) 
The foregoing examination of the aims and objectives of the OAU Charter 
reveals that the founding fathers of the OAU recognized the need for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. The OAU Charter is the first 
regional Charter to subscribe to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The Member States of the OAU have a duty to cooperate in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. However the effective 
promotion and protection of human rights is not enhanced by the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
Member States. It is however submitted, that due to the obligations that 
OAU Member States have assumed by being Members of the UN and by 
endorsing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these States cannot 
claim that human rights issues are matters solely confined to domestic 
jurisdiction. 
(c) The Principal Organs of the OAU 
We propose to examine the institutional framework of the principle organs 
of the OAU in the context of human rights promotion and protection. As 
indicated in the organizational chart of the OAU116, the OAU Charter 
provides for the following principle institutions: 
-------------------- 
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(1) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government; 
(2) The Council of Ministers; 
(3) The General Secretariat; 
(4) The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
In Addition to the foregoing principal institutions, Article XX of the OAU 
Charter provides for the following specialised Commissions: 
(1) Economic and Social Commission; 
(2) Educational and Cultural Commission; 
(3) Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission; 
(4) Defence Commission; 
(5) Scientific, Technical and Research Commission 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is "the supreme organ" 
of the OAU117 . The Council of Ministers ranks second and 
it acts as a 
118 "cabinet" to the Assembly. The General Secretariat is subordinate to 
the Council of Ministers to which it Is directly responsible. The 
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration is not to be 
confused with the specialised Commissions established under Article XX. 
The Commission Is rates on a par with the Secretariat, the Council of 
119 
Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
Whereas these four organs are the principal institutions of the 
organisation, the specialized commissions are answerable to the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government through the Council of Ministers. 
The fact that the Charter does not provide for a Commission on Human 
-------------------- 
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Rights is probably significant of the attitude of African States towards 
the effective protection of human rights during the OAU's formative 
years. Again, the desire to seek solace in the fact that the list is not 
exhaustive proves attractive. 
(i) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government (The Assembly) 
Article VIII of the OAU Charter provides that the Assembly shall be the 
supreme organ of the organization. It shall subject to the provisions of 
the Charter discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to 
coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the organization. It 
may, in addition, review the structure, functions and acts of all the 
organs and any specified agencies which may be created In accordance 
with the Charter. 
Article II of the Charter lists as one of the purposes of the OAU, the 
promotion of "international cooperation having due regard to the Charter 
of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 
Consequently, violations of human rights in Africa would fall within the 
"matters of common concern to Africa" and hence subject to discussion 
by the Assembly being the main deliberative organ. This role of the 
Assembly is significant because, the Charter assigns to each specialised 
Commission functions which do not Include human rights120 
The Assembly is composed of the Heads of State and Government of OAU 
121 Member States or their duly accredited representatives. The 
Assembly meets once a year. However, extraordinary sessions are 
convened, if any Member State makes a request to that effect and it is 
-------------------- 
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approved by a two-thirds majority of Member States122. The Assembly 
decides by a simple majority at its ordinary session, the place of Its next 
session123. It has become customary for the head of the host 
government to be elected the Assembly's Chairman. All the meetings of 
the Assembly are held in private except where a simple majority of 
124 
member states decide otherwise. 
A quorum of at least two-thirds of the membership of the OAU Is 
required before any business can be transacted, at either an ordinary or 
extraordinary session. Each Member State has one vote in the 
Assembly125 and all resolutions and decisions are determined by the two- 
thirds majority of the members of the organisation126. However, 
127 
questions of procedure require only a simple majority. 
The deliberation of the Assembly are envisaged to lead to resolutions or 
decisions. Neither the Charter nor the Rules of Procedure render any 
definition of what' constitutes a "decision" or a "resolution". However, 
the Rules of Procedure reveal that decisions are to be taken regarding 
the appointment of the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretaries 
General128. Decisions are also envisaged regarding budgetary matters 
and amendments to the Charter and Rules of Procedure. Other instances 
122 Rule 5, OAU Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Gove rnment (OAU General Secretariat, Division of Press and 
Information) Jan 1982.1. 
123 Rule 6 Ibid. 
124 Rule 7 Ibid. 
125 Rule 24 Ibid. 
126 Rule 25 Ibld: See also Article X (2) OAU Charter. 
127 Rule 26. Ru les of Procedure of the Assembly. 
128 Rules 32 and 34 Ibid. 
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include decisions regarding the interpretation 
129 
of the Charter and the 
130 
admission of new members 
The legal effect of OAU resolutions or decisions is that they impose 
obligations on Member States. For instance the recommendations of the 
UN General Assembly are binding on Member States precisely because 
they have assumed the obligation to be so bound by signing the UN 
Charter. Similarly, the resolutions of the OAU Assembly are binding 
upon OAU Member States because of the obligations they have voluntarily 
assumed under the OAU Charter131 Furthermore, the Charter provides 
the conditions subject to which Its decision in the form of resolutions or 
otherwise must be taken If they are to be binding. Article 10(2) states 
that "all resolutions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the 
Members of the Organisation". In practise resolutions adopted by the 
Assembly take the form of recommendations to Member States132. The 
fact that most OAU resolutions in the form of recommendations may be 
attributed to the emphasis laid by the Charter on non-interference in the 
internal affairs of Member States. Some scholars are however of the 
view that only those resolutions dealing with the structure and operation 
133 
of the OAU would be binding on the members. 
129 Article XXVIII OAU Charter. 
130 Article XXXIII OAU Charter. 
131 T. O. Elias "The Legality of the OAU Council of Ministers Resolution 
on Rhodesia in December 1965" The Nigerian Law Journal (1969) Vol. 3, 
p. 7. 
132 D. Meyers "International Conflict Management by the OAU" Journal of International Organizations Vol. 28 (1974) p. 348. 
133 Z. Cervenka op cit p. 45-46. K. Mathews, "The Organization of African Unity" Domenico Mazzeo (ed) African Regional Organisations 
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Unlike the Statute of the Council of Europe which provides for the 
suspension of any Member that seriously violates Article 3 thereof134, 
the OAU Charter does not make any provision for the suspension or 
expulsion of a member that violates the Charter provisions or OAU 
resolutions. There is no machinery for the enforcement of discipline in 
ensuring compliance with OAU Resolutions. These factors have eroded 
the succinct positivity that ought to characterize State reactions to OAU 
resolutions135. Members of the OAU Assembly strive to achieve 
unanimity at the expense of depriving most resultant resolutions of the 
necessary legal impact, thus rendering the resolutions mere declaratory 
pronouncements. Although OAU resolutions are meant to be binding, 
they have in practice been of only persuasive value; in this lies one of 
the main weaknesses of the OAU. 
The most significant decision136 taken by the Assembly with regard to 
human rights was the "Decision on Human and Peoples Rights in Africa" 
on July 20 1979137, which called for the convening of a Meeting of 
African Experts to prepare a preliminary draft of the African Charter on 
-------------------- 
134 Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 1949. Article 3, 
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Morocco to recognise the admission of SADR by the OAU; the defiance of 
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that Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi never observed this boycott. 
136 This is without prejudice to the numerous OAU Assembly resolutions 
adopted in furtherance of the decolonization campaign which were 
Implicitly humanitarian In nature. See Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government Resolutions, Decisions and Declarations of Ordinary and 
Extraordinary Sessions (OAU DOC AHG/Res. and AMG/Doc Series). 
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Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR). The impact of this decision led to 
the adoption of the AFCHPR in Nairobi on June 28 1981 and eventually to 
its entering into force on October 21 1986. 
(ii) The Council of Ministers 
The second most important organ of the OAU is the Council of Ministers. 
The Council Is composed of "Foreign Ministers or such other ministers as 
are designated by the Governments of Member States"138. The 
composition of the Council allows flexibility in that It accommodates any 
Minister of a Member State to attend its sessions, and not necessarily the 
Foreign Minister. The Council meets at least twice a year139 and acts as 
a "Cabinet" to the Assembly because It is specifically responsible for-the 
implementation of the Assembly's decisions140. However, this 
responsibility does not assume parliamentary forms. 
Under Article XII of the OAU Charter, the Council has three major 
functions, namely, the preparation of the Agenda for the Assembly's 
sessions, the implementation of the decisions of the Assembly and the 
coordination of Inter-African cooperation in accordance with the 
Assembly's instructions and in conformity with Article 11(2). Pursuant to 
discharging Its functions, the Council of Ministers Is to hold biennial 
meetings; the first of which Is "its ordinary annual session which shall 
be held in February each year, it shall consider and approve, inter alia, 
the programme and Budget of the Organisation"141. The second 
ordinary annual session is devoted to the preparation of the Assembly's 
annual Summit Conference. Justice T. O. Elias states that these biennial 
-------------------- 
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meetings provide a measure of continuity for the work of the organisation 
as a whole142. The Councils meetings, ordinary and extraordinary, 
require a quorum of two-thirds majority of the total membership of the 
OAU143. At all Council meetings, each Member State has one vote and 
all resolutions are determined by a simple majority of members144. It Is 
pertinent to note in this context that the resolutions of the Assembly 
require a two-thirds majority. The rationale for this difference may be 
that the conclusions of the Council on Important issues take the form of 
mere recommendations to the Assembly, while the Assembly which has the 
power to take final decisions needs the desirable force of a larger 
majority. 
Consequently, the decisions of the Council of Ministers cannot be 
intended to be legally binding especially in the light of its restricted 
powers under the Charter which has been described as "supervising or 
just noting the implementations of resolutions voluntarily by Member 
States and reporting back to the Assembly"145. It Is pertinent to refer 
to the matter of the Council of Ministers Resolution on Rhodesia of 1965, 
in a bid to illustrate the limits of the power of the Council. 
At its sixth Extraordinary Session held in Addis Ababa (December 3-5 
1965) the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution which that: 
"The Council of Ministers of the OAU... having considered 
the illegal action of independence by the European Settler 
Minority Government of Southern Rhodesia... decides... that 
if the United Kingdom does not crush the rebellion and 
restore law and order, and thereby prepare way for majority 
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rule in Southern Rhodesia by December 15,1965, the Member 
States of the OAU shall sevel16diplomatic relations on that 
date with the United Kingdom" 
By December 15th only 9 Member States had broken off diplomatic 
relations with the UK147; twenty-seven Members of the organisation did 
not follow suit. Although the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government had earlier passed a resolution requiring Member States "to 
reconsider all their political, economic, diplomatic and financial relations 
with the United Kingdom"148, it had stopped short of imposing an 
obligation on Member Stated to sever diplomatic relations with the U. K. if 
the latter failed to take steps to end Ian Smiths rebellion in Southern 
Rhodesia. However, the Council of Ministers proceeded to adopt a 
resolution in which it "decided" to impose an obligation on Member States 
to sever diplomatic relations with the U. K. The majority of Member 
States that refused to implement the Resolution of the Council were right 
because the Council can only make recommendations, for the 
consideration and decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
149 Government 
The Council of Ministers is not an executive body capable of taking 
binding decisions. In a strongly worded statement at the meeting of the 
Assembly held in Addis Ababa (from 29 October to 9 November 1966) the 
Liberian President stated that: 
"The Foreign Ministers who met in Addis Ababa exceeded the 
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scope of their authority. No Foreign Minister on the 
Liberian political level would direct a breach of diplomatic 
relations between Liberia and any foreign government. This 
can only be done by the President of Liberia... This 
procedure and condition imposed by the resolutio is 
considered to be harsh, unreasonable and impracticable" 
The attempt by the Council of Ministers to "usurp" the powers of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government may be explained In the 
light of the Councils desire to respond spontaneously to an exigent 
situation. It also highlights the need for the creation of a new organ 
which could be competent to deal with urgent matters during periods of 
recess between one session of the Assembly and the next. The absence 
of an organ equivalent to the UN Security Council which has the 
"primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security" (Article 24, Charter of the United Nations) has inevitably led 
to the relatively slow response of the OAU to massive violations of human 
rights and to regional inter-state disputes. Ad-hoc solutions to this 
problem have been either through the convening of extraordinary 
sessions which are rather difficult to summon or through the good offices 
of the Chairman of the Assembly. A final solution may however be on 
the horizon because the Council of Ministers have adopted a Resolution 
(CM/Res 789(XXXVI) of 1979) which proposed the establishment of a 
Political Security Council with powers to respond Instantly to major 
problems. In this regard an Ad-hoc Ministerial Committee has been 
established to study and submit an In-depth report on the Issue151. In 
the meantime, however, the Council has continued to perform the role of 
promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes by establishing ad-hoc 
commissions to Investigate disputes and reconcile state 'parties'. 
-------------------- 
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One of the main contributions of the Council of Ministers to the evolution 
of a regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human rights 
in African has been its preparation of the "Decision on Human and 
Peoples Rights in Africa" 152 which called for the convening of a Meeting 
of African Experts to prepare a preliminary draft of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights. In response to this Decision, the Meeting 
of African Experts met in Dakar, Senegal from November 28 to December 
8,1979 to prepare the first Draft of the African Charter. 
In a bid to draft a Charter reflecting African realities, a Ministerial 
Conference composed mainly of African Ministers of Justice and Legal 
Experts met in Banjul, The Gambia, from 8 to 15 June 1980 to complete 
the Draft Charter. At the end of this debate, only eleven articles had 
been approved. Spurred by this progress, the OAU Council of Ministers 
requested that the Ministerial Conference reconvene in Banjul "as soon as 
possible" to complete the Charter153 The Ministerial Conference on the 
Draft Charter convened again at Banjul from 7-19th January 1981 and 
completed the Draft Charter154 The Ministerial Conference thus passed 
on the completed Draft Charter to the 37th Ordinary Session of the 
Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers took note of the Draft 
Charter and decided to submit it with no comments to the Assembly for 
its consideration. On June 17,1981, the 18th Session of the Assembly 
deliberated on the Charter and adopted it with no amendments. 
(iii) The General Secretariat 
-------------------- 
152 Decision 115 (XVI) Rev. 1. OAU Doe. AHG/115 (XVI) 1979 adopted by 
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 20th July 1979. 
153 OAU Doe. CM/Res 792 XXV (1980). The Meeting of the 35th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 
June 18-28,1980. 
154 Report of the OAu Secretary General on the Draft African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights. OAU Doc. CM/1149 XXXVII at 2 (1981). 
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The pivot of most international organisations is found in the permanent 
secretariat; the OAU is no different. Article XVI of the OAU Charter 
provides that a Secretary General appointed by the Assembly shall direct 
the affairs of the organisation. The founders of the OAU had initially 
provided for an "administrative secretary-general" because the 
Secretariat was envisaged "to be an administrative body and not a 
political one; "a body which implemented decisions but did not make 
them" 155. Thus the authority given the administrative secretary general 
were those necessary for directing the routine affairs of the 
secretariat156. However, due to institutional reviews which were 
effected in July 1979, the prefix "administrative" was deleted and the 
Secretary-General's functions became more executive in effect. 
The Secretariat, located in Addis Ababa, is the permanent organ of the 
organization and headed by the Secretary-General. In accordance with 
Article XVII, the Secretary-General is to be assisted by one or more 
Assistant Secretaries-General who are to be appointed by the Assembly. 
The appointment of the Secretary-General is not subject to the sub- 
regional considerations 
157. However, the Assistant Secretaries-General, 
each of whom heads a department within the Secretariat, are chosen from 
four countries on a basis of geographic, linguistic and political balance. 
The Assistant Secretaries-General are nominated by their home 
governments and are invariably senior civil servants in the diplomatic 
corps of Member States. This policy probably informs the official 
comment that the OAU's future was threatened by "tensions in the 
-------------------- 
155 Speech of Senegals President Leopold Senghor at the Addis Ababa 
Summit, 1963 (Ministry of Information, Ethiopia) p. 53 
156 B. David Meyer "The OAU Administrative Secretary General" 
International Organization No. 3 Vol. 30 Augumn 1976 p. 510. 
157 Rule 8; Functions and Regulations of the General Secretariat, OAU. 
Jan. 1982. Addis Ababa. 
118 
Secretariat" and 
158 
regionalism" 
"a growing tendency towards nationalism and 
Thus there is a tendency for Member States to risk 
breaching Article XVIII(2) of the OAU Charter which imposes an 
obligation on Member States to respect the exclusive character of the 
responsibilities of the Secretary General and the staff and not to seek to 
influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
The main functions of the OAU General Secretariat are: - 
- to supervise the Implementation of all economic, social, 
legal and cultural exchanges of Member States; 
- to keep custody of the official documents and records 
of all OAU organs; 
- to place at the disposal of the Specialized Commissions 
all available technical and administrative services; 
- to receive communications of ratification of instruments 
of agreements entered into between Member States; 
- to prepare an Annual Report of the activities of the 
OAU; and, 
- to prepare the P§ygramme and Budget of the OAU for 
each fiscal year 
In the performance of their functions, the Secretary General and his 
staff are not to seek or receive Instructions from any government or any 
other authority external to the OAU160. OAU officials are thus 
protected from such influences by Article XXXI of the Charter which 
grants the Council of Ministers power to "decide on the privileges and 
immunities to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the 
respective territories of the Member States". Accordingly, the General 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the OAU was signed by 
twenty-seven OAU Member States on October 25 1965 at Accra, 
-------------------- 
158 
'Report of the Administrative Secretary-General' (1974) In Africa 
Research Bulletin, Political Series, June 1974, p. 3258. 
159 Rule 2, Functions and Regulations of the General Secretariat op cit. 
160 
Article XVIII (2) OAU Charter. 
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Ghana161 Due to the fact that the General Convention applies only to 
the representatives of the Members of the OAU and OAU Officials, to the 
exclusion of the officers serving the Specialized Commissions, an 
Additional Protocol162 was prepared by the General Secretariat and 
approved the Assembly on 3 July 1980. The Additional Protocol provides 
for privileges and immunities including the issue of the OAU laissez- 
passer to OAU officials and other staff members, and travel certificates 
to expert and non-nationals of OAU Member States employed by the 
Specialized agencies. The General Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities is envisaged to apply to the members of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights by virtue of Article 43 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR). 
An examination of the OAU Charter and the Functions and Regulations of 
the General Secretariat reveals that no specific mention is made of the 
Secretariat's responsibility on human rights issues. However, in 
practice, the General Secretariat has recently discharged duties, 
pertaining to human rights by virtue of the decision of the Assembly to 
evolve a regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human 
rights. Hitherto, the response of the General Secretariat to human 
rights issues has been dismal. It is instructive to note that despite 
being officially invited to several UN sponsored African Regional 
Seminars on Human Rights163, the OAU Secretary General attended only 
-------------------- 
161 34 out of 51 OAU Member States have signed the General Convention 
on Privileges and Immunities, the latest signatory being Equitorial Guinea 
(16 June 1986). The following countries are yet to sign the Convention: 
Chad, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gambia, Buinea Bissau, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Saharawi, Sao Tome and Principle, Togo, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
162 Additional Prorocol to the OAU General Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities; OAU Doc CM 1034 XXXV Rev. 3 Annex 1. 
163 The first of these UN seminars was the UN Seminar on Human Rights 
in Developing Countries held at Dakar, Senegal from 8-22 February 1966. 
For a chronological list of major human rights Conferences and Seminars 
In Africa, see Appendix VII. 
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the September, 1979 UN Seminar on the Establishment of Regional 
Commission on Human Rights with Particular Reference to Africa164 The 
OAU Secretary-General's presence at this September 1979 UN Seminar 
may have been encouraged by the earlier July 1979 Session of the OAU 
Assembly "Decision on Human Rights and Peoples Rights in Africa" 
adopted in July 1979. The Decision of the Assembly called on the 
Secretary-General of the OAU to: 
"organize as soon as possible in an African capital, a 
restricted meeting of highly qualified experts to prepare a 
preliminary draft of an African Charter on Human Rights, 
providing, inter alia, for the ets6tgblishment of bodies to 
promote and protect human rights" 
We consider this Decision as the first clear mandate giving the 
Secretary-General power to discharge duties concerning the promotion 
and protection of human rights in Africa. In compliance with the 
Decision, the Secretary-General convened a Meeting of African Experts to 
prepare a preliminary Draft Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. At 
the inaugural Meeting of Experts the Secretary-General stated that the 
preliminary draft Charter should reflect the African concept of human 
166 
rightsa Although no specific definition of the African concept of 
human and peoples rights was proffered, the Secretary-General 
suggested that it was essential that the draft Charter should: 
(a) "give importance to the principles of non- 
discrimination; 
-------------------- 
164 
UN Doc ST/HRSER. A/4 (10-21 Sept. 1979). The OAU was 
represented at this Seminar by its Secretary-General, Mr. Edem Kodjo 
and its Chief Legal Adviser, Mr. C. O. Egbunike. 
165 "Decision on Human Rights and Peoples Rights in Africa" Decision 
115 (XVI) Rev. 1, OAU Doc AHG/115 (XVI). 
166 Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Meeting of African Experts for the 
Preparation of a preliminary draft of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights) Dakar, Senegal, Nov. 28-Dec. 8,1979, p. 1. 
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(b) lay emphasis on the principles and objectives of the 
OAU as defined in Article 2 of the Charter of the OAU 
with particular reference to respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of each state and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence; and to 
absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the 
African territories which are still dependent; 
(c) include peoples rights beside individual rights; 
(d) determine the duties of each person towards the 
community in which the lives and more particularly 
towards the family and the state; 
(e) show that African values as well as morals still have an 
important place in our societies; 
(f) give econpic, social and cultural rights the place they 
deserve" 
The extent to which the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(AFCHPR) reflects these guidelines will be examined in Chapter Seven. 
The Secretary-General has been instrumental to bringing the AFCHPR 
into force through the dispatch of regular communications and reminders 
to OAU Member States with a view to ensuring the ratification of the 
Charter168. From our interview with Ambassador Dede, the OAU 
Assistant Secretary-General (Political Division) held at Addis Ababa on 
8th April 1987, one comes away with the impression that the Secretariat 
has committed most of its available resources to ensure the early 
enforcement of the AFCHPR. According to Ambassador Dede, the OAU 
Legal Department is directly responsible for the coordination of the 
Secretariat's activities in the field of human rights especially the 
preparation and convening of the Meetings of the African Experts 
appointed to draft the Charter. The OAU's Acting Chief Legal Adviser, 
Madame T. Moussa was the OAU's representative at all meetings and 
deliberations of the Meeting of Experts. She describes the function of 
-------------------- 
167 Ibid p. 1. 
168 OAU Secretary-General Communications to Ministers of Foreign and External Affairs of Member States (CAB/LEG/67/1/12) of 7 September 1981. The OAU Secretary-General also issued similar appeals on each Human Rights Day (Dec. 10) from 1981 to 1986. See for Instance OAU 
Press Release No. 65/81 of 10 Dec. 1981. 
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the Legal Department as the "engine room" facilitating the metamorphosis 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR). The 
OAU Legal Department was also responsible for responding to comments 
and inquiries from external sources regarding human rights in Africa 
generally, and the AFCHPR in particular. 
During our sojourn at the OAU Secretariat, it was evident that the Legal 
Department is understaffed. We recommend that a separate unit be 
created solely for human rights issues and such a unit could form part 
of the Legal Department. This suggestion is particularly pertinent in 
view of the fact that the AFCHPR envisages the OAU Secretariat to 
provide both staff and services to the African Commission on Human 
Peoples Rights. The OAU Secretariat's library and facilities for research 
are unsatisfactory and require an overhaul to provide services to the 
African Commission. 
Despite its regrettable cold start in pursuing human rights issues, the 
OAU Secretariat has so far played Its role fairly satisfactory since being 
given the relevant mandate by Assembly. The dismal response of the 
Secretariat to human rights issues may to an extent be blamed on the 
administrative nature of the Secretary-General's duties. Nevertheless, 
past OAU Secretaries General could have used their initiative and 
personal qualities to expand the powers by exploiting human rights 
issues or at least responding to violations of human rights. Admittedly, 
one of the major problems restricting the potential influence of the 
Secretary-General is the failure of Member States to provide the 
Secretariat with material resources. Minimal funding restricts the 
Secretary-General's activity to one of merely providing services to 
meetings of OAU organs. Membership dues are often withheld as much 
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out of political pique as financial necessity169 The OAU is caught in a 
vicious circle; the efficiency and . effectiveness of the Secretariat is 
handicapped by the failure of Members to pay dues; similarly, the 
ineffectiveness of the Secretariat does not encourage members to grant 
financial resources to it. 
The OAU Budget has expanded five-fold from the first budget of 
US $4,500,000.00 for 1963/64 to US $23,254,236.00 for the 1985/86 
Budgetary Year170. Article XXIII of the OAU Charter stipulates that 
Member States should make contributions to the budget "in accordance 
with the scale of assessment of the UN, no Member State shall be 
assessed an amount exceeding twenty per cent of the yearly (OAU) 
regular budget". During the first year of the OAU, less than half of 
the assessments were actually paid. Similarly in the year 1985/86, only 
US $9,692,514.00 was paid as contributions to an approved budget of 
US $23,254,236.00171 
. At the close of the 
financial year on 31 May 1986 
the total amount of arrears of contributions stood at US 
$34,371,145.00172. This state of affairs poses dire problems for the 
institutional growth, nay effectiveness of the OAU. Indeed, according to 
the OAU Secretary-General, "if the current trend continues, the 
completion of a number of activities already started is very much in 
173 doubt". We were constrained to inquire if the establishment and 
169 M. Wolfers "The Institutional Evolution of the OAU" In El. Ayouty & 
W. Zartman (eds) The OAU After Twenty Years. op cit p. 98. 
170 Report of the OAU Secretary-General on the Activities of the General 
Secretariat (July 1986 to February 1987) Addis Ababa Feb. 1987; 
CM/1406 (XLV) Part II, p. 1. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid p. 2. 
173 
Ibid P. 3. 
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operations of the African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights is 
amongst the 'activities' envisaged by the Secretary-General to be aversely 
affected. Ambassador Dede's answer174 was affirmative. 
In the absence of any imminent and concerted resolve by Member States 
to clear arrears and pay dues promptly, it is likely that the proposed 
modernisation and computerisation of the OAU Financial Management 
System will identify weaknesses in the present system and enhance 
accountability175. Thus, an efficient Secretariat should encourage 
dithering states to deposit their dues timely, thereby erasing both the 
circular problem and more importantly any likelihood of a stillborn 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. 
(iv) The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
With a view to ensuring efficiency in achieving "peaceful settlement of 
disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration176, the 
OAU Charter provides for the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration as its fourth principal organ. The functions of the 
177 
Commission as outlined by its Protocol178 were mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration. It is pertinent to emphasise that the Commission has hardly 
ever functioned because OAU Member States preferred to settle disputes 
by recourse to flexible ad-hoc processes. Thus the Commission was 
-------------------- 
174 OAU's Assistant Secretary-General (Political Division). 
175 The OAU Secretariat has initiated plans to switch from its present 
manual or semi-mechanised financial management system to an integrated 
computerised system. This transformation Is expected to be completed in 
1988. Ibid p. 3. 
176 Article III (4) OAU Charter. 
177 Articles VII (4) and XIX, Ibid. 
178 The Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) was approved by the Assembly on 21 July 1963. 
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abolished in 1969179. We nevertheless propose to briefly examine the 
theoretical framework of the Commission with the object of ascertaining, 
firstly its shortcomings, and secondly to establish its hitherto 
unexplained potential relevance to human rights promotion and 
protection. 
Article XIII of the Protocol provides that "a dispute may be referred to 
the Commission" and where "parties have refused to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission" the matter shall be referred to the 
Council of Ministers180. One of the weaknesses of the Commission 
therefore is the fact that its jurisdiction was not compulsory and this 
was exploited by Member States. 
The Protocol provides for the settlement of disputes by three alternative 
processes: - mediation, conciliation or arbitration. 
The Mediation procedure is governed by Article XX of the Protocol which 
provides that when a dispute between Member States is referred to the 
Commission for Mediation, the President shall, with the consent of the 
parties, appoint one or more members of the Commission to mediate on 
the dispute181. When the parties in the dispute decide on an acceptable 
means of reconciliation, proposed by the mediator, the proposed mode 
consequently constitutes the basis of a protocol of arrangement between 
the parties182. It must be observed that the procedure adopted by the 
Protocol is similar to the provisions of Article 4 of the 1895 and 1907 
-------------------- 
179 
In November 1966, The President of the Commission suggested to the 
Assembly that because OAU Member States were reluctant to submit 
themselves to the Commission's jurisdiction, there was no necessity to 
maintain it. See Higbie Polhemus op cit p. 127. 
180 [Underlines for emphasis. ] 
181 Article XX Protocol of the CMCA. 
182 Article XXI Ibid. 
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Hague Conventions for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. 
Furthermore, the possibility of parties to the dispute resorting to 'good 
offices', though not mentioned, is not necessarily precluded. Indeed it 
has been observed that the absence of a reference to 'good offices' is not 
a major omission because in practice it is very similar to mediation183. 
The 'good offices' procedure basically involved a third party bringing the 
two disputing parties together to negotiate. 
With regard to the conciliation procedure, the Protocol states that 
"... requests for settlement of a dispute by conciliation may be submitted 
to the Commission by means of a petition addressed to the President by 
one or more of the parties to the dispute. The petition shall Include a 
summary explanation of the grounds of the dispute"184. Upon receipt of 
the petition, a Board of Conciliators Is established to clarify the Issues 
and bring about an agreement upon mutually acceptable terms185. The 
Board is granted powers to determine its own procedures; therefore it 
may decide to invite counsel, experts or all persons whose evidence 
appears to be relevant. Although this process appears to be more formal 
than mediation, the Board had no means to enforce any settlement. 
Arbitration differs from the two foregoing procedures because of its 
judicial nature. The Protocol provides for the establishment of an 
Arbitral Tribunal which consists of three arbitrators of which at least 
two must have legal qualifications186. The Protocol also stipulates that 
the arbitrators should not be nationals of either of the disputing State 
-------------------- 
183 T. O. Elias, Africa and the Development of International Law (Ocean 
Publications Inc. 1972) p. 170. 
184 
Article XXII, Protocol of the CMCA op cit. 
185 Articles XXIII and XXIV, Ibid. 
186 Article XXVII Ibid. 
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parties nor should they be domiciled in the territories of the parties187. 
These provisions ensure the neutrality of the arbitrators which ought to 
guarantee impartial awards. However, before reaching a final award, the 
Tribunal must in each case conclude a compromise with the parties with 
regard to the legal effect of the award, the subject matter of the 
controversy and the law to be applied188. If no specific provisions are 
made regarding the law applicable, the parties may apply the principles 
of international law. The Protocol also takes cognisance of the need to 
settle disputes, by avoiding existing law, and granting the Tribunal 
power to judge "ex aeguo et bono"189. This provision is often regarded 
as a reflection of the selective attitude of most African States to certain 
established rules of International law and their preference to have 
disputes settled by standards to which they have themselves agreed, 
such as in new conventions190. We however submit that while this 
provision may be viewed as a vehicle for bypassing purely adjudicative 
procedures and possibly customary international law, it Is certainly not 
peculiar to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 
For instance, Article 38(2) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice191 provides that the Court may decide cases 'ex aequo et bono', 
If the parties agree. Similarly, the Bolivia-Peru Treaty of 1902 
stipulates that a boundary dispute can be determined by arbitration 'ex 
aeguo et bono' and the arbitrators are empowered to each decision based 
on true knowledge, understanding and in conformity with justice, equity 
187 Article XXVII (3) Ibid. 
188 Article XXIX Ibid. 
189 Article XXX Ibid. 
190 Z. Cervenka op cit p. 9. 
191 See D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (Sweet 
and Maxwell, London 1979) p. 797. 
128 
and fairness192. The ultimate benefit of such a provision is the latitude 
or the 'carte blanche' it bestows on adjudicators to seek resolution of 
disputes. 
The OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration rarely 
performed its duties despite the flexibility and adaptability of its 
procedures. A study of the settlement of African disputes reveals that 
the predominant OAU practice has been the creation of Ad-Hoc 
Committees to deal with specific disputes193. Furthermore, individual 
Heads of State have responded to disputes by using their 'good offices' 
to reconcile parties. It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct 
research into the settlement of African disputes, however, suffice it to 
say that an effective machinery for dispute settlement in Africa will 
remain an illusion unless states are prepared to grant compulsory 
jurisdiction in such matters to the OAU and thereafter submit to its 
enforcement procedures and decisions. There may also be a need to 
consider amending the OAU Charter to introduce suspension or indeed 
expulsion as a sanction for non-compliance with OAU principles and 
procedures. 
How far was the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
relevant to human rights protection In Africa? 
Article VII of the OAU Charter established the Commission as one of four 
main groups to accomplish the "organisations purposes , 
194 
which include 
-------------------- 
192 
A. L. W. Munkman, "Adjudication and Adjustment: International 
Decisions and the Settlement of Boundary Disputes" BYIL. Vol. 46 1972-73 
pp" 24-25 . 
193 For instance, the Ad-Hoc Consultative Commission on Nigeria 
established as a response to the Nigerian Civil War; the Ad-Hoc 
Committee of Good Offices on the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute; and the Ad- Hoc Wisemens Committee on the Western Sahara Issue. 
194 
Article VII OAU Charter. 
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"the promotion of international cooperation having due regard to the 
Charter of United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights"195 It is therefore submitted that in addition to the Commissions 
specific duties of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, It also has a 
general duty to promote international understanding with a view to 
enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights. More 
specifically, Article XII of the Protocol of the Commission grants it 
"jurisdiction over disputes between states only" 
196 We interpret this 
phrase to mean that the Commission may exercise jurisdiction over an 
dispute submitted to is by a state party (as opposed to one presented by 
an individual). Furthermore, since the Protocol does not define the 
word "dispute", we submit that the ordinary meaning of the word 
includes the Instance where a the basis of a dispute or conflict is the 
objection of a State Party to the massive Infraction of human rights in 
another State. Admittedly, both States must be willing to submit 
themselves to the Commission's jurisdiction. The basic underlying 
principle requiring the consent of the parties to the Commission's 
procedures may have proved the undoing of any attempt by the 
Commission to execute its jurisdiction on 'human rights disputes'. A 
further obstacle to the Commission's attempt would have been the defence 
of political prerogatives as couched in the principle of "non-interference 
in the internal affairs of states"197. Nevertheless the OAU's practise in 
a few instances shows that it is willing to create exceptions to the 
principle of non-interference. For Instance, during the Nigerian Civil 
War, the Western Sahara Crisis, and the Ethiopia/Somalia War, it would 
seem that the presence or threat of foreign and extra continental 
intervention and the consequent implications to regional stability rather 
-------------------- 
195 
Article II (1) Ibid. 
196 Article XII Protocol of the CMCA op cit. 
197 Article III (2) OAU Charter. 
130 
than human rights have led to the piercing of the veil of non- 
interference through the establishment of Ad-hoc Committees. 
In summation, we believe that there was sufficient scope within the OAU 
Charter and the Protocol of the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration to exploit solutions to human rights violations. However, 
the prerequisite of consent of State Parties to the Commission's 
jurisdiction may have reduced the feasibility of such a procedure. 
(v) Specialised Commissions 
The OAU Charter provides for establishment of the following specialised 
Commissions: - 
(1) Economic and Social Commissions; 
(2) Education and Cultural Commissions; 
(3) Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commissions; 
(4) Defence Commissions; 
198 (5) Scientific, Technical and Research Commissions. 
The foregoing Commissions have very little relevance to human rights 
protection and the OAU Charter did not provide for the establishment of 
a Commission on Human Rights. In comparison, the Charter of the UN Is 
more expressly facilitative in providing that: 
"The Economic and Social Council shall setup Commissions in economic 
and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other 
commissions as may be required for the performance of Its functions"99. 
198 Article XX OAU Charter. 
199 Article 68, Charter of the UN. 
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However, the OAU Charter does grant the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government the facilitative power to "... establish such Specialised 
Commissions as it may deem necessary... ". The Assembly has not 
utilized this provision to setup a Human Rights Commission. In 1964, 
the Assembly created two new Commissions, namely: (a) the Commission 
of African Jurists200 and (b) the Commission of Transport and 
201 Communications 
The functions of the Commission of African Jurists were: - 
(i) to promote and develop understanding and cooperation 
among African Jurists; 
(ii) to promote the development of the concept of justice; 
(ill) to consider the legal problems of common Interest and 
those that may be referred to It by any of the 
members, and by the OAU and to make 
recommendations thereon; 
(iv) to encourage the study of African Law, especially 
African Customary Law in the universities and 
institutions of legal studies in African and elsewhere, 
and its progressive development or codification by 
African Governments; 
(v) to consider and ý62dy international law In Its relation 
to African States 
According to Dr. T. O. Elias, the Commission also had the mandate to 
"study African Political Institutions and legal ideas with particular 
reference to the promotion of the rule of law and the observance and 
protection of fundamental human rights throughout the continent"203 
The Commission of African Jurists was dissolved In 1966 by virtue of a 
recommendation by the OAU's Institutional Committee. The Assembly at 
-------------------- 
200 
OAU Res. AHG/4-1,1964. 
201 
OAU Res. AHG/20-1,1964. 
202 Article 1 Statute of the Commission of African Jurists adopted on 29 
January 1964. See L. B. Sohn "Basic Documents of African Regional 
Organizations" (Oceana 1971) p. 100. 
203 T. O. Elias, Background Paper to the UN Seminar on the 
Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special 
Reference to Africa, Monrovia, Liberia 10-21 Sept. 1979, p. 8. 
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its 3rd Session in November 1966 also decided to reduce the number of 
Commissions from six to three, namely (a) the Economic and Social 
Commission, (b) the Educational, Cultural, Scientific and Health 
Commission, and (c) the Defence Commission. 
The rationale for the reorganisation was that the Commissions did not 
meet regularly due to the lack of quorum. It has also been suggested 
that there was a lot of duplication in the functions which the 
Commissions were called upon to fulfil204. We cannot see the justification 
in the foregoing reasons for the abolition of the Commission of African 
Jurists especially as there were no other Specialised Commissions sharing 
the same functions as the Commission of African Jurists. 
The functions of the Commission of African Jurists was probably 
handicapped by the political implication of Article XXI of the OAU 
Charter which states that: "each Specialised Commission... shall be 
composed of Ministers concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries 
designated by the Government of Member States". One cannot 
overemphasise the need for a Commission, which Is charged with human 
rights protection, to be comprised of Independent members elected in a 
personal capacity. It Is thus evident that the creation of a Human 
Rights body within the framework of the OAU Charter was not seriously 
contemplated. 
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the OAU Charter formally 
subscribes to human rights principles as expounded in the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. OAU Member States 
have a duty to promote and protect human rights through inter-state 
cooperation. The organs established by the OAU Charter are not 
-------------------- 
204 
Z. Cervenka op cit p. 68. 
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endowed with express powers to pursue human rights promotion and 
protection. However, it is possible to argue that since one of the 
purposes of the organisation is to promote international cooperation 
having due regard to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, OAU organs are enjoined to pursue human rights issues. 
The difficulty with such an argument is that all OAU organs are subject 
to the executive power of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. Thus the concentration of power on the Assembly has been 
a restrictive factor in the pursuance of human rights matters within the 
OAU regime, since the Assembly has been reluctant to respond to 
massive human rights violations on the continent. 
In the last 25 years, the OAU has not done too badly in its emphasis on 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the maintenance of existing 
boundaries205, consequently there are prospects for the future. The 
OAU and its Charter have also responded to the promotion of human 
rights in the following areas: 
(1) The Self Determination of peoples 
206 
(2) Non-discrimination 207; 
-------------------- 
205 
William Gutteridge "The Organisation of African Unity 1963-1983" 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol. 3 No. 1/2 Octobeer 
1983/April 1984. 
206 
Preambular paragraph 1, Articles II (1)(d) and III (6) OAU Charter; 
The Lusaka Manifesto adopted by the OAU In 1969; see also the UN 
Res. 2505 adopting the Manifesto - UN Doc A/PV/1815 of 10 Nov. 1969. See further N. M. Shamuyarira "The Lusaka Manifesto in Southern Africa" 
African Review Vol. 1(1) Nairobi. March 1971, pp . 67-69. 
207 Preambular Paragraph 2, Articles II (1)(e) and III (1). 
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(3) Protection of and assistance to refugees208; 
(4) Economic, social and cultural rights209; and 
(5) The settlement of disputes210 
The preponderance of opinion regarding OAU's human rights practice is 
summed up by 0. Aluko's observations that: 
"In terms of the denial of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in independent African States, the OAU's record 
has been dismal. It has remained throughout, a passive 
spectator of violations of human rights among Member 
States. t he prospects for human rights in Africa are not j 21 bright" 
We submit that the efforts of the OAU in recent years, with particular 
reference to the evolving African regional machinery for human rights, 
should convince skeptics that the prospects for human rights in Africa 
are not gloomy. 
(d) Membership & Termination of Membership 
Membership of the Organisation of African Unity Is restricted to 
independent African States. Article IV accordingly provides that "each 
Independent sovereign state shall be entitled to become a member of the 
organisation212. Consequently, the aforesaid Article excludes all 
territories under colonial rule, liberation movements, as well as countries 
like the Republic of South Africa on account of its apartheid policy which 
dramatically contradicts the aims and purposes of the OAU Charter. 
--- 
208 
----------------- 
See the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (entered into force on 27 September 1969). 
209 Preambular Paragraph 3, OAU Charter. 
210 
Articles III (4) and VII (4) Ibid. 
211 A. Oluko "The OAU and Human Rights" Roundtable (1981) p. 240. 
212 
Article IV OAU Charter - See Appendix II. 
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Article XXIV of the OAU Charter stipulates that "... The Charter shall 
be open for signature to all independent sovereign African States and 
shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes"213. Thus all independent sovereign 
African states that signed and ratified the Charter became the founding 
members. An independent African State may also become a member by 
214 
adhesion or accession to the Charter. 
According to Elias215, there was a protracted debate over the eligibility 
for membership of an African country with a multiracial society but with 
a European Prime Minister. Majority of the states preferred an 
independent state under an African Prime Minister as a candidate for 
membership216. Nevertheless, no provision of the Charter precludes an 
independent sovereign African State who Prime Minister is of extra 
African origin or descent from being member. Therefore the fears 
expressed by Cevenka217 about the considerable implications of the 
majority opinion, for the status of non-African citizens in African States 
should be dispelled. However, the individual practice of a few African 
States toward non-African citizens has left much to be desired. The 
case of Idi Amin's ill treatment of the East African Asians is Instructive 
on this matter. 
The OAU Charter did not envisage the phenomenon of coup detat, hence 
no provision exists to debar independent sovereign African States whose 
Heads of State seized power through "the barrel of the gun". Indeed 
-------------------- 
213 Article XXIV, OAU Charter, See Appendix II. 
214 Article XXVII, OAU Charter. 
215 Elias op cit. p. 251. 
216 Ibid. 
217 
Z. Cevenka, The OAU and its Charter, New York 1969, p. 37. 
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there is no provision in the OAU Charter for the expulsion of Members 
for breach of its obligations. However Article 111(5) of the Charter 
states the OAU's "unreserved condemnation in all its forms of political 
assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of 
neighbouring States or any other State". Thus it may be argued that 
any change in government that is effected by such means is illegal and 
thus should be precluded from OAU proceedings. Furthermore it is 
worth considering whether any neighbouring state which takes part in 
subversive activities should be suspended or expelled218. The practice 
of the OAU has been one of granting recognition to new regimes that 
exercise de facto power and consequently, no qualifications are attached 
219 to their right of membership 
It is noteworthy that by comparison, Article 6 of the United Nations 
Charter makes specific provision for the expulsion of Members which 
220 have persistently violated its principles. 
The rationale for the deliberate omission of an expulsion/or suspension 
provision in the OAU Charter may lie in the effect that such 
expulsion/or suspension may have on the organization. It would lead to 
cessation of relations between Member States and an expelled State; this 
may ultimately lead to a split in the organization. It has been argued 
218 At the 16th OAU Summit held in Monrovia, Liberia from July 17-21 
1979, President Nimiery of Sudan issued a statement (regarding the 
Tanzanian invasion of Uganda which resulted in the overthrow of the 
Amin regime), to the effect that such an invasion was a violation of the 
principles of the OAU. The Summit did not take any decision on the 
issue of either rights of admission or expulsion of a Member State. See 
Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 16 No. 7 August 1979, pp. 5328-5331. 
219 J. Mayall, "African Unity and the OAU" in Yearbook of World Affairs 27,1973 p. 116. 
220 Article 6 of the UN Charter, p. 5. 
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that expulsion is an unrealistic sanction221. Expulsion can also act as a 
double-edged sword. It is probably in realisation of this fact that the 
institutions of several specialised agencies and organisations contain no 
provision for expulsion; for instance the World Health Organisation 
(FAO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Although the 
Charter of the Organisation of American States does not provide for 
expulsion of Members, its Interpretation of the inherent powers of an 
international regional organisation in the Cuban issue Is instructive. 
The OAS accepted the argument that the organisation was responsible for 
the interpretation of its own Charter, which interpretation should give 
effect to the organisation's primary purposes and that no regional 
organisation could be made to accept a member which the organisation 
felt was violating its Charter and furthermore that the organisation 
should have the inherent right to decide on who should be permitted to 
222 
participate in its activities. 
Consequently, if we are to hold that the OAU is a regional organisation, 
matatis mutandis, there exists a bridgehead that the OAU may hold to 
facilitate the expulsion of members that habitually violate its central 
purposes. This rather non-restrictive interpretation of the Inherent 
powers of expulsion in the OAU Charter should be used not as a sword 
but as a shield to coerce members Into abiding to the principles of the 
organisation. Furthermore, the ultimate benefits of having a Member 
State remaining in an organisation far outweighs the consequences of an 
expulsion. Sohn's suggestion of a temporary suspension rather than the 
outright expulsion of a recalcitrant Member is a worthwhile alternative. 
-------------------- 
221 
Louis B. Sohn "Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International 
Organisation" in Harvard Law Review Vol. 77 June 1964 No. 8, p. 1400. 
222 
Sohn, op cit p. 1419. 
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In any event there are several means by which expulsion can be 
achieved in the absence of an express expulsion clause. For instance 
through veiled invitations to a recalcitrant Member State to withdraw by 
a concert of other Member States calculated to embarrass a Member to 
withdraw. The procedure for termination of membership in the OAU is 
straightforward. Article 32 provides that: "any state which desires to 
remove its membership shall forward a written notification to the 
Secretary General. At the end of one year from the date of such 
notification, if not withdrawn, * the Charter shall cease to apply with 
respect to the renouncing state, which shall thereby cease to belong to 
223 the organisation. 
The original intention of the draftsmen in prescribing the one year 
period between the submission of the notification and the cessation of 
membership Is to give both parties time to adjust all pending obligations 
and rights. 
As at present no state has carried out a withdrawal except Morocco, 
which withdrew its membership in 1985 in reaction to the OAU's 
recognition of the Saharan Democratic Republic. In 1971 when Dr. Milton 
Obote was overthrown in Uganda by Idi Amin, President Nyerere of 
Tanzania attempted to raise the matter of criteria for OAU membership. 
The Tanzanian delegation was precluded from discussing the matter 
because it breached the Charter principles of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of states, in this instance Uganda224. A similar attempt 
was made in 1975 when the OAU Assembly of Heads of State met in 
Kampala. The Tanzanian Government then issued a statement that 
objected to the OAU double standard In condemning the atrocities of 
-------------------- 
223 
Article 32 of the OAU Charter, See Appendix II. 
224 M. Wolfers: "The Institutional Evolution of the OAU" In "The OAU 
After Twenty Years" eds. El Ayouty & W. Zartman op. cit p. 95. 
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colonial and racist states, and remaining silent "when massacres, 
oppressions and torture are used against Africans In the independent 
225 
states in Africa". 
In the light of our submission that the OAU Charter imposes obligations 
on Member States to promote and protect human rights through inter 
state cooperation, an amendment to the OAU Charter is necessary to 
incorporate a provision on the suspension and termination of membership 
for the massive violation of human rights in addition to the violation of 
the central principles of the Charter. Such a provision should prove to 
be an effective deterrent to States especially in light of the increasing 
succeptibility of some States to violate human rights. 
(e) Observer Status at the OAU226 
The OAU Charter does not provide for the granting of Observer Status. 
This lacuna was filled by the resolution of the 14th Session of the OAU 
Assembly on The Criteria for Granting Observer Status with the OAU227. 
An Organization applying for Observer Status with the OAU must have 
objectives and perform activities that conform with the fundamental 
principles and objectives of the OAU Charter. Such an organisation 
228 
must be registered in Africa and have its headquarters in Africa. The 
--------------- 
225 
Ibid. 
226 See Appendix VIII for the List of Organisations with Observer Status 
at the OAU. 
227 OAU Doe. CAB/LEG/117/82. 
228 
Part I, Article 1(a), The Criteria for Granting Observer Status with the OAU Ibid. 
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membership of the organisation is required to be African, however where 
the membership is external to Africa, such latter membership should not 
229 have voting rights. 
Observer Status is granted by the Council of Ministers to organisations 
which the Council deem to have satisfied the terms of the Criteria. 
There are three categories of Observers at the OAU. 
The first category includes Governments-in-exile and the Liberation 
Movements, which are recognised by the OAU. For Instance, the 
Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe230 and the Polisario Front231 have enjoyed 
the OAU Observer Status. Furthermore African intergovernmental 
organisations which have important interests in the activities of OAU 
232 Member States are included in this category. 
The second category is reserved for African intergovernmental 
organisations having a specialised competence and having interest in the 
activities of the OAU. The African Re-insurance Corporation233 and The 
234 Lake Chad Basin Commission, amongst others, belong to this group. 
-------------------- 
229 
Article 1(b) Ibid. 
230 
Prior to 1975, the OAU had given recognition to both the ZAPU and 
ZANU before their merger to form the Patriotic Front (for the Liberation 
of Zimbabwe). 
231 The Polisario Front later formed the Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR) which was admitted to the OAU by the "Administrative 
Decision" of the OAU Secretary-General based on a formal notification by 
a majority of OAU members of their recognition of the SADR. See Djamel 
Abdel Nasso Manna "The Western Sahara dispute and International Law" 
M. Phil Thesis of the University of Hull, 1985. 
232 For Instance, the African Regional Standardization Organisation 
(Observer Status No. 36 of 22 February 1982). 
233 OAU Observer Status No. 34 of 1 March 1981. 
234 OAU Observer Status No. 9 of 31 August 1970. 
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The majority of OAU Observers 
reserved for Inter-African non- 
associations or unions. The 
Unity235 and the Pan-African 
category. 
belong to the third category which is 
governmental organisation, Institutions, 
Organisation of African Trade Union 
Women Association236 belong to this 
All Observers may be invited to attend in inaugural and closing meetings 
of all OAU Conferences. Participation In the proceedings by observers 
is limited to cases where the Chairman of the Conference or Session of 
an OAU Institution grants express authorisation. However in the case of 
the Sessions of OAU Specialised Commissions, observers may participate 
by requesting the inclusion of Items of particular Interest on the agenda 
of the Session and by making written or oral statements thereon. 
The list of current organisations granted Observer Status with the OAU 
reveals that only two organisations, the Anti-Apartheid Committee237 and 
the African Jurists Association (AJA)238 have a direct interest or 
relevance to human rights matters. The significance of gaining Observer 
Status at the OAU is reflected in the invaluable access observers are 
granted to the proceedings of OAU institutions, thus enabling them to 
lobby African statesmen and technocrats. It is significant that up until 
1986, apart from the AJA no organisation of Lawyers or human rights 
interest groups, have attempted to explore this avenue to influence the 
OAU on human rights issues. The African Jurists Association (AJA) was 
granted Observer Status on 4 March 1986, and it has utilized this status 
to endure that at lease six of its members were appointed to the eleven 
-------------------- 
235 
OAU Observer Status No. 12 of 4 April 1974. 
236 
OAU Observer Status No. 1 of 12 September 1968. 
237 OAU Observer Status No. 15 of 11 June 1974. 
238 OAU Observer Status No. 38 of 4 March 1986. 
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man African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights239. African human 
rights interest groups could utilize the status of being OAU Observers to 
influence human rights promotion in Africa and ensure compliance of OAU 
Member States to the provisions of the AFCHPR. This approach Is 
pertinent, in the light of vague guidelines on status of "persons" 
permitted to enlighten and/or submit communications to the African 
240 Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
It is noteworthy that the OAU Criteria on Granting Observer Status is 
restrictive in comparison to the Council of Europe, especially as the 
former permits non-member States of the Council of Europe and non- 
governmental international organizations (NGO's) to obtain Observer 
241 Status, 
The AFCHPR permits international cooperation in the field of human 
rights and allows "any person" to "enlighten" the African Commission, 
and may facilitate the Commission access to data banks of NGO's. 
Reciprocity may demand that NGO's be granted "consultative" or 
"observer status" with the OAU ergo, the African Commission. In the 
absence of formal rules governing this area apart from the OAU Criteria 
-------------------- 
239 Daily Times, (Lagos Nigeria) 17 December 1987; See Appendix XII 
for the List of Members of the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights. 
240 Article 46 of the AFCHPR states that the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights "may hear from any. . . person capable of 
enlightening it". While Article 55(1) states that the Commission "may 
interpret all the provisions of the Charter at the request of a State 
Party, an institution of the OAU or an African organization recognized 
by the OAU". Article 45(1)(e) provides that the Commission shall 
"cooperate with other African and international institutions concerned 
with the promotion and protection of human and peoples rights". [Underlines for emphasis. ] We shall analyse the implications of these 
provisions in Chapter 2. 
241 Committee of Ministers Resolution 76(3). To date, the following have 
been admitted as observers to the Councils Steering Committee for Human 
Rights: - Canada, The Holy See, Amnesty International, the ICJ and UNESCO. 
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for Granting Observer Status, the OAU may consider evolving a Regional 
Convention on the status of national and international NGO's, not unlike 
the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of 
242 International Non-Government Organizations, 
-------------------- 
242 
For the text of this Convention see M. Bettati and P. M. Dupuy eds 
Les ONG et le Droit International (Economica, 1986) pp. 272-291. See 
also Andrew Drzemczewski "The Role of NGO's in Human Rights Matters 
in the Council of Europe" Human Rights Law Journal Vol. 8, Nos. 2-4 
(1987) pp. 273-282. 
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Chapter Three 
Self-Determination in Africa 
The struggle for African independence was waged under the banner of 
the right of self-determination. Self-determination in essence being the 
right of self-government. However in its process of evolution, the 
concept has assumed varied characteristics depending on the historical 
context, the social and economic conditions prevailing in given societies 
as well as on the political groups seeking to exercise it as a right. 
We propose to trace briefly the historical evolution of the concept with 
particular emphasis on its relevance to Africa. Furthermore we shall 
examine the application of the concept in colonial and post-colonial 
Africa, and especially the OAU role in the latter period. The Charter of 
the United Nations provides for the promotion of universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, so as 
to assure "the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination"'. Is 
self-determination a human right, a fundamental freedom? Is it a legal 
right? What is self-determination? We propose to answer these and 
other questions which inevitably flow from an analysis of what has been 
described as the "elusive goal of African self-determination"2. 
-------------------- 
1 
Article 55, United Nations Charter. 
2 T. M. Shaw "The Political Economy of Self-Determination: A World Systems Approach to Human Rights in Africa" in C. E. Welch and R. I. Meltzer (eds) Human Rights & Development in Africa (State 
University of New York Press Albany 1979) p. 226. 
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(a) Evolution of the Concept of Self-Determination 
The history of self-determination is traceable to the time of the Greek 
city states and the period of the Roman Empire3. However the principle 
was significantly magnified by the French Revolution of 1789 which 
transformed the monarchical status quo into a popular and democratic 
nation state by virtue of the twin proclamations of human rights and 
popular sovereignty4. The growth of nationalism and democracy in West 
and Central Europe led to the germination of the concept of self- 
determination. Although some legal scholars of the period believed that 
national self-determination was a legal right, the prevailing practice of 
5 
the era reveals a preponderance of opinion to the contrary. 
While the external aspects of self-determination of nations emphasised the 
notion of the nation and the state, the concept also promoted an internal 
democratisation process which emphasised the rights of citizens. The 
American Declaration of Independence evolved from the colonial 
experience of inhabitants of United Colonies and their determination to be 
free and independent. This resolve is evident in the Declaration of 
Independence which states that: 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with 
certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men deriving their just 
powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any 
form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is 
the right of the People to alter or abolish it and to institute 
-------------------- 
3 U. O. Umozerike, Self Determination in International Law, (Hamden, 
Connecticut, Archan Books 1972) p. 3. 
4 M. Shaw Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986) p. 59. See also H. S. Johnson Self 
Determination Within the Community of Nations (Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 
1967) p. 25. 
5 M. Shaw op. cit at p. 3. 
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new Government, laying its foundations in such Principles 
and Organising its Powers in such form as to th6em shall seem 
most likely to effect their safety and happiness" 
The impact of the American Declaration on the African struggle for self- 
determination and independence cannot be overemphasized. The colonial 
experience of the United Colonies can to a very large extent be equated 
to African experience. The former having laid the precedence of 
successfully challenging the basis of colonial rule. 
The internal democratisation aspect of self-determination was further 
enhanced by the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 
1789. The French Declaration can be summed up as the first complete 
code of principles of constitutional government and rule of law7. 
Although the American Declaration of Independence and the French 
Declaration enshrined principles which were later to be restated in 
modern constitutions, French colonial practice and the American attitudes 
to blacks, Indians and lower class whites negated the democratisation 
8 
process, being the internal aspect of self-determination. 
Self-Determination assumed a prominent profile in international law and 
politics during the two world wars. Indeed, the wars were fought under 
6 H. C. Commager (ed) Documents of American History, (London & New 
York, Appleton-Century-Crofts 1948) p. 103. 
7 I. Brownlie (ed) Basic Documents on Human Rights, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1971) p. 8. et. seq. The Declaration established 
various democractic principles: that men are born and remain free and 
equal in respect of right; that the purpose of all civil associations is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man nd that 
these rights are liberty, property and resistance to oppression, and 
finally that the nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty, nor 
shall any body of men or any individual exercise authority which is not 
expressly derived from it. (Ibid). 
8 O. C. Eze "Prospects for International Protection of Human Rights in 
Africa" in African Review, Vol. 4, No. 1,1974 p. 79. 
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the banner of right of self-determination of nations. In 1916 President 
Wilson of the United States emphasised the right of every people to 
choose the sovereignty under which they will lives. In his address to 
the Congress on 11 February 1918, President Wilson stated that "'self- 
determination" is not a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of 
action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore to their own peril'10 
Nevertheless neither the 1919 Peace Conference nor the final draft of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations regarded national self-determination as 
a significant principle of legal application11. The Peace Conferences and 
the League of Nations addressed the issue of boundaries and minorities 
In Europe and emerged with agreements and treaties which provided 
limited self-determination for the minorities12. A parallel could be drawn 
here between the problems faced in Europe then and the contemporary 
minority problems of many modern African States13. The fact that a 
collection of ethnic groups coexisted peacefully under colonial rule was 
not necessarily an indication that such groups could coexist In the post 
colonial period. In some cases, colonial boundaries cut across ethnic 
14 
groups . 
-------------------- 
9 M. Shaw op cit p. 60. 
10 Foreign Relations (1918) Suppl. 1 Vol. 1, p. 110. 
11 M. Shaw op. cit p. 60. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Many African States are composed of heterogeneous groups with 
distinct cultural and religious values. Peaceful ceexistence between 
minority groups and the majority within the State has proved an onerous 
task. For instance, the inter Kikuyu/Luo conflict in Uganda; the 
Tutsi/Hutu conflict in Burundi and Rwanda; and the Hausa-Yoruba/Ibo 
conflicts in Nigeria. 
14 Examples of such ethnic groups bisected boundary lines include the 
Masai in Kenya and Tanzania; the Somalis in Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia; the Yoruba in Benin Republic and Nigeria and the Ewes in Ghana and Togo. For further analysis of this problem see S. Chime, "The OAU and African Boundaries" in C. G. Widstrand (ed) African 
Boundary Review (Uppsala, 1969) p. 63. 
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Although the League of Nations introduced the Mandate System which was 
restricted to territories - taken from defeated enemies, and only 
supervisory powers were exercised by the League, nevertheless, it 
heralded the "beginning of systematic international intrusion into the 
workings of colonialism"15. Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant 
subjected the mandated territories to a process of international 
supervision by which the peoples of the concerned territories were to be 
16 
guided towards self government 
(b) The UN & Self Determination 
The end of the Second World War not only eradicated Germany's 
expansionist dreams but also the shattered myth of Western supremacy. 
The death knoll of the latter was sounded by two forces. Firstly, the 
Western educated elites in Africa and Asia who challenged the basis of 
-------------------- 
15 lnis L. Claude, Jr. Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation (New York: Random House, 1964) 
p. 3. 
16 Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, (S. W. A. Opinion) 1970 I. C. J. pp. 28-32. 
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colonial authority by invoking the right of self-determination. Secondly 
Western liberal commentators questioned the legitimacy of colonialism in 
17 the light of instruments such as the Atlantic Charter. 
Thus prior to the adoption of the United Nations Charter, self- 
determination was perceived as a principle, as the Atlantic Charter 
recognised the right of self-determination. However the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals of 1944 did not include the right of self-determination. 
The concept of self-determination has acquired universal acceptance and 
recognition since the establishment of the United Nations and the 
inclusion of the principle in the UN Charter18. The consecration of the 
principle of self-determination of peoples In Articles 1(2) and 55 of the 
UN Charter has instigated debates as to Its juridical character. Article 
1(2) provides for the development of "... friendly relations between 
states based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples". Furthermore, Article 55 provides that with a 
17 For the text of the Declaration of Principles known as the Atlantic 
Charter see J. A. S. Grenville, The Major International Treaties 1914-173 
A History and Guide with Texts, (London, Mathews & Co. Ltd. 1974) 
pp. 198-199. The Atlantic Charter embodied a joint declaration by 
President Roosevelt of the United States and Winston Churchill, which 
states inter alia their "desire to see no territorial changes that do not 
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned and that 
they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live and they wish to see sovereign rights and self 
government restored to those who have been forcefully deprived of them. 
Ibid. However it has been noted that Churchill later stated that the 
Atlantic Charter was only intended to apply to conquered Europe (See M. 
Huber "National Self-Determination", in Social Research X (1943) 1). 
Churchills statement may well be better appreciated in the context of the 
fourth paragraph of the Declaration which provides that "The 
(declarants) will endeavour with due respect to their existing 
obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor 
or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials 
of the world which are needed for economis prosperity". The assumption 
of equal status among states in this context cannot, thus, be extended 
to colonies which were at any rate subjugated. 
18 It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union was instrumental to the 
Inclusion of the principle of self-determination In the UN Charter. See 
U. O. Umozerike Self-Determination in International Law, op. cit p. 44-5. 
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view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being among 
nations, base d on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote certain social 
and economic objectives. Articles 1(2) and 55, thus, establish self- 
determination, the essential elements of which are the free and genuine 
expression of the will of the people19 and the promotion of their social 
and economic well-being20. 
The principle of self-determination is further affirmed by Chapters XI, 
XII and XIII of the UN Charter. Chapter XI deals with the 
administration of non-self-governing territories while Chapter XII deals 
with the trusteeship system. In the administration of non-self-governing 
territories, the administrators were to "take due account of the political 
aspirations of the peoples and to assist them in the progressive 
development of their free political institutions1P21. One of the major 
objectives of the trusteeship system is the "progressive development 
towards self government or independence"22. Consequently, in the 
administration of non-self-governing territories which have been 
subjected to the UN Trusteeship, system the guiding principle was self- 
23 determination. 
-------------------- 
19 L. M. Goodrich & El Hambro, Charter of the United Nations (Boston, 
World Peace Foundation 1949) p. 95. 
20 Towards the achievement of these essential elements the United 
Nations evolved the International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural 
Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966). 
21 Article 73(b) UN Charter. 
22 Article 76 UN Charter. 
23 Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law through the 
Political Organs of the UN (Oxford University Press; London 1963) 
pp. 91-106. 
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However, the concept of self-determination as expressed in Chapter XI 
does seem to have subjugated the will of the peoples of the concerned 
territories to those of the administering powers. Firstly, the provisions 
do not expressly refer to independence as a necessary corollary of self- 
determination and secondly the intention of the UN Charters authors', 
especially with regard to Articles 73(b) and 76(b) appears to be that the 
granting of independence was to be a transitorial or gradual process 
depending on the particular circumstances of each territory. 
Consequently it would be difficult to take the view that the cumulative 
effect of Articles 1(2) and 55 and Chapters XI, XII and XIII establish 
binding legal objectives on states to grant self-determination to non- 
independent peoples. First, in considering the intention of the original 
contributing parties at the time as a basis of the Interpretation of the 
Charter provisions regarding self-determination, one cannot but submit 
that there was no intention to create legal obligations on the parties; 
Articles 73(b) and 76(b) support this argument. Secondly, the UN 
Charter refers to self-determination as a "principle" rather than a 
"right" and may Indeed be comparable to a non-justiceable "directive 
24 
principle" as expressed in some national constitutions. 
-------------------- 
24 
J. E. S. Fawcett, 'The Role of the United Nations In Relation to Human 
Rights - Is It Misconcieved? " Proceedings of the Nobel Symposium 7 
(1968) 95-101; See Part IV, Article 37 of the Constitution of India, 
which lists the Directive Principles of State Objectives in. 
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On the other hand, Professor H. Lachs25 argues that by 1945 the right 
of self-determination was already in existence as part of the general 
international law and that the UN Charter was merely endorsing a 
principle which was most certainly a "right" and had gained general 
recognition26. 
Is the right of self-determination, therefore, a legal right? It could be 
argued that the UN Charter imposes binding obligations on Member States 
by virtue of Article 56 which requires all members to pledge themselves 
to "take... action for the purposes set forth in Article 55". It may be 
argued that by ratifying the UN Charter, States have subscribed to legal 
27 
obligations including the right to self-determination. 
M. Shaw however argues that, such a conclusion is non tenable, firstly, 
because Article 55 has an ominous quality that may exclude the principle 
of self determination; secondly the expression 'pledge' alone can hardly 
"convert the humanitarian aims set out into binding legal obligations"28. 
The appeal of Shaw's argument is evident, however, subsequent UN 
practice has shed light on the issue. 
Since Its Inception, the UN has adopted more than fifty resolutions 
dealing generally or specifically with the concept of self-determination. 
The most important UN manifestation of its recognition of self- 
determination as a legal right was the 1960 Declaration of the Granting of 
-------------------- 
25 Prof. H. Lachs, "The Law in and out of the UN - Reflections on the 
principle of Self-Determination" Indian Journal of International Law 1961 
pp. 429-42 at p. 432. 
26 Lachs, Ibid p. 432. 
27 Quincy Wright Recognition & Self-Determination" PASK (Proceedings of 
the American Society of International Law) 1954 p. 23-37. 
28 M. Shaw "Title to Territory in Africa" op cit p. 63. 
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples29. The significance of 
the Declaration is underlined by its record of having the highest citation 
per session of the General Assembly30. The Declaration sets the 
objective of immediate transmission of power, to peoples of all territories 
not yet independent, without any reservations. The Declaration 
31 
specifically notes that "all peoples have the right to self determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"32. The 
significance of the Declaration and its impact on international affairs is 
not unconnected with the zeal with which developing states have 
prosecuted its provisions. Indeed, it has been described as "only less 
33 
sacred than the Charter for the Afro-Asian States". 
In furtherance of the right of self-determination the General Assembly 
legitimized the use of force by dependent peoples to assert their right of 
self-determination, and declared the use of force to suppress colonial 
34 
revolts to be contrary to the principles, objectives and obligations 
29 General Assembly Resolution 1514 XI of 14 December 1960. 
30 
A. Bleicher "The Legal Significance of the Citation of General 
Assembly Resolutions" AJIL p. 475. 
31 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) Para. 5. The significance of 
the Declaration Is further reflected In the fact that the General Assembly 
[in General Assembly Resolution 1724 (XV) ] recognised the Algerian 
right to self-determinatin basing its stand on the 1960 Declaration. 
During the Angolan struggle for Independence, the General Assembly (in 
Resolution 1819 (XVII) of 18 December 1962] called on the Government of 
Portugal to transfer power Immediately to the people of Angola In 
accordance with the 1960 Declaration. Furthermore, with regard to the 
Rhodesian issue, the General Assembly (in Resolution 1515 (XV) ] 
specifically mentions the United Kingdom's failure to fulfil the 
requirements of Paragraph 5 of the 1960 Declaration. 
32 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). 
33 R. Rosenstock "The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey: 65 AJIL (1971) p. 730. 
34 Paragraph 10, General Assembly Resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965; preamble, General Assembly Resolution 2160 (XXI) of 30 November 1966; and Paragraph 7, General Assembly Resolution 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966. 
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undertaken by the administering powers 
35 
In light of the foregoing, can the 1960 Declaration be viewed as an 
Interpretation of the principle of self-determination as contained in the 
Charter? 
The problem of the legal effect of General Assembly Resolutions and 
arguments about the relevance and applications of the traditional sources 
of law to the development of international legal rules through the organs 
of the UN have already been mentioned36. thus we shall limit ourselves 
to the issue raised. 
A proposition advanced by H. Bokor-Szego is that the 1960 Declaration is 
not an authoritative Interpretation of the Charter since some parts of the 
Declaration go "beyond the Charter provisions Included In Chapter XI 
and XII when it condemns all forms of colonial rule, puts an end to 
differentiation between the status of trust and non-self-governing 
territories and demands the immediate independence to all dependent 
territories"37. The moderate view Is advanced by Castenada who 
believes that despite the fact that the Declaration differs in certain 
respects with some Charter provisions, the former is nevertheless "the 
modern interpretation of the principle of self-determination" by the 
-------------------- 
35 General Assembly Resolution 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965; General 
Assembly Resolution 2160 (XXI) of 30 November 1966. 
36 See M. Shaw op cit pp. 64-91, p. 73; R. Higgins The Development of 
International Law Through the Political Organs of the UN op cit p. 4-7; 
and B. Cheng "UN Resolutions on Outer Space: Instantaneous 
Generation of Customary Law" 5, IJIL 1965 pp. 23-114. Judge Tanaka's 
dissenting opinions in the South West African Case (2nd phase) 1966 ICJ 
Report at p. 292; J. Castenada, The Legal Effect of United Nations 
Resolutions, L. M. Goodrich and T. R. Fox (eds) No. 6 Columbian 
University Studies in International Organisation (New York, Columbia 
University Press 1969) p. 174. 
37 Hannah Boko-Szego, New States and International Law (Budapest: 
Akademiai Kiado, 1970) p. 29. 
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38 UN. Furthermore, since all interpretations refine and develop 
particular concepts in a manner acceptable to the parties, this alone 
should not diminish their influence or effect39. In the Western Sahara 
Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) upheld the principle of 
self-determination as a binding principle of international law. However, 
in reaching this conclusion the ICJ did not reveal how it came to this 
conclusion. 
In his analysis of the issue, Dr. M. Shaw states that the core of the 
1960 Declaration constitutes an interpretation of the UN Charter, 
although the provision of the Declaration limiting self-determination to 
the attainment of independence should be regarded as a suggestion and 
not an authoritative interpretation of the Charter40. We share Dr. 
Shaw's opinion on the basis that aspects of the Declaration are 
41 
apparently inconsistent with subsequent UN practice.. 
In addition to proclaiming the general right to self-determination, several 
UN Resolutions have also specifically proclaimed the right of self- 
-------------------- 
38 Judge Castenada "Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions" op 
p. 175. 
39 Ibid. 
40 M. Shaw op cit p. 79. 
41 
Whereas the 1960 Declaration limits self-determination to the attainment 
of independence, subsequent UN practice and trends, as manifested in 
the 1970 Declaration of Principles of Internatinal Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the UN (Res. 2625 (XXV), expand the application of the principle. The 1970 Declaration states that "the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of 
self-determination by that people". 
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determination in specific situations42 and these proclamations have been 
predicated upon the 1960 Declaration. The adoption of the two 
International Covenants on Human Rights43 and the subsequent signature 
and ratification thereto by states have given the right of peoples to self- 
determination the quality of a mandatory rule of international law. These 
UN resolutions should be regarded as evidence of State practice and 
universal practice of significant proportions to justify the conclusion that 
the right of self-determination is a legal right arising from charter 
interpretation and indeed may amount to a customary right. 
A few jurists44 and some States resist this conclusion, the former 
because of their unshakeable commitment to the postulates of classical 
international law, and the latter because of their concern for their 
traditional interests45. However ICJ opinions on this matter seem to 
support the view that self-determination is a basic principle of 
international law of universal application, and thus a legal right of which 
-------------------- 
42 For instance, in May 1967, the UN General Assembly specifically 
reaffirmed the right of South West Africa to "freedom and Independence" 
and created a UN Council for the Territory - Questions of South West 
Africa, General Assembly Resolution 2372,22 UN GAOR Supp. 16A UN 
Doc A/6716/Add. 1 1968. 
43 The two International Covenants state that "all peoples have the right 
to self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development" - Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; Article 1 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights General Assembly Resolution 2200,21 UN GAOR 
(Supp. 16) UN Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
44 See D. J. Devine "The Status of Rhodesia in International Law" 
Actar Juridica 1974 p. 182 at pp. 183-209; I. G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual 
of International Law (6th ed) (Professional Books Ltd. Milton 1976) p. 59; 
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (OUP, 1966) p. 483. These jurists believe that self-determination does not constitute part of 
customary International law, but a formative legal principle of the law of 
nations because of Its recognition by the UN Charter and due to post 1945 UN Declaration. 
45 See Judge Ammouns dicta, ICJ Reports 1971, pp. 16,75. 
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may be part of "Jus cogens""46 Indeed, R. Higgins has observed that 
self-determination is a "legal right backed by a legal obligation and not 
merely a pious hope devoid of substance"47. The development of human 
rights in the international arena has made Its greatest strides as part of 
customary international law by way of self-determination. 
48 
(c) The OAU and Self Determination 
Our examination of the OAU's institutional evolution reveals that the 
campaigns against colonialism and racial discrimination contributed to the 
formation of the organisation49. Consequently, the OAU Charter, 
provides for the eradication of all forms of colonisation from Africa50 and 
the "total emancipation of the African territories which are still 
dependent"51. The OAU Charter also subscribes to the principles of the 
52 UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
instruments which uphold the principles of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples. 
The overwhelming African view of self-determination in the post-colonial 
era is succinctly proffered by the Kenyan delegations memorandum to the 
1963 OAU inaugural Summit at Addis Ababa: 
-------------------- 
46 The Namibia Case ICJ Reports 1971, pp. 16,31; The Western Sahara 
Case ICJ Reports 1975, p. 122. 
47 R. Higgins op cit p. 90. 
48 H. Lauterpacht "Some Concepts of Human Rights" Harvard Law 
Journal (1965) p. 264. 
49 See Chapter Two. 
50 Article II(1)(d), OAU Charter. 
51 Article 111(6) Ibid. 
52 Article II(1)(e) Ibid. 
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"The Principle of, self-determination has relevance where 
foreign domination is the issue. It has no relevance whýTe 
the issue is territorial disintegration by dissident citizens" . 
This view finds support from some scholars who contend that 
international law does not recognise self-determination beyond 
independence or decolonization54. The legal basis of this approach in 
the African context, is predicated upon Article II(1)(c) of the OAU 
Charter which specifies as one of the purposes of the OAU, the defence 
of the sovereign and territorial integrity and independence of Member 
States55. Furthermore, by virtue of Article III, OAU Member States 
"solemnly affirm and declare their adherence (inter alIa) to respect... the 
sovereign and territorial integrity of each State and its inalienable right 
to independent existence". 
Thus, once self-determination has been exercised by a particular colony 
through independence, it is debarred from further exercise of the right, 
not unlike the effect of "res judicata"56. This view presupposes that 
the entity or "self" entitled to exercise the right of self-determination is 
not an individual ethnic group constituting part of a multi-ethnic colony 
or State, but the aggregate of the diverse groups collectively inhabiting 
the colony. 
-------------------- 
53 Proceedings of the OAU Inaugural Summit: Addis Ababa, 1963. 
CAB/LEG File, 1963. 
54 R. Emerson states that "The room left for self-determination in the 
sence of the attainment of independent statehood is very slight with the 
great current exception of decolonization - Rupert Emerson "Self 
Determination" (1971) 65 AJIL p. 459. See also R. Higgins op cit p. 104- 
105. 
55 Similarly, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that "All Members 
shall refrain... from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state... ". 
56 R. Emerson op cit p. 465. 
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The basic rationale here is that to extend the right of self-determination 
beyond national boundaries will encourage secession and thus undermine 
the stability of multi-ethnic states and indeed threaten universal nay, 
regional, peace and security. 
57 
The second school of thought advocates that there is a general and 
continuous right of self-determination to all peoples irrespective of the 
fact that a colony has been granted independence58. Consequently, any 
ethnic group with an independent multi-ethnic State may, if it wishes, 
demand statehood59 and in effect secede. Y. Dinstein states that "just 
as a people under colonial domination is entitled to create a new State 
where none existed before, so can a people living within the framework 
of an extant state secede from it and establish its own independent 
,, 60 country 
The third school of thought submits that general international law neither 
forbids nor supports the grant, demand for or the denial of self- 
61 determination in the post-colonial era. This view is based on the 
observation that international law is neutral on the issue of secession 
until the claim is successful. We submit that the argument based on the 
57 S. K. Panter - Brick "The Right to Self-Determination: its Application 
to Nigeria" International Affairs (London) Vol. 44, April 1968, p. 254. 
58 C. C. Mojekwu, "Self Determination: The African Perspective" In 
Alexander and Friedlander (eds) Self-Determination op cit pp. 228-229; R. 
Rosenstock "The Declarations of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations: A Survey" (1971) 65 AJIL pp. 713,732; See also Y. Dinstein 
"Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities" ICLQ Vol. 25, (1976) 
pp. 103-120. 
59 Jack Forbes "Do Tribes Have Rights? The Question of Self- 
Determination for Small Nations" Journal of Human Relations (Wilberforce) 
Vol. 18,1 (1970) pp. 670-9. 
60 
Y. Dinstein on eit n. 109- 
61 S. K. N. Blay "Changing African Perspectives on the Right of Self- Determination in the Wake of the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples Rights" Journal of African Law (1985) p. 148. 
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neutrality of international law to secessionist action, neglects one 
pertinent factor. 
Self-determination is not recognised by international law in secession 
situations because it constitutes a violation of the territorial integrity 
and independence of the State62. A former UN Secretary-General U 
Thant, has stated that "the United Nations has never accepted and does 
not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of 
secession of a part of its Member States"63. Admittedly, it Is possible to 
argue that Article III of the OAU Charter relates only to International 
relations between OAU Member States and consequently, political and 
territorial claims arising out of intra-national frictions, like the Nigerian 
[Blafran] Civil War64, are not affected by the Article. However, In the 
light of Article III antecedents, such an argument cannot prevail because 
the intentions of the parties to the OAU Charter is clearly indicated by 
subsequent State practice65 shows that the respect for territorial 
integrity is not predicated upon any conditions or exceptions. 
Furthermore, the OAU has passed several resolutions, notably the 
Resolution of 1964, in which Member States restated their pledge to 
"respect boundaries existing on their achievement of national 
Independence"66 OAU resolutions on the inviolability of existing 
boundaries have established a standard of African State practice and 
consequently serve as the basis for a rule of regional customary 
-------------------- 
62 
Article III OAU Charter; Article 2(4) Charter of the UN. 
63 UNMC 9 February 1970 p. 36. 
64 See S. K. Panter-Brick op cit p. 254; KWJ Post "Is There a Case for 
Biafra? " 44 International Affairs 1968 p. 28. 
65 Article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 in D. J. 
Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (2nd ed) (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1979) p. 620-1. 
66 OAU Res. AHG/16/1 (July 1964). 
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international law binding on the States which have subscribed to the 
existing boundary regimes at independence67. Dr. Shaw refers to the 
Biafran experience as "a crucial piece of state practice in Africa with 
regard to post independence secession; and the high level of consensus 
reached by African States on this basis principle of territorial integrity 
demonstrates a strongly held belief militating against secessionist 
attempts"68. 
In light of the foregoing conclusion, the question arises as to whether all 
legal avenues are shut to oppressed minority or other ethnic groups in 
Africa, seeking to assert their right of self-determination? 
Although the general attitude of the OAU and the UN Is basically anti- 
secession, one may Interpret certain International Instruments as having 
opened up some avenues for the exercise of self-determination by peoples 
in the post-colonial context. 
Firstly, UN practice reveals that non-intervention does not seem to be an 
absolute principle. In situations where internal or domestic upheavals 
constitute threats to international peace and security, the UN has 
'pierced the veil' of the principle of non-intervention69. For Instance, 
Paragraph 7 of the General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Among States states that: 
-------------------- 
67 
The Resolution of July 1964 may thus serve as the foundation of 
regional customary law rule not dissimilar to the principle of 'usi 
possidentis' as applied in the Latin American Republic. See the 
"Colombia - Venezuela Award" (1922) 16 AJIL p. 428. 
68 M. Shaw op cit p. 210. 
69 In such situations Article 2(7) of the UN Charter appears to be in 
applicable. R. Higgins believes that UN practice upholds the view that there can be varying degrees of threats to peace, less drastic than those 
necessitating enforcement measures under Article 42, yet which - inspite 
of Article 2(7) - allow actions under Chapter VI in order to maintain international peace - R. Higgins, op cit pp. 79-81. 
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"Nothing in the foregoing Paragraph shall be construed as 
authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair totally or in part the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples as described above and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction to the 
race, creed or colour". 
It is possible to deduce from the foregoing paragraph that the 
inviolability of colonial, nay territorial boundaries and therefore the 
denial of the right of secession is predicated upon the observance and 
protection of the right of self-determination of peoples constituting a 
particular State. Consequently, it is possible to argue that an 
oppressed group can justifiably exercise the right of self-determination if 
the government of the relevant state does not represent all the peoples 
or if distinctions exist based on race, creed or colour. 
70 
Secondly, the emerging concept of peoples rights to self-determination as 
pronounced in recent international legal instruments - can be construed 
in specific contexts as creating legal inroads to the hitherto sacrosanct 
principle of the territorial integrity of states. As A. Cassese rightly 
observes, under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "one may 
continue to question whether the government of, a sovereign State 
complies with Article 1; whether it truly recognizes its peoples rights to 
71 internal self-determination or has become oppressive". 
-------------------- 
70 
This argument is further buttressed by one of the principles of the 
Declaration which states that: 
"The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free 
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence Into any other political status feeely determined by a people constitute 
modes of implementating thought of self determination by that people" - Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
71 A. Cassese, "The Self Determination of Peoples" in The International 
Bill of Rights (ed) L. Menkin, Columbia University Press, 1981 p. 98. 
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The inevitable question that arises is, what constitutes "peoples". Two 
types of units have been accorded or thought to be entitled to self- 
determination. One defines "peoples" by geography and political history, 
the other by its origins and culture. The former rel ates mainly to a 
land-territory with natural or otherwise clearly demarcated boundaries 
falling under a single administration; the latter, to the observable 
characteristics 
72 
of the group. 
This divergence of opinion on what constitutes "peoples" manifested itself 
at the drafting session of the International Convention Economic & Social 
Rights and the International Convention on Civil & Political Rights, 
whence the United Kingdom delegate stated that the term 'people' 
necessarily meant the sovereign state73. On the other hand, the El 
Salvador delegate disagreed and illustrated his own conceptions of 
'people' to include a tribe in Tanganyika (Tanzania) being deprived of its 
ancestral land, requiring settlement against its will74. The concept of 
people has also been defined as: 
"(a) a social entity possessing a clear identity and its own 
characteristics; 
(b) which has a relationship with a territory, even if it 
has been wrongfully expelled from it and artificially 
replaced by other populations; and (c) a people should not be confused with ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities, whose existence and rights are 
recognised in Article 27 of tote International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights" . 
------------------- 
72 
Harris 0. Schoenberg "The Concept of 'People' in the Principle of Self-Determination" 
. Ph. D. Thesis Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University (1972). 
73 
James N. Hyde "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth & Resources" 50 AJIL (1956) 854 at 859. 74 
Ibid. 
75 
A. Cristescu, Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on Arevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the Right of Self-Determination, 
UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/408/Rev. 1, p. 41. 
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Cristescu's definition appears to be a broad reconciliation of Schoenberg's 
differentials and does not indicate criteria with which to measure terms 
such as "social entity", a "clear identity" and "its own 
?6 
characteristics". 
The restrictive approach to the definition of "peoples" has been adopted 
by Professor Cassese who contends that the people of a national 
component of a State must be of dimensions which are comparable with 
other national groups in the same state and not only a minority group; 
secondly that the unit should be accorded a distinct legal status in the 
constitutions of the State. 
77 
We submit that it is not advisable to formulate a 'strai ght-jacket' 
definition for such an amorphous, nay amoebic, concept such as 
"peoples"78, such attempts inevitably lead to anamorphosis. Rather, a 
categorization of the concept is preferable, consequently we ought to 
consider Francois Rigaux approach which categorises the concept of 
peoples into three units: 
"(a) The people constitute a human community who are quite 
significantly different from other peoples; 
(b) The people is the entirety or the majority of the 
population of a State and have one fundamental right: 
that they are not subject to the power of the minority; 
(c) The people can be a homogeneous people structured In 
a State, or they can be national minoriY whose 
collective rights are recognized in that state" 
-------------------- 
76 See M. Shaw op cit p. 103. 
77 
A. Cassese op cit p. 95. 
78 
cf. Jean-Bernard Marie suggests a methodological approach where 
conservative methods should be adopted to specify entities which cannot 
claim to qualify as "peoples" by eliminating Ineligible entities such as the 
State - Jean Bernard Marie, "Semantic and Methodological Distinctions" 
Human Rights Law Journal (1986) Vol. 7 p. 202. 
79 Francois Rigaux "The Algiers Declaration of the Rights of Peoples" in 
Antonia Cassese (ed) UN Law: Fundamental Rights (Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Netherlands, 1979) pp. 211-218. 
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With regard to Rigaux's first category, additional criteria or definition 
would be required to measure, for instance, how a community differs 
'significantly' from other peoples. Such a criteria would admittedly 
Involve anthropological and other sociological considerations such as 
historical and cultural homogeneity. Although this category may serve 
as a basis for establishing a definition of peoples to suit political 
purposes, we must not loose sight of the fact that the definition of 
peoples is not a sociological but a legal one when determining the nature 
of "self" in self-determination80. Rigaux second and third categories 
recognise the state and thus territory as a basic criteria In the 
determination of the term "peoples"; this coincides with the present legal 
approach to the right of self-determination of peoples. 
It is therefore in the context of the Rigaux categories that we may 
better appreciate the concept of peoples rights as stated in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR). 
Article 20 of the AFCHPR provides that: 
(1) 
... all peoples... shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination.. They shall 
freely determine their political status and shall pursue 
their economic and social development according to the 
policy they have freely chosen. 
(2) Colonised or oppressed peoples have the right to free 
themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting 
to any nuns recognized by the international 
community. " 
Although the AFCHPR does not define the term "peoples", a contextual 
approach indicates that the term refers to the collection of individuals 
who constitute distinct communities in Africa and to whom the collective 
-------------------- 
80 
M. Shaw op cit p. 100-101. 
81 Underlines for emphasis only. 
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rights stated in the AFCHPR apply81. The contextual approach hinges 
upon the issue of recognising the very identity of diverse cultures, 
civilizations and peoples with due respect for fundamental and universal 
values of humanity82. Furthermore, the fact that the AFCHPR does not 
affirm the concept of "territorial integrity", unlike the OAU Charter and 
other OAU Resolutions is a very important indication that the right of 
self-determination may be liberally interpreted, within the regime of the 
AFCHPR, as applicable in the post-colonial context. 
Nevertheless, an OAU Member State may decide to raise the shield of 
"non-interference In (its) internal affairs"83 against any assertion of a 
peoples right to self-determination since the relationship between a State 
and its own nationals is almost exclusively regulated by internal law. We 
submit that, quite apart from the fact that the protection of human 
rights is no longer exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of 
States84 the new African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(AFCHPR) creates binding legal obligations on signatory States to 
observe the terms of the Charter and submit to its procedures. 
Consequently, the competence of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights as prescribed by the AFCHPR, constitutes a negation of 
the view that the principle of "non-interference In the internal affairs of 
Member States" is absolute. However, the competence of the Commission, 
as we shall review presently85, is delimited to Investigative powers only, 
while binding decisions on concrete violations of human and peoples 
-------------------- 
81 
See, preambular Paragraph 4, and Article 22(1) AFCHPR. 
82 Theo Van Boven "The Relations between Peoples Rights and Human 
Rights in the African Charter" Human Rights Law Journal, Vol.? (1986) 
p. 186. 
83 Article III (2) OAU Charter. 
84 Rudolf Benhardt "Domestic Jurisdiction of States and International 
Human Rights Organs" Human Rights Law Journal Vol. 7 (1986) p. 205. 
85 Chapter Seven, post. 
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rights are to be taken by the Assembly of Heads of States and 
Government. Furthermore, the competence of these organs are restricted 
"ratione personae" and "ratione materiare" with the framework of the 
AFCHPR. 
In the light of the foregoing, we submit that self-determination Is a legal 
right which excludes the right of secession. Although international law 
is percieved as neutral on the issue secession86, we submit that here is 
a presumption against secession in international law on the basis that the 
principle of territorial integrity places obligations upon the state to 
observe the rule87 . The causes of secessionist trends88, which 
invariably include the denial of rights, should be more seriously 
addressed by African States. Ian Brownlie has suggested that under 
present positive international law, a solution "could be precisely the 
granting of autonomy to peoples - whether minorities, indigenous peoples 
or other ethnic groups inside multi-ethnic states"89. The legal basis for 
this suggestion under current International law is doubtful, however It Is 
possible to argue that in the African regional regime, there is a viable 
exception to the presumption against secession. For instance, under the 
regime of the AFCHPR, where an ethnic group or "people" are 
"oppressed" and as a result seek the expression of their right to self- 
-------------------- 
86 M. Shaw op cit p. 215. 
87 Although most secessionist movements are perpetuated by the 
inhabitants of affected States, (who are arguably not under any 
international obligation to observe the principle of territorial integrity), 
secessionist claims cannot be successful without achieving the criteria of 
Statehood founded upon effectiveness in establishing a viable State (with 
international cooperation) and recognition by other States. See M. 
Lauterpacht Recognition In International Law (Cambridge University Press 
1948). See also J. L. Kunz "Critical Remarks on Lauterpachts 
Recognition in International Law" 44 AJIL (1950)p. 713; and M. Shaw op 
cit p. 162. 
88 Discussed In Chapter Four, post. 
89 
Ian BrownlIe "The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law" 
Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy Vol. 9 p. 117. 
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determination via secession on universally acknowledged humanitarian 
grounds, the presumptions against secession may be rebutted subject to 
the exhaustion of the AFCHPR procedures and the attainment of the 
criteria of statehood90. Admittedly, African States will jealously guard 
their hard won independence and resist any international or regional 
trend aimed at establishing a right to secessionist self-determination. 
The OAU is also committed to the preservation of the territorial status 
quo of States in Africa. Consequently, a more realistic solution Is the 
utilization of the machinery of the AFCHPR through which the rights of 
peoples to self-determination can be amplified and thus hopefully 
influence the decentralization of socio-political and economic structures in 
multi-ethnic African States. 
Secessionist claims and political instability in Africa is caused not only 
by the denial of peoples civil and political rights, but is also influenced 
by the denial of their rights to socio-economic self-determination. 
Consequently we propose to address the issue of socio-economic Self 
Determination in Africa. 
(d) Socio-Economic Self Determination 
The concept of self-determination has hitherto been limited to the process 
of political emancipation and independence. Immediately after being 
granted political independence, African States realised that the vestiges 
of colonialism extended beyond political structures. President Nyerere 
highlighted the issue when he stated that: 
"Liberation is a historical process. It Is not a single action 
which can be completed and have that action celebrated 
-------------------- 
90 
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States stipulates that: 
"the State as a person in international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
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annually. And for Africa, liberation has four aspects or 
stages: first is the freedom from colonialism and racialist 
minority rule; second is freedom from external economic 
domination; third is the freedom from injustice and 
oppression imposed by Africans upon Africans. And fourth 
is mental freedom - an end to the mental subjugation which 
makes Africans look upon other peoples or other nations as 
inherently superior and their experiences as being 
automaticallýl transferable to Africa's needs and 
aspirations" 
While the first of Nyerere's categories, (i. e. freedom from colonisation 
and racialism) has been achieved to a very large extent, with the 
exception of South Africa and Namibia, the achievement of the remaining 
freedoms have for all practical purposes remained elusive. Nevertheless, 
conscious of economic imperatives, the African nations have recognised 
the nature of neo-colonialism92 and have taken steps to protect the social 
and economic right of their peoples. African leaders have thus, directed 
attention to foreign economic control as they once did on colonial political 
control. Their basic imperative is to ensure control over natural wealth 
93 
and resources as a foundation to national development. African nations 
are subject to the system of international economic relations which is 
grossly inadequate for their needs. The system allowed the 
industrialised nations to grow rich by the exploitation of the developing 
91 The Process of Liberation, Ad 
Nverere to the Convocation of lb 
1976 p. 2. 
ess given by President Julius K. 
an University, Nigeria, 17 November 
92 Neo-colonialism has been described as "the survival of colonial systems 
in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging 
countries, which became the victims of an indirect and subtle form of 
domination by political, economic, social, military or technical 
(forces)... " - M. B. Brown, Economics of Imerpialism, (Harmondsworth, 
Penquin Books, 1974) pp. 256-25?. Nkrumah defines neo-colonialism as 
the endeavour of "imperialists to achieve their ends not merely by 
military means, but by economic penetration, cultural assimilation, 
ideological domination, psychological infiltration and subversive acitivies 
even to the point of inspiring and promoting assassination and civil 
strife" Statement to the First Conference of Independent African States 
(Accra, April 1958). 
93 See Osita Eze, "Public International Law, Private Foreign Investment 
and New International Economic Order" Nigerian Journal of International 
Studies, 1980. 
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countries. It demarcated the world into capital-importing nations - who 
export basically raw materials and primary goods at dismally low prices 
to capital-exporting nations and the latter who export manufactured 
goods in turn to the already impoverished developing nations at high 
prices. 
This gross economic imbalance has propelled African States to intensify 
the campaign to assume full control over their natural resources. Thus, 
the attitudes of industrialised nations to the is sue of permanent 
sovereignty over national resources was in collision with Third World 
expectations. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
observed that there are a few, if any issu es in international law on 
which opinions are so divided as the limitation on a states power to 
expropriate the property of aliens. 
94 
The OAU approach to the issue has been to seek UN support in evolving 
an acceptable formula of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
The legal basis of OAU's relationship with the UN Is stated in several 
OAU and UN Resolutions, the first being the OAU Resolution on Africa, 
Non-Alignment, and the United Nations Issued at the 1963 Inaugural 
Summit. The Resolution expressed the OAU's view that "the United 
Nations Is an important instrument for the maintenance of peace and 
security among nations and for the promotion of the economic and social 
advancement of all peoples"95. On 11 October 1965, the UN General 
Assembly, at the request of the OAU Member States, adopted a 
Resolution on Cooperation between the United Nations and the 
Organisations of African Unity96. A few weeks later on 25 October the 
-------------------- 
94 
Banco Nacional de Cuba V Sabbatino 376 US 398,428 (1964). 
95 OAU Summit, CIAS/Pters. 2/Rev. 2/Res. C. 1963. 
96 General Assembly Resolution 2011 (XX). 
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OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, at its second ordinary 
session held in Accra, in turn adopted a Resolution on Relations between 
the Organisations of African Unity and the United Nations97. It noted 
with satisfaction that the UN Charter had been amended in a way that 
would improve African representation on the Security Council and on the 
Economic and Social Council. The resolution also requested the OAU 
Administrative Secretary-General to invite the UN Secretary-General to 
follow the work of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and 
the Council of Ministers as well as those of all the OAU Specialised 
Commissions as an observer, and to do his utmost to ensure that the 
cooperation between the two organisations be as close as possible and 
98 
cover all fields that interest both organisations. The foregoing 
resolutions constitute the basic framework of OAU-UN relationships. In 
the field of technical and economic cooperation these resolutions have led 
to mutual activities towards the evolution of rules regarding the natural 
99 
wealth and resources of developing countries. 
The UN in December 1954100 adopted the formula of permanent 
sovereignty of natural resources outside the context of human rights and 
self-determination, however in December 1962, the General Assembly 
passed The Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
which was based upon the idea of a "right of peoples and nations to 
-------------------- 
97 
AHG/Res. 33 (II). 
98 Ibid. 
99 It has been argued that the nationalisation of foreign assets are in 
violation of international law because the catalogue of agreements between 
the. companies and colonizers (on behalf of indigenous peoples) amounts 
to "pact sunt servanda". We subscribe to the view that in international 
law, these agreements were not international treaties as they were not 
concluded between the subjects of international law. See further: 
Charles C. Okolie, International Law Perspectives of Developing 
Human Riff 
100 UN Res A/837 (IX). 
p. 343. 
Basic 
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Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources"01 Consequently 
"peoples and nations" were the subjects of this right. The Resolution 
states that the "right. . . must be exercised 
in the interest of national 
development and of the well being of the people of the state 
concerned "102; furthermore, exploration, development and disposition 
have to take place in accordance with the rules which the peoples and 
nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable103 The Resolution 
further states that in "cases of nationalisation, expropriation or 
requisitioning.. . based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security 
or the national interest", the owner "shall be paid appropriate 
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking 
such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty, and in accordance with 
104 international law 
The 1962 Resolution represented the first major step by developing 
countries to assert control over their natural resources. Although the 
Resolution was in itself a compromise between the developing and 
industrialised countries105, international law remained the standard of 
treatment of foreign Investments. 
-------------------- 
101 UN Res A/837(IX). 
102 Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Paragraph (1). 
103 Ibid Paragraph (2). 
104 Paragraph (4) Ibid. 
105 The 1962 Resolution has been criticised by many scholars. For 
instance G. Fitzmaurice refers to it as "a highly deficient and ambiguous 
injunction that takes back with one hand all It purports to give with the 
other". - G. Fitzmaurice "The Future of Public International Law and of 
the International Letgal System In the Circumstances of Today In 
Institute de Droit Internationale, Livre du Centenalre (1973) pp. 196 also 
G. Schwarzenberger The Principles and Standards of International 
Economic Law, 117 Recueil des Cours, (1966) (I) p.?. G. Schwarzenberger regards the resolution as "an outright denial of the 
rule of International customary law that the legality of expropriations 
depends on the payment of full, prompt and effective compensation" 
p. 321. 
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The concerted action of OAU Member States together with other 
developing countries led to a further erosion of the customary 
international law approach through the adoption of the 1966 International 
Covenants106 The Covenants also reflect a compromise In the provision 
that "All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligation based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit and international law.. , ºº107. 
Between 1966 and 1974, several resolutions108 were passed by the UN 
which represented a progressive trend towards the 'domesticization' of 
the rules of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, culminating 
in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS)109 
The essence of CERDS is that it emphasises the relevance of the laws 
and regulations of the State over issues of national resources and 
economic activities; furthermore with regard to compensation, disputes 
are to "be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and 
110 by its tribunals 
The significance of the CERDS, to African States, is that It provided a 
political, nay legal, basis for the restructuring of their national 
economies by nationalization and localisation. Whether CERDS amounts to 
-------------------- 
106 General Assembly Resolution 2200,21 UN GAOR Supp. 16. UN Doc 
A/6316 (1966). 
107 Article 2, of the International Covenant of Social Economic and 
Cultural Rights (1966), Ibid. 
108 For instance see, General Assembly Resolution A/2158 (XXI) of 25 
November 1966 which confirms that the exploration of natural resources 
in each country should always be conducted according to national laws 
and traditions; General Assembly Resolution A/3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974 being the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order; UNCTAD Declaration in Resolution 88 (XII) of 19 October 1974 which states that any dispute over State expropriation of foreign property "falls within the jurisdiction of its courts". 
109 General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974. 
110 Ibid. 
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declaration or evidence of customary international law governing the 
nationalisation of foreign assets is a controversial issue. A definitive 
answer, if there is one, will depend upon ones view on the effect of UN 
voting distribution 
111 
and State practice. An overwhelming majority of 
States voted for the CERDS, thus indicating the recognition of new 
principles of international law, notwithstanding the fact that the states 
that voted against CERDS or abstained, represent industrialised 
countries. Furthermore, even though the Industrialised countries voted 
against or abstained on the Charter, they nevertheless expressed 
support for the Initiative and the basic objectives of the document112. 
This seems to suggest that there is a vivid western acceptance that 
international economic order Is unfair. 
On the other hand, State practice provides limited support for the 
argument that CERDS is declaratory evidence of new principles governing 
foreign investment. Recent economic policies and legal developments 
reveal that there is a growing tendency on the part of developing 
countries to attract foreign companies by amending national laws on 
industrialisation and taxation, and by the conclusion of bilateral 
111 The CERDS was adopted by 120 votes; (6 votes against and 10 
abstentions. The negative votes were cast by Belgium, Denmark, The 
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the UK, and the US. The 
countries that abstained were Austria, Canada, France, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Spain. Admittedly, It is 
questionable if the voting distribution can be regarded as near- 
unanimity, a prerequisite for the adoption of a UN resolution that is 
declaratory of law. 
112 Canada for Instance described CERDS as the formulation of principles 
and guidelines to enable the International community to establish and 
maintain an equitable distribution of the worlds wealth. Japan on its 
part was In full agreement with the objectives of the Charter and 
expressed the hope that efforts would be successful for a universally 
acceptable solution of the economic and social problems facing all states 
in an era of growing Interdependence - See Yearbook of the United 
Nations 1974 Vol. 28 (Office of Public Information, UN New York 1977). 
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agreements113 which represent a retreat to the regime of traditional 
concessions114. However, it has been submitted that most of these 
bilateral and multilateral agreements are evidence of the withering of 
classical rules of international law relating to the expropriation of foreign 
assets because they are in effect a type of investment insurance which 
do not necessarily give cover to ensure compensation for loss of foreign 
1 investments15 
The modern rules of Permanent Sovereignty over National Resources are 
still evolving. There has admittedly been a noticeable shift from the 
progressive stance of the domesticization towards the accommodation of 
the internationalization of agreements, a trend not unconnected with the 
contemporary third world debt problem. 
It is pertinent to stress the moral, political and legal justification for the 
right of economic self-determination. Numerous UN Resolutions, the 1966 
International Covenants and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States have established the right to economic self-determination, 
however the legal effect of the right remains doubtful. 
In the absence of a world debt amnesty, what practical options are left 
to African States in the pursuance of economic self-determination? 
-------------------- 
113 See The International Chamber of Commerce - Bilateral Treaties for 
the Encouragement of International Private Investment (ICC Commission 
on International Investments & Economic Development, 1 Dec 1970). See 
also International Economic Law and Developing States (British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law (ed)) 1988. 
114 Rudolph Dolzer "Permanent Sovereignty over National Resources and 
Economic Decolonization" in Human Rights Law Journal No. 2-4 Vol. 17 
(1986) p. 217, at p. 224; T. Wolde, Third World Mineral Development in 
Crisis, 19 Journal of World Trade Law (1985) p. 3. 
115 J. E. S. Fawcett and A. Parry, Law and International Resource 
Conflicts, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981) p. 16. 
176 
Our suggestion is self-reliance. By self-reliance we mean the harnessing 
and utilization of all existing resources in African countries for the 
primary purpose of achieving what development experts refer to as Basic 
Human Needs116 The strategy of most African states, be they, 
capitalist, state capitalist or state socialist, has been primarily predicated 
upon the prompt response to international demand for primary 
commodities"?. The limited foreign reserve proceeds of the sale of such 
commodities are used to finance the local elite demand for western 
finished products, thus satisfying the secondary needs of a minority 
class. Lately, a significant proportion of the foreign reserves of African 
Countries have been committed to servicing International debts118. The 
effect of self-reliance through the Basic Human Needs approach will lead 
to the reduction of poverty, disease and consequently inequality. The 
eradication of poverty and inequality will lead to the transformation of 
society by providing a basis for economic self-determination. 
In view of the apparent apathy of industrialised nations towards 
restructuring the international economic order, it is pertinent to examine 
existing African regional, legal and economic structures with a view to 
reflect on their disposition to ensure economic self-determination. 
During the first decade of its existence, the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) achieved limited success in the economic field, on the 
continent. However the OAU succeeded in rallying the African Lobby at 
-------------------- 
116 
The primary considerations of Basic Human Needs are food, shelter 
and clothing. See F. B. Liser "A Basic Human Needs and the Physical 
Quality of Life Index" in T. Shaw (ed) Alternative Futures for Africa 
(Boulder, Colorado. Westview 1982). 
117 T. M. Shaw "The Political Economy of African International Relations" 
Issue 5 No. 4 Winter 1975 pp. 671-88. 
118 For instance, 25% of the 1987 Nigerian Natinal Budget of N8 billion 
naira (i. e. £1.2 billion) was earmarked for debt servicing. (1987 Budget 
Speech of President Ibrahim Babangida; 31 December 1986 - Federal Ministry of Information - Lagos, Nigeria). 
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the UN to effect the passing of a resolution towards the establishment of 
a New International Economic Order. The reasons for this initial inertia 
in the field of continental economic cooperation are threefold. 
Firstly, the OAU, being basically a political organisation, concentrated 
on consolidating the fragile political unity achieved through compromise 
between the Casablanca Group of radical/progressive states and the 
Monrovia Group of moderate states. Furthermore, the domestic economic 
policies of African States differed and were wholly based on the inherited 
colonial economic structures which were designed to serve the needs of 
the colonial powers. Consequently, African economies were vulnerable to 
the incessantly inclement international economic environment. 
Secondly, the OAU's loose political structure and administrative 
machinery which favoured national Independence over continental unity, 
restricted the organisations power and authority to Implement resolutions 
effectively. The OAU was also preoccupied with settling regional 
conflicts 
119 during its first decade, and thus had limited scope to evolve 
regional economic programmes. The OAU administrative machinery was 
provided with limited financial support to acquire skilled staff, technical 
knowledge and data resources in the economic field. 
Thirdly, the relationship between the OAU and other international aid 
regional organisations such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
on economic and related issues defied definition and scope. The ECA 
was established on 29 April 1958, as a subsidiary organ of the UN 
Economic and Social Council, to assist African countries to achieve social 
and economic development. Towards this end, Resolution 671(XXV) 
establishing-. the Commis. ion provides that: 
119 For Instance, the Moroccan-Algerian War of 1963; the Ethiopian- 
Somalia Conflict Since 1964; the Congo Crisis of 1964; the unilateral 
declaration of independence by Rhodisia (UDI) In 1965; the Nigerian Civil 
War (1967-1970) and the Internal wars in Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. 
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"The Economic Commission for Africa acting within the 
policies of the United Nations and subject to the general 
supervision of the Economic and Social Council, shall, 
provided that the Commission takes no action with respect to 
any country without the agreement of the government of that 
country: 
(a) Initiate and participate in measures for facilitating 
concerted action for the economic development of 
Africa, including its social aspects, with a view to 
raising the level of economic activity and levels of 
living in Africa, and for maintaining and strengthening 
to economic relations of countries and territories of 
Africa both amongst themselves and with other 
countries of the world". 
The ECA was not conceived primarily as an institution for the promotion 
and protection of human rights, however Its activities in the social and 
economic spheres of Africa do enhance the basic needs and rights of 
Africans. Efforts at Involving the ECA In human rights protection was 
not encouraged by many African States. For Instance, ad raft resolution 
sponsored by Nigeria, requesting the Economic and Social Council to 
invite regional economic commissions to study ways and means by which 
they could contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights 
was scuttled due to its rejection by several African States. Nevertheless 
the General Assembly accepted the principle of regional human rights 
120 
arrangements without reference to regional economic commissions 
The ECA's role in the promotion and protection of economic and social 
rights was however recognized by the 1976 ECOSOC Resolution which 
called for "all the organisations and agencies in the system to work 
closely with regional commissions to achieve the overall economic and 
121 social development objectives at the regional level°. 
-------------------- 
120 
UN Doc. C/CN 4/L 907; E/4322 pp. 84-88; See J. Blaustein "Regional Promotion and Protection of Human Right" Commission to Study 
Organisation of Peace, 40th Anniversary Year. Append. Sent. Draft 
1979 pp. 38. 
121 ECOSOC Resolution 2043 (LXI) 5 August 1976. 
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The objectives of the ECA are similar to the states goals of the OAU's 
Economic and Social Commission. This duplication of functions has led to 
complications in the sphere of economic cooperation between the two 
bodies122. A framework for effective cooperation between the OAU and 
the ECA was established in an Agreement signed on 15 November 1965. 
The Agreement provides for mutual consultation between the OAU and 
the ECA on all matters of common concern, the exchange of observers, 
cooperation in matters of statistics and documentation and inter- 
secretariat liaison. Whereas the Agreement allows only for a loose form 
of cooperation, in practise, the OAU's Inactiveness has allowed the ECA 
to establish a nominal preeminence in the promotion of economic 
cooperation on the continent. The failure of African countries to 
contribute to the expansion and development of the OAU's Economic and 
Social Commission is due to the fact that they perceive the latter organ 
as duplicating the functions of the ECA. 
Despite the ECA's handsome efforts towards assisting several African 
States in achieving the social and economic needs of their peoples, the 
problems still persist. The rapid deterioration in the social and economic 
conditions at both national and regional levels became more evident at the 
beginning of the OAU's second decade. The economic and social crisis 
had been fermenting, since the early 1970's, as a result of the 
cumulative impact of a number of adverse factors, both internal and 
external to the region. The crisis has escalated and reached a critical 
level in the 1980's as a result of widespread severe and persistent 
climatic and ecological conditions and the deterioration of national 
economies. All these factors have interacted to create monumental 
-------------------- 
122 For a detailed examination of the conflict between the OAU and the 
ECA - See B. Andimichael, The OAU and the UN: Relations between the 
Organization of African Unity and the United Nations (New York: 
Africana, 1975); Z. Cervenka. The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa 
and the OAU (London Julian Friedman 1977) pp. 177-182. 
180 
economic and social problems, solutions to which seem beyond the ability 
123 of African countries, many of which are just surviving, 
The OAU's response to these gloomy indicators was to conduct a total 
reappraisal of the efficacy of its dependence on the UN Institutional 
machinery. It is evident that although the UN recognised the benefits of 
an integrated-multi-disciplinary-approach to developments124, it was 
125 
nevertheless, institutionally incapable of adopting such a strategy 
With a view to securing alternative strategies for the economic 
development of Africa, the OAU Member States Initiated external 
deliberations with the European Community (EC) under the Lome 
Convention. The Lome II Convention of 1979 which was signed on 31 
October 1979 applied to fifty-eight African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) 
States. The Convention is based on six main principles, namely: 
123 The terms of trade of African countries declined by more than 50% 
between 1977 and 1981. The annual loss of external resources because 
of the deterioration is equivalent to their total annual aid receipts. The 
fall in commodity prices has been particularly devastating In Africa. 
Statistical evidence shows that between 1979 and 1981, African countries 
exporting coffee, copper, cocoa, banana, vegetable oils, and tea suffered 
a loss of earnings of about US $2.2 billion due to the sharp decline In 
the prices of those commodities. The ratio of debt service to export 
earnings for Africa as a whole amounted to 22.5% In 1983 compared with 
10.7% in 1980 - Special Memorandum by the ECA Conference of Ministers 
on Africas Economic and Social Crisis. E/ECA/CM 10/37/RW2. Addis 
Ababa; and "Critical Economic Situations In Africa", Report of the UN 
Secretary-General to the 39th Session of the General Assembly A/39/594, 
2 October 1984. 
124 United Nations Action In the Field of Human Rights 1980, (New York 
United Nations Publications, 1981) pp. 251-255. 
125 The UN's inability to evolve an Intersectional approach to human 
rights and development is based on two factors. Firstly, the political 
differences among Member States regarding the objectives and authority 
of UN organs dealing with development. Secondly, bureaucratic conflicts 
between UN bodies as to jurisdictional Issues. See R. I. Meltzer "UN 
Structural Reform: Institutional Developments In International Economic 
and Social Affairs" in Toby T. Gati (ed) The US, the UN and the 
Management of Global Change (New York. New York University Press 
1963). 
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- the promotion and development of trade between the ACP and 
the European Community; 
- industrialization of ACP States, the main prerequisite for 
their economic development and for increased trade to the 
benefit of these countries; 
- stabilization of export earning from commodities; 
- improvements in the agricultural sector, with the particular 
aims of guaranteeing the ACP's food supply; 
- special measures for the least developed ACP countries126. 
Although the Lome II is primarily a conventional trade and aid 
agreement, during its negotiation attempts were made to integrate human 
127 
rights into the comprehensive development programme. The Lome II 
Convention reflected a prominent characteristic of conventional North- 
South trade agreements by emphasizing economic growth, trade and 
foreign exchange remittance objectives rather than responding to meeting 
human needs and social problems. Its integrated approach to 
development is restrictive and it failed to establish a relationship between 
development and human rights within its programme. The failure to 
128 
incorporate human rights was due to several factors. The EC took the 
initiative to Include human rights In the civil and political context to the 
exclusion of social and economic rights. The EC, thus proposed a two- 
pronged approach to the inclusion of human rights in Lome H. Firstly, 
-------------------- 
126 
EC Doc 1-559/80, p. 31. 
127 R. I. Meltzer, International Human Rights and Development: Evolving 
Conceptions and their Applications to Relations between the European 
Community and the African-Carribean-Pacific States in C. E. Welch and 
R. I. Meltzer (eds) Human Rights and Development in Africa op cit p. 221. 
128 Amy-Young Anawaty "Human Rights and the ACP-EEC Lome II 
Convention: Business as Usual at the EEC", New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics (1980 Spring) pp. 88-90. See also, Nantang Jua, ACP-EEC Lome Regime: Implementing the Comprehensive 
Development Strategy Ph . D. Thesis State University of New York at Buffallo, (1982). 
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it proposed a preambular clause that stated unequivocally, the 
signatories obligation to promote and protect human rights. Secondly the 
European Community proposed that it would commit itself to the public 
condemnation of human rights abuses by any of the signatory States, 
and that such condemnation may lead to the suspension of aid to 
violators but may not necessarily occasion the termination of commercial 
129 transactions. 
The ACP States responded by proposing the extension of reciprocal 
human rights obligations on EEC States with particular reference to the 
protection of ACP migrant workers in Europe and the discontinuation of 
EEC interests in South Africa. The ACP proposal was rejected by the 
EEC and thus led to the exclusion of human rights provisions in the 
Convention. The ACP States also contributed to this failure to include 
human rights provisions in Lane II because they believed that the EEC 
proposal would justify European intervention in the internal affairs of 
ACP States130 This attitude reflects the resistance of African States to 
the fact that the protection of human rights is no longer a matter solely 
of domestic domain but had risen to the level of international 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the fact that African States had contemporaneously 
adopted the Monrovia Declaration to draft an African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights131 probably establishes the resolve of African States 
to limit human rights promotion and protection to the regional jurisdiction 
rather than the international. The failure to Integrate human rights into 
the Lome II Convention may also be attributed to the statements of ACP 
States that economic considerations and advantages must precede the 
-------------------- 
129 Amy-Young Anawaty Ibid p. 80. 
130 Statement of Mr. Adjibade of the Republic of Benin in the Summary 
Report of the Proceedings of June 8-10 1972 ACP-EEC Consultative 
Assembly (2nd Annual Meeting) Doe: No. CA/47/48/49/fin; p. 27. 
131 Decision on Human and Peoples Rights in Africa, OAU Asembly of Heads of State and Government, 16th Session (July 17-20,1979). 
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guarantee of civil and political rights. In the final analysis, both the 
ACP and EEC groups of States are jointly responsible for not seizing the 
opportunity to establish a commitment to human rights principles. This 
132 
attitude reflects a vivid insincerity of purpose 
Notwithstanding the limited economic advantages of the Lane II, the OAU 
Assembly had earlier in July 1976 initiated a parallel economic programme 
by adopting the Monrovia "Declaration of Commitment on Guidelines and 
Measures for National and Collective Self Reliance in Social and Economic 
Self-Reliance in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order". The Declaration called for the 
ECA and the OAU to collaborate In drawing up plans for the 
implementation of the Declaration to be presented to a special economic 
Summit to be held in Nigeria. Consequently, the Lagos Plan of Action 
for the Economic Development of Africa (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos 
were adopted by the extraordinary Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads 
133 of State and Government In April 1980. 
The main objectives of the LPA "is the establishment of self sustaining 
development and economic growth, based on collective self-reliance and 
aimed at improving the standards of living of the mass of the African 
people and reducing unemployment" 
134 The LPA also recommends "that 
Member States should take appropriate measures to ensure that all 
citizens have equal opportunities to the acquisition of the means of 
-------------------- 
132 
At signing the Lome II Convention on 31 October 1979, it was a 
paradox that the major ceremonial speeches emphasised the need for 
human rights protection while the main Convention was devoid of such 
resolve. See Speech of Mr. H. B. St. John, President of the ACP 
Council of Ministers. The Courier November 1979 at p. 5 and 9 (No. 58 Special Issue) ACP-EEC Convention at Lome II. 
133 The OAU Lagos Plan of Action for the Development of Africa 1980- 2000, UN Economic Commission for Africa 'Implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action' (Addis Ababa: ECA 1982) UN Doc. E/ECA/PSB. 2/12/Rev. 1. 
134 
Ibid p. 2. 
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production - education and training, including health facilities, physical 
factors of production and equitable access to the benefits of development 
and economic growth - food, water, health services, and money 
135 Income" 
The LPA provides programmes for different areas of endeavour, 
including food and agriculture, trade and finance, transport and 
communication, scientific skills and the role of women In development. 
The ultimate goal of the LPA is the creation of an African Common 
Market by the year 2000. If African countries can remain solidly 
committed to the objectives and recommendations of the LPA, the 
continent will be insulated to a large extent from the vagaries and 
depressive effect of the prevailing inequitable international economic 
order. 
The World Bank proposals for the economic development of Africa as 
heralded in the World Development Report136 In our opinion exposes the 
continent to the idiosyncrasies of the world economic system. The 
Report emphasises the relevance of "global economic conditions" to the 
survival of the continents and provides that "the development of the 
poorest most slowly growing countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
immediate future depends very much on aid and trade trends., bu t in 
the longer run, - domestic policies are critical"37, 
-------------------- 
135 Ibid p. 9. 
136 World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action. (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development) (World Bank) 1981. 
137 Ibid pp. 35-36. For an incisive critique of the LPA and the World 
Bank Report, see T. M. Shaw "Debates about Africa's Future: The Brandt 
World Bank and Lagos Plan Blueprints" Third World Quarterly (1983)(5) 
2,331. 
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The thrust of the LPA and the World Bank Report represent two sharply 
contrasting strategies. The LPA aims to satisfy basic human needs and 
human rights as a stepping stone to development. The World Bank 
Report, on the other hand, espouses the erstwhile colonial strategy of 
unrestrained growth for export as a prerequisite for achieving basic 
human needs. The World Bank Report has been criticized by social 
scientists as representing only the interests of foreign capital and for 
"adopting a very negative and demeaning attitude on the ability of 
African leadership and institutions" 
138 The OAU Secretary-General has 
also dismissed the World Bank Report as "incomparable with the 
139 
continental self-reliance proposed in the Lagos Plan". 
We subscribe to the theorem that negative rights of protection and 
participation can only be achieved when the positive rights of satisfaction 
of basic human needs are present. We also submit that the LPA can 
achieve this objective if African leaders can go beyond the symbolic 
endorsement of the LPA and commit themselves to a regime of binding 
rules and supervisory organs in ensuring the implementation of the LPA. 
The problem encountered by the OAU during its first decade was the 
reluctance of Member States to scale their varied ideological political and 
economic differences. During its second decade of existence, the OAU 
has, to an extent, scaled those hurdles by adopting the LPA. However, 
economic self-determination will remain elusive unless the OAU ensures 
that African States commit themselves to economic integration through 
-------------------- 
138 Report of the CODESRIA/ECA, (Conference of Directors of Social 
Science Research Institutes and Policy Makers of the Third World UN 
Development Decade), the Monrovia Strategy and the Lagos Plan of 
Action, March 1982, Africa Development 7, No. 1 and 2 (Jan-June 1982) 
p. 199. 
139 Report of the Secretary-General on the World Bank Report (OAU 
Council of Ministers, 38th Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa) 23 February-1 
March 1982; OAU/1177 Appendix II; 3. 
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self-reliance. The emergence of sub-regional economic organisations 
140 
in Africa is an indication of the will of African States to pursue the goal 
of economic self-determination through self-reliance and cooperation. 
The implementation of a Basic Human Needs strategy will no doubt face 
barriers such as the reluctance of the ruling elites in Africa who will 
feel threatened since the basic needs strategy would redistribute Income 
to the benefit of the poor and the detriment of the elite141. The OAU 
LPA represents an authentic continental strategy towards achieving 
economic self-determination and is not incompatible with the Basic Human 
Needs approach. 
Africa needs to gradually disengage itself from dependency on global 
economic and ideological networks142. These networks are represented 
by foreign currency and capital exchange, Western multinational 
corporations and international aid; and also by socialist armies and 
'advisers' and so-called interest-free grants. We do not advocate a total 
break with the International financial network but a gradual 
disengagement which should retain only meaningful and beneficial 
relationships. It Is evident that these links cannot be easily 
relinquished because of the debt trap to which African States have 
succumbed to. Consequently, the calls of total and Immediate 
disengagement from the world financial network sound hollow. We thus, 
suggest a concerted action by African States to engage Western Creditors 
in working out a 'debt amnesty' rather than adopting unilateral threats or 
-------------------- 
140 
These organisations include the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Developmental Coordination 
Conference (SADCC). See O. Onwuka and A. Sesay (eds) The Future 
of Regional and Sub-Regional Institutions in Africa (London, Macmillan 
1983). p. XX. 
141 A. Schecter "The Views of the 'Chartists' and 'Skeptics' on Human 
Rights in the World Order: Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right" 9. Hofstra 
Law Review (1981) p. 374. 
142 Chimelu Chime, Integration and Politics Among African States 
(Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of AFrican Studies, 1972) pp. 391. 
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declarations on the repudiation of loans. The basis of such an amnesty 
is not charity but economic justice, which is the basis of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). The present international economic 
order is riddled with inadequacies and inequalities, thus necessitating 
the universal clamour for a NIEO which has been described as "a means 
143 
to achieve equity, justice between nations and within nations" 
The LPA represents a redefinition of the relationship between the OAU 
and the ECA144, Its success will depend on the capability of both 
organisations to harness their resources for the benefit of social and 
economic self-determination. It will also depend on the realisation by 
States of their duty to ensure economic self-determination and 
development of their peoples. As earlier stated, the Basic Human Needs 
(BHN) approach is not incompatible with the LPA. The BHN strategy 
also reflects some of the characteristics of the 1966 International 
Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its prescription 
for "an adequate standard of living". Article 11 of the International 
Covenant provides for a comprehensive right to an "adequate standard of 
living" by requiring State Parties to "recognize the right of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living... Including food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous Improvement of living standards". The Covenant 
also establishes the "fundamental right" of all "to be free from hunger". 
The International Covenant constitutes treaty obligations for ratifying 
States and consequently, African States which have ratified the 
-------------------- 
143 
"Unjust International Economic Order and Human Rights" Address of 
Theo Van Boven, Director of the UN Division of Human Rights (1977- 
1982) to the UN Seminar on "The effects of the existing unjust 
international economic order on the economies of developing countries and 
the obstable that this represents for the implementation of Human 
Rights", Geneva 30 June 1980 in T. Van Boven "People Matter: Views on 
Human Rights Policy" (Menlenhoft, Nederland by, 1982, p. 175. 
144 Isebill V. Grahn "The ECA/OAU Conflict and Collaboration" in 
R. Onwuka and A. Sesay (eds) The Future of Regional and Sub-Regional 
Institutions in Africa op cit p. 30. 
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Covenants have assumed the obligations to provide food, clothing and 
housing subject to their respective domestic margins of economic 
145 
appreciation. 
In addition to the duties assumed by African State Parties under the 
International Covenants, the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights (AFCHPR) specifically protects the peoples rights to social and 
economic self-determination146 and their right to development147, 
Furthermore, the AFCHPR imposes a duty on States "individually and 
collectively to ensure the exercise of the right to development"148. The 
AFCHPR does not however specifically refer to the LPA, an omi ssion 
which we believe would have given greater legal force to the 
implementation of the LPA. An examination of the legal effect and 
implication of the AFCHPR provision on socia l and economic self- 
determination will be undertaken in Chapter 7. 
-------------------- 
145 
The International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural rights 
imposes on signatory States obligations to observe minimum standards of 
civil and political rights but the responsibility for the implementation of 
economic and social rights depends upon the availability of resources. 
See Article XXX. 
146 Article 21 AFCHPR. 
147 Article 22(1) Ibid. 
148 Article 22(2) Ibid. 
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Chapter Four 
Obstacles to the Protection of Human Rights In Africa: Selected Problems 
(a) Introduction 
One of the main factors responsible for deficient human rights protection 
in Africa has been colonialism. The political and economic structures 
inherited from the colonial powers continue to contribute to the violation 
of human rights in Africa'. Upon achieving independence, many African 
states proceeded to embark on egalitarian programmes which they sought 
to achieve for Africans the enjoyment of living conditions long denied 
them: sufficient food, clean water, communication facilities, roads, health 
care, education, good housing and other benefits of a developed society. 
However these desires could not be achieved because many States 
possessed limited and/or undeveloped resources, and lacked strong and 
determined governments. 
The quest for rapid development and modernization can only be feasible, 
within a stable political framework and there can be no political stability 
without a national political consensus. Many newly independent African 
States, by their very nature artificial creations of the colonial powers, 
encompass heterogeneous collections of tribes and represent at best, 
colonial convenience. National boundaries are not based on any definable 
criteria other than the accident of colonial partition2. Therefore, 
African governments on attaining independence were confronted with a 
situation in which the very existence of their respective nations were 
threatened by cross boundary claims. 
1 Oboro Ikime "Towards Understanding the National Question" in Africa 
Events, London, April 1987 p. 34. 
2 S. K. B. Asante; "National Building and Human Rights in Emergent 
Nations" Vol. 2, Cornell International Law Journal (1969) p. 83. 
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These boundary demarcations have led to the deportation of Africans 
from one territory to another3. Nigerians were deported from the 
Cameroons and Ghana soon after independence, Ghanaians from Ivory 
Coast, Rwandans from Burundi and vice versa; Liberians were In 1971 
deported from Ivory Coast; and nationals of West African were deported 
from Nigeria in April 19834. The First All Africa Peoples Conference 
meeting in Accra, in 1958, denounced the . "artificial frontiers" and called 
for their "abolition or adjustment". However, African leaders, fearing 
the catastrophic consequences, have refrained from venturing into 
boundary readjustments5. Rather, they have preferred the ad hoc 
solution of mass expulsion of non-nationals. R. Emerson has observed 
that "the balkanization of Africa was an old established matter to which 
colonialism only added a new dimension". 
s 
African States have to take on the fundamental problems of welding 
heterogeneous conglomeration of tribes and communities Into a united 
nation. The withdrawal of colonial powers often meant the removal of the 
only rationale holding a country together, and the nightmare of 
disintegration haunts every African government. Indeed, unity is a 
recurring theme in the rhetoric of most African governments and it is 
obviously a value which must be fostered In plural states which have a 
weak base of national loyalty. Yet, the paradox of the theme Is that, 
because tribal identities and loyalties are historical, primordial and 
cultural in a very authentic sense, any attempt to suppress them too 
3 U. O. Umozerike, International Law and Colonialism in Africa, (Nwamife 
Publishers (Enugu) Nigeria), p. 106. 
4 See "The Expulsion. of West African Aliens", Journal of Modern African 
Studies IX No. 2 (1971) pp. 205-30. 
5 Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism" in M. E. Doro and N. M. Stultz, 
Governing in Black Africa: Perspectives on New States, (Englewood 
Cliffs N. J. Prentice Hall (1970)) P. 5. 
6 Ibid at p. 311. 
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much by overemphasizing unity may be regarded as an attempt to 
extinguish the very root of ones identity. Nevertheless, effective 
participation by all the diverse communities in the life of a new national 
entity is the key to national unity and stability in Africa7. Where such 
participation is denied, or the security of one community Is threatened, 
the most natural form of protest is to attempt secessions. As S. K. B. 
Asante has observed, in striving for national unity, "bogey of tribalism 
should not be invoked to stifle legitimate political expression, It certainly 
should not be invoked to gloss over the fundamental requirement of 
effective participation by all groups in the natural political process, and 
the critical problems posed by such requirements. 
9 
Much as the ideal of unity ought to be sought, we should not gloss over 
the reality of African States as comprising ethnic groups which face each 
other as distinct groups competing for economic, social and political 
advantages. Civilian governments have been overthrown by military 
coup d'etat for reasons not unconnected with the former Inability to 
ensure the equitable distribution of these opportunities. The military in 
turn has resorted to the use of authoritarian measures to prevent social 
and political disintegration. Thus some scholars have thus justified the 
existence of pragmatic authoritarian governments as a preferable option 
of Marxist-Leninist governments for the enhancement of human rights10. 
In his study of the military in Africa, C. Liebenow concludes that the 
increasing involvement of the military in politics gives little hope for the 
-------------------- 
7 W. A. Lewis, Politics in West Africa (Allen and Unwin 1965). 
8 K. A. Busia notes that "tribal pressures and tensions In Congo, 
Burundi, Rwanda and the Sudan erupted in civil wars, murders and 
massacres. Tribal cleavages also contributed to the January 1966 events leading to the military take-over In Nigeria"; op cit p. 112. 
9 S. K. B. Asante op cit p. 95. 
10 M. Haile, "Human Rights, Stability and Development In Africa: Some 
Observations on Concept and Reality"; Virginia Journal of International Law (1984) Vol. 24.3 p. 611. 
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modification of the dismal state of human rights observance in Africa" 
It is thus pertinent to examine the major objective conditions existing on 
the continent that present obstacles to the protection of human rights; 
these obstacles include ethnicity, racism, apartheid and militarism. We 
also propose to examine OAU efforts towards the resolution of these 
problems and the legality thereof. 
(b) Ethnicity & Racism 
One of the major obstacles to the promotion and protection of human 
rights in Africa is ethnicity. An ethnic group has been defined as "a 
collectivity within a large society having real or putative ancestry, 
memories of shared historical past and a cultural focus on one or more 
symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples 
of such symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical ambiguity as in 
(localism or sectionalism), religious affiliations, nationality, phenotypical 
features, or any combinations of these"12. 
Ethnicity, therefore is a conscious effort on the part of an ethnic group, 
within a State, to discriminate against all others to its own advantage. 
Most of pre-colonial Africa was divided along ethnic lines. The colonial 
rulers imposed boundaries without giving due consideration to existing 
ethnic boundaries. Nevertheless, the newly Independent African States 
reaffirmed their commitment to the colonial boundaries and sought to 
ensure cohesion between the heterogeneous groups within their national 
boundaries. It was probably inevitable that some of the efforts at 
-------------------- 
11 Gus Liebenow, "The Military in African Politics: A 25 Year 
Perspective" in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara (eds) African Independence: 
The First Twenty Five Years, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1985) pp. 126-159. 
12 R. A. S. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for 
Theory and Research (New York, Random House, 1970) p. 12. 
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unification were bound to fail13. One of the major factors that has 
encouraged ethnicity In Africa has been the manipulation of the fragile 
national socio-economic structures by the African elite and ruling groups 
to perpetuate ethnocentric policies14. Th e ideology of the ethnic leader 
has been used to perpetuate exploitation. Archie Mafeje, thus observes 
that "there is a real difference between a man who on behalf of his 
tribe, strives to maintain its traditional integrity and autonomy, and the 
man who invokes tribal Ideology In order to maintain a power position, 
not in the tribal area but in the modern capital city and whose ultimate 
15 
aim is to undermine and exploit the supposed tribesmen" 
The exploitation of the socio-economic systems by dominant ethnic groups 
within African States, to the disadvantage of other groups has led to 
gross violations of human rights. A brief analysis of this practice in 
some selected African countries is necessary. 
In Uganda, ethnic differences since independence have led to abhorrent 
human rights violations. Ethnic differences in Uganda are broadly 
delimited between a northern power base and a southern power base 
competing for State power over the economic and military structures. On 
the attainment of independence, the British helped the Southerners to 
attain a greater degree of prosperity, education and urbanization than 
the North. The agricultural and mining industries were located in the 
south, thus the southerners were in control of the economy. On the 
other hand, the British in forming the Ugandan Army, had recruited 
-------------------- 
13 W. J. Breytenbach "Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Africa" Human Rights Case 
Studies Vol. 1 The Hague 1975 p. 31; C. Ake Explanatory Notes on the 
Political Economy of Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 14,1 
(1976) pp. 4-9. 
14 0. Nnoli "Socio-Economic Insecurity and Ethnic Policies in Africa" 
African Review, Vol. V No. 2 (1974) p. 12. 
15 Archie Mafeje "The Ideology of Tribalism", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. IX (1971) p. 258. 
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soldiers overwhelmingly from the northern ethnic groups, thus reposing 
military power with the Northerners. The lack of balance in power thus 
reinforced the ethnic divide. 
Under Idi Amin (1971-1979), Uganda witnessed the most atrocious 
violations of human rights. Amin was a Northerner who in 1972 
attempted to rectify the southern domination of the economy by expelling 
Asians (who opted for British citizenship) with the aim of giving the 
Northerners more economic power. It is arguable that Idi Amin 
succeeded, albeit unintentionally, in Integrating the country to the 
extent that he achieved the balance of power between the north and the 
south In the economic sphere16. Earlier Milton Obote (President, 1967- 
71) had In realization of the numerical strength of the south over the 
north, adopted a popular ideology of "Move to the left" In an attempt to 
create a northern power base through political Ideology. However in his 
second coming, 1980-1985, Obote adopted an aggressive strategy by the 
military intimidation of the south. The Southern ethnic groups who had 
already suffered under Amin resorted to guerilla warfare against the 
Obote regime. The Southern reaction culminated in the formation of two 
military groups, the first under Yusufu K. Lule (briefly Ugandan 
President in 1979) and the second under Yowerl Museveni (Ugandan 
President since 1986). The Obote government was toppled by another 
Northerner General Tito Okello, who ruled until Musevenis National 
Resistance Army (NRA) gained power in January 1986. Musevenis rule 
may be viewed as a restoration of the military balance between the 
Northern and the Southern ethnic groups. His success will depend upon 
his ability to extend this balance to the political and economic spheres. . I- 
The ruling government should evolve a system that gives adequate 
-------------------- 
16 Ali A. Mazrui and O. H. Kokole "Ethnicity and the North-South Divide 
in Ugandan Politics" in 1987, Britannica World Data Annual 1987 e (Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., Chicago/London, 1987); p. 441. A 
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representation to each ethnic group or indeed consider granting some 
form of autonomy to the groups17. A basically stereotyped theory has 
been evolved to justify the disposition of descendants of certain Ugandan 
ethnic groups to 'democratic' rule than others. We submit that such 
18 
theories only serve to exacerbate the problems of unification rather than 
solve them. 
In Nigeria, ethnic groups compete for the control of the socio-political 
and economic systems. Civil politics in Nigeria has been characterized 
by political parties which represented the ethnic interests of the Hausa- 
Fulani (North), Ibo (East) and Yoruba (West). In the early 1960's the 
three main political parties were the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) 
representing the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups, the Action Group (AG) of 
the Yoruba's and the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(NCNC) which mainly represented the Ibo's. The political dominance of 
the NPC and NCNC alliance led to resentment and riots on the part of 
the Yoruba Action Group in 1964. A socio-political upheaval ensued in 
1966, characterized by antagonism between the Ibo's and Hausas 
culminating in the country's first military coup, and the civil war which 
-------------------- 
17 Milton Obote's government consisted mostly of Langi and the Ancholi 
to the exclusion of the Buganda. Idl Amin excluded the Langi and the 
Ancholl from power and thereafter proceeded to annihilate them 
systematically. The present government of Y. Museveni has so far 
achieved a greater degree of success in ensuring relative representation 
of the ethnic groups. Nevertheless, ex-President Milton Obote's National 
Liberation Army, has continued to campaign against Musevenis rule by 
launching brutal guerilla attacks on Ancholi regions and causing the 
exodus of some 50,000 refugees - Africa Confidential Vol. 27 No. 18,3 Sept 1987, p. 8. 
18 Al! Mazrui and O. Kokole base their contention on the fact that 
'republican' northern ethnic communities have produced human rights 
violators like Idi Amin, Milton Obote and Tito Okello; while the "monarchial" southern ethnic groups have descendants such as George Kanyeihamba (Attorney General) and G. Binalsa, (President 1979-80) who 
are both human rights exponents. Ali A. Mazrui, op cit p. 441. 
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19 lasted from 1967 to 1970. Since the end of the civil war, consecutive 
Nigerian civil and military regimes have attempted to evolve systems that 
will ensure an equitable balance of power between the various ethnic 
groups, but with limited success. The devolution of central power to 
the regions was effected by General Yakubu Gowon in 1967 through the 
creation of 12 states out of the 3 main regions. The formulae of the 
creation of states has had a calming influence on ethnic nationalism. 
Consequently, successive military regions have pursued this policy of 
state creation and at present there are 21 states in the Federation of 
Nigeria. Nevertheless, the fact that Nigeria has had several military 
coups detat and several attempted coups is evidence of the continuing 
manipulation of the socio-economic system by ethnocentric military and 
vicilian elites. Thus, ethnicity is one of the main bases of instability, 
economic problems and the deprivation of human rights in Nigeria. 
In Burundi, the minority Tutsi hegemony over the majority Hutus led to 
the 1972 bloodletting in Burundi when about 2,000 Batutsi and upwards 
of 100,000 Bahutu were massacred. In Rwanda, the political parties 
20 
that struggled for independence were established along ethnic lines. 
Although the Hutu majority now control power In Rwanda, they have 
nevertheless continued to discriminate against the Tutsi minority. 
According to J. Greenland, one of the major factors responsible for the 
Hutu virtual monopoly of the socio-political and economic systems In 
Rwanda was an overreaction to the fact that the Tutsi minority being 
better qualified, occupied important positions in the political and 
19 W. J. Breytenbach 'Inter Ethnic Conflicts in Africa' op cit pp. 314-316; 
P. Pergham 'Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War' International Affairs, 
London Vol. 46 No. 2 (1970) pp. 231-246; A. H. M. Kirk-Green, Crisis and 
Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook (1966-1970) Vol. 111 July 
1967-January 1970, (London OUP, 1971). 
20 Jeremy Greenland, "The Two Options New Facing Burundi"; Rene 
Lenerchand, "Ethnic Genocide"; and Warren Weinstein, "Burundi: Ethnic 
Alternatives to Violence" in Issue Voi. V No. 2 (Summer 1975). 
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economic structure21. The Hutu's have thus succeeded in consolidating 
their control over the political system in Rwanda. 
In Burundi, politics is based on ethnic division and since independence, 
the Tutsi who constitute about 1296 of the population have continued to 
control the political system to the displeasure of the Hutu who constitute 
83% of the population. The Tutsi minority rule has led to several futile 
attempts by the Hutu majority to seize political control with the inevitable 
massacre of the Hutus. The deliberate discriminatory policies evolved by 
the Tutsi minority government is exemplified by the October 1986 
Government Order banning 300,000 Hutu children from participating in 
literacy and religious education programmes known as "Yaka Mukama"22 
The discriminatory policies have also been exercised against the Hutus in 
employment and other social services23. As recently as August 1988, the 
Tutsi controlled government used its modern army to slaughter an 
estimated 5,000 unarmed Hutus, while about 35,000 Burundi refugees 
have fled the country. 
The OAU response to thee violations of human rights in Burundi has 
24 been disappointing. One of the only OAU responses to the Burundi 
issue was the visit of the OAU Secretary-General, Diablo Telll, to 
Burundi in May 1972 during which he declared his "total solidarity" with 
President Micombero of Burundi. At the OAU Summit Conference, a 
-------------------- 
21 
J. Greenland "Ethnic Discriminatinon in Rwanda and Burundi" Human 
Rights Case Studies, Vol. 4, The Hague, 1976, p. 114. 
22 "Burundi: Holy War" in Africa Confidential Vol. 28; No. 1; 7 January 
1987, p. 8. 
23 J. Greenland op cit p. 122-124. 
24 R. Lemarchand 'Selective Genocide in Burundi', Report No. 20 
(Minority Rights Group, London) Part I, (July 1984). 
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25 
month later, no public statement referred to the massacres. 
The foregoing ethnic conflicts are representative of a common practice in 
heterogeneous African States. Ethnicity creates barriers to the 
protection of human rights in Africa. Ethnic hegemony pervades the 
socio-political strata of African States and implications on human rights 
protection are not abysmal. 
In addition to ethnicity, the practice of racial discrimination and 
apartheid constitute barriers to the promotion and protection of human 
rights in Africa. Racism has been defined as "any set of beliefs that 
organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or Imagined) 
between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or 
characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of 
26 invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races". 
There is no doubt that colonialism played a major role In the introduction 
and development of racism in Africa27. When the Europeans colonized 
Africa, one of the main justifications for the system Introduced was the 
inability of Indigenous peoples to rule themselves and manage the 
resources of their land. Thus under the mask of "civilizing" the 
indigenous peoples the colonial rulers proceeded to establish political 
systems that were not representative of the people. The economic 
structures installed were to exploit the resources of the colonies to the 
-------------------- 
25 J. Messer, "Holocoust in Burundi 1972" 5. Case Studies on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A World Survey W. Veehoven (ed) 
(1976) p. 225. 
26 P. vender Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comprehensive Prospective 
(London- John Wiley & Sons Inc) 1967 p. 11. 
27 M. Halle op cit p. 594. 
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advantage of the metropolis28. 
The practice of racism is evident in post-colonial Independent African 
States such as Chad, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda despite the 
fact that these states have promulgated laws that proscribe discrimination 
based on race29. The Sudan and Chad can be singled out as two States 
that their peoples have experienced discrimination along racial lines. 
In Chad, the Sara Negroid peoples of the South who are mainly 
Christians and traditional religionists have traditionally dominated the 
Sudanic-Arab Tonbou and Gorane groups constituting the North. During 
the 1960's and early 1970's, the country was politically and economically 
under the control of the southern Chadians. Although France had 
maintained the administration of the Northern Regions after 
independence, in 1965 France succumbed to the nationalistic claims of 
President Tombalbaye. The French administrators of the Northern region 
were replaced by southern Sara's who initiated aggressive policies which 
led to uprisings. The Sara administrators were forced to withdraw In 
the wake of attacks by disparate dissident northern groups which 
eventually coalesced under the Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad 
(Frolinat). 
Thus, from its genesis, the political Instability that Is Chad, today, has 
been based by racial discrimination despite inter breeding between the 
races and ethnic groups. The Chadian civil war was exacerbated 
30 
through the external intervention of Libya and France. In 1979, the 
-------------------- 
28 M. Santa Cruz, Racial Discrimination (New York United Nations) 
E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/307/Rev. 1/1971 p. 8. 
29 For a discussion on the provisions on human rights in the 
Constitutions of African States, see Chapter Five, post. 
30 Africa South of the Sahara, Europa Publications Limited (1975) p. 235. 
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central government collapsed giving rise to approximately eleven different 
rebel forces claiming legitimacy and demanding a role In the formation of 
a new government31. Recently, Hissein Habre and his Gorane dominated 
Forces armees du nord (FAN) succeeded in reimposing a workable central 
government and expelled the foreign invaders32, but not without the 
support of the central eastern Hadjeral ethnic group. The battles along 
ethnic lines have continued in Chad with the creation of the Gorane 
dominated Chadian ruling party the Union nationale pour l'independence 
et la revolution (UNIR). 
The Chadian civil war created many human rights problems including the 
exodus of refugees to neighbouring states of Nigeria, Sudan, Central 
African Republic (CAR), Cameroon and Niger33. The success of any 
government in Chad will depend on its. ability to accommodate the 
interests of the diverse races and ethnic groups In Chad thus limiting 
the explosive potential of deliberate discriminatory policies. 
The Sudan has witnessed the installation and perpetration of northern 
Arab rule over the southern Negroid ethnic groups. Since independence 
from the British, the Sudan has experienced the Arab monopoly of 
economic, social, educational, administrative and military institutions34 
In 1951, the legislative Assembly of the Sudan approved Article 100 of 
the Self-Government Statute of the Sudan, which guaranteed effective 
-------------------- 
31 D. Pitman, "The OAU and Chad" in Y. el Ayouty and I. W. Zartman 
(eds) The OAU After Twenty Years op cit p. 302. 
32 Chad: The Factions Return, Africa Confidential Vol. 28, No. 15,22 
July 1987 p. 5. 
33 The United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) reports that the Chadian refugee population as at March 1985 
were 47,000 (in CAR), 123,000 (in Sudan), and 40,000 (in Cameroon). 
UNCHR Report 1985-6, A/AC. 96/677(II). 
34 O. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint (London OUP 1970) 
PP. 3-4; M. O. Bechir, Revolution and Nationalism In the Sudan (London, 
Rex Collings, 1974) p. 2. 
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participation of the south in the political system. However, the Anglo- 
Egyptian Agreement of 12 February 1953 cancelled this protection given 
to the South by Article 100. In 1955, the Sudanese Parliament embarked 
on a Sudonization programme which effectively excluded the Southern 
ethnic groups from occupying senior political positions. The failure of 
the Sudanese Government to grant effective autonomy to the Southern 
35 
peoples led to civil war, which temporarily ceased in 1972. 
Despite the enactment of the law for Regional Self-Government In the 
Southern Provinces36 the Southerners have continued to demand self- 
determination and Independence, by launching guerilla warfare against 
the Sudanese Government, mainly under the banner of the Sudan Peoples 
Liberation Army (SPLA) by Dr. John Gurang37. The dissatisfaction of 
the southerners, despite the enactment of the Organic Law and Interim 
Agreements38 Is based on their conviction that the government lacks the 
will to implement these legislations. It must however be emphasised that 
the Organic Law sets out conditions for the effective and equitable 
-------------------- 
35 O. Albino op cit pp. 4-5. 
36 The Sudanese Government and the Southern Liberation Movement 
signed an agreement on 24 February 1972, which preceded the historic 
legislation named the Organic Law for Regional Self-Government in the 
Southern Provinces. The Organic Law provides for regional autonomy by 
granting the Southern Peoples (of the provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, 
Equatoria and Upper Nile) the right to elect a Peoples Regional Assembly 
that can legislate on matters such as public order, education, public 
health, internal security, the promotion of trade and tourism (Article 
11). However, matters such as mining and land use are subject to 
Central Government control. (Article 11 (XIV) and (XVI). Chapter VIII 
grants the Peoples Regional Assembly the power to levy regional duties 
and taxes. The Organic Law also provides for the freedom of religion, 
and the right of minorities to use their languages and develop their 
culture - Paras. 4 and 6. 
37 The other pro-divisionist organisations are the Sudanese African 
National Union (SANU), the Sudanese Progressive Party (PPP). The 
only southern profunity party Is the Southern Sudan Political 
Association. 
38 The Interim Agreements provide for the recruitment and Integration of 
citizens from the Southern Regions into the Sudanese Peoples Armed 
Forces. 
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participation of the southerners in the government of the Sudan. 
Political stability in Sudan can only be assured if the Government can 
ensure the effective participation of southerners in government and in 
the economic institutions. 
The Sudanese civil war has created refugee problems, duly acknowledged 
by the UNHCR in its Report which records the registration of 86,670 
refugees of Sudanese origin settled in Ethiopia refugee camps of Itang on 
the Sudan/Ethiopian border39. The refugee problem has been 
exacerbated by the famine In Ethiopia and recent floord In the Sudan. 
During this writers visit to Ethiopia in April 1987, attempts to visit the 
refugee camps were frustrated because of Ethiopian government 
restrictions. Ethiopian regulations allow only UNCHR officials access to 
the refugee camps. Interviews with UNCHR officials at Addis Ababa 
confirmed that the rationale for such restrictions are not unconnected 
with the fact that the SPLA use these camps as rear bases and 
recruitment centres for its guerilla army. 
It is evident that a military solution to the Interracial civil war In Sudan 
is not feasible. A viable solution lies in the exploration of a federal or 
confederal system of government that would ensure autonomy for the 
southern provinces40. The parties to the conflict may also consider 
exploiting the newly created avenue of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights. The Sudan, having ratified the AFCHPR is obliged 
to observe the principles enunciated in the Charter. Article 19 of the 
Charter provides that "nothing shall justify the domination of a people 
by another". Furthermore. Article 20(2) guarantees the "right of 
colonized and oppressed peoples to free themselves from the bonds of 
-------------------- 
39 
UNCHR Report for 1985-8 op cit p. 29. 
40 Moyigahorokoto Nduru "Sudan: Sharie by Another Name" Afric Asia 
No. 40 April 1987, p. 20. 
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domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international 
community". Although the Charter does not define "peoples" it is 
possible for the peoples of southern Sudan to justify their demands 
especially if it can be proved that they have been 'oppressed" and that 
there has been a consistent or massive violation of their rights. It is 
however, doubtful whether multi-ethnic African States, such as the 
Sudan, will allow the establishment of such an interpretation. 
Nevertheless, once the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
is seized of the matter, it will enjoin the OAU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government to act on a matter it has hitherto neglected. 
The problem of racism as an obstacle to the protection of human rights 
in Africa is further exemplified by the plight of East African Asians. 
Intercontinental trade between the Indian subcontinent and Eastern 
Africa over the centuries produced a large Asian community in East 
Africa. During the era of British colonialism In East Africa, Asians 
continued to participate effectively in trade and commerce in the region. 
Thus the nationalist struggles in East Africa was two-pronged, against 
the British and the Asians, because of their joint domination of the 
economic spheres41. Although the reaction to British rule was basically 
due to political domination, the resentment of Asian presence was due to 
the latter's commercial malpractices and segregationist inclinations which 
were no doubt fuelled by the caste syndrome. 
On the granting of independence to the East African States of Kenya, 
Tanganyika and Uganda, the Asians were given the choice of either 
becoming British Citizens in Kenya 42 , British protected persons in 
41 D. P. Ghai (ed) Portrait of a Minority: Asians in East Africa (London OUP, 1965) pp. 1-4. 
42 Kenya, being a colony. 
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Tanganyika and Uganda43 or registered citizens of these States. 
The problem of racism in East Africa is highlighted by the treatment of 
the Asians that decided to become citizens of these States. In Uganda, 
Asians of Indian origin or those with British passports regardless of the 
fact that they were registered citizens of Uganda were expelled by Idl 
Amin. The despicable action of the massive expulsion of citizens on 
racial grounds was paradoxically justified by Idi Amin on grounds of 
44 
nationalization, 
In Kenya, the expulsion of Asians was carried out in a more systematic 
manner. The Asians who were Kenyan citizens had constituted 
themselves as small but dominant groups In control of the trade and 
commerce in Kenya. In realization of this fact, the newly independent 
Kenyan State gradually revoked the citizenship of the Kenyans of Asian 
origin. The Kenyan government justified its action on the need to effect 
fundamental structural changes in the State with a view to generating 
greater social and economic mobility for Africans45. Indeed, Tom Mboya 
emphasised the need to restructure the economy "in which the poverty 
line dangerously coincided with the racial lines"46. Consequently, 
-------------------- 
43 Tanganyika and Uganda being a Trusteeship and Protectorate 
respectively. 
44 Idi Amin's justification was that "the Asian community frustrated 
attempts by Ugandan Africans to participate in the economic and business 
life of their country. Asians have used their economic power to ensure 
that Ugandan Africans are effectively excluded from participating in the 
economic life of their own country. They have used their family ties, 
their languages which are unknown to Ugandans to exclude Ugandan 
Africans from business life of their own country. They have refused to 
identify themselves with Uganda... " quoted in Osita Eze, The Legal 
Status of Foreign Investments in the East African Common Market 
(Geneva, Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales/Leiden 
Sigthoff, 1975) pp. 302-303. 
45 Y. P. Ghai American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 
67th Annual Meeting, Washington DC, 12-14 April 1973, p. 123-4. 
46 T. Mboya quoted in A. Mohiddin "Socialism or Capitalism? " Sessional 
Paper No. 10 reviewed in East Africa Journal, March 1969 p. 43. 
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official Kenyan government policies discriminated against the Kenyans of 
Asian origin despite constitutional guarantees to the contrary. 
The practice of restructuring the national economy on racial lines was 
also evident in Tanzania. Some writers have claimed that Tanzanian 
socialist practices based on the Arusha Declaration of 196747 were non- 
discriminating in spite of the fact that the brunt of the policies were 
borne by the citizens of Asian origin48. We cannot subscribe to the 
notion that because the Arusha Declaration consecrates the principles of 
social justice, and economic equality, this fact alone absolves the State 
from charges of implementing a policy with particularly dire implications 
for a predetermined race. The controls and restrictions imposed by the 
Tanzanian government on economic activity and property ownership 
divested Tanzanian Asians of their right and means of livelihood. 
Consequently, we cannot appreciate any distinction between the desired 
effects of the policies of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda on their citizens 
of Asian origin; the only difference being the method of implementation. 
The need to restructure the economic 'and social systems of African 
States cannot be overemphasised. Indeed, economic self-determination 
and self reliance cannot be achieved without structural intra-national and 
global economic changes. However these antra-national or domestic 
policies should take due cognisance of the equal rights of Individual and 
groups within the national polity. Ethnic or racially biased socio- 
economic policies cannot achieve unity and the egalitarian objectives 
sought by African States. Such policies only serve to alienate the 
minorities and fuel calls for full political and economic self-determination. 
-------------------- 
47 J. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, (Nairobi, OUP 1968) p. 13- 
37. 
48 0. Eze, Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems, op cit. 
p. 111. 
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Individuals, ethnic and racial groups within a State also have a duty to 
identify with and contribute to national aspirations and refrain from 
forming ethnic or racial enclaves for exploitable purposes. 
(c) Apartheid 
Apartheid Is the extreme form of racism. It Is a formalized and 
established system of racial discrimination evolved from the factual 
conditions existing in South Africa and Namibia. The institutions and 
instruments of State are calibrated to ensure the maintenance of 
inequality and distinction between racial groups. Apartheid Is thus the 
foremost barrier to the protection of human rights In Africa. 
South Africa officially declared the apartheid policy in 1948, thus 
"legalizing" the practice of segregation and racial prejudice perpetuated 
by previous regimes. Apartheid is based on four distinctive but 
mutually complementary factors, namely; (a) racial prejudice and 
discrimination, (b) racial segregation and separation, (c) economic 
exploitation of natural and human resources and (d) legal, administrative 
and police terror. These ramifications of terror have been described as 
apartheid's "most indestructible component on which It Is dependent for 
49 its continuation" 
The basic objective of apartheid Is to ensure a stratified society through 
the imposition of restrictions on Africans, coloureds and Asians, thus 
securing status and employment for whites who constitute only 2096 of the 
population of South Africa. Political control is vested in the white 
population by virtue of the Act to Constitute the Republic of South 
-------------------- 
49 
J. R. Friedman, Basic Facts on the Republic of South Africa and the 
Policy of Apartheid. New York, United Nations, 1978 Doc 
ST/PSCA/SER. A/K p. 34. 
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Africa50. Consequently only the whites can be voted into Parliament. 
Africans and coloureds are barred from voting51 except in the homelands 
where they are allowed to participate In legislative functions subject to 
the veto powers of the Minister for Bantu Administration52. 
The control of the economy is firmly in the hands of the white minority 
and restrictions are placed on the participation of blacks and coloureds 
in the economy. Several legal instruments have been promulgated to 
place restrictions and regulate the jobs that Africans and coloureds can 
perform. For Instance, the Native Labour Act and the Bantu Laws 
Amendment Act of 1967 grant the Minister of Bantu Administration powers 
to define which categories of work Africans may not engage In, and also 
to prescribe the numerical strength of Africans In certain categories of 
employment. 
The minority racist government of South Africa has passed laws to 
ensure effective control 
workers and prohibiting 
South African Laws and 
majority of its citizens54 
of trade unions by restricting the rights of 
strikes53 
practices violate the fundamental rights of the 
The right to life, liberty and security of the 
-------------------- 
50 Act No. 33 of 1961 (superceding the amended South Africa Act of 
1909). 
51 J. R. Friedman, op cit p. 19. 
52 International Commission of Justits (ICJ), A Study by the ICJ on 
Apartheid in South Africa and South West Africa, (Geneva, 1967) pp. 13- 
14. 
53 Industrial Conciliations Acts of 1959 and 1965; The Native Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act, 1953; See South Africa: Detention and 
Torture of Trade Unionists, Amnesty International, London, August 
1986. 
54 Kader Asmal "The South African Constitution: Racism in the Basic 
Law of Apartheid" International Review of Contemporary Law 2 (1985) 
pp. 65. 
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person55 and the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel and inhuman 
or degrading treatment are not protected or observed56. The 
Government of South Africa also violates the citizens rights to 
recognition as a person before the law as well as equal protection by the 
law. South African Laws violate the prohibition of arbitrary 
57 
interference within the individuals privacy, family, home or 
correspondence58, the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the borders of ones state59, the right to leave any country including his 
60 
own and return to his country, the right to marry and found a family, 
-------------------- 
55 For instance, the Bantu Administration Act No. 38 of 1927 (as 
amended) grants the State President power to banish Africans In the 
public interest. The Criminal Law Amendment Act No. 8 of 1953 (as 
amended in 1965) permits detention of persons for 180 days without trial. 
The Terrorism Act No. 83 of 1967 restricts the right of habeus corpus; 
S. 50A of the Internal Security Act also restricts the right to liberty. 
56 Police violence, torture and Ill-treatment of detainees and deaths In 
police custody have been reported. See Amnesty International Report 
for 1987 (Al Publications, London 1987) p. 99. 
57 The cumulative effect of South African Laws has been described as 
amounting to denying Africans recognition as human beings. - 
International Commission of Jurists - Study by the ICJ on Apartheid, 22 
cit p. 6. 
58 Under the State of Emergency Imposed by the Public Safety Act since 
11 June 1986 (renewed on 11 June 1988), security policy have raided 
homes arbitrarily and without warrants - Amnesty International Report 
1987, op cit p. 100; For a catalogue of restrictions Imposed by the 
Emergency Regulations - See "Human Rights Index" South African 
Journal on Human Rights (1988) Vol. 4 p. 110. 
59 The South African regime of Pass Laws have led to the Imprisonment 
of up to a quarter of a million black people each year on grounds of 
race. Although President P. W. Botha withdrew the Pass Laws on 1 July 
1986, other Laws continue to provide for the registration of people by 
race and requires all adults to possess individual Identity documents. 
For instance the Group Areas Act (1950) Is still In force and the various 
anti-squatter legislations which ensure racial segregation - Ibid p. 99-100. 
60 The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 imposed a criminal 
penalty on mixed marriages; Inter-racial Intercourse Is criminal under the 
Immorality Act of 1957; The Mixed Marriages Act of 1967 renders null 
and void marriages contracted by white South African males with non- 
whites. 
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the right to propertysl, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, the right to freedom of opinion and expression62, the right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly, the right to the standard of living 
63 
adequate for health and the wellbeing of the subject and his family, the 
right to education and the right to freely participate in the cultural life 
of the community. 
By its Bantustan policy64 of granting 'national' self-determination to the 
homelands, the South African government is evolving a cordon of so- 
called "national" client "states , 
65 designed to be dependant on the 
Republic66. The Bantustans are not representative of the will of the 
black South Africans because the political leadership of these client 
homelands is predefined by the Pretoria regime. The UN has 
consistently declared the Bantustans as fraudulent and contrary to the 
principle of self-determination. Furthermore, apartheid laws are applied 
in these homelands67. The dependency of these homelands on the South 
African regime is graphically illustrated by Dr. C. Phatudi of Lebowa: 
-------------------- 
61 The right to property' is violated by The Native Land Act (1913), 
Native Trust Land Act (1936), Natives Consolidation Act (1945). The 
effect of these laws Is to reserve to the white minority (1996 of the 
population) 87% of the land, while the African majority (6996 of the 
population) holds only 13% of the land. The most fertile and economically 
viable lands are held by the minority. 
62 Marcus Gilbert "The Wider Reaches of Censorship" South African 
Journal on Human Rights 1.1 (May 1988) p. 69. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act 1970. 
65 The so-called national states are: Gazankulu, Ka Ngwane, Kwa 
Ndebele, Kwazulu, Lebowa and Quaqua. See Henry Richardson "Self- 
determination, international law, and the South African bantustan policy" 
Columbia Journal of International Law 2.1978 p. 185. 
66 The Bantustan Programme: Its Domestic and International Implications, 
document submitted by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement to the 
United Nations pp. 25-26. 
67 The Second Bantu Laws Amendment Act No. 71 (1974). 
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"We became vast reservoirs of labour for the Industrial and 
mining sectors of the Republic of South Africa. We are 
omni-dependent on the Republic of South Africa for all the 
electrical power consumed in these territories as well as for 
most of our water requirements. We are also absolutely 
dependent on the Republic for our transportation requirement 
as well as every aspect of telecommunications, postal and the 
like. 
If you add to this pattern of dependence, the considerably 
high disparity in the level of development, demographic 
explosions and in pure economic power between the 
territories and our white ruled neighbours, you will 
understand sv by we have been dismissed as a hostage or 
client state" 
The continued existence of the racist regime In South Africa Is 
dependent to a large extent on Its economic relationship with 
industrialised nations69. Foreign investors are perpetuating apartheid 
by colluding with the regime In exploitation of the socio-economic 
resources of South Africa. The military might of South Africa was built 
upon the appeal of its argument that highlights the Country's 
significance as a strategic geopolitical location as a bulwark against 
communism in the region. 
?0 
The installation of the apparatus of a totalitarian state by the 
establishment of the South African National Security Management System 
with branches In all State agencies and even In private enterprise Is 
paradoxical, in the light of South Africa's expressed fear of Marxist 
totalitarian threats. The government of South Africa, though not 
Marxist has become a true Leviathan. 
-------------------- 
68 The Bantustan Programme op cit p. 25-26. 
69 The major export destination of South African minerals and goods are 
U. S. 9.7%, Japan 7.7%, Switzerland 6.6%, U. K. 4.2%, West Germany 3.996, 
Italy 2.6%. South Africa imports goods from the U. S. 19.7%, West 
Germany 15.8%, Japan 12.9%, U. K. 11.2% - Britannica World Data 1987 op 
cit p. 747. 
70 0. Eze The United Nations and Decolonization in Southern Africa: 
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 3, Nos. 1 and 2,1977, 
pp. 55-56. 
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Most of the industrialised nations have resisted the universal call to 
relinquish trade links with South Africa. The justification proferred by 
these nations is that the continuing foreign trade and investment in 
South Africa will lead to the integration of Africans into the main socio- 
economic system, thus gradually withering down apartheid71. It has also 
been stated that total imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against 
South Africa would have a devastating effect on the material conditions 
of South African blacks72. We submit that the present living conditions 
of the majority of South Africans barely satisfies their basic human 
needs; consequently, the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions on 
South Africa will not have significant adverse effects on their condition. 
Furthermore, the effect of such sanctions will force the South African 
regime to make a choice between imminent economic collapse and/or socio- 
political upheaval. 
The high birth rate among black South Africans and the changing 
political economy means that the blacks must be brought into government 
to head off a revolution, which will be made more imminent if 
comprehensive and mandatory sanctions are imposed. In realisation of 
this fact, the South African Government is attempting to raise the 
standard of living of urban blacks by establishing Joint Management 
Committees that are granting financial support to strategic townships for 
the improvement of housing and infrastructure73. The perceived effect 
of this policy, is the creation of a moderate black opinion sympathetic to 
the government. We submit that as long as the structures of apartheid 
exist, especially the Group Areas Act and the State of Emergency, 
attempts to dissuade the aspiration of blacks for self-determination and 
freedom will most certainly fail. 
71 J. R. Friedman, op cit p. 57. 
72 Ibid Prime Minister M. Thatcher of U. K. has rigidly subscribed to 
this argument. 
73 Africa Confidential (1988) May p. 1-2. 
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South Africa has continued its occupation of Namibia and extended its 
apartheid policy to the territory; an analysis of the Namibian issue is 
thus pertinent. 
(d) Namibia (South West Africa) 
By virtue of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced all her 
overseas possessions including South West Africa, and a Mandates system 
was created over these territories. Under the Mandates System, these 
territories were declared "sacred trusts" to be administered by 
Mandatory powers with the aim of protecting the Interests of the 
inhabitants. Article 22 of the Treaty granted His Britannic Majesty a 
Mandate over South West Africa to be held on his behalf by the 
Government of the Union of South Africa. 
Under Article 22(6) of the Treaty, South West Africa was designated one 
of the Class "C" Mandated territories "which, owing to the sparseness of 
their population, or their small size, or other remoteness from the 
centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of 
the Mandatory", were "best administered under the laws of the 
Mandatory as Integral portions of Its territory", subject to specific 
safeguards for the indigenous Inhabitants. 
The Treaty spelled doom for the people of South West Africa because the 
Mandatory State extended its laws and practices of apartheid and social 
segregation to the territory. Although the Mandates system provided 
safeguards such as reposing the ultimate responsibility over the territory 
In the Council of the League, it however failed to act unanimously, as 
required under Article 5(1) of the Leagues Covenant, to prevent the 
South African violations. 
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At the end of the Second World War the United Nations introduced the 
International Trusteeship System as a successor regime to the territories 
held under the Mandate System. South Africa breached the principle of 
self-determination, as expressed in the UN Charter, by refusing to 
negotiate under the new system, and proceeded to annex South West 
Africa as part of Its own territory. The legal thrust of South African 
position was that, with the dissolution of the League of Nations, South 
Africa was not internationally accountable to the UN for Its actions in 
South West Africa. 
The General Assembly, consequently referred the Issue of the status of 
South West Africa to the International Court of Justice for an Advisory 
Opinion. The ICJ Advisory Oplnion74 stated that Chapter XII of the UN 
Charter did not impose a legal obligation on South Africa to negotiate a 
trusteeship agreement, however, it was under an obligation to submit 
reports on its administration of South West Africa. 
In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia raised the issue of South West Africa 
before the International Court of Justice, (ICJ) in response to a decision 
of the 1960 Summit Conference of Independent African States. Liberia 
and Ethiopia asked the ICJ to confirm inter alia; 
(a) that the Mandate was a Treaty still in force under Article 37 
of the Statute of the Court and that the Union of South 
Africa was subject to international obligations as set out in 
Article 22 of the Leagues Covenant and in the Mandate; and 
-------------------- 
74 South West Africa Case (1950) ICJ Reports p. 130. 
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(b) that South Africa was internationally accountable to the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the UN regarding the exercise of 
75 the Mandate 
South Africa raised preliminary objections which challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Court and the locus standi of Ethiopia and Liberia, 
however the Court held that it did have jurisdiction by virtue of Article 
7 of the Mandate. In the Second Phase of its judgement, given on 18 
July 1966, the Court decided that Ethiopia and Liberia had no locus 
standi because they had no independent Interest under the Mandate to 
bring the action76. The relative merits and demerits of the ICJ 
judgement have been referred to elsewhere77, however suffice it to say 
that for all practical purposes South Africa refused to alter Its policy on 
South West Africa. South Africa reinforced its control over the economic 
and political processes in Namibia, thus effectively turning the territory 
Into a colony. 
South Africa established a political system In South West Africa which 
was composed of a Senate, a House of Assembly and territorial legislative 
houses all of whose members were white South Africans. The Indigenous 
black populations were effectively excluded from exercising their civil 
and political rights. The territory's socio-economic infrastructure 
including commerce, industry, land, mining, immigration, civil service, 
health, customs and excise were subjected to the 'administrative and 
75 South West Africa Cases (1962) (Preliminary Objections) Ethiopia v 
South Africa; Liberia v South Africa. Phase 1 ICJ Reports pp. 132-147. 
76 South West Africa Cases, Second Phase, Ethiopia v South Africa; 
Liberia v South Africa, ICJ Reports (1966) p. 6. 
77 B. Cheng "The 1966 South West Africa Judgement of the World Court" 
Current Legal Problems (1967) pp. 181-213; S. S. Lonin, South West 
Africa and the United Nations, (Baltimore, London- John Hopkins 
University Press, 1973) p. 298. 
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legislative control of the South African government78. South Africa also 
extended the system of homelands to South West Africa by passing the 
Native Nations Act79. The International Commission of Jurists Study 
refers to the powers of the South African State President as "drastic" 
and "unlimited" including the appointment and removal of chiefs, the 
amalgamation of tribal communities, deportations and banishment; the 
President can also order the removal of any person from one part of the 
80 territory to another without any form of access or appeal to courts. 
The last two decades have witnessed mounting international concern over 
the situation in South West Africa. The UN General Assembly has 
passed a series of Resolutions by virtue of which the UN assumed 
responsibility for South West Africa and terminated the Mandate81. The 
UN also passed Resolution 2372 which renamed the territory Namibia and 
declared that the continued occupation of the territory by South Africa 
82 
"constituted a grave threat to international peace and security". 
In addition to the General Assembly Resolutions, the UN Security Council 
has also passed several resolutions on Namibia, Including Resolution 249 
(1969) which re-emphasized the UN termination of the Mandate and UN 
responsibility over the territory. The Security Council also declared 
South Africa's refusal to comply with the UN Charter and the UN 
resolutions on Namibia as "an aggressive encroachment on the authority 
of the United Nations" and thus Issued an ultimatum to South Africa to 
78 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), A Study of the ICJ on 
Apartheid op cit p. 19. 
79 Elizabeth A. Landis "Namibia and Human Rights" Human Rights 
Journal Vol. 4,2-3 (1976) p. 321. 
80 ICJ Report on Apartheid, op cit p. 19. 
81 General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 28 October 1966. 
82 General Assembly Resolution 2372 (XXII) of 11 June 1968. 
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leave Namibia before 4 October 1969, failing which the Council would 
decide upon "effective measures in accordance with the appropriate 
provisions of the relevant chapters of the UN Charter , 
83. The Security 
Council consequently, passed several resolutions Including 276 (1970), 
284 (1970) and 283 (1970) calling on all States to relinquish diplomatic 
and other relations with South Africa in so far as these applied to 
84 Namibia. 
The Security Council in July 1970 requested an Advisory Opinion on the 
following questions: 
(I) Was South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal and was there 
a duty on South Africa to withdraw? 
(ii) Whether States (Members or not) are under an obligation to 
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia 
and act accordingly? 
85 
The ICJ answered both questions in the affirmative. With regard to the 
second q uestion, the court was of the opinion that the decisions of the 
Security Council were binding on all Member States. Regarding the first 
question, the Court held that the termination of t he Mandate was not 
ultra vires because the UN was successor to th e League regarding 
Mandated territories and thus could exercise any supervisory powers 
-------------------- 
83 UN Security Council Resolution 269 (1969). 
84 France and the United Kingdom abstained from voting on these 
resolutions. 
85 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
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over them which the League was competent to do86. The Court also took 
judicial notice of apartheid and declared that it is a flagrant violation of 
the purposes and principles of the Charter. 
The OAU 8th Assembly reacted to the ICJ opinion, by sending a 
delegation to the Security Council with the aim of seeking means of 
implementing earlier UN Resolutions87. The OAU Member States accepted 
the method of dialogue rather than confrontation with South Africa. The 
UN Security Council thus, adopted Resolution 309 (1972) Inviting 
Secretary-General Waldheim in consultation with the representatives of 
Argentina, Somalia and Yugoslavia to enter Into dialogue with South 
Africa. 
Despite these discussions, which took place in 1972, South Africa 
continued to apply its "homelands" policy and apartheid laws in 
Namibia88. On 24 May 1973, the OAU Council of Ministers acting on the 
advice of the OAU Liberation Committee called on the UN Security 
89 Council to revoke the UN Secretary-General's talks with South Africa 
The UN General Assembly acceded to this request on 12 December 1973, 
after the UN Council on Namibia re-echoed the OAU request90. The UN 
General Assembly took a further step on 12 December 1973 by adopting a 
resolution which acknowledged the special role of the OAU In recognising 
-------------------- 
86 In his disssenting opinion, Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice stated that 
the General Assembly lacked the power to terminate the Mandate. Ibid. 
See R. Higgins "The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions 
are Binding under Article 25 of the Charter? " ICLQ, (1972) Vol. 20 
pp. 270-289. 
87 AHU/Res 65 (VII) 23 June 1971. 
88 "Apartheid in Namibia: a study by the Inernational Commission of 
Jurists" Objective: Justice 6.1 (Jan-March 1974) p. 16. 
89 William J. Foltz and J. Widner "The OAU and Southern African 
Liberation" in Y. El Ayouty and W. Zartman (eds) The OAU After 
Twenty Years op cit p. 258. 
90 Ibid p. 259. 
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liberation movements and declared the South West African Peoples 
Organisation (SWAPO) as the "authentic representative of the Namibian 
91 
people" 
It has been observed that the effect of the Resolution 3111 (1973) was to 
strengthen South African intransigence92. The Resolution also had the 
effect of influencing a lull in SWAPO's military activities because the 
organisation nursed expectations that the UN would effectively resolve 
the issue. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which called 
for UN supervised elections in Namibia. By virtue of Resolution 435, 
diplomatic dialogue commenced between the Western "Contact Group" 
(comprising the United Kingdom, US, France, Western Germany and 
Canada) and South Africa with a view to finding an arrangement 
acceptable to the Front Line States and SWAPO. 
Notwithstanding these negotiations, the South African Government 
installed the so-called Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) 
in June 1985. The TGNU has very limited powers because the South 
African Government retains direct responsibility for defence, foreign 
affairs and the constitutional status of Namibia. Eleven second tier 
ethnic authorities (one white and ten black) were established, under 
Administrator Generals Proclamation No. 8 (AG8) of 1980, to control health 
and education services. In August 1987, the majority of the TGNU's 
Constitutional Council voted for a constitution which would abolish AG8 
and its racially and ethnically biased provisions. However, the all white 
Afrikaaner National Party in Namibia and the government of South Africa 
refused to accept the vote. 
'ItA 
-------------------- 
91 
UN Resolution 3111 (XXVIII), 12 December 1973. 
92 W. J. Foltz and J. Widner op cit p. 259. 
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It is pertinent to note that the Proclamation of the State, establishing 
the TGNU, has a Bill of Fundamental Rights attached thereto as an 
annex91a. The rights proclaimed include the freedom of association, 
assembly and expression, the rights to a fair trial, equality before the 
law and the freedom from torture, ill treatment and arbitrary detention 
without trial. The legal validity of the Bill of Fundamental Rights if 
very doubtful because it is attached as an annex to the Proclamation. 
Furthermore, the existence and application of laws such as the Terrorism 
Act (1967), the Suppression of Communism Act, the Internal Security Act 
(1950), and Proclamation AG9 (1977), the provisions of which negate 
those of the Bill of Fundamental Bill of Rights, casts severe doubts as to 
the legal positivity of the Bill of Rights. 
In August 1980, the Windhoek Supreme Court of Namibia was asked to 
determine the validity of these laws in the light of the provisions of the 
Bill of Fundamental Rights93. Before the court could pass a ruling on 
the matter, the State President of South Africa, issued a new decree, 
Proclamation 157 of 1986, which stated that no court could be competent 
"to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of" any act passed by 
the South African Parliament before or after the formation of the TGNU. 
Nevertheless, in October 1986, the Windhoek High Court took a 
courageous decision which in effect declared that the Terrorism Act 
effectively became invalid when the Bill of Fundamental Rights was 
introduced as part of the Proclamations establishing the TGNU94. In 
December 1986, the Appelate Division overturned the October judgement 
-------------------- 
91a 
Proclamation R101 of 1985. 
93 , Namibia" Amnesty Al Report, op cit p. 82. 
94 See The State v Heita &7 Others (1986) 3. South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 400. 
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and held that the Bill of Fundamental Rights did not affect laws such as 
the Terrorism Act which were already in force at the time of its 
95 introduction 
The foregoing scenario and the reported cases of widespread detentions 
without trial, torture, "disappearances", deaths In detention96 coupled 
97 
with the legal immunity conferred on the security forces, reflect the 
Intransigence of South Africa and its determination to resist International 
98 
efforts at ensuring self-determination and human rights In Namibia. 
The efforts of the Western Contact groups at ensuring self-determination 
In Namibia has yielded little99. The main obstacle to self-determination 
in Namibia Is South Africa's Insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
in Angola prior to its withdrawal from Namibia. A multilateral agreement 
between South Africa, Cuba, SWAPO and Angola may open the door to 
100 
negotiations for Namibia's Independence. 
95 Cabinet of the Interim Government v Katofa (1987) 3 SAJHR pp. 140- 
141. 
96 "File on Torture in Namibia" (A. I. Publications, London, 1985). 
97 Proclamation AG9 of 1977. 
98 Gay J. McDougall, "International Law, Human Rights and Namibian 
Independence" Human Rights Quarterly (1987) p. 443. 
99 Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale "South Africa: Why Constructive 
Engagement Failed" Foreign Affairs, 64.2 (Winter 1985/86) p. 234. 
100 Between 8-9 September 1987, in London, the Angolan President 
Eduardo dos Santos held talks with the US Secretary of State for African 
Affairs in which the Angolan President announced that a withdrawal of 
Cuban forces will take place over two years involving all Cuban troups 
south of the 16th parallel. "Angola/US: More Talks" Africa Confidential 
Vol. 28, No. 19,23 September 1987 p. 8- 
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(e) Evaluation of OAU Solutions to the Problem of Racism & Apartheid 
The struggle against racism and apartheid as manifested in southern 
Africa has been pursued directly by liberation movements with the 
coQperation and assistance of the OAU. 
The OAU Charter emphasises the determination of Member States to 
safeguard their hard won independence and to fight neo-colonialism in all 
its forms101 One of the purposes of the OAU is "to eradicate all forms 
of colonialism from Africa"102. Article III(6) of the OAU Charter 
reaffirms the "absolute dedication" of all Member States to the "total 
emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent". The 
Charter stipulates that this and other objectives shall be achieved by 
"political and diplomatic cooperation, economic cooperation and cooperation 
for defence and security"103. Thus, OAU unequivocal measures against 
neo-colonialism and racial oppression derive their justification from the 
Charter. The struggle against racism and apartheid In Africa has thus 
become a fundamental tenet of the OAU104. Two major methods are 
adopted by the OAU in its struggle against racism and apartheid; 
namely, diplomatic and economic measures, and secondly, military and 
financial assistance to national liberation movements. 
(i) Diplomatic & Economic Measures 
At its inaugural Conference in 1963, where the OAU Charter was 
adopted, the OAU Member States unanimously adopted a resolution, in 
response to apartheid, racism and colonialism in Africa. The resolution 
101 6th Preambular Paragraph; OAU Charter. 
102 Article II(1)(d), Ibid. 
103 Article 11(2) Ibid. 
104 Z. Cervenka, The OAU and Its Charter op cit p. 37. See also W. E. Langley and J. E. Okolo "The Organisation of African Unity and Apartheid: Constraints on Resolution" World Afairs, 137.3 (Winter 1974- 1975) p. 206. 
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called on Member States to grant "effective moral and practical support 
to any legitimate measures which the African nationalists leaders may 
devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the 
African majority"105 Prior to the 1963 Conference independent African 
and Asian States at the UN had demanded an immediate and unconditional 
end to colonialism and racial discrimination by minority governments. 
The UN consequently passed the General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) 
of 14 December 1960 entitled "The Declaration of the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". 
Portugal's persistent refusal to comply with Resolution 1514 led the 
African Group at the UN in 1963 to Initiate a Security Council meeting on 
the applications of an arms embargo on Portugal106, The Security 
Council resisted the African request to declare such an embargo. 
However in 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2107(XX) 
which recommended sanctions against Portugal. The legal efficacy of this 
recommendation is doubtful, since the Security Council, being the 
competent organ to make such a recommendation, did not do so. OAU 
Member States were thus constrained to pass OAU Resolution 9(1) which 
established a Bureau to supervise and coordinate the application- of 
sanctions by African and non-African States107. The OAU's efforts at 
imposing sanctions on Portugal was not very effective because the 
response of African States was not encouraging. 
In contrast, OAU's efforts against the minority regime of Ian Smith in 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were more pronounced and effective. 
Prior to Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) In 
105 Z. Cervenka op cit p. 16. 
106 Andemichael op cit p. 109. 
107 AHG/Res 9(1) of 21 July 1964. 
223 
December 1965, the OAU had passed several resolutions which declared 
support for the liberation movements of Southern Rhodesia108 and 
condemned the racialist policy of the regime109, 
In response to the UDI, the OAU Council of Ministers passed a resolution 
on 5 December 1965 "deciding", firstly on the severance of all 
communications and commercial links between OAU Member States and 
Southern Rhodesia and secondly, the severance of diplomatic relations 
with Great Britain in the event of her failure to end Ian Smith's regime 
and pave the way for majority rule before 15 December 1965110. The 
resolution also called on African States to render financial and military 
assistance to liberation movements in Rhodesia. The poor response of 
African States to the resolution was due to two main factors. Firstly, 
many African States, being members of the Commonwealth, had very 
close economic and diplomatic ties with Britain and were thus reluctant to 
relinquish such ties easily. Secondly, the OAU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government felt that the Council of Ministers had exceeded its 
scope of authority by deciding to impose an obligation on Member States 
to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain 
lll. However, despite 
this reaction, the OAU continued to render financial and military 
assistance to the liberation movements. 
At the level of the UN, the efforts of OAU Member States was directed 
at ensuring the imposition of diplomatic and comprehensive mandatory 
-------------------- 
108 Osita Eze "OAU faces Rhodesia" The African Review, Vol. 5 No. 1 
(1975) p. 46. 
109 C. H. Zimmerli "Human Rights and the Rule of Law In Southern 
Rhodesia" ICLQ Vol. 20 1971 p. 231. 
110 OAU Council of Ministers Resolution ECM/Res. 13(VI), 
ECM/Res. 14(VI) of 5 December 1965. 
111 For a discussion of the powers of the Council of Ministers. see 
Chapter 2 above at p. XX. See also T. O. Elias, "The Legality of OAU 
Council of Ministers Resolutions on Rhodesia" op cit p. 9. 
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economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. The UN Security Council 
responded by adopting Resolution 232 which declared the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia as constituting a "threat to international peace and 
security" and banned UN Member States from importing several major 
Rhodesian minerals including iron ore and asbestos; the supply of oil, oil 
products and arms to Southern Rhodesia was also prohibited112. The 
General Assembly also declared that the violation of the Resolution by 
Member States would constitute a violation of Article 25 of the UN 
Charter. Despite this Covenant, several States Including the United 
Kingdom, U. S., and Japan continued to trade with Southern 
Rhodesia 113 . 
The determination of the OAU to ensure the imposition of diplomatic and 
economic sanctions as a response to racism and apartheid Is reflected In 
several OAU Resolutions. At the 1967 OAU Assembly held In Kinshasa, a 
resolution was adopted which declared "that the continued existence of 
apartheid and racial discrimination constitutes an odious crime against 
humanity and represents a menace to peace and security" 
114, The 1967 
Resolution also condemned the continuance of economic, political and 
military collaboration of Western countries with South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia. The apparent reluctance of the UN to Impose 
comprehensive mandatory sanctions on Southern Rhodesia and South 
-------------------- 
112 
UN Security Council Resolution 232, of 16 December 1966. 
113 P, J. Kuyper, The Implementation of Sanctions - The Netherlands ai Rhodesia (Sijthoff and Noordoft International Publications, 1978); Repor 
on the Supply of Petroleum Products to Rhodesia (Bingham and Gray) 
HMSO/1978 p. 212. 
114 Quoted in Z. Cervenka "Thre Organisation of African Unity and Its Charter" op cit p. 21. 
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Africa coupled with the sporadic attacks on Tanzania and Zambia by 
South Africa propelled the OAU Council of Ministers to pass Resolution 
153 of 12 September 1968115 
Resolution 153 strongly condemned three permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, United Kingdom, the U. S. and France, for their 
refusal to apply economic sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, and called on them to sever all ties with South Africa116. 
The Resolution also strongly condemned several NATO members, in 
particular, West Germany, Italy and France, for continuing to sell 
military equipment to South Africa and assisting in the production of 
arms, ammunition and poison gas in violation of the UN Security Council 
and General Assembly resolutions117. The resolution concludes with a 
note of regret on the failure of the UN Security Council to bring about 
an end to apartheid in South Africa because of the resistance of the main 
trading partners of South Africa, including the three permanent members 
1 
of the Security Council18 
However in 1970, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 277 which 
in effect called on UN Member States to withdraw consular and commercial 
representatives in Southern Rhodesia. The Security Council Resolution 
also imposed mandatory transportation barriers between Southern 
Rhodesia and UN Member States119 Resolution 277 has formed the basis 
of several UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on the 
effective implication of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Sanctions 
-------------------- 
115 CRM/Res 153(XI) of 12 September 1968. 
116 Paragraph (1), Ibid. 
117 Paragraph (4), Ibid. 
118 Paragraph (8), Ibid. 
119 UN Security Council Resolution 277,1970. 
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were eventually lifted by the UN Security Council In December 1979, in 
response to the Lancaster House Agreement of 17 September 1979 which 
paved the way for self-determination in Zimbabwe. 
The campaign of African States against apartheid in Southern Africa was 
waged mainly within the framework of the UN and resulted in the 
adoption of a number of UN resolutions and several declarations120. 
Several UN Members including a few African countries especially Malawi, 
continued to disregard UN resolutions on diplomatic and economic 
sanctions against South Africa. 
Notwithstanding these setbacks, the UN established a legal framework, 
for the campaign against apartheid, which consisted of two treaties. The 
first, is the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination of 21 December 1965121, the second is the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
-------------------- 
120 For Instance, UN General Assembly Resolution 1761(XVII) of 6 
November 1962 which called on UN Member States to take diplomatic and 
economic measures to effect the eradication of racial policies in South 
Africa including the boycott of all South African goods. The resolution 
also established the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the 
Government of South Africa. This Committee was later renamed the 
Special Committee on Apartheid and was responsible for monitoting the 
racial policies of the goverment of South Africa. The General Assembly 
reinforced the mandate of the Committee by virtue of Resolution 1978 A. 
(XVIII) of 16 December 1962. The UN Security Council Resolution 181 
(1965) called on States to stop sales of arms and ammunition and military 
vehicles to South Africa; UN General Assembly Resolution 2396 (XXIII) of 
1968 called on the UN Security Council to declare the situation in South 
Africa a grave threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and thus implement mandatory sanctions. The resolution also 
called on all States to render "moral, political and material assistance to 
the South African Liberation Movement in Its legitimate struggle" The UN 
Security Council Resolution 282 of 1970 condemned all violations of the 
arms embargo. 
121 The Convention was declared open for signature and ratification by UN General Assembly Resolution 2106 A(XX) of 21 December 1965, and 
entered Into force on 4 January 1969 after being adhered to by twenty 
seven states. See Human Rights, A compilation of International Instruments of the United Nations, (New York, UN; 10973/DOC 
ST/I+R/1, pp. 24-29). 
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122 
of Apartheid of 30 November 1973. 
Article 1 of the 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimination defines racial 
discrimination as: 
"any distinction or preference based on race, colour, descent or national 
or ethnic origin with the purpose of the effect of nullifying or Impairing 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal footing of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of human life". 
State Parties to the Convention are required to pursue by all appropriate 
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all 
its forms. In pursuance of this objective, State Parties to the 
Convention are required under Article 5 to guarantee the right of 
everyone to equality before the law, the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights, and economic, social and cultural rights. Article 8 of the 
Convention establishes a Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination123 which is empowered to make recommendations to affected 
parties or specific organs of the UN. The Committee has however 
encountered significant drawbacks; firstly it does not have decision 
making powers. Secondly, South Africa not being a party to the 
Convention can neither be expected to be bound by Its provisions, nor 
make declarations allowing individual or group communications to the 
-------------------- 
122 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
Apartheid entered into force on 18 July 1976; International Legal 
Materials, Vol. 13,1974 p. 51. 
123 The functions of the Committee include the consideration of reports 
of measures which State Parties have adopted to give effect to the 
provisions of the Convention, and the consideration of matters arising 
from allegations of infractions of the Convention brought before It by a 
party to the Convention. The Committee shall also consider 
communications from individuals or groups of Individuals within the 
jurisdiction of State Parties which have accepted the competence of the 
Committee to receive such communications. 
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Committee. Consequently, the Committee has been forced to rely on 
informal and indirect methods of receiving information from South African 
refugees and other non-governmental bodies such as the Amnesty 
124 International and the World Council of Churches, 
The 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid declared organisations, institutions and 
individuals that practice apartheid as criminals125. The Convention 
defines apartheid as including policies and practices of racial segregation 
and discrimination as practised In southern Africa. The Convention also 
provides a list of the Inhuman acts declared illegal Including any act 
committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining discrimination 
by one racial group of persons over any other racial group or persons 
and thus systematically oppressing them126. The Convention also endows 
international criminal responsibility upon any Individual, institution or 
representative of States that commit, perpetuate in, directly incite or 
inspire In the crime of apartheid or directly abet, encourage or cooperate 
in the commission of the same127. The effect of this provision Is that an 
accused person cannot plead the absence of criminal intent or that he 
was acting in the course of official duty. State Parties to the 
Convention have jurisdiction to apprehend and punish the persons 
committing the crime of apartheid whether or not such person is a 
resident or national of the State in which the acts are committed, or of 
-------------------- 
124 K. Das "Measures of Implementation of the International Covenant in 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination with Special 
Reference to the Provisions Concerning Reports from State Parties to the 
Convention" Human Rights Journal, Vol. V 1971, p. 213. 
125 Article 1 International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 
126 Article II Ibid. 
127 Article III Ibid. 
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some other State128. Consequently, a South African resident or citizen 
found to have committed the crime of apartheid can be punished by any 
State Party to the Convention. The Convention requires State Parties to 
submit periodic reports to a group consisting of three members of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights who are representatives of State Parties to 
the Convention and appointed by the Chairman of the Commission on 
Human Rights. These periodic reports are required to disclose the 
legislative, judicial and administrative measures that the State Party has 
adopted that give effect to the provisions of the Convention. The copies 
of the Report are to be transmitted through the UN Secretary-General to 
129 the Special Committee on Apartheid 
By virtue of Article X(C) of the Convention, the Commission on Human 
Rights is empowered to request information from UN organs on reports of 
alleged apartheid crimes, not only in State Parties but also in the 
Dependant Territories and Trust Territories; therefore, the Commission's 
jurisdiction will cover Namibia. 
We submit that the cumulative effect of UN Resolutions and the two 
Conventions on the issue of apartheid, Is that there now exists 
established international law rules on the crime of apartheid130. Judge 
Ammoun has observed that the principles of "equality and fundamental 
rights violated by apartheid constitute obligations which are In fact 
placed under the protection of International law"131. States now have an 
international responsibility under the UN Charter and under customary 
-------------------- 
128 
Article IV Ibid. 
129 Article VII Ibid. 
130 United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Declaration of the Seminar 
on the Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime and Other Legal Aspects of the Struggle Against Apartheid held at Lagos, Nigeria 13-16 August 
1984, UN Doc A/39/423-S/16709 (1984). 
131 Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports (1971) pp. 16,79. 
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international law not only to do nothing to assist apartheid but to take 
action to end apartheid132. The establishment of an international legal 
regime for the eradication of the crime of apartheid is an eloquent 
testimony to the determination of Member States of the OAU and the 
administrative machinery of the UN to surmount the most intractable 
barrier to the protection of human rights in Africa. 
The OAU's concerted efforts to ensure the imposition of comprehensive 
133 
and mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, led the UN 
General Assembly on 12 December 1979 to request the UN Security 
Council to put a stop to: 
"All military or nuclear collaboration with South Africa. Deliveries of 
oil, allied products and other strategic materials. Loans and 
investments, including guarantees and other investments inducements. 
Preferential tariffs and other measures favouring South African exports. 
All trade with the country. " 
At the OAU's 18th Ordinary Session in June 1981, the Assembly endorsed 
a Council of Ministers Resolution CM/Res 865(XXVII) which imposed an 
oil embargo and other comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa. 
The OAU cooperation with the UN led to the adoption of the Paris 
Declaration on Sanctions against South Africa which reaffirmed that 
sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are the most effective 
and appropriate means of ensuring South Africa's compliance with UN 
134 
resolutions 
-------------------- 
132 G. T. Butcher, "Legal Consequences for States of the Illegality of 
Apartheid" Human Rights Quarterly (1986) Vol. 8 No. 3 p. 442. 
133 For instance see the OAU Council of Ministers Resolution CM/Res. 865 
XXVII endorsed by the OAU Assembly in June 1981. 
134 Paris Declaration on Sanctions against South Africa 27 May 1981 (UN 
Charter Against Apartheid) p. 20. 
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Universal calls for the imposition of economic sanctions have been 
resisted by several States, mainly the U. S., Japan and members of the 
European Community. Admittedly, the European Community had adopted 
some restrictive measures against South Africa under the EEC Code of 
Conduct for South Africa135 however these measures have been of partial 
and symbolic effect136 The reluctance of many EC Members to adopt 
substantive measures is no doubt linked to the self centred economic 
interests of certain Members camouflaged by the argument against the 
efficacy of sanctions. We submit that sanctions cannot be effective when 
they are denied any opportunity to succeed by inadequate universal and 
regional political consensus to effect adequate provisions for Implementing 
them. Even If doubts are cast over the legal efficacy of UN resolutions 
on South Africa, one cannot deny the binding legal effect of EEC 
regulations which have only but once been utilized to enforce 
sanctions137. The EEC should consider adopting further measures such 
as a ban on the importation of newly mined South African gold, coal and 
other minerals and the withdrawal of International loan facilities. These 
measures should meet the objectives of sanctions which include "raising 
the price of imports; preventing the sale of exports and halting other 
flows" which will in effect reduce South Africa's revenue and limit Its 
capacity to import138. It is thus pertinent for the OAU not to confine 
its sanctions campaign to the UN form alone, but explore ways and means 
of influencing a reformulation of EEC's reflective policy on South 
-------------------- 
135 Martin Holland, "The EEC Code for South Africa: a reassessment" 
The World Today 1985 Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 12. 
136 For instance the Community-wide ban on the import of gold-coins 
originating in South Africa (Council Resolution No. 3302/86) and the 
suppression of the import of certain iron and steel products from South 
Africa (ECSC decision 86/459). 
137 EC Council Regulation No. 3302/86 Ibid. 
138 Joseph Hanlan and Roger Omond, The Sanctions Handbook (London, 
Penguin 1987) p. 217. 
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Africa139. The EEC should take a leaf from the US House of 
Representatives which has recently approved a Bill barring all US 
investment In apartheid South Africa and Imposing a near total embargo 
against the country140. Subject to the US Senate and US Presidential 
approval, the Bill will b ecome law presently. 
(ii) Military and Financial Assistance to Liberation Movements 
The OAU has, since Its inception, resolved to bringing every kind of 
pressure to bear, including the use of force, against colonial regimes 
and minority racist regimes in Africa with a view to ensuring self- 
determination and the eradication of apartheid. In 1963, the OAU 
established the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa141, to 
provide moral, financial and military assistance to national liberation 
movements. OAU Member States agreed to contribute one per cent of 
their national budget to the Special Liberation Fund142. Unlike the OAU 
Assembly and the Council of Ministers, which were organs of 
deliberation, the Liberation Committee was adversely affected by lack of 
funding, organizational problems and conflict among member states. 
Member States used the Liberation Committee as a symbolic forum to 
herald their foreign policies and other self-Interests. The Liberation 
Committee nevertheless, succeeded in providing a degree of financial 
assistance to liberation movements during this period. For instance, it 
provided arms for Liberation Movements procurred from Soviet Union and 
-------------------- 
139 Martin Holland The European Community and South Africa: In search 
of a policy for the 1990's In International Affairs (Summer 1988) Vol. 64, 
No. 3, p. 417. 
140 "US Sanctions Law approved" West Africa (29 Aug-4 Sep 1988) 
p. 1598. 
141 The Liberation Committee is composed of Algeria, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tanganyika (Tanzania), the United 
Arab Republic, Uganda and Zambia. 
142 U. Umozerike, International Law and Colonialism In Africa (Nwanife 
Publishers: Enugu Nigeria 1979) p. 113. 
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China and it provided funds to the MPLA In Angola and purchased 
military trucks for the ZANU in Southern Rhodesia143. The paucity of 
funds available to the Liberation Movements is exemplified by the fact 
that during 1977-78, the Swedish International Development Agency 
alone, contributed almost twice the amount provided by the Liberation 
Committee144 
The efforts of the OAU to provide financial and military assistance to 
Liberation Movements were hindered by two main factors. First, the 
sharp division between African States over strategy. A group of African 
States led by Malawi and the Ivory Coast preferred peaceful dialogue and 
trade with South Africa rather than the Imposition of diplomatic and 
economic sanctions. The pro-sanctions group was led by Nigeria, Ghana 
and Zaire. At the 7th OAU Summit in October 1971, Nigeria's 
representative declared that: "Nigeria will oppose to the last drop of its 
blood any suggestion that the OAU, as an organisation which speaks on 
behalf of all independent Africa, should enter into a dialogue with South 
Af ricall 
145 
Secondly, there was a division between African States regarding which of 
the competing liberation movements should be supported. For instance, 
In 1963, the OAU Liberation Committee tried to unite the various 
liberation movements in Angola146 and finally decided to support the 
-------------------- 
143 D. Martin and P. Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1981) p. 78. C. Cevenka, op cit p. 60. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Colin Legum: Africa Contemporary Record (1971-72) (New York, 
Africana Publishing) p. A76-A78. 
146 The Liberation Movements in Angola were the Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA); the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA). 
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147 FNLA. However due to pressure from progressive African States. the 
Liberation Committee decided to share funds earmarked for the Angolan 
148 Struggle equally between the FNLA and the MPLA. 
In 1970 the OAU finally decided to grant official recognition to the 
following Liberation Movements; the African National Congress of South 
Africa, African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde; 
Comoro National Liberation Movement; Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique; Liberation Front for Somalia Coast; Liberation Movement for 
Djibouti; National Front for the Liberation of Angola; Pan Africanist 
Congress of South Africa; Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola; South West African Peoples Organization; Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). 
Between 1972-3 the OAU established ad-hoc committees of African foreign 
ministers to ensure cooperation among the liberation movements. To 
ensure discipline between the Liberation Movements they were threatened 
with the termination of aid If they failed to comply with the ministers 
149 
resolutions. 
The liberation struggle was pursued in Southern Rhodesia by the ZAPU 
and the ZANU. The OAU achieved very little success in uniting these 
two rival groups. Although temporary unity between the ZANU and 
ZAPU was however achieved through the good offices of several African 
150 leaders, the two liberation groups split again. It was however mainly 
-------------------- 
147 Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (London OUP, 1972) 
p. 231. 
148 Ibid p. 219-20. 
149 B. Andemicael "Trends in the OAU Quest for African Liberation with 
the help of the UN" in International Organisations in World Politics 
Yearbook (1975) p. 186. 
150 In particular, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Seretse Khama of 
Botswana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Samora Machel of Mozambique. 
Ibid p. 191. 
235 
through the efforts of the Ministers of the Frontline States that they 
eventually merged as a military and political alliance In November 1975, 
initially as the ZIPA Front and later as the Patriotic Front151. The 
Patriotic Front alliance was a significant step towards the success of the 
Lancaster House Conference and ultimate independence in 1980. 
The success of most of the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique and Angola was dependent on the efforts of the OAU in 
coercing and maintaining order between the groups. Furthermore, the 
unequivocal stance of the OAU during its second decade, with regard to 
military and financial assistance to liberation movements accelerated the 
process of liberation152. It is pertinent to note that OAU's success In 
coordinating liberation activities is predicated on the prompt and 
effective decisions taken by the Frontline States. Indeed, the Frontline 
States have been described as the OAU's "executive committee" on 
liberation struggles" 
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. 
The effectiveness of the OAU's resolute policy on financial assistance to 
liberation movements is reflected in the achievement of independence by 
Guinea Bissau (10 September 1974), Mozambique (25 June 1974), Angola 
(11 November 1975) and Zimbabwe (18 April 1980). 
-------------------- 
151 African Contemporary Record 1974-75 p. A20 op cit. 
152 At the 1976 OAU Summit in Mauritius, the OAU designated 
Mozambique Bank for Solidarity as an official channel for OAU Funds to 
Liberation Movements. The volume of military assistance and financial 
aid by the OAU to liberation movements Is a secret, however, symbolic 
individual state donations are publicized. For Instance at the 1976 OAU 
Summit, Nigeria donated the sum of US $250,000 to Mozambiques MPLA 
directly - African Contemporary Record 1974-1975 p. A20. 
153 W. J. Folz and J. Widner "The OAU and Southern Africa Liberation" 
in Y. El. Ayouty and W. Zartman (eds) The OAU After Twenty Years op 
cit p. 260. 
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In Namibia, the OAU has continued to provide military and financial 
assistance to the SWAPO. The basis of the OAU's support for the 
SWAPO is the "Dar-es-Salaam Declaration" issued by the Liberation 
Committee on 14 January 1975 which pledged the Committee's 
determination to end apartheid and minority rule in South Africa through 
the allocation of financial and military assistance to the SWAPO. 
In the light of the foregoing evidence of OAU's financial and military 
assistance to national liberation movements, the questions arise as to the 
legality of the use of force by national liberation movements in Africa; 
and the legal basis of OAU's financial and military support to these 
movements. 
It has been argued that national liberation movements are not recognized 
in international law because international law is concerned with "war" as 
a contest between subjects of International law154 We contend that 
liberation movements are recognized by International law. It Is evident 
that many national liberation movements have been granted quasi- 
international status155 and platforms at the UN. Furthermore, the 
opinion of the majority of States Is that national liberation movements 
qualify for belligerent status156 It is significant that recognition is no 
longer required as far as the contested colonial power Is concerned, 
however where there are rival national liberation movements, the 
-------------------- 
154 Amechi Uchegbu "Armed Struggles for National Liberation and 
International Law" African Review 1, (1977) p. 61. 
155 See Preamble and Article 12 of the International Hostages Convention 
in (1981) 75 AJIL p. 81. 
156 To qualify as international legal subjects, traditional International law 
rules require a "movement" or "insurgents" to meet the following 
criteria: (1) they must be waging a war, (Ii) they must be grouped 
under a central command, (iii) they must be in control of part of the 
territory and population and (iv) they must have been accorded 
"recognition of belligerancy" - Georges Abi-Saab "Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War" Annals of International Studies 3 (1972) 
p. 93. 
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international community may recognize one of them to the exclusion of 
others157. Furthermore, contemporary international law in recognizing 
the legal right of colonized peoples to self-determination and the 
corresponding duty on colonial powers to the dependent peoples, mutatis 
mutandis, amounts to the recognition of national liberation movements 
established to pursue self-determination. Thus the legality of the use of 
force by national liberation movements is based on the right of self- 
determination as expressed in a number of UN General Assembly and 
Security Council Resolutions158. During the liberation struggle for the 
independence of Zimbabwe, the UN Security Council passed more than 
nine resolutions which reaffirmed "the Inalienable right of Southern 
Rhodesia to self-determination and independence in accordance with 
General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV)... and the legitimacy of their 
struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations"159 The UN Resolutions, especially the 
Declaration of Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States160 
establish two basic pillars in support of the legitimate use of force; 
firstly, they establish the right of colonized peoples to rebel against 
colonialism and forbid states from using any forcible action which 
deprives colonized peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom 
and independence. Secondly, they establish the legitimacy of liberation 
movements to seek and receive the support from third states. 
-------------------- 
157 For Instance, by virtue of A/Res. 3111(XXVIII) the UN General 
Assembly recognized the SWAPO as the authentic representative of the 
Namibian People. 
158 For Instance, UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 
October 1970. 
159 Resolution 232 (1966). See also UN Security Council Resolution 253 
(1968); 277 (1970); 318 (1977); 326 (1973); 328 (1973); 442 (1979); 455 
(1979) and 448 (1979). 
160 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October 1970. 
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Although these UN resolutions do not specifically refer to the use of 
force, it is now universally acknowledged that struggles for national 
liberation are invariably effected by armed force. Indeed it has been 
argued elsewhere that the right to effect liberation struggles by use of 
force should be a rule of customary international law161. Much as such 
a conclusion is desirable, its efficacy will depend upon the role and 
capacity of international organizations in the formation of customary 
international law, and the content of these resolutions. The capacity of 
international organisations in the formation of International law has been 
acknowledged by many scholars of international law162. Much as the UN 
resolutions do not specifically refer to the use of force, the Implied 
acceptance of this mode of enforcement is vivid from the legitimacy and 
practice of military and financial support rendered by third states to 
national liberation movements. 
South Africa and Portugal have Indeed raised objections to the practice 
of OAU Member States in providing military and financial aid to national 
liberation movementsi63 The objections regard the practice of OAU 
164 States as contravening Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The practice 
of African States as reflected in the various OAU resolutions and in the 
provision of financial and military support to liberation movements is also 
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161 J. C. Nkala "Legality of Use of Force by National Liberation 
Movements" In K. Ginther and W. Benedek (eds) New Perspectives and 
Conceptions of International Law: An Afro-European Dialogue (Springer- 
Verlag: Wien; New York, 1983) p. 196. See, Kader Asmal "Legal Status 
of National Liberation Movements (with particular reference to South 
Africa)" Zambian Law Journal (1983) Vol. 15 p. 32. 
162 See R. Higgins "The Development of International Law Through the 
Organs of the UN op cit; B. Cheng "UN Resolutions on Outer Space: 
Instantaneous Generation of Customary Law" op cit. 
163 S. C. O. R. 18th Year Proceedings of 1042nd Meeting; Paragraphs 13 
and 38-19. 
164 Article 2 (4) UN Charter provides that: "All Members shall refrain In 
their International relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political Independence of any State, or in any 
manner Inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". 
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regarded by some commentators as unjustifiable "threat" or "use of 
force" within the meaning of Article 2(4)165. It may be argued, to the 
contrary, that these actions are indirect and not direct actions, thus do 
not amount to 'threats' or 'use of force' by OAU Member States against 
the independence or territorial integrity of another state166. However, 
such arguments avoid the Issue, since it Is evident that OAU Member 
States have consistently and unequivocably stated their determination to 
liberate all colonies In Africa and "Intensify efforts to put an end to the 
South African governments criminal policy of apartheid and wipe out 
racial discrimination in all its forms"167. The OAU Lusaka Manifesto of 
April 1969 clearly indicates the OAU's resolve to resort to a non-peaceful 
plan of action In the light of the disappointing response of the racists of 
Southern African States to its peaceful overtures168. In addition to 
these facts, the provisions of military training facilities and other 
logistical support to liberation movements especially by the frontline 
States establish sufficient proof of a "threat" if not "use of force" by 
African States against the territorial integrity of another 'State'. 
Several arguments may be adduced to justify OAU's military support for 
the armed struggle in Southern Africa. Firstly, Article 51(1) of the UN 
Charter permits the use of force by a State or a group of States in self- 
defence to an armed attack against one of them. Thus, the OAU being a 
regional arrangement within Chapter VIV (UN Charter) Is not precluded 
from the use of the right of self-defence. The right can be invoked by 
the OAU in response to the constant South African bombings and armed 
-------------------- 
165 C. J. R. Dugard "The OAU and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the plea 
of self-defence as a justification for the use of force in the eradication of 
colonialism" ICLQ (1967) p. 160. 
166 B. AndimIcael "Peaceful Settlement Among African States: Roles of 
the OAU and the UN" UNITAR, New York 1972, p. 102. 
167 Z. Cervenka op cit p. 20. 
168 UN Doc A17754 of 9 November 1969. 
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incursions into Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe169. The main difficulty 
with this argument will be how to determine the aggressor in the absence 
of an objective international fact-finding machinery. A further problem 
is whether, as Rosalyn Higgins suggests, Article 51 allows for a right of 
anticipatory self-defence170. If so, it may be argued that since South 
Africa nuclear and massive conventional military power overwhelms the 
combined military capability of African States, this fact gives the latter a 
right to anticipatory self-defence. 
Secondly, the OAU may justify its military support for the liberation 
struggle in Southern Africa as an "enforcement action" within the 
meaning of Article 53 of the UN Charter. Although the Security 
Council's approval is required for such an action, it has been held that 
in the sphere of international peace and security, the Security Council's 
role, though primary, does not exclude the role of the General 
Assembly171. Consequently it may be proffered that the UN General 
Assembly's approval of the OAU Lusaka Manifesto by 113 votes to 2 
(Portugal and South Africa against) 
172 
amounts to UN authorization or 
endorsement of OAU military action in Southern Africa173. The main 
reservation with this teleological interpretation of the UN Charter is the 
doubt over the dispositive legal effect of General Assembly 
------------------- 
169 UN Doc 5/PV 1590 (Memo) 8 October 1971. 
170 R. Higgins, The Development of International Law through the 
Political Organs of the UN, op cit p. 200 fn. 49; and Thomas H. Franck 
"Who Killed Article 2 (4) or the Changing Norms Governing the Use of 
Force by States" AJIL (1970) p. 809. 
171 Expenses Case ICJ Reports (1962) p. 151. 
172 General Assembly Resolution 2505 (XXIC) of 29 November 1969. 
173 See J. N. Nwodo, The Relations between the UN and Selected 
Regional Organizations in Peaceful Settlement. PhD Thesis University of 
London 1974. 
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Resolutions174. Therefore, it will be difficult to assert that the General 
Assembly can legally authorize "enforcement" within Article 53(1). 
We submit that the justification of OAU's financial and military support to 
the armed action of national liberation movements in Southern Africa is 
based on the fact that It is consistent with the purposes of the UN 
Charter since OAU action in this context is In pursuance of the legal 
right of self-determination. Although the legal right of self- 
determination does not per se endow a right to assist armed struggles in 
pursuance of that objective, several UN resolutions seem to allow 
financial and military action and support thereof. 
In this context, Principle 5 of the Declaration on Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States which relates the principles of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples states that: 
"Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action 
which deprives peoples referred to above In the elaboration 
of the present principle of their right to self-determination 
and freedom and Independence. In their actions against or 
resistance to, such forcible action In pursuit of the exercise 
of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled 
to seek and receive support 11 7 occordance with the purposes 
and principles of the Charter" 
Evidently, the Declaration does not define the term "support" however, 
it may be safely assumed that this includes political support. Any 
attempt to stretch the term "support" to include military or financial 
assistance is discouraged by Principle 1(8) of the Declaration which 
states that: 
174 Justice Tanaka however observes that "the accumulation of 
authoritative pronouncements, such as resolutions declarations, decisions, 
etc., concerning interpretation of the competent organs of the 
international community can be characterized as evidence of custom 
referred to in Article 38 paragraph 11(b)" South West Africa Case (Phase 
Two) ICJ Reports (1966) (Judegement on Merits) p. 248 at 292. 
175 Underlines for emphasis. 
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"Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or 
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed 
bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory 
of another State". 
The absence of a definitive scope in the Declaration regarding the term 
"support" has been clarified by subsequent UN Resolutions. For 
instance, General Assembly Resolution 2105(xx) of 20 December 1965: 
"recognizes... the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples 
under colonial rule to exercise the right to self-determination 
and independence and invite all states to provide material 
and moral assista4g to national liberation movements in 
colonial territories""-. 
Likewise. the General Assembly Resolution 2396 XXIII of December 1968 
invited States "to provide greater moral and political and material 
assistance to the (South African) liberation movement in its legitimate 
struggle". 
It can thus be submitted that UN Resolutions seem to permit the financial 
and military assistance provided by the OAU to national liberation 
movements. However such assistance can only be justified and rendered 
if the peoples concerned are forcibly restrained from exercising their 
right of self-determination. We submit that the action of the South 
African government as evidenced by institutionalized oppression and 
force to circumscribe the legitimate aspirations of South African blacks to 
self-determination amounts to "forcible action" sufficient to justify the 
OAU military and financial support accorded the liberation movements in 
South Africa. 
(f) Overview 
The foregoing analysis of selected problems of human rights in Africa 
------------------- 
176 Underlines for emphasis. 
243 
reveals several trends. First, the mechanisms of power and status in 
Africa are based upon ethnic loyalties. The dominance of a particular 
ethnic group in a heterogeneous state is predicated upon its ability to 
monopolise or at least control major socio-economic and political 
institutions. The implications of this phenomenon on human rights arises 
where this control or power Is utilized by the dominant ethnic group to 
secure advantages to itself to the detriment of others and without due 
regard to established or prescribed norms of equality, merit and justice. 
Ethnic hegemony therefore ensures discrimination, subjugation and in 
some cases genocide. Ethnicity has become more pronounced with 
modernization and urbanization. Urbanization has brought the relatively 
ethnically homogenous rural peoples into urban melting pots of diverse 
ethnic groups within the national polity. Survival in urban areas for 
many Africans is dependent on the formation of cultural and ethnic 
associations through which ethnic sentiments and patronages are kept 
alive. Although, these ethnic associations provide psychological, moral 
and social security for their members, they are invariably more 
destructive as a basis for promoting the political and economic dominance 
other ethnic groups ergo national institutions. 
The effectiveness of any prescribed solution to the problem of ethnicity 
as an obstacle to human rights, will depend mainly on the will of African 
political leaders. Such solutions should include, the enactment of 
constitutional provisions which will ensure that ethnically composite 
entities within a state are granted relative self-government subject to 
limited central government supervision. Secondly, the enactment of 
constitutional provisions that will ensure equal representation of different 
ethnic groups in national social, political and economic institutions. 
Thirdly, African multi-ethnic states should consider the introduction of 
integrated rural development schemes, in the field of agriculture and 
industry, to ensure the commercial viability of rural areas, thus 
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stemming the problems of urbanization. Fourthly, we have seen that the 
problems of racism in East Africa stem from the cultural arrogance and 
exploitative practices of the settler Asian communities which have in turn 
invited nationalization and mass expulsion orders. We submit that, while 
the policy of Africanization creates job opportunities for the hitherto 
deprived and disadvantaged citizens of African States, it ought to be 
tempered with a liberal "citizenization" policy whereby aliens, with 
genuine contributions to the social-economic systems, can be integrated. 
These states should also encourage establishment of interracial 
organisations with the object of promoting goodwill amongst the various 
groups. 
The problem of racism and apartheid have largely been borne by those 
'locus situs'. The OAU's battles against apartheid and racism have been 
fought both regionally and at the level of the UN. These efforts have 
been responsible for the universal declaration of apartheid as a crime 
against humanity. At the regional level, the OAU grants financial and 
military aid to national liberation movements. We have attempted to 
establish the legality of such activities as not being Inconsistent with the 
Charter of the UN. In spite of universal condemnation of Its evil 
practices, the racist South African regime has persisted in its apartheid 
mould. The reluctance of western countries to Impoe comprehensive and 
mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, represents one of the 
greatest barrier to dismantling the apartheid regime. The OAU should 
thus direct its efforts at achieving a change of EEC policy towards South 
Africa, which has so far been one of the selective and symbolic albeit 
ineffective, solutions. 
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Chapter Five 
The Relevance of National Constitution in the Protection of Human Rights 
in Africa 
Traditionally, the question of human rights in national and international 
law is viewed in the context of categories of competence between States 
and the international community acting through universal or regional 
organisations. 
Internationally, several factors are responsible for the establishment of a 
conducive atmosphere for human rights. First, the Charter of the UN, 
which devotes its preamble and several articles to "encouraging" and 
"promoting" respect for human rights1; second, the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is the main yardstick for 
determining the content of human rights and has been inspirational to 
the shaping of human rights in Africa2. Third, the European 
Convention on Human Rights3 which translated human rights into precise 
legal rights has directly influenced the constitution of several African 
countries. Finally, the American Convention on Human Rights4, which 
was the first regional organisation to be evolved by some of the 
developing States of the 'Third World'. The American Convention 
spurred African states to start serious deliberations on the establishment 
of a similar regional structure for Africa. 
-------------------- 
1 The UN Charter, Articles 1,13,55,62,73 and 76. 
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 
217(111) A, UN Doc. A/810 at 71, (hereinafter referred to as the 
Universal Declaration). 
3 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedom, 4 November 1950,213 UNTS, 1953 Or. Britain 
T. S. No. 71 (Cmd 8969) (entered Into force 3 September 1953) 
(hereinafter referred to as the European Convention). 
4 The American Convention on Human Rights, No. 22,1969, O. A. S. T. S. 
No. 36 at 1 O. A. S. Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/11.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (entered Intol 
force 8 July 1978), reprinted in 9 I. L. M. (1970) (hereinafter referred to 
as the American Convention). 
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However, the immediate impact of these factors on Africa is reflected In 
the constitutional provisions of many African states which were, needless 
to say, initially moulded on English and French models. The human 
rights provisions of the constitutions of Francophone African States are 
directly traceable to the French Declaration of Rights of 1789, as 
restated in the French Constitution of 1946 and 1958. The constitution 
of English speaking, African states include human rights principles that 
reflect the influence of the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights of 
1689, the American Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights of 
the American Constitution enacted in 1791. It Is worth noting that while 
the fundamental rights in English Law are located In the labyrinths of 
the Laws of England, the constitutions of ex-British colonies have 
detailed human rights sectors. Indeed some of the Constitutions of 
African States precede the adoption of the Universal Declaration, for 
instance, the 1st Liberian constitution, which has a Bill of Rights 
modelled on that of the United States, was issued on 26 July 1947. We 
propose to undertake an analysis of the types of constitutional 
guarantees of human rights in African countries; in addition a study of 
the efficacy of the domestic implementation of this International 
responsibility will also be embarked upon. 
The rights protected in most constitutions, not least in African 
constitutions, are subject to exceptions; thus it is difficult If not 
impossible to provide for rights in absolute terms. This fact no doubt 
inspired the oft-quoted remark of Professor Wheare: 
"The ideal constitution.. . would contain few or no declarations 
of rights, though the ideal system of law would define or 
guarantee many rights; rights cannot be declared In a 
constitution except in absolute and unqualified tgrms, unless 
Indeed they are so qualified as to be meaningless . 
-------------------- 
5 A. D. Wheare Modern Constitutions (Oxford University Press 1960) 
p. 71. 
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The ideal constitution as perceived by Professor Wheare does not exist in 
Africa, because most African Constitutions contain human rights 
provisions which subject the rights protected to certain qualifications, 
limitations or derogation. However an analysis of African State 
Constitutions will establish the fact that these rights are not necessarily 
rendered meaningless by virtue of the derogations permitted. In the 
quest to protect the rights of the individual, the rights of the society 
must not be sacrificed. A delicate balance must be struck between the 
interest of the society and the interest of the individual. Consequently 
an ideal constitution should be the standard reference point for those 
competing claims in the Interest of peace, order and good government in 
the State, and political, social and economic progress of its citizens. 
Thus, a constitution Is expected to play a role as one of the Instruments 
of political socialization by prescribing In general terms, rules of 
behaviour. s 
Most African States recognise the quintessence of constitutionalism by 
providing constitutional guarantees of Individual freedom, civil liberties 
and political, social, legal and participatory rights. However, these 
constitutions vary in their approach to the protection of human rights. 
Furthermore, practise may remain distant from the ideal, nevertheless 
African jurists and statesmen recognize the value of written guarantees 
as guiding beacons by which the advancement of a nation may be 
accessed. 
It is difficult to conduct empirical research on human rights and political 
restrictions in Africa because the governments have been unwilling either 
to admit restrictions of human rights or allow investigation of what is 
-------------------- 
6 
No D. Ducachek. Rights and Liberties in the World Today: 
Constitutional Promise and Reality (ABC Inc Oxford/California, 1973) 
p. 26. 
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generally regarded as sensitive or security matters7. Thus we have 
limited our assessment of the regimes of human rights promotion and 
protection in African States, mainly, to the examination of their 
respective constitutional provisions on human rights. Evidence of state 
practice shall be gleaned from significant judicial decisions on human 
rights. We consider constitutional and other domestic legislative 
provisions on human rights to be of primary importance in the 
implementation of human rights obligations. 
In so far as human rights protection is concerned, African State 
constitutions may be broadly divided Into five main categories, namely: - 
I) Constitutions of Anglophone African States 
ii) Constitutions of Francophone African States 
iii) Constitutions of Anglo-Arab States 
iv) Constitutions of African States (ex Portuguese colonies) 
v) Constitutions without Human Rights protection 
The foregoing compartmentalization is based broadly on the colonial 
heritage of the States concerned and Is made without prejudice to the not 
Infrequent differences between the Bills of Rights of States within the 
same category. These antra-group differences, though not insignificant 
in some cases, are deliberate attempts by some States to respond to 
peculiar local political, economic, social and cultural factors concerned. 
7 For documented but controversial, compilation human rights abuses in Africa see Charles Humana. The Economist: World Human Rights Guide 
(Hodder and Stoughton: London 1986); See also Amnesty International 
Report 1987, (A. I. Publications, London 1987). See Country Reports on Human Practices for 1987 (United States: State Department Feb 1988) 
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(I) Anglophone African States 
An analysis of the constitutional guarantees of Anglophone African States 
reveals that they contain the longest and most elaborate provisions on 
fundamental human rights on the continent. The currently enforceable 
constitutional bills of rights In this category are contained In the 
constitutions of the following countries: - 
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Country Date of Date of Chapter of Constitution 
Independence Current/Last 
Constitution 
Botswana 30 Sep 1966 3 Mar 1965 Chapter II, Protection 
of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedom of the 
Individual 
Gambia, The 18 Feb 1965 24 Apr 1970 Chapter III, Protection 
of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms 
Ghana 6 Mar 1957 24 Sep 1979 Chapter III on the 
Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms formally 
abrogated by the 
Provisional National 
Defence Council Law of 
1982 
Kenya 12 Dec 1963 12 Dec 1963 Chapter V, Protection 
of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedom of the 
Individual. 
Liberia 26 Jul 1847 20 Jul 1984 Chapter III, 
Fundamental Rights 
Mauritius 12 Mar 1968 12 Mar 1968 Chapter II, Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms of 
the Individual Rights. 
Nigeria 1 Oct 1960 1 Oct 1979 Chapter V, Fundamental 
Rights. 
Sierra Leone 27 Apr 1961 14 Jun 1978 Chapter II, Fundamental 
Rights and the Freedom 
of the Individual. 
Seychelles 29 Jun 1976 5 Jun 1979 Preamble 
Tanzania 9 Dec 1961 25 Apr 1977 (as Section III, Rights and 
amended Obligations. 
through Act 
No. 15 of 1984) 
Uganda 9 Oct 1962 1981 Chapter III, Protection 
of Fundamental Rights 
and Freedom of the 
Individual. 
Zambia 24 Oct 1964 25 Aug 1973 Part III, Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and 
the Freedom of the 
Individual. 
Zimbabwe 18 Apr 1980 18 Apr 1980 Chapter III, Declaration 
of Rights. 
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With the singular exception of the Seychelles, the foregoing constitutions 
contain a detailed Bill of Rights with an average of 14 pages of 
institutional text. The length and descriptive detail of these chapters 
reflect the inspiration derived by their authors from the provisions of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Articles 2-11) which latter instrument the United 
Kingdom had earlier subscribed to on behalf of some of her former 
colonies8. The length and detail of some of the Bills of Rights may also 
be attributed to recent modifications and improvements based on the Bill 
of Rights of the 1960 Nigerian Constitution 
9. 
However the Anglophone Bill of Rights differ In certain respects. For 
Instance unlike the Nigerian Bill of Rights, the Bill of Rights of Zambia, 
Uganda and Kenya contain a declaratory section which constitutes a sort 
of preamble to the substantive section protecting human rights and 
freedom. The preliminary declaratory section of the Zambian constitution 
states that : 
"Whereas every person in Zambia is entitled to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual that is to 
say the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political 
opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest 
to each and all of the following, namely: - 
(a) Life, liberty, security of the person and the protection 
of the law; 
(b) Freedom of expression and of assembly and association; 
and, 
(c) Protection for the privacy of his home and other 
property and from deprivation of property without 
compensation. 
8 The Extension Clause in the European Convention was used by the 
United Kingdom on 3 Oct 1953 to extend the application of the 
Convention and Protocol to forty-two of Its overseas territories, the 
relevant African territories being Basutoland, Bechuanaland, The Gold 
Coast, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Somaliland, Tanganyika, 
Uganda and Zanzibar. 
9 Articles 18-32 of the 1960 Nigerian Constitution reproduced In "Basic 
Documents on Human Rights" Ian Brownlie (ed) op cit p. 56-67. 
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"The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the 
purpose of affording protection to those rights and freedoms 
subject to such limitations of that protection as are contained 
in those provisions being limitations designed to ensure that 
the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any 
individtýl does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of 
others" 
The legal effect of such declaratory preambular recitals have been 
considered by several African courts. The legal effect of S. 13 of the 
Zambian Constitution was considered in the case of Nkumbula v Attorney- 
General of Zambia" where the court held that "Section 13 is merely a 
general statement of principles embodied in the following sections,, 
12. 
Although the Zambian High Court did not give any reasons for such an 
interpretation, In a similar case in Kenya, Shah Vershi v Transport 
Licensing Board13, a detailed judicial Interpretation of the declaration- 
section of the Bill of Rights to the Kenyan Constitution was rendered. 
The applicant, in this case an Asian, sought to challenge the decision of 
the Transport Licensing Board which refused renewal of his transport 
licenses. He claimed that the board's decision was discriminatory since it 
was based on the fact that the company was owned by a non-Kenyan. 
The applicant based his claim on Section 70, the declaratory section, 
which prohibited "discriminatory treatment" of every individual, whether 
a citizen or a foreigner. The High Court of Kenya held that Section 70 
of the Constitution created no justifiable rights on its own. In his 
judgement, Chanan Singh J. stated that "... although given a separate 
number, this section is quite clearly in the nature of a preamble... [The] 
section itself creates no rights: it merely gives a list of the rights and 
-------------------- 
10 S. 13 Zambian Constitution. 
11 (1972) ZLR III. 
12 Per Doyle, C. J. Ibid p. 115. 
13 (1971) EA289. 
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freedoms which are protected by other sections of the Chapter"14. 
It Is thus submitted that declaratory recitals In the form of preambles to 
the substantiv provisions of Bills of Rights In Anglophone constitutions 
do not confer legal rights and obligations which can be enforced 
judicially. 
The form and substance of the rights in the substantive text of Bills of 
Rights of Anglophone States are very similar. The specific protections 
guaranteed by these constitutions follow a similar sequence tailored on 
the general sequence of Articles 2-11 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The following rights and freedoms are protected: 
(a) Right to life; 
(b) Right to personal liberty; 
(c) Protection against slavery and forced labour; 
(d) Protection against inhuman treatment; 
(e) Protection against deprivation of property; 
(f) Protection against arbitrary search or entry; 
(g) Protection of the law; 
(h) Right to conscience; 
(I) Right to expression; 
(j) Freedom of assembly and association; 
(k) Freedom of movement; 
(1) Protection against discrimination. 
From the foregoing list of rights and freedoms, It Is evident that the 
Anglophone constitutions have adopted the style of the European 
Convention by laying emphasis on the protection of civil and political 
rights. However, the constitutional provisions are more detailed than 
the provision of the Convention, and they also contain precise definitions 
of the qualifications to the rights protected15. With regard to the 
economic rights, all the constitutions provide protection from the 
-------- - --------- 
14 Ibid at p. 298. 
15 J Read "Bill of Rights in the Third World: Some Commonwealth 
Experiences" op cit at pp. 30-33. 
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deprivation of propertyis. For Instance S. 40(i) of the Nigerian 
Constitution provides that no movable property or interest in an 
Immovable property shall be taken possession of compulsorily except 
under the authority of and for the purpose prescribed by a law; such a 
law must provide for the "prompt payment of compensation" and grant a 
right of access to the court of law or other tribunal for the 
determination of the extent of the Interest of the owner or the amount of 
compensation payable. The provision of the Nigerian Constitution is 
similar to the provisions of the other Anglophone States and Is consonant 
with the common law presumption of the Interpretation of statutes, 
against the removal or proprietary rights without legal authority and the 
provision of adequate compensation. 
The Interpretation of S. 40 of the Nigerian Constitution, has attracted 
several judicial decisions, notable amongst which Is the case of Adewole 
and others v Alhaji Jakande and others17. In holding that the statutory 
abolition of private primary schools by the Lagos State Government, may 
violate amongst others, the constitutional injunction against compulsory 
acquisition of property without the payment of adequate compensation, 
Justice Omololu Thomas further stated that: 
"the effect of the provisions of Section 40 is mainly to 
require that there shall not be acquired compulsorily any 
property or interest in property... without the prompt 
payment of compensation. The provision also guarantees 
right of accelt to the courts for determining the amount of 
compensation" . 
-------------------- 
16 
S. 18 Constitution of Gambia; S. 8 Mauritius Constitution; S. 11 Sierra 
Leone Constitution; S. 75 Constitution of Kenya; S. 240) Tanzanian 
Constitution; S. 22 Liberian Constitution; and S. 16 Constitution of 
Zimbabwe. 
17 Nigerian Constitutional Law Reports 1 (1981) p. 262. 
18 Ibid. 
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The requirement of "prompt payment of adequate compensation" is now a 
common feature in the constitutions of Anglophone African States 
19 
0 
however different formulas have been adopted. The Kenyan 
Constitution, for instance, provides for the "prompt payment of full 
compensation"20, while the Constitution of Liberia requires the "prompt 
payment of just compensation"21. On the other hand, the Zambian 
constitution states that the compulsory acquisition of property can only 
be authorized by an Act of Parliament "which provides for payment of 
compensation"22. The Zambian formulae gives more power to the 
legislature to determine the mode and criteria for the development of 
compensation. The formulas adopted by the majority of the States, 
apparently gives the courts a wider scope on the issue. However, the 
Nigerian regime is an exception to this general trend. 
In Nigeria, by virtue of the Land Use Act (1979)23 ownership of State 
land is vested In the Governor of the S tate and held by him in trust for 
the citizens. By virtue of S. 27(4 ) of the Constitution, compensation in 
respect of compulsorily acquired land Is t o be calculated and paid in 
accordance with S. 29 of the Land Use Act. Disputes arising therefrom 
are to be referred to t he Land Use and Allocation Committee and no 
------------------- 
19 S. 40(1)(a) Nigerian Constitution; S. 8(1)(b)(1) Constitution of 
Botswana; S. 16(1)(c) Constitution of Zimbabwe; S. 11(1)(c)(1) 
Constitution of Sierra Leone. 
20 S. 75(1)(c) Kenyan Constitution (underlines for emphasis only) 
21 s. 24(a)(ii) Librian Constitution (underlines for emphasis only). 
22 S. 18(1) Constitution of Zambia. See also the Zambian High Court 
decision in Patel v Attorney General in which the court held that so far 
as the Exchange Contract Act requires inter alia payment of compensation 
for compulsory possession of property and grants the applicant a right 
to apply to the High Court for determination of the amount of 
compensation, it Is not contrary to the Zambian Constitution. M. Ndule 
and Kaye Turner, Civil Liberties Cases In Zambia (African Law Reports, 
Oxford 1984)pp. 15-19. 
23 See J. A. Omotola (ed) 'Essays on the Land Use Act (Lagos University 
Press', 1980) p. 30. 
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further appeal will lie from the decision of the Committee. Since all 
members of the Committee are appointed by the Governor, it would seem 
that the provision conflicts with the fundamental principles of natural 
justice which provides that a person shall not be a judge In his own 
cause. Furthermore since 274(5) of the Constitution states that nothing 
In the constitution shall invalidate the Land Use Act (1979) it cannot be 
argued that the Act Is unconstitutional. There is thus, an urgent need 
for the review of this major anomaly In the Nigerian Constitution to allow 
for a just and equitable determination of land and compensation issues In 
the courts of law. 
In addition to the fact that the right to property is not absolute In 
Anglophone African Constitutions, the State Is also granted the right to 
control all mineral oils. resources and national gas within State 
boundaries24. Interests in mineral resources may also be acquired 
compulsorily by the State In the Interest of promoting the "public 
benefit" or "the public welfare" of its citizens25. The rationale for the 
States incursion into the right to property Is based on the need of the 
State to control land resources for egalitarian objectives. The economic 
and social development of African States depend upon the availability and 
proper management of land resources. 
There exists a noticeable absence of provisions on socio-economic rights 
in Anglophone constitutions, such as the right to work, the right to 
medical services and the right to education. The absence of socio- 
economic rights is due to the fact that the incorporation of such rights 
in the constitution would impose a corresponding duty on States to 
provide the basis for their enjoyment. The present state of 
------------------- 
24 
For instance, S. 40(3) Nigerian Constitution. 
25 S. 11(1)(a) Sierra Leone Constitution; S. 8(1)(a) Constitution of Mauritius; S. 75(1) Kenyan Constitution. 
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underdevelopment in African States cannot support such demands. The 
inclusion of such rights in national constitutions would only invite a 
plethora of futile litigations based on the infringement of socio-economic 
rights. The Nigerian Constitutional Drafting Committee, responded to 
such demands by stating inter alia that: 
"... all fundamental rights are in the final analysis, rights 
which impose limitations on executive, legislative or judicial 
powers of the government and are accordingly easily 
justifiable. By contrast, economic and social "rights" are 
different, they do not impose any limitations on governmental 
powers. They impose obligations of a kind which are not 
justifiable. To Insist that the right to freedom of expression 
is the same kind of "right" as the "right" to free medical 
facilities and can be treated alike In a constiti. oval document 
is, the majority of us feel, basically unsound" 
Thus the constitution of Nigeria like other Anglophone States, but unlike 
the African Francophone countries, remain generally silent on social 
27 
and economic rights and the individuals duty to society. The absence of 
socio-economic rights in Anglophone African States has been attributed to 
the "laissez faire" tradition inspired by English jurisprudence28. 
Professor B. O. Nwabueze, however, contends that the absence of socio- 
economic rights in the constitutions of emergent states cannot amount to 
the establishment of any particular type of economic philosophy, be it 
-------------------- 
26 Report of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, Vol. 1 (Lagos: Federal 
Ministry of Information, 1976) p. xv-xvi. 
27 For socio-economic rights in Francophone African Constitutions see 
The Algerian Constitution, Chapter 4; and The Constitution of the 
Republic of Benin, Chapter 8. See also Section 7 of the Constitution of 
Togo states that "All citizens according to their abilities shall contribute 
to collective responsibilities". See also Article 27 Constitution of Zaire, 
1979. 
28 B. Onimode and E. Osagie "Economic Interpretatin of Nigerias Draft 
Constitution" (unpublished paper 1979) p. 18. See also T. G. Verhelst 
and Z. B. Plate "Constitutional Guarantees of the Individual" in T. G. 
Verhelst (ed) Legal Process and the Individual: African Source Materials 
(Addis Ababa: The Centre for African Legal Development, Faculty of Law, Hoile Selassie I University; 1971) p. 24. 
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capitalism, socialism or communism29. Although it is evident that the 
constitutions of most socialist states contain provisions for socio-economic 
rights which are seemingly justiceable30, the absence of such rights In 
most African constitutions is more or less a reaction to the objective 
socio-economic conditions prevailing on the continent and not necessarily 
a reflection of a prevailing political ideology. Modern social rights are 
limited by the economic and social resources that governments can muster 
31 to disentangle their citizens from misery, sickness and illiteracy. 
The Nigerian constitutional solution to the problem of socio-economic 
rights Is reflected in the adoption of a Chapter on Fundamental 
Objectives and Directives Principles of State Policy32. The Nigerian 
Constitution Imposes on all organs of government exercising legislative, 
executive and judicial powers, "the duty and responsibility... to conform 
to, observe and apply" the political, economic social, educational and 
foreign policy objectives. The economic objectives are meant to ensure 
the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen In pursuit 
of national economic development. The social objectives are founded on 
Ideals of Freedom, Equality and Justice and Include equality of rights, 
obligations and opportunities before the law for every citizen; 
impartiality and integrity of the courts and easy access to them; equal 
-------------------- 
29 B. O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in The Emergent States: (London, 
C. Hurst & Co. 1973) p. 49. 
30 See, Constitution of Albania 1946 (as revised through 1958) Articles 
25,28,29 and 50; The Constitution of the German Democratic Republic of 
7 Oct 1949 (as amended through 12 Sept 1960) Articles 15-18; The 
Constitution fo the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1936, Articles 118- 
121. Reprinted in A. J. Peaslee Constitutions of Nations Vol. 111 (The 
Hague: Martinuss Nijhoft 1968); and A. P. Blaustein and Flanz, 
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, (New York, Oceana 
Publications Inc. 1977) Vol. XIII. 
31 No Ducachek op cit, p. 44. 
32 Section 14-22 Nigerian Constitution; See also Section II of the Tanzanian Constitution entitled "Important Objectives and the Basic Structures of the Direction of Government Affairs". 
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employment opportunities, pay and conditions for equal work; the 
provision of adequate social facilities and amenities, the protection of 
children, young persons and the aged against exploitation, moral and 
material neglect; and the provision of social assistance in deserving 
cases. The Educational Objectives provide that the State shall direct its 
policy towards ensuring equal and adequate educational opportunities at 
all levels. Furthermore, the government Is required to eradicate 
illiteracy and endeavour wherever practicable to provide for free 
33 
education at all levels. 
Despite the duty imposed on government organs to pursue these 
objectives, Section 6(6)(c) of the constitution divests courts of 
jurisdiction over any Issue or question regarding "any act or omission by 
any authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision 
is in conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles 
of State Policy ... "34 In other words, the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directives Principles are non-justiceable and are thus basically "beacons 
to guide the government in steering the ship of state"35. Nevertheless, 
it may be argued that despite the non-justiceability of the Fundamental 
Objectives, they may be of legal value In establishing standards of 
legislative innovation and judicial review36. We submit that the Nigerian 
approach to the Issue of socio-economic rights Is a cautious but realistic 
method which appears to narrow the gap between constitutional fiction 
and fact; a gap which may otherwise widen by the full incorporation of 
the catalogue of social and economic rights in the constitution of 
emergent stat e s__------ 
33 Nigerian Constitution, Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 B. Obinna Okere "Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy under the Nigerian Constitution" in ICLQ Vol. 32 (Jan 1983) 
p. 221. 
36 B. O. Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (London, C. Hurst 
& Co. 1977) p. 143. 
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It must however be observed that the outright exclusion of socio- 
economic rights by some Anglophone African Constitutions 
37 
and the 
restriction of socio-economic matters to Fundamental Objectives of States 
by others, amounts to a contradiction of the provision of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR). The seventh 
preambular paragraph of the (AFCHPR) provides that OAU Member State 
Parties to the AFCHPR are "convinced that It is henceforth essential to 
pay a particular attention to the right to development and that civil and 
political rights cannot be disassociated from economic, social and cultural 
rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction 
of economic. social and cultural rights is adequate for the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights". 
The AFCHPR also guarantees the individuals right to property38, right 
to work39, right to education40. Furthermore, African States are 
required to take "necessary measures to protect the health of their 
people and ensure that they receive medical attention when they are 
sick"41. It is an anomaly, that African States have emphasized socio- 
economic rights in the AFCHPR, yet in their respective constitutions 
little or no reference Is made to economic and social rights. Amendments 
should therefore be made to Incorporate soclo-economic and cultural 
rights in national Constitutions. However the Implementation of socio- 
economic rights should be tied to the economic capacity of the State 
-------------------- 
37 The approach of most Francophone Sates to the issue of socio- 
economic rights has been by simply declaring adherence to the Universal 
Declaration in the preambles of the respective constitutions. See the 
Constitutions of the following States: Comores, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, 
Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo. 
38 Article 14, Ibid. 
39 
Article 15, Ibid. 
40 
Article 17, Ibid. 
41 
Article 16, Ibid. 
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which should in turn undertake to achieve social and economic objectives 
progressively. This latter suggestion Is preferable to the current 
outright exclusion of socio-economic rights In most African constitutions. 
Furthermore, since most Anglophone African States have undertaken the 
obligation to protect socio-economic rights under the AFCHPR42 they are 
required to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them43. 
Most Anglophone African Constitutions expressly provide for the 
enforcement of the rights guaranteed44, a significant feature which is 
absent from the American Bill of Rights. For instance, the Constitution 
of Zambia provides that any person alleging that a fundamental right has 
been, is being or is likely to be contravened "in relation to him" may 
apply to the High Court for redress45. The Courts are thus under a 
duty to hear and determine the justiceable Issues involved, and may In 
consequence thereof, make such orders, they may consider appropriate. 
Furthermore, most Anglophone State Constitutions provide that the 
practice and procedure to be followed in the determination of fundamental 
rights cases arising under the special jurisdiction of the High Courts and 
or the Supreme Courts is to be prescribed by the persons or authorities 
having power to make rules of court with respect to practice and 
-------------------- 
42 The following Anglophone States have ratified the AFCHPR; Botswana (25.2.86), Gambia (13.6.83), Nigeria (22.7.83), Sierra Leone (27.1.84), 
Uganda (27.5.86), Zambia (2.2.84), Zimbabwe (12.6.86). Kenya, 
Mauritius and Seychelles as at 1 January 1988, have not signed or 
ratified the AFCHPR. 
43 Article 1, AFCHPR. 
44 See Section 18(1), 28, 
. 
84(1), 17,42 and 29(1) of the Constitutions of 
Botswana, Gambia, Kenya, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Zambia 
respectively. The Constitution of Nigeria goes further by authorizing 
the provision of legal aid to "Indigent citizens" whose fundamental rights 
have been Infringed - Section 42(4). 
45 Article 29(1) of the Zambian Constitution of 1973. 
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procedure46. It is noteworthy that procedural technicalities have not 
been allowed to create obstacles where issues of fundamental rights are 
concerned. In the Nigerian case of Cheranci v Cheranci47, Bate J. 
observed that "the constitutional order gives no guidance as to 
procedure and no law such as is envisaged by Section 245(4) has yet 
been passed to regulate procedure. No objection has however been 
taken to procedure adopted by the applicant and "since the liberty of 
the subiect is involved. I would not myself think it proper to raise a 
rocedural objection"48 
As regards the locus stands of applicants In human rights cases, most 
Anglophone African Constitutions guarantee the access to court of any 
person who alleges that any of the rights guaranteed by the constitution 
"has been, is being or is likely to be contravened In relation to him"49. 
In elucidating the principle of locus standi as regards persons alleging 
the violation of their rights, common law courts have held that: "the 
party who Invokes the power must be able to show not only that the 
statute Is Invalid, but that he has sustained, or Is immediately in danger 
of sustaining, some direct Injury as the result of its enforcement, and 
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way In common with people 
generally"50. 
46 For instance, See Section 84(6) of the Kenyan Constitution which 
gives the Chief Justice power to make rules of practice and procedure 
relating to the High Courts jurisdiction on human rights matters. 
47 (1960) NRNLR 24 at pp . 25-26. 
48 (Underlines for emphasis) Ibid. 
49 For Instance see S. 29(1) Constitution of Zambia. 
50 Per judgement in Massachussetts v Mellon (1923) 262 US. 447 at 488. 
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This principle has been restated in several African decisions, notably in 
the Nigerian case of Olawoyin v Attorney-General of Northern Nigeria51. 
The applicant in this case brought an application challenging the validity 
of the Childrens and Young Persons Law 1958 (Northern Region). The 
Law banned political activities by juveniles as well as inducement of 
juveniles, by adults, to take part in political activities. Although the 
applicant had not induced any juveniles to engage In political activities, 
thus obviating any direct threat of prosecution, he nevertheless sought 
an order of court to declare that the law infringed the guarantee of 
private and family life, freedom of conscience and the freedom of 
expression in the Constitution of Nigeria (1954). The applicant deposed 
that as a father, he intended to Instruct his children politically and was 
unable to do so for fear of violating the statute. The High Court 
dismissed his action on the ground that: 
"no right of the applicant is alleged to have been Infringed and that It 
would be contrary to principle to make a Declaration "in vacuo"". 
The applicant thence appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that 
the legislation created an offence of a right which a person is 
constitutionally entitled to and as such, he was an interested party. In 
the leading judgement of the Supreme Court, Unsworth C. J., held that: 
"The applicant did not in his claim allege any Interest but 
his counsel said that the evidence would be that the 
applicant had children who he wished to educate politically. 
There was no suggestion that the applicant was In Imminent 
danger of coming into conflict with the law or that there had 
been any real or direct interference with his normal business 
or other activities. In my view the applicant failed to show 
that there was an interest to sustain a claim. 
----------------- 
51 (1961) 1 All NLR. 
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"It seems to me that to hold that there was an interest here 
would amount to saying that a private Individual obtains an 
interest by the mere enactment of a law with which he may in 
future com%2 in conflict. I would not support such a 
proposition" 
The decision of the Supreme Court failed to specify the acts of the 
applicant that would have granted him locus standi. It may, however be 
suggested that such acts which may attract locus standi, by virtue of 
the fact that they will infringe the statutes, would Include the 
addressing of a political rally of juveniles or encouraging juveniles to 
53 join a political party, 
The foregoing case exemplifies the extent to which some Anglophone 
African courts will go in determining locus standl by adopting the 
restrictive "a posteriori" Interpretation of the phrase "has been, is being 
or is likely to be contravened In relation to him" (I. e. the applicant). 
In other cases, less restrictive Interpretations have been adopted. In 
the case of Stephen Ncube v State54 the appellant was found guilty of 
rape and sentenced by the Magistrate Court to 6 years imprisonment with 
hard labour and a whipping of six strokes. The sentence was imposed 
by the presiding magistrate under authority of Section 54(5)(c) and (8) 
of the Magistrates Court Act of Zimbabwe. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe, the appellant argued that the aspect of his sentence 
which imposed the punishment of whipping was in contravention of his 
fundamental human rights and that the relevant provisions of the 
Magistrates Court act which sanctioned the punishment were 
---------- --------- 
52 Ibid at p. 274. 
53 B. O. Nwabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa op cit p. 63-64; See also David Grove "The Sentinels' of Liberty? " The Nigerian Judiciary 
and Fundamental Rights" JAL (1963) 152 at p. 161. 
54 S/C of Zimbabwe, Judgement No. S/C 156/67 Criminal Appeal 
No. 202/87, of 6 Oct 1987. See also Brown Tshuma v The State, Criminal Appeal No. 287/87 of 14 Dec 1987. (S/C of Zimbabwe) 
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unconstitutional. In upholding the appeal, the Supreme Court held that 
the sentence as well as the provisions of the statute which imposed the 
punishment of whipping were unconstitutional and of no effect since they 
contravened Article 15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution which 
guaranteed the freedom from inhuman and degrading punishment. The 
procedure for a "a priori" determination of constitutionality of an act or 
legislation does not generally exist in Anglophone African Constitutions. 
The only exception to this position is the Zambian constitution, Article 
28(5) of which provides that: 
"No application shall be brought under subsection (1) of this 
section (i. e. S. 28) on the grounds that the provisions of 
Sections 13-26 (inclusive) of this constitution are likely to be 
contravened by reason of proposals contained in any bill 
which, as the date of the application has not become law. " 
This provision was subject to judicial Interpretation In Henry Nkumbula v 
the Attorney-General for Zambia. The applicant sought a declaration 
55 
of the court that the proposal by the Zambian government to introduce a 
legislation establishing a "one-party participating democracy" will infringe 
his rights under the constitution. The Court held that "the existence of 
Section 28(5) makes It clear that If the only step taken by the executive 
is the Introduction of the bill In question, subsection (1) cannot be 
56 Invoked... " 
The basis of the courts decision and Indeed of the very existence of 
S. 28(5) is that the Zambian Constitution expressly provides for a 
machinery for testing whether or not a bill infringes upon the 
Constitutional Bill of Rights, before It becomes law. Thus under Section 
27 of the Zambian constitution, the Chief Justice Is authorized to appoint 
-------------------- 
55 (1972) ZLR III. See M. Ndulo and K. Turner op cit pp. 52-55. 
56 Ibid at p. 54. 
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a Special Tribunal, at the instance of the National Assembly, to consider 
whether a bill, if enacted will be incompatible with the Bill of Rights 
contained in the constitution57. The Zambian constitution thus permits 
the "a priori" determination of constitutionality as well as the Anglophone 
norm of "a posteriori" judicial review. An appraisal of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of both methods of determination of 
constitutionality will be undertaken shortly In our analysis of the 
predominant "a priori" practice of Francophone African States. 
(a) Limitation to Human Rights Guarantees In Anglophone African State 
Constitutions 
The complexity and detail of exceptions to the rights and freedoms under 
African Bills of Rights are vast in comparison to the European 
Convention58. Indeed Professor B. Nwabueze described the 1960 
Nigerian Bill of Rights as "a Bill of exceptions not a Bill of Rights"59. 
However, only a few Anglophone constitutions retain this characteristic 
of the 1960 Nigerian Constitution. 
It is difficult to provide constitutional guarantees for rights and 
freedoms in absolute terms because "the entrenchment of human rights is 
an attempt to strike a more or less permanent balance between the 
60 interests of the individual and those of the State". 
Exceptions or limitations to constitutional guarantees may be broadly 
divided into two groups. The first group of exceptions do not endow 
-------------------- 
57 S. 27(l)(b) The One Party Constitution of Zambia (1973). 
58 James S. Read "Bill of Rights in the Third World: Some 
Commonwealth Experiences" in Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee (1973) 
Heft 1, pp. 30-33. 
59 B. O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in Emergent States op cit p. 393. 
60 Ibid p. 408. 
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any authority on the legislature to derogate from the guaranteed rights 
In the interest of defence, public order, public safety, public morality 
and public health. The exceptions In this group do not have a common 
denominator upon which they are based, but each provision protecting or 
guaranteeing a particular right or freedom also defines its own 
exception. Consequently,, the provision guaranteeing the right to life, 
personal liberty, freedom from inhuman treatment, slavery and forced 
labour, freedom from discrimination, and the right to the protection of 
law provide specific exceptions peculiar to each provision. For instance, 
the right to personal liberty is generally guaranteed but subject to 
qualifications or limitations that may be Imposed by laws relating to the 
execution of a sentence or in the execution of court orders. Other 
restrictions to the right to personal liberty Include laws passed In 
consideration of welfare of minors, vagrants or persons of unsound mind, 
the spread of infectious diseases, and entry into a country or restricted 
parts of. itsl. Thus when courts are asked to determine infractions of 
these rights they are rarely drawn into the area of State policy 
considerations such as attempts to balance the Interest of the individual 
against that of the community as a whole62. 
Courts are however drawn Into the controversial area of State policy 
when considering the effect of the second group of exceptions in 
Anglophone African Bills of Rights. Under this group, the legislature is 
empowered to implement measures to curtail certain rights and liberties 
such as the right to privacy of home and other property, freedom from 
deprivation of property, or conscience of expression, of assembly and 
-------------------- 
61 See Sections 15,5 and 32 of the Constitution of Zambia, Botswana and 
Nigeria respectively. 
62 David Grove op cit p. 156-7; However see the cases: Shugaba Darman 
v Minister of Internal Affairs ((1981) 1 NCLR 25); and Ibigira v Uganda (196)') E. A. 306; In the former case, the Court declared that the 
infringement of fundamental rights may attract exemplary damages. 
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f 
association and of movement, provided that such measures are 
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society" in the interest of defence, 
public safety, public order, public morality and public health. Under 
the second group of exceptions, government encroachment on guaranteed 
rights and freedoms is permitted as long as the measures are regarded to 
63 be "reasonably justifiable in a democratic society", 
African Courts have thus been called upon, in several cases to determine 
the means of the expressions "reasonably justifiable In a democratic 
society". 
In Feliya Kachasu v The Attorney-General for Zambia64 the applicant had 
been suspended from school because, being a Watchtower Jehovah's 
Witness, she refused to salute the national flag and sing the national 
anthem, as required by Ministerial regulations65. The school headmaster 
suspended her and refused to reinstate her, pursuant to the powers 
granted him by the said regulationsss. The applicant thus brought an 
action claiming that the regulations were contrary to S. 21 of the Zambian 
Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of conscience, thought and 
religion. The Court held that the law which was utilized to suspend the 
applicant was reasonably required in the interest of national safety or 
security. The Court ruled that: 
"Bearing in mind the compelling consideration, particularly at 
the present time, of national unity and national security, 
without which there can be no certainty of public safety nor 
-------------------- 
63 For instance see Section 41(1) Constitution of Nigeria, S. 12(2) 
Botswana Constitution, 5.16(1) and (2) Sierra Leone Constitution; and 
S. 21 of the Zambian Constitution. 
64 SJ2,1967/HP/273 Reported in M. Ndolo and K. Turner Civil Liberties 
Cases in Zambia (African Law Reports, Oxford, 1984) p. 83. 
65 Education (Primary & Secondary Schools) Regulation 1966 (Zambia). 
66 Regulation 25(1)-(4), and Regulation 31(1)Ibid. 
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guarantee of individual rights and freedoms, I think it is a 
reasonable requirement that pupils in... school%7should sing 
the national anthem and salute the national flag" 
In his interpretation of the meaning of what is "reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society", Blagden C. J. ruled that: 
"The criteria of what is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society might vary according to whether that society is long- 
established or newly-emergent. Zambia is a newly emergent 
state. It would be unrealistic to apply this criterion of a 
long established democratic society. We should look to the 
democratic society that exists in Zambia; and having found 
that these regulations are reasonably required In Zambia I 
have no hesitation In finding that they are r% sonably 
justifiable In the democratic society that exists here" . 
Nigerian Courts have also been called upon to Interpret the meaning of 
"reasonably justifiable in the democratic society" in the Bill of Rights to 
the Nigerian Constitution69. In Cheranci v Cheranci; the court was of 
the opinion that where there has been. an infringement of a fundamental 
rights, there is a presumption that the legislature acted constitutionally 
and that the laws which they have passed are necessary and reasonably 
justifiable. However, the court stated that "a restriction upon a 
fundamental right must before it may be considered reasonably justifiable 
-------------------- 
67 Per Bladgen C. J. Ibid at p. 100. 
68 Ibid at p. 101. In another Zambian case. Patel v Attorney-General 
((1967) ZR. 145) the High Court held that it was reasonably justifiable in 
a democratic society for customs officers to have the power to seize and 
open mail under exchange control laws "on the basis that the customs 
officer is duly authorized, that his reasonable suspicion is objective and 
not subjective... " In reaching this decision Magnus J. ruled that "it is 
necessary to adopt the objective test of what is reasonably justifiable, 
not In a particular democratic society, but in any democratic society". 
The court also held that although "some distinction should be made 
between a developed society and one which Is still developing.., there 
are certain minima which must be found In any society, developed or 
otherwise, below which it cannot go and still be entitled to be considered 
as a democratic society"p. 160 Ibid. See further Chandra P. Gupta "The 
Patel Currency Case" Zambian Law Journal (1969) Vol. 1 p. 49. 
69 Cheranci v Cherancl 1960 NRNLR (1960) 24; DPP v Obi (1961) I All NLR 186; Williams v Majekodumi (1962) 1 All NLR 324,328,413. 
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(a) be necessary in the interest public morals or public order and (b) 
must not be excessive or out of proportion to the object which Is sought 
to achieve". 
70 
In addition to the foregoing restrictions, on human rights, all 
Anglophone States have constitutional provisions which were evolved to 
preserve the security and safety of the State from either actual public 
emergency or some other threatened danger that may face a State71. It 
Is universally acknowledged that constitutions should have this built in 
safety measure which hinges on the principle of "salus popull est 
supreme lex" (i. e. the safety of the nation Is supreme law). There Is a 
dire need in African States to preserve the security of the State. The 
relatively young States of Africa have to contend with fragile and 
underdeveloped socio-political and economic Institutions which are 
vulnerable to the threats posed by competing claims made upon them. 
Consequently it Is pertinent to reconcile and balance these competing 
claims with the prior requirement of preserving the State. The primacy 
of the security of the State is exemplified in statement of the Attorney- 
General of Zambia, that: 
"National security is thus, paramount not only in the interest 
of each individual member of the State; and measures 
designed to achieve and maintain that security must come 
first; and... must override if need be the inter, sts of 
individuals and of minorities with which they conflict" 
-------------------- 
70 Ibid at pp. 28-9. 
71 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Deny's Holland Emergency 
Legislations in the Commonwealth. CLP Vols 9,10,11, of 1956,1958 and 
1960 respectively; Personal Liberty In the Commonwealth (1958) CLP 151, 
B. Nwabueze, Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa (London, C. Hurst 
& Co. 1979) Chapter 10; J. O. Akande Emergency Powers in Newly 
Independent African States within the Commonwealth (PhD. Thesis 
University of London 1975). 
72 In Feliya Kachasu v Attorney-General for Zambia op cit. 
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Thus the majority of African Constitutions expressly provide for the 
derogation of fundamental rights during an emergency. African State In 
practice reveals the propensity of States to proclaim states of emergency. 
Human rights are invariably the first casualties of declarations of 
emergency. Justice Elias has suggested three main criteria that would 
have to be met before a State could curtail basic human rights: - first, 
there should be a breakdown in law and order within the State or a 
threat to Its security and political Independence arising from political 
insurrection or external aggression. Secondly, there should be an 
official declaration of emergency by the government prior to Introducing 
measures drastically limiting the basic freedoms of the people. Thirdly, 
the situation must be such that no alternative measures other than the 
curtailment of individual fundamental liberties may be considered 
?3 
appropriate to contain the situation. 
Justice Elias criteria does not prescribe the preservation of a certain 
class of rights from derogation during periods of emergency. However 
only a few Anglophone African Constitutions have adopted the neo- 
Nigerian constitutional device of preserving certain rights from 
encroachment during an emergency74. For Instance Section 26 of the 
Zambian Constitution provides that: 
"Nothing shall be inconsistent with or in contravention of 
Articles 15,18,19,21,22,23,24 or 25 to the extent that it 
is shown that the Law in question authorizes the taking 
during any period when the Republic is at war or when a 
declaration under Article 30 (i. e. declaration relating to 
emergencies or threatened emergencies) is in force, of 
measures for the purpose of dealing with any person under 
-------------------- 
73 
T. O. Elias "Government Action, State Security and Human Rights" 
Report of the Proceedings of the Tenth African Conference on the Rule 
of Law, Lagos, Nigeria (3-7 Jan 1961) p. 42. 
74 See Sections 83,265,58,29/30 and 68 of the Constitutions of Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively. See further 
A. Aihe "Neo-Nigerian Human Rights in Zambia" Zambian Law Journal 
Vols. 3&4 (1971 & 1972) pp. 43-63. 
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the authority of any such Law shall be held to be in 
contravention of any of the said provisions unless anything 
which, having due regard to the circumstances prevailing at 
the time, could reasonably have been thought to be required 
for the purpose of dealing with the situation in question". 
The implications of the foregoing provision, which is similar to the 
provisions of the Constitution of Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Zimbabwe 
Is that the following rights are guaranteed, although subject at all times 
to emergency measures: - the right to personal liberty, freedom from 
deprivation of property, right to privacy of home and other property, 
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and 
association, freedom of movement and freedom from discrimination. 
The significance of the provision of Article 26 is in Its omission of a 
class of rights contained In Articles 14,16,17 and 20 of the Zambian 
Constitution which protect the right to life, freedom from slavery and 
forced labour, freedom from Inhuman treatment and the right to the 
protection of the law, respectively; thus these rights cannot be 
derogated from at any time. 
The absence of the foregoing protective provision from many African 
constitutions provides a 'carte blanche' for the executive and legislature 
to derogate from all the human rights guaranteed under the constitution. 
The declaration of emergency Is the first measure taken by all military 
regimes In Africa; similarly, multi-party States In Africa have utilized 
the device, as well as Public Security Acts, to violate human rights by 
proscribing opposition parties and detaining political leaders75. The 
general attitude of African courts towards the declaration of emergency 
-------------------- 
75 
J. K. Ebiasah "Protecting the Human Rights of Political Detainees: The 
Contradictions and Paradoxes in the African Experience" Harvard Law 
Journal (1979) Vol. 22 p. 270. 
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is reflected in the Nigerian case of Williams v Majekodunmi76 in which 
Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the existence or nonexistence of a 
state of public emergency is "a matter apparently within the bounds of 
Parliament, and not for this court to decide"77. Similarly, In the case of 
Kamara and Others v Director of Prisons78, the Sierra Leone High Court 
was reluctant to impugn the declaration of a State of Emergency in the 
Country. The detention of individuals under various Emergency and 
Public Security Acts or Laws have also come under the judicial 
periscope79. In Zimbabwe, a continuous state of emergency has been in 
existence since independence In 1980. This situation has been justified 
by Dr. E. Zvogbo80 as necessary for security purposes81. 
Nevertheless, Zimbabwean Courts have been courageous enough to 
upturn measures taken by the Government under the Emergency Powers 
Act82. For example in the case of Dabengwa and Anor v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others83, the wives of certain detainees held under the 
Emergency Powers Act brought a motion seeking an order that their 
husbands be granted access to legal representatives, since such access 
had been denied by the government. The Court held that the Regulation 
whereby an executive could prevent access by detainees to lawyers was 
unconstitutional-, anA-arL order for access was issued. 
76 1962 All NLR 415. 
77 Ibid; See also Alhaji D. S. Adegbengro v Attorney-General of the 
Federation and Others (1962) WNLR 150 at p. 160; Baffour Osel Akoto and 
Others v The Minister of Interior (re Akoto) (Ghana) Civil Appeal 42/61. 
78 (1972-73) A. L. R. (SL) 162 at 168. 
79 Sharma v Attorney- General (1978) ZR 163, Eleftheriadls v Attorney- 
General (1979) ZR 154. Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons (Ex Parte 
Matovu) (1966) EA. 514. Grace Stuart Ibingira v Uganda (1966) EA. 306 & 
445. 
80 The Zimbabwean Minister for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. 
81 E. Zvogbo "Zimbabwean Constitution After Four Years" Public Law 
(1984) Vol. 29, p. 448. 
82 Cap. 83, Laws of Zimbabwe. 
83 (1982) 4 SA (ZSC) 301. See also Minister of Home Affairs v York (1982) 4. SA (ZSC) 496. 
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Under the regime of Public Security Acts the courts have been willing in 
some cases, to examine the validity of detention regulations and orders 
and executive measures in execution thereof. For instance In Re 
Chiluba84, the application was for the Issue of a writ of 'habeas corpus 
ad subjuciendum'. The President of Zambia had in the exercise of the 
powers conferred on him by Regulation 33(1) of the Preservation of 
Public Security Regulations ordered that the applicant, be detained. 
The grounds upon which he was detained was that he addressed meetings 
at which he desired a change of Government. The High Court held that 
the need to detain under the provisions of the Regulations arises when 
the detaining authority comes to the conclusion or is satisfied on 
reasonable grounds that the activities of the detainee were prejudicial to 
public security and that there was genuine apprehension that the 
detainee, if left at large, would continue to persist In the commission of 
unlawful activities. The Court thus ordered the release of the applicant 
on the grounds inter alia - that an Isolated incident In the circumstances 
of the case cannot necessarily amount to a threat to public safety. 
The granting of habeas corpus orders by the courts is more of the 
exception than the rule, and virtually nonexistent in most military 
governed Anglophone African States. 
It is pertinent to note that unlike the European Convention85 on Human 
Rights and the American Convention, the AFCHPR does not contain a 
86 
non-derogation clause protecting human rights during times of war or 
public emergency threatening the life of a nation. Consequently the 
majority of African States that have Constitutions without non-derogation 
-------------------- 
84 
Reported in Civil Liberties Cases in Zambia (Ndolo and Turner) op cit 
p. 304. 
85 Article 15, European Convention. 
86 Article 27 American Convention. 
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clauses are not under any obligation to Incorporate such provisions 
under the regime of the AFCHPR. However, African States that are 
parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights will be 
required to observe the standards of human rights observance prescribed 
therein, which standards include non-derogation from the right to life, 
freedom from torture and, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, freedom from slavery or servitude, freedom from 
imprisonment for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation, freedom from 
ex post facto laws, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the 
right to recognition before the law. 
87 
In summation, therefore, it is evident that African governments are 
inclined to abuse the constitutional power to derogate from fundamental 
rights during periods of emergency as well as during peacetime in the 
guise of preserving public good. Additional safeguards should be 
incorporated In most constitutions to ensure that measures which are 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and/or for the purpose of 
dealing with emergency situations are not arbitrary, excessive or out of 
proportion. A few Anglophone African States have adopted non- 
derogation clauses in their constitutions to preserve the sanctity of a 
certain class of rights, while others are under international law 
obligations to do so. The presence of non-derogation clauses in all 
African Constitutions Is necessary in the light of the frequency of 
declarations of emergency albeit perpetuated by extra-legal regimes 
disposed to the suspension and abrogation of constitutions. The 
susceptibility of African State Constitutions to such hazards Informs us 
of the need for a non-derogation provision in the AFCHPR. In the 
absence of such a provision, African Courts must be prepared to rebut 
the presumption of constitutional validity of statutes and decrees where 
----------------- -- 
87 Artricle 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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they appear prima facia to Invade "absolute" rights guaranteed by the 
constitution. In the words of the Indian Supreme Court, "such meagre 
safeguards as the constitution has provided against the Improper exercise 
of power must be jealously watched" 
88. The constitutions of Anglophone 
African States view the judiciary as the guardian of individual liberties. 
These constitutions confer on superior courts the jurisdiction to 
determine cases involving all human rights guaranteed under their 
respective constitutions. 
The paucity of cases on fundamental human rights consecrated in 
Anglophone African Constitutions is due mainly to the militarization of 
African political structures and also paradoxically to the common law 
tradition of these states. The inclination of practising barristers Is to 
seek remedies within the labyrinths of the common law and the rules of 
procedure and evidence. This method inevitably, albeit tacitly touching 
upon fundamental rights, obviates the need to primarily seek the 
invocations of rights protected in the constitution. The training of 
lawyers in these countries Is based on the traditions of the English Bar 
which has hitherto been averse to Bills of Rights. Lately however, 
there has been evidence of an increasing awareness of the utility value 
of the Bill of Rights as an effective vehicle to restrain executive and 
legislative power89. The efficacy of Bills of Rights cannot be judged 
only by judicial activation. They also serve an educative function in 
enlightening citizens, both public officers and politicians, to the 
permitted limits of execution and legislative power, consequently, 
reducing the inclination, in some quarters, to regard judicial review of 
-------------------- 
88 Pam Krishna v State of Delhi (1935) SCR (India) 318 at 329. 
89 See generally, Ndulo, M. and Turner, K., Civil Liberties Cases in 
Zambia op cit, See also D. O. Aihe and P. A. Oluyede Cases and Materials 
on Constitutional Law in Nigeria (Oxford University Press) 1979. 
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90 
constitutionality as judicial supremacy. 
It is significant that amongst Anglophone African States, only Ghana, 
Kenya, Mauritius and Seychelles are yet to ratify the AFCHPR. In 1976 
President J. Nyerere of Tanzania stated that "a bill of rights... provides 
little by way of protection for the individual and induces in the citizen a 
mood of cynicism about the whole process of government"91. The effect 
of this conviction was the absence of a Bill of Rights In the Tanzanian 
Constitution of 1977. It is hoped that all African Leaders will emulate 
Dr. Julius Nyerere's "u-turn", not only by ratifying the AFCHPR92, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights93, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
94 but 
also ensure the incorporation of Bills of Rights In their respective 
constitutions95. 
(ii) Francophone African States 
The constitutions of most former French African colonies contain 
declarations of human rights protection. The declarations refer either to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) or the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), or to both. Furthermore, 
some of the constitutional Chapters under reference, encapsulate detailed 
provisions on the protection of human rights. 
-------------------- 
90 James. S. Read "Judicial Power and the Constitution of Ghana" Review 
of Ghana Law, Vol.!!! No. 2 (1971) p. 107. 
91 Speech of President Nyerere given at the opening of the University 
of Dar-es-Salaam College Campus" cited in G. F. Malwa "The Constitution 
of the United Republic of Tanzania: Proposed Changes" East African Law 
Review (1978-81) Vol. 11-14 p. 143. 
92 Ratified by Tanzania on 18 February 1984. 
93 Ratified by Tanzania on 11 June 1984. 
94 Ratified by Tanzania on 11 June 1984. 
95 Section Three: Rights and Obligations: Constitution of Tanzania (Fifth Amendment of the State Constitution of 1984). 
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Country Date of Date of Chapter of Constitution 
Independence Current/Last 
Constitution 
Benin 1 Aug 1960 26 Aug 1977 Chapter VII, 
(as amended Fundamental Rights and 
through 1981) Duties of Citizens. 
Cameroon 1 Jan 1960 12 Jun 1972 Preamble adheres to the 
Universal Declaration 
1948 and earnestly 
guarantees rights and 
liberties. 
Central 13 Aug 1960 21 Nov 1986 Preamble and Title 1- 
African Fundamental Bases of 
Republic Society 
(CAR) 
Comores 6 Jul 1975 1 Oct 1978 Preamble - guarantees 
the protection of human 
rights & proclaims 
adherence to the 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
Chad 11 Aug 1960 Constitution of Fundamental Act of the 
29 Aug 1978 Republic "guarantees 
abrogated and the fundamental 
replaced by liberties and rights of 
The the Individual". 
Fundamental 
Act of the 
Republic Oct 
1982 
Congo 15 Aug 1960 8 Jul 1978 Title II. 
Brazzaville 
Djibouti 27 Jun 1977 27 Jun 1977 Title III which 
subscribes to the 
Universal Declaration of 
the Rights & Duties of 
Man. 
Gabon 17 Aug 1960 21 Feb 1961 (as Preamble - reaffirms the 
revised through rights and freedoms as 
1976) defined in the 
Declaration of 1879 and 
the Universal 
Declaration of 1948; 
Also Preliminary Title - 
(Article 1). 
Guinea 2 Oct 1958 Constitution of Declaration of MCNR 
14 May 1982 reaffirms the rights and 
abrogated & liberties contained in 
superseded by the Universal 
Declaration of Declaration of Human 
the Military Rights (1948). 
Committee of 
National 
Recovery 
(MCNR) of 1984 
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Date of Date of Chapter of Constitution 
Independence Current/Last 
Constitution 
Ivory Coast 7 Aug 1960 31 Oct 1960 (as The Preamble adheres 
revised through to the principles of 
1978) Democracy and the 
Declaration of the 
Rights of Man (1789) 
and the Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948). 
Mali 22 Sep 1960 Decree No. Preamble reaffirms the 
3P/G RM of principles of the 
1974. Declaration of the 
Rights of Man (1789) 
and the Universal 
Declaration (1948). 
Also Title II - 
Fundamental Rights & 
Duties of an and 
Citizen. 
Rwanda 1 Jul 1962 20 Dec 1978 (as Preamble pledges 
reviewed adherence to the 
through 1980) Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). 
Also Chapter II Civil 
Liberties 
Senegal 20 Aug 1960 7 Mar 1963 (as Preamble - Declaration 
reviewed of the Rights of Man 
through 1976) and the Citizen (1789) 
and the Universal 
Declaration (1948) Also 
Title II Public Liberties 
and Human ig s. 
Togo 27 Apr 1960 13 Jan 1980 Preamble - adherence to 
the Universal 
Declaration (1948) and 
the UN Charter. Also 
Title II - Fundamental 
Rights an Duties o 
Citizens. 
Zaire 30 Jun 1960 15 Feb 1978 Preamble - adherence to 
the Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights. Also Title II - 
Fundamental Rights and 
Duties of Citizens. 
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Three main trends are evident from the foregoing table of Francophone 
African Constitutions. First, several States reflect their French colonial 
heritage by reaffirming the rights and liberties contained In the 
Declaration of Man and the Citizen (I. e. Declaration des droits de Phomme 
et du citizen (1789)96. Secondly, most of the constitutions under 
reference, contain preambular provisions which reaffirm or pledge 
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and/or to 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789)97. Thirdly, in addition to 1 
preambular references to the Universal Declaration and/or to the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, most of the Constitutions contain 
detailed Bills of RIghts98. It Is agreed that where human rights 
provisions are included in the substantive part of the constitution, as in 
most of the aforementioned constitutions, they are generally binding. 
Thus, the issue arises as to the juridical value of preambular references 
to international human rights instruments in national constitutions. 
Under Common Law jurisprudence, where references to human rights are 
found In the preamble, they are considered not to confer rights and 
obligations and are thus non-justiceable99. However, the provision in 
-------------------- 
96 See The Constitution of Gabon, Ivory Coast and Mall. 
97 See the Constitution of C. A. R.; Comores, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, 
Mauritius and Rwanda. 
98 See the Constitutions of Benin, CAR, Congo (Brazaville), Mali, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Zaire. 
99 In the Tanzanian case of H. Adamji v EAP&T the court held that "the 
preamble to a constitution does not in law constitute part of the 
constitution and so does not form part of the laws of the land". (1973) 
Law Reports of Tanzania (LRT) No. 6, p. 10. Similarly In the Nigerian 
case of Chief Victor Olabisi Onabanjo v Concord Press of Nigeria Ltd the 
court in finding that the preamble is not justiceable held Inter alia that 
"The preamble is part of the constitution and may be used in order to 
ascertain the meaning but only when the preamble is clear and definite In 
comparison with obscure and Indefinite enacting words. The preamble 
serves to portray the intention of its framers, and the mischiefs to be 
remedied but as a general rule the preamble Is to be resorted to only in 
cases of ambiguity in the constitution"(1981)2 Nigerian Constitutional Law 
Reports, p. 399. 
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relation to Francophone constitutions is not entirely as clear-cut. 
French jurisprudence as propounded by the Conseil d'Etats commissioner 
for government in 1950 states that French "public law does not regard 
the provision contained in the declaration of rights or the constitutional 
preambles as legal prescriptions of either constitutional or legislative 
nature"100. The Conseil observed that such provisions were intended to 
represent general principles of law which should inspire legislative and 
administrative actions and were not constitutional provisions. 
Consequently, one can say that this view is in consonance with common 
law jurisprudence. 
On the other hand Professor Gonidec is of the opinion that: 
"In the absence of an express provision one must seek out 
the intention of the drafters of the constitutions. They have 
sometimes pronounced in favour of the constitutional value of 
the preamble. Thus, In Ivory Coast, Mr. Ph Yac, President 
of the National Assembly, declared that "the preamble is not 
a simple statement of philosophical and moral principles 
exempt from legal value, as one had previously imagined... 
It is the source of positive laj 1with regard to the branches of government and the courts" 
Taking Gonidecs position therefore, where the provisions in the preamble 
and expressly and clearly stated, they may amount to legal rights102; 
however, where reference Is made to one or more International 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration or the French Declaration 
-------------------- 
100 See Conseil d'Etat, 25 January 1957, Syndicat federal des 
fonctionnaires melagaches et assimilles, quoted in "Constitutional 
Guarantees of the Individual" by T. G. Verhelst and Z. B. Plater in Legal 
Process and the Individual African Source Materials op cit, p. 31-32. 
101 Ibid. 
102 For instance, the preambles to constitutions of Comores and the Republic of Cameroon proclaim adherence to the Universal Declatation 
(1948) and also expressly guarantee the equality of citizens, the liberty 
of the individual, freedom of expression and assembly, the right to 
education, freedom of religion and the Inviolability of property. The Preambles also subject some of these rights and liberties to the 
restrictions of "legislative prescriptions" and "public order". 
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of 1789103, such references could not aspire to more than "declarations 
of philosophical or moral principles". Consequently we submit that the 
preambular human rights clauses contained in the Constitution of the 
Comores and the Republic of Cameroon are of a more significant 
justiceable value than the preambular provisions of the Constitutions of 
the Ivory Coast and Guinea. This latter group of States should 
therefore take a leaf from the other Francophone nations, such as 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Zaire, by Incorporating the basic provisions 
on the protection of fundamental rights In the substantive texts of their 
respective constitutions. 
Indeed, by ratifying the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(AFCHPR), the Comores and Guinea'04 have undertaken to "adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to [the] rights, duties and 
freedoms" enshrined in the Charter105. Thus in our consideration of 
Francophone constitutions we shall limit ourselves to those States which 
have provisions on human rights consecrated in the substantive text of 
the constitution. 
A comparative analysis reveals that Francophone African Constitutions 
106 
embody provisions on civil and political rights and freedoms which are 
similar to those contained in Anglophone African Constitutions. 
-------------------- 
103 For Instance, the Preambles to the constitutions of Guinea and Ivory 
Coast simply declare adherence to the principles of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man (1789) and/or to the Universal Declaration 1948. 
104 Ratification of the AFCHPR has been effected by the Comores (1 
June 1986)and Guinea (16 February 1982). However The Republics of 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Djibouti and Madagascar are yet to ratify the 
Charter. 
105 Article 1, AFCHPR. 
106 See Articles 4-6 - Togo Constitution; Article 1- Constitution of Gabon; Articles 7-14 - Constitution of Congo and Articles 6-11 - Constitution of Senegal. 
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However, unlike Anglophone constitutions, the constitutions of ex-French 
colonies contain provisions which guarantee social, economic and welfare 
rights. Thus under Francophone African constitutions, the State is 
under a duty to create conditions which shall guarantee the education of 
all children107, primary school education Is compulsory and free of 
charge108, and the State guarantees equal access for all children and 
adults to education, professional training and culture109. Francophone 
constitutions also provide for the protection of the family 
110 
and the 
right to marry and sanctity of marriage" It Is pertinent to note that 
some Francophone constitutions expressly bestow equal rights and 
obligations on children born in wedlock and those born outside 
wedlock112. The Constitution of Rwanda expressly recognises only 
113 
monogamous marriages, thus It may be argued that the rights of 
Rwanda's Muslims, who constitute 1096 of its population to contract 
polygamous marriages is not recognised. Consequently, although the 
Rwandan constitution protects the freedom of worship. (Article 18), the 
right to found a family In accordance with religious precepts Is abridged. 
By virtue of the provisions of some Francophone constitutions, the State 
guarantees to all, especially children, women and the aged, the 
-------------------- 
107 Article 16, Constitution of Senegal; Article 130 Constitution of the 
Republic of Benin; and Article 12 Mall Constitution. However the 
Constitution of Zaire states that the care and education of children shall 
constitute a right and a duty for parents which shall be exercised under 
the authority and aid of the state - Article 19. 
108 Article 27, Constitution of Rwanda. 
109 Article 12, Constitution of Gabon. 
110 Article 19, Constitution of Congo. See also the Preambles to the 
Malagasy Constitution. 
111 Article 126, Benin Constitution. 
112 Article 10, Constitution of Gabon, and Article 19, Constitution of 
Congo. 
113 Article 25, Constitution of Rwanda. 
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protection of health, material security. rest and relaxation114 The 
Gabonese Constitution, for instance does not define the term "material- 
security", however it would seem to include the provision of housing and 
social security. Francophone constitutions guarantee the right to 
work115 and the right of the worker to defend his rights through trade 
unions116 Consequently, In some constitutions, the right to strike is 
expressly guaranteed, albeit subject to the laws governing strikes and 
the right of the individual to work"?. Thus In Rwanda for Instance, a 
worker or trade union member cannot be compelled by his trade union to 
strike if he chooses not to. It is instructive to observe that these 
provisions are In consonance with Article 10 of the AFCHPR which states 
that no one may be compelled to join an organisation. The constitution 
of Rwanda however, expressly forbids public service employees from 
striking118. The incorporation of the right to work and other social and 
civil rights In most Francophone African Constitutions obviates the need 
for these States to provide further measures in compliance with the 
relevant provisions of the AFCHPR which latter provisions are less 
detailed than the constitutional provisions. Most Anglophone States, on 
the other hand, will have to review their constitutions and Incorporate 
the social, economic rights consecrated in the AFCHPR. 
-------------------- 
114 
Article 1(5) Constitution of Gabon and Article 147 Benin 
Constitution. 
115 Article 30, Constitution of Rwanda; Article 13 Mali Constitution-; 
Article 20 Constitution of Congo; Article 1(4) Constitution of Gabon, and 
Article 127 Benin Constitution. 
116 Article 31, Constitution of Gabon, Article 13 Mali Constitution and 
Article 22 Congo Constitution. 
117 Article 32, Constitution of Rwanda; Article 13, Mali Constitution. 
118 Article 32, Constitution of Rwanda. 
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Most Francophone African constitutions protect the Individual as well as 
the collective right to property119. However, no deprivation of property 
is permitted except by reason of public necessity as prescribed by law 
and In such event, just compensation must be made120. It should 
however be noted that the political philosophy of some Francophone 
African governments has influenced their attitude to the right to 
property. For Instance the constitutions of Benin and the Congo contain 
no provision for the Individual's right to property. 
The Congolese Constitution provides that: 
"Along the entire length of the Peoples Republic of the 
Congo, the land is the property of the people. All land 
claims and common rights are abolished. All use of these 
titles and rights Is contrary to the Constitution and penalized 
by law. 
However, every citizen may freely dispose of12jhe lands 
products, which are the fruits of his own labour" 
Although the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR) 
protects the right to property, it also expressly states that some rights 
may "only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community and In accordance with the provisions 
. of appropriate laws" 
122 
It is thus arguable that African constitutions, such as the Congolese 
Constitution which reserve the rights of ownership of all land in the 
state as 'trustees' of the people, may not necessarily be discordant with 
the terms of the Charter. 
119 For instance, Article 14, Constitution of Mall; Article 1(6), 
Constitution of Gabon; Article 21, Constitution of Zaire and Article 6. 
Constitution of Togo. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Article 31, Constitution of Congo. 
122 Article 14, AFCHPR. 
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We however submit that the abolishment of individual claims and common 
rights in land by the Congolese constitution is contrary to the spirit and 
provisions of the Charter. Although it however may be argued, to the 
contrary, that although the Congolese approach is in the interest of the 
community, such justifications are only plausible as exceptions to the 
general rule of the right to property. Secondly, a government's claim 
that the acquisition of land rights is in the interest of the community are 
sometimes subjective. According to M. Parenti: 
"Although the decisions of government are made In the name 
of the entire society, they rarely benefit everyone with equal 
effect. No government represents all Its people. Some 
portion of the populace, frequently a majority, loses out on 
government decisions. What Is considered national policy Is 
usually the policy of dominant social groups and what is 
called public policy is not formulated by the public but by 
those sectors of the publiclýýat are most strategically located 
within the political system" 
Consequently, the attempt by some African nations to impose Marxist 
socialist based socio-economic systems on their peoples through 
constitutional abduction of proprietary interest In land is not only 
contrary to the fundamental rights and freedoms but also economically 
retrogressive In stifling individual enterprise. 
(a) Limitations to Constitutional Guarantees of Human Rights in 
Francophone African Constitutions 
As earlier discussed, the limitations to human rights provisions in 
commonwealth African Constitutions are detailed and are embodied in the 
substantive provisions of the respective constitutions. The provisions 
that guarantee human rights in Francophone African constitutions are 
either in the preamble or in the substantive text of the Bill of Rights. 
The exceptions or limitations to the constitutional rights protected, 
-------------------- 
123 M. Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York, St. Martins Press 
1974) p. 57. 
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whether located in the preamble or substantive text, are defined by the 
particular provision relating to the specific right granted. Most of the 
rights guaranteed by these constitutions are subject to such limitations 
as provided by ordinary law124. For Instance, the Constitution of 
Senegal provides that: 
"All citizens shall have a right to freely constitute 
associations and groups, on the condition that they comply 
with the formalities set down by the11sws and regulations. 
This right may be limited only by law" 
Furthermore, Article 6 of the Constitution of Togo provides that: 
"The Togolese Republic shall assure each citizen, In 
accordance with the law, respect for the rights and liberties 
of the human person, the family, and local organizations; 
political liberties; philosophic and religious liberties; labour- 
union liberty; the right to property, Individual or collective; 
and economic and social rights. " 
In Francophone constitutions the following rights are also subject to the 
general limitations "of the law": 
The freedom of speech and Information and for privacy of 
correspondence126, the right to strike, the freedom of settlement and of 
assembly and association 
127, the right to work128 and the inviolability of 
129 the home. 
-------------------- 
124 Article 1(1) Constitution of Gabon; Article 41 Constitution of Guinea; 
Article 5 Constitution of Ivory Coast; Articles 8-11 Senegal Constitution. 
125 Article 9, (Underlines for emphasis). 
126 Articles 10 and 11, Senegal Constitution; Article 23 Constitution of 
Zaire; and Article 1(3) Constitution of Gabon. 
127 Articles 15,17 and 18 Constitution of Congo; Article 1(8) Constitution 
of Gabon. 
128 Fourth preambular clause and Article 13 Constitution of Mali. 
129 Article 8 Constitution of Congo; Article 13 Mali Constitution. 
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Some Francophone constitutions, In addition to restricting rights by 
reference to conditions "determined" or "defined by law", also allow 
derogations from the rights protected where public Interest or public 
order or public necessity so require130. Consideration of public good 
permit derogation from the following protected rights: - the freedom of 
speech131, right to property 
132, freedom of conscience and religion 
the right of personal development134 and the freedom of association 
135. 
The aforementioned platitudes of derogations, unlike the Anglophone 
constitutions, lack detail and measures to safeguard the protected rights 
from being rendered meaningless. Suffice it to say that most of the 
derogations permitted by both the Anglophone and Francophone 
constitutions are in accord with the provisions of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR). For example, the Charter states 
that: 
"Freedom of conscience, the profession and freedom of religion shall be 
guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to 
measures restricting the exercise of these freedom" 
136. 
-------------------- 
130 See the Constitutions of Zaire, Mall, Gabon, Senegal and Congo. 
131 
Article 18, Constitution of Zaire. 
132 Article 14, Constitution of Mall and Article 21, Constitution of Zaire. 
133 Article 11, Constitution of Mali; Article 1(2), Constitution of Gabon; 
and Articles 17 and 19, Constitution of Zaire. 
134 Article 7, Constitution of Congo; Article 1(1), Constitution of Gabon; 
Article 14, Constitution of Zaire. 
135 
Article 9, Constitution of Zaire. 
136 Arrticle 8, AFCHPR (Underlines for emphasis). 
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The AFCHPR also subjects the right to assemble to "necessary 
restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the 
interest of national security, safety, health, ethics and rights and 
freedoms of others"137. 
While we do not challenge the rationale for such limitations, there is a 
need for the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights to evolve 
standard rules for the determination of margins of appreciation to be 
accorded to State Perogatives. 
Most Francophone African constitutions however provide some Inbuilt 
protections against the abuse of State power. The maxim nulla poena 
sine praeter lege is recognised. Consequently, no Individual may be 
arrested, convicted, detained, jailed, or exiled except as a consequence 
of a law In effect at the time the alleged 
presumption of innocence until guilt has 
preserved by the constitutional provisions c 
the majority of the constitutions in this 
consecrate this principle. 
act was committed138. The 
been legally established Is 
f Rwanda and Zaire139, while 
category do not expressly 
The freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention Is generally protected 
by all Francophone constitutions, either in the chapters pertaining to 
140 human rights or the judiciary. However, unlike most Anglophone 
constitutions, there are no prescribed minimum periods within which 
-------------------- 
137 
Article 11, Ibid (Underlines for emphasis). 
138 Article 6, Constitution of Senegal; Article 15, Constitution of Zaire; 
Article 7, Constitution of Congo; Article 8, Constitution of Mall. 
139 Article 12, Constitution of Rwanda; Articles 15 and 16, Constitution 
of Zaire. 
140 Articles 15 and 16, Constitution of Zaire; Article 6, Constitution of Senegal; Article 135, Constitution of Benin; Article 7, Constitution of Mali; Article 7, Constitution of Congo; and Article 12 Constitution of Rwanda. 
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persons arrested or detained should be brought before a court. This 
omission may be due to the nonexistence of habeas corpus In French civil 
law tradition. Additional safeguards provided by most Francophone 
141 
constitutions include the right to defence and counsel. 
The judiciary, not unlike Anglophone constitutions, is generally regarded 
as the guardian of individual liberties, however, differences exist in the 
Francophone African approach to constitutionality. The determination of 
constitutionality is inextricably linked with the effective protection of 
fundamental rights. The principle of constitutional supremacy means that 
laws and regulations which are contrary to the substantive provisions of 
the constitution can be declared invalid. In Francophone African States, 
the determination of constitutionality Is made by Supreme Courts or 
special tribunals142. The determination of constitutionality generally 
occurs before a law under consideration comes into effect, In other 
words, during the period between parliamentary approval and subsequent 
promulgation by the Heads of State or Government. Thus until the Head 
of State promulgates the law, the citizen cannot challenge its 
constitutionality according to the maxim "pas d'interest, pas d'action". 
The Francophone "a priori" review, estopps constitutional challenges 
after the law has been promulgated, whereas, the Anglophonic "a 
posteiori", method permits challenger any time after the law enters into 
force. The French approach therefore does not permit mistakes or 
omissions in legislation, which become obvious over time, to be 
challenged. The Implications of this approach on human rights is 
apparent. In the Francophone "a priori" method, the constitutionality of 
a proposed legislation Is determined through the Initiative of executive or 
-------------------- 
141 
Article 6, Constitution of Senegal; Article 16, Constitution of Zaire, 
Article 14, Constitution of Rwanda. 
142 For instance see Cameroon, Loi 69/CF/2 of 14 June 1969; Ivory Coast 
Lot No. 61-107 of 19 July 1961 as amended by Loi No. 62-091 of 1 October 
1969; Senegal Ordinance 60-17 of 3 September 1969. 
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legislative organs rather than by individuals 
143. However very few 
Francophone States permit the "a posteiori" challenge of the 
constitutionality of a law, but not executive measures or "actes de 
144 
gouvernement". 
In Anglophone States, the "a posteriori" method of determining the 
constitutionality of laws and executive measure Is universal rule. 
However, Zambian Constitution Is an exception to this general rule by Its 
provision on "a priori" review145 as a supplement to the constitutional "a 
posteriori" judicial review procedures. The Zambian system thus 
provides a double guarantee for persons whose rights and liberties may 
be threatened by legislation. 
The Anglophone "a posteriori" determination of constitutionality provides 
a more efficient method of guaranteeing that fundamental rights are not 
Infringed or abrogated by legislation and subsequent executive measures. 
Admittedly, the "a priori" determination of constitutionality puts 
legislation through a critical test of constitutional pre-qualifications by 
legislative and judicial organs, however, such an approach excludes the 
law from clinical tests of judicial proceedings since interested Individuals 
are precluded from Initiating action. Professor Gonidec has observed 
that "... the most satisfactory system is one which permits every 
Interested party to raise the question of constitutionality, either 
directly, or by subjecting the measure to attack, during the course of a 
146 judicial proceeding", 
-------------------- 
143 See Article 8, Constitution of Ivory Coast. 
144 Republic of Congo and-Malagasy Republic - See T. G. Verhelst, 
"Constitutional Guarantees of the Individual" in T. Verhelst and Z. 
Plater (ed) Legal Process and the Individual op cit p. 54. 
145 Article 27 Zambian Constitution. 
146 A. Gonidec, Droits Africanis, Evolution et sources, Vol.!. op cit, 
p. 97. 
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Is is therefore submitted that there Is a need for African States to 
review their respective constitutions to allow for both "a priori" and "a 
posteriori" determination of constitutionality, not unlike the Zambian 
model, in the interest of effective human rights protection. 
Furthermore, Individuals with locus standi should be allowed to challenge 
the constitutionality of legislative acts and executive measures, a right 
denied individuals In most Francophone African States. It however, goes 
without saying, that the Francophone African States that have ratified 
the AFCHPR, will now have to ensure that domestic legislations pass the 
"a priori" test of conformity with the Charter. 
(iii) Afro-Arab States 
The constitutions of the Afro-Arab States contain guarantees on human 
rights in their substantive provisions. These provisions are consecrated 
in the specified chapters of the following State Constitutions: - 
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Country Date of Date of Chapter of Constitution 
Independence Present/Last 
Constitution 
Algeria 3 Jul 1962 1976 (amended Chapter 4. Fundamental 
in 1977 and Liberties and the Rig s 1980) of an and o the 
Citizens 
Egypt 28 Feb 1922 1980 Chapter I. Public 
Freedoms, 11-1g-fits and 
u ies, and ocial, 
ora & Economic 
Constituents of 
Society) . 
Libya147 24 Dec 1951 (1969) Preamble - and Articles 5-, -rT, 14 and 15. 
Mauritania 28 Nov 1960 Constitutional Preamble adheres to the 
Charter of the principles consecrated 
Military by the Universal 
Committee of Declaration of Human 
National Rights (1948) 
Salvation MCNS 
(1985) 
Morocco 2 Mar 1956 10 Mar 1972 Chapter I. Fundamental 
(amended in Principles, Articles, 
1980) 8,10 and 11-15. 148 Saharawi 28 Feb 1976 Constitution of Fundamental Rights 
26-30 1976 
(amended in 
1982) 
Somalia 1 Jul 1960 25 Aug 1979 Article 6.. .E ualit of i iý z' ens; Chapter-11 
Fundamental Q s, 
Freedoms and Duties of 
the Citizens and 
Individuals. 
The 149 1 Jan 1956 1985 Part III: Fundamental Sudan Rights an Freedoms-. 
Tunisia 20 Mar 1956 1 Jun 1959 (as Chapter I: General 
amended Dispositions Articles 5- 
through 1976) 17. 
147 On 2 March 1977, the Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamghiriyya was 
formally proclaimed and a short document called "The Declaration of the 
Establishment of the Peoples Authority" was issued. The Declaration of 
1977, specifically states that "The Holy Quran Is the Constitution of the 
State". It is therefore evident that this declaration amounts to a 
rebuttal of the 1969 constitution. 
148 The Polisarlo (Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagult el Hamra 
and Rio de Oro) declared Western Sahara the Saharan Arab Democratic 
Republic on 28 February 1976 and passed a Constitution on 26-30 August 1976 (amended in 1982). As at the beginning of 1988, over seventy States had recognized the Republic, the majority comprising of OAU Member States. The legitimacy of the Republic is still being challenged by Morocco. Saharawi is yet to become a member of the UN. 
149 The Transitional Military Council adopted the Transitional 
Constitution of 10 Oct 1985. The drafting of a permanent Constitution 
was to be embarked upon after the April 1986 Assembly elections. 
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The classification of the foregoing States is based primarily on their 
common feature of being either of dominant Arab culture and/or of 
significant Islamic jurisprudential orientation150. An analysis of the 
concept of human rights in Islamic Law151, though desirable, is beyond 
the scope of our thesis, thus we shall confine ourselves to the 
consideration of the provisions on human rights consecrated In the 
Constitutions of the aforementioned Afro-Arab States. 
The Afro-Arab States' provide guarantees in their respective 
constitutions for the protection of the following rights: - 
right to life 
152; 
right to personal liberty153 ; 
protection against inhuman treatment 
154; 
-------------------- 
150 In each of the States under consideration, Islam is the State religion 
(with the possible exception of Sudan). See Article 1, Tunisian 
Constitution; Article 6, Moroccan Constitution; Articles 4,19 and 195 
Algerian Constitution; Preamble, Mauritanian Constitution; Llbyas 1977 
Declaration adopts the Holy Quran as its fundamental text. With regard 
to the Sudanese Transitional Constitution, no reference Is made to a 
State religion, however, Section 4 refers to Islamic Sharia and custom as 
the main sources of legislation. See further A. M. Tier, Freedom of 
Religion under the Sudan Constitution and Laws, Journal of African Law 
(1982) No. 2 p. 148. 
151 For an analysis of human rights In Islamic Law, see Abdul Aziz Said 
"Human Rights in Islamic Perspectives" in A. Pollis and P. Schwab (ed) 
Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (London Praeger) 
p. 86; See also Report of the International Commission of Jurists Seminar 
on Human Rights in Islam (Kuwait, 1982, ICJ). See also Koen De Feyter 
"Unveiling a Hidden Painting - Islam and North African Constitutions" in 
Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee. I Quartal (1988) p. 17. 
152 Article 48, Constitution of Algeria; Article 25(1) Constitution of 
Somalia. 
153 Article 39, Constitution of Algeria; Article 26(1), Constitution of Somalia; Article 41, Constitution of Egypt. 
154 Article 29, Constitution of The Sudan; Article 27, Constitution of Somalia; Article 42, Constitution of Egypt. 
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Protection against deprivation of property 
155; 
protection against arbitrary search or entry 
156; 
protection of the law157; 
freedoms of conscience158 and expression 
159It 
freedom of worship and religion 
160; 
freedom of assembly and association 
161; 
freedom of movement 
162; 
and 
protection against discrimination163, 
It Is evident that only a few States under review expressly guarantee 
the freedom of religion. Thus, where a State Constitution omits this 
guarantee and expressly declares the State religion to be Islam, this 
should imply that freedom of religion or worship is to be interpreted 
according to Islamic tradition. Under Islamic Law the Ahl Al Kitab, the 
People of the Book, mainly the Jews and Christians are accorded the 
right to worship. 
155 Article 25, Constitution of The Sudan; Article 15, Constitution of 
Morrocco; Article 28(1), Constitution of Somalia; Article 14, Constitution 
of Tunisia; Article 34, Constitution of Egypt. 
156 Article 50, Constitution of Algeria; Article 30 (Sudan); Article 10 
(Morrocco); Articles 26(2)(5) and 29 (Somalia); Article 9 (Tunisia); 
Article 44 (Egypt). 
157 Articles 45 and 46 Constitution of Algeria; Article 26 (Sudan); 
Article 10 (Morrocco); Articles 32-34 (Somalia); Article 7 (Tunisia); 
Article 57 (Egypt). 
158 Article 53, Constitution of Algeria; Article 9 (morrocco); Article 
24(1) (Somalia); Article 5 (Tunisia). 
159 Article 55 (Algeria); Article 9 (Sudan); Article 9 (Morrocco); Article 
24(2) (Somalia); Article 8 (Tunisia); Article 47 (Egypt). 
160 Articles 1 and 5 Tunisian Constitution; Article 6 (Morrocco). 
161 Article 56, Constitution of Algeria; Article 22 (Sudan); Article 9 
(Morrocco); Article 24(1) (Somalia); Articles 54 and 55 (Egypt). 
162 Article 56, Constitution of Algeria; Article 23 (Sudan); Article 9 
(Morrocco); Article 24 (Somalia); Article 10 (Tunisia); Article 50 
(Egypt) 
163 Article 39, Constitution of Algeria; Article 17(21 (Sudan); Article 40 
(Egypt). 
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One of the significant characteristics of most of the Afro-Arab 
constitutions is the provision for and emphasis laid on social and 
economic rights and moral duties. With the exception of Sudan, Tunisia 
and Morocco, all the States under consideration, provide a catalogue of 
socio-economic rights and duties Including, the right to work; and 
protection of employment164, the right to social security and free health 
166. 165 
services to all citizens, and the right to education 
The civil and political rights in these constitutions are subject to two 
main types of derogations. First, most of the guaranteed rights and 
freedoms such as the freedom of expression, assembly and movement, are 
subject "to limits prescribed by law"167. However under Article 53 of 
Algerian Constitution the "freedom of conscience and opinion are 
inviolable" and there are no Inbuilt exceptions to this provision. The 
vulnerability of this provision to derogations is evidenced by Article 55 
which provides that the freedoms of expression and assembly are "not to 
be used to undermine the basis of the Socialist Revolution". The thin 
distinction between the freedom of opinion and expression underlines the 
susceptibility of the former to the wide derogation permitted from the 
latter. The freedom of the Press and publication under the Egyptian 
Constitution Is near-absolute, and may only be derogated from during a 
168 State of Emergency or during war. 
-------------------- 
164 Articles 13 and 14 of Algeria; Article 17(2) (Somalia); Article 59 
(Algeria). 
165 Articles 64 and 67 Constitution of Algeria; Articles 16 and 17 
(Egypt). 
166 Article 23 Constitution of Somalia; Article 66 (Algeria); Article 18 
(Egypt). 
167 For example, Article 23 Constitution of Sudan; Article 10 (Tunisia). 
168 Article 43, Constitution of Egypt. 
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The second category of derogation authorized by some constitutions are 
contained in omnibus clauses designed to permit the limitation of all 
protected rights. For Instance, Article 7 of the Constitution of Tunisia 
provides that: 
"The citizens exercise the plenitude of their rights in the forms and 
conditions foreseen by the Law. The exercise of these rights cannot be 
limited except by a law enacted for the protection of others, the respect 
for the public order, the national defence, the development of the 
169 
economy and social progress". 
Although the right to private property is assured by most of the Afro- 
Arab constitutions, It Is subject to varying formulas of derogation. The 
Egyptian Constitution for instance protects the right to private property, 
provided that Is may not conflict "in the ways of its use with the general 
welfare of the people"170. Under the Constitution of Somalia, the right 
to private ownership is subject to "the public Interest and the objectives 
of the revolution" and to the "requirements of the planned economic 
growth and social development of the Nation"171. However, where 
expropriation of property is effected, it must be according to the 
procedures prescribed by law172 and "equitable compensation" must be 
made in exchange173. The economic and social significance of land Is 
emphasised by the Egyptian Constitution which provides for three types 
of land ownership; public ownership, cooperative ownership and private 
-------------------- 
169 For similar omnibus derogation clauses. see Article 73, Algerian 
Constitution and Article 33 of the Sudanese Constitution. 
170 Article 32, Egyptian Constitution. 
171 Article 28(2) Somali Constitution. 
172 Article 15, Constitution of Morrocco; Article 14 (Tunisia). 
173 Article 28(3) Constitution of Somalia. 
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ownership 
174. Article 37 of the Constitution is unique in its protection 
of farmers. and agricultural labourers by authorizing the promulgation of 
a law to fix the maximum limit of land ownership,. 
The Saharawai Constitution states the achievement of socialism and the 
implementation of social justice is the main objective of the Republic. 
Thus the Constitution establishes two types of ownership: national and 
private, the former reserved for the people, but the latter is guaranteed 
175 
subject to its being non-exploitative. 
A review of the constitutional provisions of Afro-Arab States, on socio- 
economic and property rights reveals that most of these States, with the 
exception of Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan, have expressly adopted 
socialism as the State Ideology. North African Statesmen have 
endeavoured to emphasize that socialism here refers to "Arab" or 
"Islamic" socialism in contradistinction to Marxism, which is generally 
regarded as atheist ideology176. The failure of the attempted fusion of 
Islam with foreign brands of socialism and other modern Ideologies and 
the problems of authoritarianism and ethnicism have fueled the revival of 
Islamic fundamentalism177. In Islam rights and duties are intertwined, 
not unlike what obtains under traditional African concept of human and 
peoples rights. In Islam, "the individual is part of a parcel of society, 
-------------------- 
174 Article 29, Egyptian Constitution. 
175 Article 8. Saharawl Constitution. 
176 See S. Johnson and M. Ottaway "Marxism-Leninism and Islamic Fundamentalism" Cultures of Development, (1984) No. 1 p. 53. 
177 R. DekmejIan "The anatomy of Islamic revival: legitimacy crisis, 
ethnic conflict and the search of Islamic alternatives" Middle East Journal (Winter 1980) pp. 11-12. 
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and fulfilment of his obligations and those of the other members of 
society constitutes the reservoir of social rights which are then shared 
by all" 
178 
Several Afro-Arab constitutions provide safeguards for the protection of 
human rights entrenched In constitution. The citizen is given a right of 
litigation and access to court to protect his rights179. The Constitution 
of Sudan consecrates "a posteriori" determination of constitutionality by 
providing that "no act of State shall be Immune from judicial review"180. 
In comparison with the Anglophone African States, the Bill of Rights of 
most Afro-Arab States are less detailed and lack adequate constitutional 
safeguards of due process to enhance the rights and freedoms of the 
individual. All Afro-Arab State Constitutions provide for the limitation 
and suspension of fundamental rights and freedoms during States of 
Emergency and do not confer upon certain rights, the non-derogable 
181 
status as per the Neo-Nigerian Constitutions. 
It is pertinent to note that all the aforementioned Afro-Arab States, with 
the only exception of Morocco, have ratified the AFCHPR. The entering 
into force of the Charter will Impose greater obligations on several Afro- 
Arab States especially In the areas of constitutional protection of the due 
182 1 
process of the law and the rights of peoples to self-determination83. 
-------------------- 
178 Quoted by C. BassIounl "Sources of Islamic Law and the protection 
of human rights in the criminal justice system" in C. Bassiouni (ed) The 
Islamic Criminal Justice System (London Oceana 1982) pp. 13-14. 
179 Article 26, Constitution of the Sudan; Article 57 (Egypt). This 
provision also prescribes the frang of a "fair compensation" by the State 
to the victim of any assault on the freedoms and rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
180 Article 26, Constitution of Sudan. 
181 See S. 265, Constitution of Nigeria. 
182 Article 7, AFCHPR. 
183 Article 20, Ibid. 
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With respect to due process of the law, we must highlight the fact that 
the Islamic Law of 'Sharia', on which the criminal law of most of these 
States is based upon, provides detailed and adequate safeguards for the 
protection of the individual in proceedings184. Thus, where the 
constitutions of some Afro-Arab States refer to the protection or 
limitation of individual rights "within the law", such references in 
relevant circumstances may refer either to the operation of 'Sharia Law' 
or to the international human rights obligations of the State; both 
regimes conferring even greater obligations on the State to protect 
individual rights. 
(iv) Ex-Portuguese African States 
The constitutions of the following African States which were former 
Portuguese territories contain substantive bills of rights, borne out of 
their common struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. 
-------------------- 
184 
See C. Bassiouni; op cit. 
Country 
Angola 
Cape Verde 
Guinea 
Bissau 
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Date of Date of current Chapter of Constitution 
Independence last 
Constitution 
11 Nov 1975 11 Nov 1975 (as Part II: Fundamental 
amended Rights and Duties. 
through 1980) 
5 Jul 1975 7 Sep 1980 Title II: Rights, 
10 Sep 1974 16 May 1984 
Mozambique 25 Jun 1975 25 Jun 1975 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
12 Jul 1975 12 Jul 1975 (as 
amended 
through 15 Dec 
1982) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
12 Oct 1968 12 Oct 1982 
Liberties, Guarantees 
and Fundamental Duties 
of Citizens. 
Chapter II, Fundamental 
Rights and Duties of 
Citizens. 
Article 17; Section III; 
Fundamental Rights and 
Duties of Citizens. 
Article 1(4); Chapter 
III; Fundamental 
Rights, Freedoms and 
Duties of the Citizen. 
Preamble: Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and 
Citizen (1789) and 
Universal Declaration 
(1948) Title III Rights 
and Duties of the 
Individual. 
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The foregoing African States have all experienced a protracted and bitter 
struggle to gain independence from the Portuguese Government. The 
constitutional provisions of these States are thus similar in several 
respects. The substantive provisions of the bills of rights of these 
constitutions guarantee the following rights: - respect for life, right to 
personal liberty, protection against slavery and forced labour, protection 
against arbitrary arrest, search or entry, protection of the law, freedom 
of expression, freedom of assembly or association, freedom of movement, 
protection against discrimination and freedom of religion. 
One of the significant features of the Bills of Rights of ex-Portuguese 
African States is the collectivistic approach to human rights. 
Consequently group rights and peoples rights are more pronounced here, 
than in other African constitutions. For Instance. the constitution of 
Equatorial Guinea guarantees the "freedom of conscience and religion, 
individual or collective, in public or in private"185, The emphasis on 
group rights in these African Constitutions Is due primarily to the 
traditional African value of communal or collective rights and duties. 
However the susceptibility of such group rights and duties to ideological 
Ideosyncracies may have also Informed their incorporation by the mainly 
Marxist/socialist States belonging to this categry. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea provides one of 
Africa's longest most comprehensive human rights Chapters containing 
forty-five articles. For Instance Article 20 (1) guarantees the: - 
"Respect for life, personal Integrity and the right to full 
material and moral development. Torture Is prohibited, as 
are all inhuman and degrading procedures. 
The death penalty may only be imposed on a crime 
determined by law. 
-------------------- 
185 
Article 20(5) of the Equatorial Guinea Constitution. 
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The objective of the prison system Is to achieve the reduction in 
number, rehabilitation and social re-incorporation of prisoners. " 
The Constitution of Equatorial Guinea is also one 
constitutions that expressly provide that "to the 
applicable, the fundamental rights also apply 
Consequently, companies are entitled to rights and 
persons in law, where feasible. 
of the few African 
extent that they are 
to companies"186, 
subject to duties as 
Derogations from the fundamental rights protected under this category of 
constitutions broadly take two forms - firstly, many of the provisions 
each contain "en-suite-clauses" limiting their application; for instance. 
the right to religion and conscience is subject to "limits as prescribed by 
law to protect national security, public order, morality and fundamental 
human rights of the people"187. Secondly, the constitutions contain 
standard omnibus derogation clauses which are generally applicable to all 
rights. For example, The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Sao 
Tome and Principe provides that: 
"The State shall guarantee the exercise of individual rights and liberties 
In so far as they do not conflict with the interests of the people or with 
the demands of public order"88. 
However an exception to the aforementioned general classification of 
derogation clauses in the constitutions of ex-Portuguese administered 
African States, Is the Constitution of Angola which provides additional 
avenues for derogation. Article 22 of the Angolan Constitution states 
-------------------- 
186 Article 21, Ibid. 
187 Article 1(5) Ibid. 
188 Article 14, Constitution of Sao Tome and Principe. 
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that the context of the achievement of the basic objectives of the Peoples 
Republic of Angola, the Law shall "ensure freedom of expression, 
assembly and association". 
The implication of this provision is that the guarantee of rights and 
freedoms may be subject to the aims and objectives of the "Marxist- 
Leninist, MPLA Workers Party which is the vanguard of the working 
,, 189 class 
An interesting but Intriguing derogation provision appears In the 
Constitution of Sao Tome and Principe, which provides that: "Persons 
who, by their actions or conduct, act contrary to National Unity and 
Sovereignty or who aid neo-colonialism, Imperialism, racism or 
regionalism, will be deprived of the exercise of their political rights and 
the fundamental rights of a citizen"190 
The rationale of the first leg of this provision is obviously to stem the 
threat of divisive factors such as ethnicity, and also to preserve the 
security of the State. However, the second leg of the provision 
expressly authorises the deprivation of a citizen's fundamental rights if 
he should aid regionalism, among the other 'isms'. The Democratic 
Republic of Sao Tome and Principe is a member of the OAU, an 
organization which is dedicated to African regionalism. The State has 
also ratified the AFCHPR a regional machinery established for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. The apparent conflict between 
Article 17 and the regional obligations of the State and its citizens191 
-------------------- 
189 
Part I, Article 2, Angolan Constitution. 
190 Article 17, Constitution of Sao Tome & Principe (underlines for 
emphasis). 
191 Article 29(8) of the AFCHPR states that "the individual shall have 
the duty to contribute... to the promotion and achievement of African 
unity". 
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ought to be remedied by the obliteration of the term "regionalism" from 
Article 17 of the Constitution of Sao Tome and Principe. 
It, therefore, appears that the derogation clauses In the constitutions of 
ex-Portuguese administered States allow substantial encroachment on 
fundamental rights and liberties of the individual, However, some 
safeguards are provided for preservation of human rights. For Instance 
Article 38 of the Equatorial Guinea constitution expressly states that: 
"the right of habeas corpus or of personal presence Is 
recognized. 
Every aggrieved person or anyone acting on his behalf, has 
the right to further it when he finds himself illegally jailed, 
detained, restrained in any way in the enjoyment of his 
personal freedoms or when during his arrest or lawful 
imprisonment he is subject to torments, tortures, oppression 
or any coercion, restriction, or unnecessary hardship for his 
personal safety or for the order of the detention centre. 
The courts, while declaring the appeal process to be In 
motion, must order the restoration of liberty, that the 
oppression be stopped, or to end the coercion to which he 
has been subjected". 
Safeguards are also provided by Article 40 of the Constitution of 
Equatorial Guinea which provides that: 
"the unconstitutionality of the laws, decree-laws, rules and 
regulations can be declared because of defects in form or 
content, in accordance with the Fundamental Law". 
The constitution does not provide the procedure to be followed In 
declaring such laws unconstitutional. However, it prescribes that a law 
should be passed to regulate the constitutionality of laws and decrees. 
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The constitutions of ex-Portuguese administered African States contain a 
comprehensive catalogue of social and economic rights and duties192. 
The right of private property Is guaranteed subject to the general 
Interest of the economic policy of the State193. The constitutions also 
generally guarantee the right to the protection of health, right to 
education, right to assistance In childhood and motherhood, old age and 
other forms of social assistance194. Work Is recognised as a right as 
195 
well as an obligation 
The comprehensive guarantees incorporated in the constitutions of the 
States under consideration reflects the determination of the States to 
prevent a repetition of the inhuman practices and other human rights 
violations experienced under the brutally oppressive Portuguese 
colonisers. It should however be noted that the derogations permitted 
by some of these constitutions may render the rights protected 
meaningless unless States provide adequate safeguards and restrain 
themselves from abusing the provisions permitting derogation in the 
interest of socialist/Marxist ideology. 
Angola and Mozambique are the only States, under this classification, 
196 that are yet to sign or ratify the AFCHPR. The preoccupation of 
192 Title VI, Chapters I and II: Work, Social Security and Betterment of 
the Citizen, Articles 11,13,52-64, Constitution of Equitorial Guinea; 
Articles 10,26 and 27, Angolan Constitution; Article 4(4) and 10 Sao 
Tome & Principie Constitution. 
193 For Instance, Article 4(4) Constitution of Sao Tome & Principe. 
194 Article 11, Constitution of Sao Tome & Principe; Article 27 (Angola); 
Article 59 (Equitorlal Guinea). 
195 Article 10, Constitution of Sao Tome & Principe; Article 52 
(Equitorial Guinea); Article 26 (Angola). 
196 The following States have signed or ratified the AFCHPR; Cape 
Verde (signed 31 March 1986); Equitorial Guinea (ratified 17 April 1986); 
Guinea Bissau (ratified 4 December 1985) ; Sao Tome & Principe (ratified 
23 May 1986). 
307 
these two States with the sustained acts of aggression by rebel forces 
and South African forces should not detract them from ratifying the 
AFCHPR which is expressly dedicated to the "total liberation of Africa 
and the elimination of neo-colonialism and apartheid"97. 
(v) Constitutions without Human Rights Protection 
The constitutions or "fundamental laws" of several African States do not 
provide guarantees for human rights. These states are Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Niger, Lesotho, Swaziland and Burkina Faso. 
It must however be emphasised that some of these countries possessed 
constitutional bills of rights which had been abrogated due to military 
coups d'etat. 
(a) Burundi 
The definitive Burundi constitution, promulgated on 16 October 1962 was 
modelled upon the Belgium constitution establishing a Constitutional 
Monarchy. However, since 1962, three constitutions have been 
passed198, the latest being the Constitution of the Second Republic(20 
November 1981). The 1981 Constitution provided for the protection of 
human rights in the Chapter on "Public Liberties and Duties of the 
Citizen". The military coup d'etat in October 1987 suspended the 
Constitution along with the Bill of Rights, with the consequence of 
exposing Burundians to human rights abuses199, Burundi is yet to sign 
and ratify the AFCHPR, consequently, possibility of bringing a 
communication before the African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights, by a State Party or individual(s) is nonexistent. The recurring 
frequency with which massive human rights violations occur in Burundi 
-------------------- 
197 
The eighth preambular paragraph AFCHPR. 
198 Burundi Constitution of 11 July 1974 and 20 November 1976. 
199 For instance, the recent massacre of over 5,000 Hutus by 
government forces. See The Independent, (London 23 August 1988. p. 8. 
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should alert OAU Member States to evolve an urgent solution to the 
problem. The ratification of the AFCHPR by a majority of African States 
is a clear indication that they no longer regard matters of human rights 
to be within the exclusive domain of domestic jurisdiction of Member 
States. Consequently, diplomatic pressure should be brought upon the 
Burundi Government to refrain from massive violations of human rights 
and secondly to ratify the AFCHPR. 
(b) Ethiopia 
In March 1974, a committee of 30 experts were appointed to review the 
1955 Constitution of Ethiopia. The Committee produced the 1974 Draft 
Constitution, the preamble of which "guarantees that basic rights and 
duties be respected". The D raft Constitution also contained a chapter 
on the Fundamental Freedoms, Rights and Duties of Citizens (Articles 36- 
59). 
The 1974 Draft Constitution was never Issued because. the army took 
over control of government in June 1974. The military government of 
Ethiopia Issued the "Declaration of Socialism" of 20 December 1974 which 
established a new Ethiopian Socialist State with "national progressive 
unity" as its main objective. All major enterprises and private land 
holdings were nationalised, and state farms and co-operatives were 
established. 
The basic constitutional document of Ethiopia Is Proclamation No. 108 of 
1976. The Proclamation makes no reference to the protection of 
fundamental rights. It is also significant to note that Ethiopia Is yet to 
sign or ratify the AFCHPR. It Is Indeed a paradox that the country 
which hosts the headquarters of the OAU and will most likely host the 
Secretariat of the African Commission of Human and Peoples Rights, has 
not ratified the AFCHPR. Consequently, the OAU may wish to consider 
locating the Commissions Secretariat elsewhere. 
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(c) Ghana 
The 1979 Constitution of Ghana enshrined elaborate provisions protecting 
civil rights and liberties. The Constitution was initially suspended 
200 
and thence formally abrogated by the Provisional National Defence 
Council (Establishment Proclamation - Supplementary and Consequential 
Provisions) Law of 1982. The PNDC Law 1982 is in effect the current 
'constitution' of Ghana. 
The PNDC Law of 1982 makes broad references to human rights under 
the Chapter titles "Directive Principles of State Policy" which states inter 
alla... that: 
"respect to fundamental human rights and for the dignity of 
the human person are to be cultivated among all sections of 
the soc 5jy and established as part of the basis of social 
justice" 
The language of this provision as well as its classifications as a 
"Directive Principle of State Policy" renders it a mere declaration of 
philosophical guidance with no justiceable value. It may indeed be 
regarded as a facade which has been progressively eroded by subsequent 
governmental measures. 
This observation is underlined by the fact that the military government 
of Ghana has passed a series of laws which violate International norms of 
human rights. For Instance, the Preventative Custody Law, 1982, 
(PNDC Law) permits the authorities to detain individuals indefinitely 
without trial "in the interest of national security or in the interest of the 
-------------------- 
200 
The PNDC Proclamation of 1981 Issued by the military regime 
suspended the 1979 Constitution, but retained the Institution of the 
Ombudsman. 
201 Paragraph 1(1)(b), PNDC Law, 1982. 
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safety of the person"202. Consequently, the law of habeas corpus in 
Ghana was amended in August 1984 to specifically exclude people held 
under PNDC Law 4 and there Is no known legal review procedure under 
this legislation. It may thus not come as a surprise that the Ghanaian 
military Is yet to sign or ratify the AFCHPR. 
(d) Niger 
The Independence Constitution of Niger (1960) was suspended by the 
proclamation of April 1974 issued by the military regime. 
The 1960 Constitution made provision for the protection of human rights 
Including "equality before the law without distinction as to origin, race, 
sex or religion"203 and also that "suffrage shall be universal, equal and 
secret""204. 
In 1983, the military government appointed the Niger Commission for 
Reflection on the National Charter, which prepared a National Charter 
that was approved by a referendum held on 14 June 1987. The National 
Charter contains a bill of rights which Is yet to come into effect. 
The Niger Government acceded, In March 1986, to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The State has also ratified the 
AFCHPR205. The impression, therefore, is that despite being an 
authoritarian military regime, the government of Niger has undertaken 
206 
international obligations to protect human rights. The government of 
--- 
202 
----------------- 
Over 50 people are believed to have been held under the PNDC Law 
4 throughout 1986 - See Amnesty International Report 1987 op cit p. 53- 
203 Article 6, (1960) Constitution of Niger. 
204 Article 5 Ibid. 
205 
Niger ratified the AFCHPR on 15 July 1986. 
206 See Al Report on Niger In 1987 Amnesty International, op cit p. 84. 
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Niger is thus on the verge of translating Its International human rights 
obligations into an enforceable domestic bill of rights as contained in Its 
National Charter. 
(e) Lesotho 
The Independence Constitution of Lesotho (1966) contained provisions for 
the protection of human rights. These rights included the respect of 
family life, freedom of conscience and expression and freedom from 
discrimination. 
The Independence Constitution was suspended on 14 February 1970 by 
Prime Minister Chief Leabua Jonathan. In 1983, the Prime Minister 
Introduced a new Constitution of Lesotho207 which made no references to 
human rights. The Prime Minister consistently used the Internal 
Security (General Act) 1982 to detain political opponents and to obstruct 
the electoral process. On 20 January 1968, a military coup d'etat ended 
twenty years of autocratic rule by Chief Leabua Jonathan. An 
examination of Lesotho judicial decisions during the "reign" of L. 
Jonathan reveals the difficulty of protecting human rights in the absence 
of an enforceable bill of rights, however the courts often ruled against 
208 the government. The military government promulgated the 
Fundamental Law209 which did not contain any provision on human 
rights. By virtue of Order No. 2 of 1986, the military government 
granted a general amnesty to those who had been convicted or liable to 
criminal prosecution for acts which constituted offences of a political 
nature. The government, however, followed this humanitar ian gesture 
-------------------- 
207 Lesotho Constitution Act No. 5 of 16 August 1983. 
208 Stephen C. Neff 'Human Rights in Africa: Thoughts on the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights in the Light of Case Law from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland' in ICLQ Vol. 33 (1984) p. 344. 
209 Order No. 1 of 1986. 
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by promulgating Order 4 of 1986 which suspended all political activities. 
Although, Lesotho signed the AFCHPR on 7 March 1984, it is yet to 
ratify the Charter. One of the major factors affecting human rights in 
Lesotho Is the fact that the country Is surrounded by the territory of 
South Africa and is often subject to political and economic pressures 
including raids by the military forces of that country in pursuit of 
members of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. 
(f) Swaziland 
The Swaziland Constitution of 6 September 1968 contains no provision on 
the protection of human rights. The State has not signed or ratified 
210 
the AFCHPR. Consequently, the human rights record of the Swaziland 
211 Government has been quite dismal. The proximity of the country to 
South Africa has further compounded its capacity to ensure political 
stability and economic viability. Due to pressure and threats from South 
Africa, many Swazi citizens and other suspected members of the ANC 
have been arbitrarily detained, arrested and deported to other African 
countries212. South Africa is also reported to be involved In the 
213 abduction and assassination of ANC members. 
(g) Burkina Faso 
Burkina Faso has had no operative constitutional human rights provision 
since the Constitution of 27 November 1977 was suspended by the 
military regime that took over power on 4 August 1983. Burkina Faso 
210 A. T. Aguda "Discriminating Statutory Provisions and Fundamental 
Rights in the Constitution sof Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland" South 
African Law Journal Vol. 87 (Sept 1972) p. 299. 
211 Weisfelder, Human Rights In Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi in 2 Botswana Journal of African Studies (1980) p. 5. 
212 AT Report on Swaziland; Amnesty International 1987 Report, op cit 
P. 108. 
213 Ibid. 
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ratified the AFCHPR on 6 July 1984 and is thus under an obligation to 
ensure the Implementation of the Charters provisions within the state. 
The reports of International human rights organisation on the state of 
human rights in the country reveal that human rights violations are 
being perpetuated by the military regime214. - Such practices Include the 
Illegal detentions without trial, and the torture and ill treatment of 
215 detainees. 
The absence of constitutional provisions on the protection of human 
rights in Burkina invites derogations by the State from regional human 
rights law. Consequently, State Parties to the AFCHPR and concerned 
citizens and organisations have a duty to ensure compliance by Burkina 
to Its obligations under the AFCHPR. 
(h) Malawi 
On gaining Independence from the United Kingdom In 1964. Malawi 
emerged with a comprehensive Bill on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
incorporated into the Independence Constitution. However, two years 
later, a new Republican Constitution216 was passed which excluded the 
Bill of Rights. 
The Constitutional Committee which unanimously agreed to expunge the 
Bill of Rights from the Republican Constitution gave three main reasons 
for its recommendation. First, that Malawi being a full member of the 
United Nations had publicly guaranteed respect for the comprehensive 
account for personal liberties enshrined in the "UN Charter of Human 
Rights". Secondly, that formal guarantees as contained In Bills of 
-------------------- 
214 
Chales Humana, The Economist World Human Rights Guide op cit. 
p. 45. See also Amnesty International 1987 Report, op cit pp. 28-29. 
215 
Al Report Ibid. 
216 The Republic of Malawi (Constitution) Act No. 23 1966. 
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Rights tend to Invite conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary 
which often results in the latter being discredited. Thirdly, that the 
laws of Malawi already provide an elaborate code for the protection of 
Individual rights against public and private Interference217. Thus, the 
fact that Malawi is yet to sign and ratify the AFCHPR may not be 
unconnected with the foregoing reasons. 
We submit that the foregoing reasons do not suffice for scuttling a Bill 
of Rights from the Malawi Constitution or indeed any other constitutions. 
First, the Malawi Republican Constitution declares that: 
"The Government and the people of Malawi shall continue to 
recognize the sanctity of the personal liberties enshrined In 
the United Nations Universal Declar gn of human Rights and 
of adherence to the Law of Nations" 
The constitution, furthermore, contains what maybe described as 
abridged declarations of a Bill of Rights. For instance the constitution 
states that no person should be deprived of his property without 
payment of, compensation. The constitution proceeds to state that "no 
law or action done under a law shall be held to be inconsistent with or 
In contravention of the declaration if the law is reasonably required In 
the interest of defence, public safety, public order or the national 
219 
economy" . 
Clearly, the language of the foregoing clause obscures its legal 
implications. It is both mandatory and admonitory In its import and 
purports to allow judicial review of legislation as well as executive action 
-------------------- 
217 P. Matipurlri, "The Absence of a Bill of Rights in the Republic of 
Malawi (Constitution) Act". UMA Students Law Journal Vol. 13 (1981) 
p. 51. 
218 S. 1(iIi) Republic of Malawi Constitution Act (1966). 
219 S1(IV) Ibid (Underlines for emphasis). 
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which the declaration, taken as a whole, vividly negates. Furthermore, 
the Republican constitution does not make provision for redress in case 
on infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual220. 
Thus, by guaranteeing respect for the personal liberties enshrined In 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without guaranteeing redress 
in the event of the breach of rights and liberties, the Republic 
Constitution does not effectively guarantee or ensure the Individuals 
liberty. In such an event, constitutional references to the Universal 
Declaration may be regarded as aspirations or objectives to be achieved. 
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has, Indeed, declared that 
"it would be Idle to pretend that In Itself the Declaration has the force 
of positive law"221. 
Secondly. we do not subscribe to the argument that since constitutional 
guarantees of rights and freedoms Invite conflicts between the Executive 
and the judiciary, the Bill of Rights should be omitted from the 
constitution. A survey of the attitude of the Executive to judicial 
determination of constitutionality and alleged infractions of human rights 
in African States reveals a tendency by the executive to resist judicial 
interference in politically sensitive issues. An apt Illustration of this 
executive tendency was the dispute between President Kenneth Kaunda of 
Zambia and the Zambian Judiciary over the latters quashing of sentences 
imposed on two Portuguese soldiers for illegal entry into Zambia. 
President Kaunda queried and termed Chief Justice Evans decision as a 
"political judgement" that was apparently In conflict with the interest of 
-------------------- 
220 The abrogated 1964 Independence Constitution of Malawi however, 
provided that "Any aggrieved person may apply to the High Court for 
redress". (S. 25). 
221 Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) No. 17, December 1973, p. 4. 
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the Zambian People222. The Chief Justice responded by stating that 
members of the judiciary: 
"share the hopes and aspirations of the nation. However, 
this does not mean that judges should decide cases or Impose 
sentences in such a way as to please public opinion or 
government. They must decide them in accordance with the 
facts before them and the law which is relevant. It Is only 
in this manner that an accused person can be guaranteed a 
fair and impartial trial before an unbiased judge free from 
the domination of public opinion. The Imposition of sentences 
is governed by the same principles. If it were otherwise, 
a 1e2zscisions 
in truth would not be decisions of the court at 
Evidently, flashpoints do occur between the executive and the 
judiciary 224, however, this alone cannot justify the non-inclusion of a 
Bill of Rights in constitutions. The Doctrine of separation of powers is 
meant to ensure the Independence of the judiciary as the sentinel of 
Individual rights and freedoms225. However, a judiciary that Is silent on 
constitutional issues is not likely to provide much needed guidance for 
any government, especially those of new and developing countries226. 
Any encroachment on the Independence of the judiciary Invariably affects 
the protection of fundamental human rights, however, where no 
enforceable Bill of Rights exists, the judiciary is handicapped In the 
performance of Its primary role. Sir Louis Mbanefo, a Nigerian legal 
luminary and former judge of the International Court of Justice, states 
that "a constitutional democracy presupposes a balanced system of 
-------------------- 
222 
Afica Research Bulletin, July 1-31, Vol. 6, No. 7 (15 August 1969) 
pp. 1478-9. 
223 Ibid p. 1480. 
224 Parker Collins "Control of Executive Discretion in Zambia" 
Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa (1980) p. 159. 
225 A. T. Aguda "Role of judges with special reference to civil liberties" 
East African Law Journal (1972) p. 147. 
226 C. Hayfron-Benjamin "Courts and the Vindications of Human Rights" Law and Justice Vol. 21, (1982) p. 42. 
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divided powers, for only with such a system could the citizen have to 
enjoy a measure of independence and freedom though a guarantee of civil 
liberties"227. 
Therefore, by adopting constitutions with enforceable bills of rights, the 
people not only place limitations on their executive and legislative but 
also empower the courts to review disputed legislation and protect their 
rights. Admittedly, the exigencies and peculiarities of African politics 
may continue to undermine the practical effect of such formal guarantees# 
however, the very existence of such provisions arms the judiciary with 
an arsenal to deter or redress violations of fundamental human rights. 
Legal history teaches us that the judicial suffers where judges are 
determined to avoid confrontation by avoiding constitutional issues. The 
legacy of judges such as Lord Coke, Chief Justices Marshall and Earl 
Warren of the United States and their uncompromising stand on 
constitutional rights have enriched the law and enhanced the prestige of 
power of the judiciary. There can be no justification for the courts to 
enhance or increase the powers of the executive or the legislature228, 
especially whereae government Is irremovable through elections. 
Thirdly, we contest the validity of the argument that since the laws of a 
State, in this instance Malawi, already provide a comprehensive code for 
the protection of individual rights and freedoms, there Is thus no need 
for an enforceable Bill of Rights In the Constitution. This argument Is 
Inspired by the view of the majority of English constitution lawyers such 
as Dicey who stated that the Habeas Corpus Acts "are for practical 
-------------------- 
227 Sir Louis Mbanefo "The Role of the Judiciary In Nigeria: Now and in 
the Future" Public Lecture Paper under the auspices of the Nigerian 
Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Lecture Series No. 9 (1977) p. 5. 
228 See, Dissenting Judgement of Lord Aitken, in Liversidge v Anderson (1942) AC 206; (1941 3. A11ER 338). 
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purposes, worth a hundred articles guaranteeing Indiv idual liberty"229. 
To this school of thought, also belongs Ivor Jennings who states that "in 
Britain.. . we merely have liberty according to law; and we think - truly 
I believe - that we do the job better than any country which has a Bill 
of Rights or a Declaration of the Rights of Man"230 . This view Is 
evidently based on the rationale that human rights are already well 
protected under English Law, therefore, the need for a Bill of Rights 
does not arise. 
Although we appreciate that the English Common Law and rules of equity 
have provided guarantees for the individuals rights and freedoms, It is 
fallacious to attempt to draw a dichotomous distinction between statutory 
and constitutional provisions on the basis of their relative efficacy. We 
submit that, constitutional and statutory law are not mutually exclusive. 
The most desirable constitution would be one that incorporates as many 
human rights and related national issues as the citizens desire and a 
legal system though which to enforce them. 
It Is evident that many national and International human rights legal 
Instruments were either Influenced or prepared by British jurists, 
thereby underscoring the advantages of a Bill encapsulating the rights 
and liberties of the Individual. The Magna Carta (1215) Influenced the 
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States of America. 
Furthermore, the constitution of most of the independent Commonwealth 
States had Bills of Rights drawn under the auspices of the Colonial 
Office. The preparation and adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
-------------------- 
229 
Dicey Law of the Constitutions (10th ed Macmillan, London 1959) 
P. 199. 
230 I Jennings The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge University 
Press 1956) p. 20. 
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Human Rights was largely due to the efforts of the British231. In 
recent times, a growing number of British jurists have called for the 
adoption of a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom. The argument of 
the pro-Bill of Rights lobby is articulated by Lord Scarman's statement 
that: 
"When times are normal and fear is stalking the land, English 
Law sturdily protects the freedom of the Individual and 
respects human personality. But when times are abnormally 
alive with fear and prejudice, the Common Law Is at a 
disadvantage; It cannot resist the ýYj, however frightened or 
prejudiced it may be of Parliament" 
To underscore this point, Sir Leslie Scarman (as he then was) expressed 
doubts whether the case of Liversidge v Anderson would have come to 
the conclusion it did, or indeed if there had been a Bill of Rights, the 
court would have shut its eyes to the dubious methods of police 
Interrogation of suspects in Northern Ireland. Support for the adoption 
of a Bill of Rights In England also comes from Sir Norman Anderson, a 
former Professor of Oriental Laws and Director of the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies in the University of London. In disagreeing 
with the prevailing English view that the availability of remedies like 
Habeas Corpus dispenses with the need for a Bill of Rights233, Sir 
Norman states that: 
"In the past years these specific remedies may indeed have 
given the individual citizen reasonably adequate protection 
against oppression by the executive; but they have given 
him no protection whatever, in recent years against an 
-------------------- 
231 S. A. - de Smith, The New Commonwealth and Its Constitutions (London: Stevens 1964) p. 169. 
232 Sir Leslie Scarman, English Law: The New Dimensions (Stevens 
London 1974) p. 15. Lord Scarman buttresses this argument by referring 
to the vulnerability of Courts In being unable to "correct" the 
retroactive effect of the Immigration Act (1971). 
233 Sir Norman Anderson "Liberty, Law and Justices" Hamlyn Lectures 
30th Series 1978 (Stevens) pp. 34-59. 
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oppressive or ill-considered Act of Parliament. Nor do they 
give wholly adequate protection today against wrongful, or 
clearly mistaken encroachments on Individual liberties by 
official actions or by the exercise of some administrative 
discretion for we live in an era In which legislation is so 
profuse that much of It Is inadequately examined, provides 
for a plethora of subsidiary regulations and often gives very 
wide discretionary 2ýpwers to local authorities or to the Minister concerned" 
The necessity for a Bill of Rights in the U. K. Is also emphasised by Sir 
Norman as a shield to protect the Individual against the excessive powers 
of multinationals and trade unions which past governments have failed to 
check. The need to protect the Increasing number of minority groups in 
British society has been rightly observed as a further justification for 
235 the enactment of a Bill of Rights In the UK. 
The foregoing arguments for the adoption of a Bill of Rights In the UK 
are equally, if not more, applicable to African States. The advantages 
of a Bill of Rights as part of a national Constitution or Fundamental Law 
of a State are several. 
First, a Bill of Rights provides a minimum standard of protection for 
every person within a State. It defines and guarantees a list of 
fundamental rights and liberties which a national deems necessary to 
protect itself from executive and legislative excesses. Secondly. a Bill 
of Rights is basically a political document, a solemn contract betwee na 
State and its people, th rough which the latter insures itself against the 
tyranny of t he former. In the words of the Minorities Commission on 
Nigeria: 
-------------------- 
234 
Ibld p. 51-52. 
235 Sir Leslie Scarman "A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom - where do we go now? " Lecture Paper delivered on 2 July 1979 at the Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London. 
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"a government determined to abandon democratic courses will 
find ways of violating them. But they (Bill of Rights) are of 
a great value in preventing a steady deterioration of 
standards of freedom and unobtrusive encroachment of a 
government on Individuals" 
The existence of a Bill of Rights ensures awareness of civil liberties by 
citizens. A comparison between the UK and the USA reveals that the 
latter possesses more public awareness of human rights and a better 
237 developed jurisprudence of human rights than the former. 
Thirdly, African States being essentially multi-ethnic, require Bills of 
Rights to protect peoples rights and thus allay the fears of minority and 
other special interest groups from discriminatory policies of the majority 
groups. Fourthly, a Bill of Rights may be used as a sword as well as a 
shield. An enforceable Bill can be utilized by an Individual to defend 
himself against excessive official rules or measures that encroach upon 
his protected rights. Bills of Rights also provide a course of action 
where none may be available under common law or the statutes. Indeed 
several cases exist where due to the nonexistence of a course of action 
under English Law, remedy was obtained under the European Convention 
on Human Rights238. Finally, the existence of international human 
rights conventions signifies the universal recognition of Bills of Rights 
as a preferable legal device towards the effective protection of human 
rights. 
236 Report of the Minorities Commission on Nigeria, (Government Press, 
Lagos, 1958) p. 5. 
237 Tom Mullen "Constitutional Protection of Human Rights" in T. 
Campbell and S. Maclean (eds) Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality 
(B. Blackwell, London, 1986) pp. 17-19. 
238 For Instance in Campbell & Fell v United Kingdom, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that the inability of Campbell to obtain legal 
assistance or representation In connection with disciplinary proceedings before a prison Board of Visitors, and the Boards failure to publish Its decision, violated certain provisions of Article 6 of the European Convention - See HRLJ Vol. 6 No. 2-4 (1985) p. 255 at 257. 
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While we do appreciate that there are some obvious disadvantages In 
adopting Bills of Rights239, these limitations are probably more 
pronounced when compared with the English Legal System. In addition 
to Its labyrinthian provisions on human rights, English Law also adopts a 
piecemeal approach to human rights protection through the enactment of 
ordinary legislation and the development of judge made case law. 
However, in the African scenario, where the system of law Inherited from 
colonial administrators have Inherent flaws and where the socio-political 
and economic Institutions are not fully developed and are prone to radical 
changes, the prescriptions for constitutional Bills of Rights rather than 
piecemeal legislations prove a more viable alternative. 
The majority of African States that have ratified the AFCHPR have 
undertaken the obligation to respect, promote and protect human rights 
and to enact fundamental laws, where appropriate, to bring the Charter 
into force within their domestic domains. A major rationale for 
240 
enacting Bills of Rights is that it lessens the likelihood of conflict 
between a State's International obligations and Its domestic laws. 
(c) Measuring Human Rights Observance in Africa: 
Objective, Subjective or Double Standards 
The foregoing analysis of the constitution of African States reveals that 
the majority of African States have set comparatively high standards for 
themselves In the promotion of human rights. In the preceding chapter 
we examined the major obstacles created by 'colonialism, ethnicity and 
239 Several criticisms have been laid against the adoption of Bills of 
Rights, namely the vagueness of fundamental guarantees of human 
rights, problems of interpretation and judicial review methods, the far 
reaching qualifications and exceptions thereto, the inflexibility of such 
mechanisms and their supposedly undemocratic nature. See Lloyd of 
Hampstead "Do We Need a Bill of Rights? " Modern Law Review 39 (1976) 
p. 121; and J. A. G. Griffith "The Political Constitution" Modern Law 
Review 42 (1979) p . l. 
240 Article 1, AFCHPR. 
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racism in the protection of human rights in Africa. These latter factors 
have often led African rulers to use authoritarian measures to prevent 
social, economic and political disintegration of the State, despite 
restrictions imposed on excessive State measures by the Bills of Rights 
in many African State Constitutions. Given this impression, therefore, 
can one reasonably expect a high standard of respect for human rights 
in Africa? or to couch it in another form; Should African Governments 
be judged by a different criteria? 
241 
The reply of the "realists" (or "apologists" as some describe them) 
242 to 
the question Is positive. The realists insist that rights and their 
observance are relative matters differing accgrding to the national 
situation involved. It has been observed that the critics of African 
human rights performance pronounce judgement on the basis of the 
rights which are most important to western societies; civil and political 
rights. But in African states, economic and social rights take 
precedence to all other rights. To buttress this argument, It has been 
emphasized that the concept of the Rule of Law in the "traditionalist" 
western liberal democratic context differs from the African interpretation 
of the concept243. Narrowly construed, the Rule of Law means the 
subjecting of the states political apparatus to defined procedures and 
limits to prevent arbitrary actions and to guarantee respect for the 
-------------------- 
241 Much as this question may appear rhetorical in the light of existing 
Bills of Rights and the AFCHPR now in force, the significance of the 
issue lies firstly, in the percieved dichotomy between civil and political 
rights on the one hand, and socio-economic rights on the other; and 
secondly in the existence and availability of derogation or "claw back" 
clauses in these Instruments. (See Chapter 7 post for an analysis of 
"claw back" clauses. ) 
242 The distinction between "apologists" and "revisionists" on human 
rights in the Third World is from Conway W. Henderson, 
"Underdevelopment and Political Rights: a Revisionist Challenge", 
Government and Opposition 12, No. 3 (Summer 1977). 
243 A. Glenn Mower Jr., "Human Rights In Black Africa: A Double 
Standard? " Human Rights Journal (1976) p. 45. 
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rights of Individuals. However, the expansion of the concept of human 
rights to include economic and social rights has appealed to African 
States. These States In their Interpretation of the concept of human 
rights have placed more emphasis on economic and social rights, and Is 
succinctly expressed thus: 
"Freedom of expression is meaningless to an illiterate; the right to vote 
may be perverted Into an instrument of tyranny exercised by demagogues 
over an unenlightened electorate: freedom from governmental interference 
must not spell freedom to starve for the poor and the destitute"244. 
In the light of the above, the abridgement of certain civil and political 
rights in the quest for fulfilling the economic and social needs of the 
African peoples seems plausible especially when one considers the fact 
that civil and political rights violations are more visible than the 
transgression of economic and social rights; thus exposing African 
governments to charges of neglect for human rights. 
In judging whether the observance of human rights by African States 
should be determined by a different criteria as compared with western 
countries, however, the views of Dr. Saeed el Mahdl are Instructive. In 
his discussion of criminal justice in Africa, the former Dean of the Law 
Faculty at the University of Khartoum states that: "an act constituting 
an offence in Europe may not be so In Africa... we have our own natural 
laws and rules of natural justice which can cope with many factual 
situations that European modes of justice have failed to cope with. "245 
It is further emphasised that Third World nations should "free themselves 
-------------------- 
244 International Commission of Jurists, "The Rule of Law in a Free Society", Report of the International Commission of Jurists, New Delhi, India; 1959, Geneva p. vi. f. 
245 S. el Mahdi "Criminal Justice in Africa and Asia", The Review of the International Commissin of Jurists, No. 15 1975; p. 59. 
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from the rigid adherence to the legal systems inherited from former 
colonial powers, and to develop their laws and procedures on lines more 
adapted to their traditions and cultures, ºº246 
The above pronouncement Is graphically illustrated by the "Amulet 
Case"247. The dualist nature of the municipal legal systems of many 
African States also underlines this view. It may thus be argued that 
248 
African States expect to be judged by different standards and values 
from the western countries, especially as the former regard certain 
249 
rights as more basic to other rights. 
While a convincing case may have been advanced by the "realists" for 
the proposition that African governments cannot be expected to be 
judged on the same criteria as advanced countries, on the other hand, 
the "revisionists" proffer persuasive views to the contrary. 
The "revisionists" maintain that Africa should not belong to a special 
group because they "no less than others are dedicated to respect for 
rights" and that "they are not different from other people"250. Indeed. 
-------------------- 
246 Ibid. 
247 The "Amulet Case" Involved an individual "A" who had told everyone 
in his village that he was bullet and knife-proof because of amulets he 
wore. In a quarrel with another villager, "A" was attacked with a 
knife, which he took from his opponent and used to stab the other man 
to death, his plea of self-defence was denied by the Court on the 
grounds that, because of his belief in his amulet, he was "under no 
apprehension from a knife attack". Ibid, p. 60. 
248 The legal systems of most African States (for Instance Sudan, Ghana 
and Nigeria) are dualist in nature; where a customary law system is 
operated along side the common law system. 
249 The consensus of African states on the precedence of economic and 
social rights over civil and political rights is reflected the preambular 
paragraph 8 of the AFCHPR. See Appendix III below at post. 
250 S. K. B. Asante, op cit at p. 102; See also W. Arthur Lewis "Beyond 
African Dictatorship: The Crisis of the One Party State" in M. Doro and 
N. Stultz (eds) op cit at p. 84; and Thomas L. Hodgkin, op cit at p. 62. 
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fundamental human rights are not peculiar to any one legal system. 
country, race or community, and as K. A. Busia contends: 
"if (democracy) refers to the values of democracy such as 
the Rule of Law, respect for human dignity, freedom of 
speech, association, conscience and other ingredients of 
democracy, it can be seen from the evidence that Africans 
cherish democratic values and that there are leaders whose 
political policies are inspired by them. The values of 
democrac, Ai must be seen as ideals which have universal 
validity" . 
Indeed, the individuals freedom to participate In political life Implies 
freedom of expression and opinion and, consequently, the freedom to 
found constructive opposition parties. It Is significant that some African 
delegates, to a UN Seminar on Human Rights endorsed the view that: 
"[t]o sacrifice the liberties inherent in the human personality in the 
name of economic development was to reduce the individual to the role of 
producer and consumer of goods, which was far too high a price to pay 
for improving the material conditions of existence 
252 ". 
The "revisionists" further maintain that the very poor economic 
performance of the sixties and seventies was accompanied by government 
programmes that were hardly tender in their regard for human rights. 
Both political and economic conditions in many African States are thus 
regarded to have actually regressed as a result. For the "revisionists". 
no further evidence of the folly of attempting to establish economic bliss 
253 through political misery arising from a denial of rights is required. 
-------------------- 
251 
K. Busla, op cit at p. 108. 
252 The Proceedings of the UN Regional Seminar on Human Rights in 
Developing Countries; Dakar, Senegal. (February 1966) UN DOC. 
ST/TAO/HR/25,1966. 
253 C. W. Henderson, op cit at p. 278; Peter J. Wiles, "Development and 
Democracy: The Chicken and the Egg". Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 4, No. 1 (Jan-Mar 1970). 
327 
The argument that African nations can be expected to perform at the 
same level of human rights protection as advanced countries is based 
first, on the claim that the socio-political background of African nations 
gives them a good start In that direction. It Is therefore stated that the 
respect for human rights Is "far from alien to the traditional societies of 
Black Africa; most ethnic groups had elements of democratic choice In 
the selection of leadership and In resolving Issues affecting the group as 
a whole , 
254. The exposure of Africans to the liberal political philosophy 
of Western democracies either through the slave trade (sic) or through 
study abroad Is regarded as having had some Influence on the men who 
later became leaders of African nationalist movements255. The fault with 
this argument is that it tends to minimise the negative Influence of 
colonialism and regards it as an aberration. 
The second reason advanced is that because of the high human rights 
standards they have set for themselves in their respective constitutions, 
African states can be expected to perform at the same level as western 
countries. As we have seen, the constitutions of many African States, 
especially the Anglophonic States, contain human rights protection 
clauses which have a strong western civil, political and democratic tone. 
The proposition that African states can be expected to perform In the 
field of human rights, at the same level as advanced countries because 
their constitutions uphold similar principles, Is weak on some points. 
While most African states' constitutions have Incorporated human rights 
provisions the written word or provisions of the constitution do not by 
themselves ensure that the rights are protected. Indeed, Professor 
-------------------- 
254 
L. Hodgkin, op cit at p. 64. 
255 Ibid. 
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BrownlIe has pointed out that many constitutions that speak of the 'rule 
of law", "civil liberties" or "fundamental rights" bear but an obscure 
relation to the actual state of affairs In political or legal life256. It Is, 
therefore, mostly In those constitutions where the rights to be protected 
have been drafted in such a manner as to take Into account the objective 
conditions imposed by underdevelopment, that rights may be more than 
empty declarations. 
Furthermore, one of the final determinants of the actual Implementation of 
these human rights objectives is whether the judges chosen to adjudicate 
In the violations of the human rights provisions are men of courage, 
transparent honest and Integrity, and are able to carry out their 
functions without undue Interference. It has been emphasised that "the 
Independence of the judiciary Is a sine qua non for a meaningful 
protection of human rights"257. The accessibility of people to courts is 
also a necessary prerequisite to the effective protection of human rights. 
But courts In African states can hardly be described as being open to all 
comers. This situation Is due to the fact that many people are ignorant 
of their rights, too poor to afford legal services or because of executive 
258 Interference with the judicial process. 
-------------------- 
256 
1. BrownlIe, Basic Documents on African Affairs (Oxford University 
Press 1971) p. 1. 
257 O. Eze, "Prospects for International Protectin of Human Rights" The 
African Review Vol. 4 no. 1 (1974) p. 84. 
258 See A. M. Akiwumi, "Human Rights Cases and African Courts", Legal 
Process and the Individual African Source Materials; Addis Ababa, 
Centre for African Legal Development, Halle Sallassie I, University. Ed. 
T. G. Verhelst (1971); See A. Aguda and O. Aguda "Judicial Protection 
of Some Fundamental Rights in Nigeria and the Sudan Before and During Military Rule". Journal of African Law Vol. 16 (1972), for a discussion In 
the way African Courts have been able to offer protection to citizens 
against the Executive encroachment upon their rights. 
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An instance of legislative manipulation by the executive to nullify a 
judicial decision which is found offensive is Illustrated by the case of 
E. O. Lakanmi and Others v The Attorney-General (West) and Others259. 
Under the Nigerian Constitution of 1963 all legislative and executive 
actions of the Government had to be tested by the grundnorm of the 
Constitution. In 1966, the military regime that came Into power in 
Nigeria suspended parts of the Constitution and decided to rule by 
Decrees which were made superior to the Constitution. Thus, In effect, 
there was nothing left against which to test the validity of Decrees 
promulgated by the rulers. Therefore the attempt by the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria in this case to hold the Constitution superior to Decrees 
Issued by the Federal Military Government was resisted by the 
Government thus: 
"It is well known that the Federal Military Government came 
to power after a bloody revolution and therefore has 
unlimited power to rule this country... 
"The third branch which Is permitted to continue, namely the 
Judiciary, owes Its present existence to the military regime 
which has always the power to abolish It and if lt had so 
wished, thg6yhole of the constitution and rule this country 
by Decree" 
While the Supreme Court of Nigeria showed a great deal of independence 
and courage In this case261, such Is state of the Rule of Law In most 
military run Governments of Africa. 
-------------------- 
259 Suit No. S/C 58/60 of 24 April 1970; See A. Ojo "The Search for a 
Grundnorm In Nigeria - The Lakanmi Case" I. C. L. Q. Vol. 20, No. l (1971) 
p. 117. 
260 Official Statement by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria on 
the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) 
Decree No. 28 of 1970). 
261 In the Lakanmi case, the Supreme Court of Nigeria had declared null 
and void Decree No. 45 of 1968 which had passed legislative judgement by 
confiscating the properties of Lakanmi. The Government replied swiftly 
by promulgating Decree No. 28 of 1970 which in effect nullified the judgement and established the supremacy of military Decrees. 
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Another factor contributing to the argument that there should be a high 
level of expectation concerning human rights In Africa is that the 
concern for and commitment to rights Is not limited to written or formal 
official statements. The participation of Africans in numerous 
international conferences and seminars beginning with the Lagos 
Conference on the Rule of Law (1961) right up to the Eighteenth 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU which adopted 
the AFCHPR, indicate the will and aspiration of Africans to achieve a 
high level of human rights protection comparable to the European 
Convention and other International human rights Instruments. 
Furthermore, it is contended that the desire for national unity and 
political stability, which are the classic excuses for authoritarian rule, 
do not justify the abridgment of rights262. The argument, here, is that 
the consideration of stability actually requires a high regard for rights, 
not the suppression of them and that restrictions are counter productive. 
Repression In any form or in any area of soclo-political experience seems 
to invite catastrophic results. Lewis, in discussing the approach of one 
party States towards the handling of public protests states that: 
"The (single) party cannot prevent tensions in an era and 
place of rapid change; all It can do is suppress open 
agitation. Discontent is then all directed Inward upon the 
party, adding to the party's instability. This Increases the 
effort to stamp out all resistance driving it underground 
whence it brelg3 out from time to time In violent 
demonstrations. " 
The One-party system has been Introduced In a number of African States 
and its practise reveals that it is no guarantor of stability. In Cowans 
262 Rupert Emerson, "The Fate of Human Rights In the Third World", 
World Politics No. 2 (Jan. 1975) p. 223; see also C. W. Henderson supra, 
note 56 at p. 278. 
263 W. A. Lewis op cit at p. 85. 
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analysis of the one-party state in Africa, he states that "as the 
opposition became more desperate in its attempts to secure a voice in 
government, there was a constantly growing danger of political 
explosion"264, 
We subscribe to the contention that repressive measures certainly breed 
instability but it shou-d be appreciated that the pressures that 
encourage repressive measures In African States are both Internal as well 
as external. The history of Euro-American statecraft Is replete with the 
hypocritical response of Western Governments, as they have confronted 
humanitarian Issues. These Governments have not been prepared to 
speak out or take action where political costs would be entailed, where 
they might embarrass an ally, where protests might harm their relations 
with another sovereign, or where economic Investments might be 
jeopardized265. Thus Richard Bilder notes that: 
"(t]he cases where governments have criticized the human 
rights policies of other countries seem only to buttress the 
argument that human rights concerns, in and of themselves, 
play little part In determining state policy... Government 
can attack their enemies for alleged human rights denials 
with considerable propaganda effect and at little cost. Thus 
the cold war has furnished some of the most notable 
International accusations of human rights denials - for 
example. racial discrimination in United States, and forced 
labour and the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union... 
Where political conflict lurks in the background, a certain 
scepticism as to the sincerity of the asserted rights 
motivations of the governments Involved may well be In 
order. One may even suspect that such governments might 
prefer that their enemies continue human righti6genials, thus 
exposing them to continued propaganda attack" 
-------------------- 
264 
L. G. Cowan op cit at p. 8. 
265 See Laurie S. Wiseberg "Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the 
Nigerian Civil War". Human Rights Journal, Vo1. VII No. 1 1974 pp. 61-98. 
266 Richard B. Bilder "Rethinking International Human Rights: Some 
Basic Questions", Human Rights Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1969) pp. 573-4. 
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Since capitalism and socialism are the dominant modes by which high 
forms of economy are organized, African countries in seeking to follow 
one path or the other are realizing that oppression is a necessary 
corollary. Simone Well argues, In her essay, that oppression is 
associated with the organization of any complex social order, both 
through its dependence on leadership and bureaucracy to administer an 
unequal division of labour and by Its necessary sponsorship of a dynamic 
power by which only a privileged few exert control over the masses, and 
ultimately by reliance on armed might267. She notes further that the 
only Instances of non-oppressive social orders are "primitive" forms of 
social organization that do not depend upon or level themselves easily to 
the co-ordination of effort and status differentiation. There Is little 
support in African States for a restructuring of state power as to 
achieve non-oppressive social orders, as Indeed some advocates of human 
268 
rights regard oppression as an Inevitable ingredient of modernism. 
It is our contention that the concept of human rights is universal 
because, quite simply, human rights are concerned with asserting and 
protecting human dignity, and they are ultimately based on a regard for 
the intrinsic worth of the Individual. However In upholding universal 
human rights, we ought to appreciate that these rights can only be 
protected to the extent of the prevailing circumstances and conditions of 
a locality. It is therefore Important to recognise the enormity of the 
development task, the extreme vulnerability of African Governments in 
the face of both internal centrifugal forces (of ethnicity, factionalism 
etc. ) and external manipulative forces (of International capitalism and 
communism), and the extent to which their priorities differ from those of 
the developed countries. Moreover, even the most highly developed 
-------------------- 
267 
Simone Well "Analysis of Oppression" in George A. Panichas (ed) The 
Simone Well Reader (David McKay Co. Inc. 1977) p. 131. 
268 See R. Falk op cit p. 39. 
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programme for the international protection of human rights, the European 
Convention of Human Rights, operates on the principle of "margin or 
appreciation", which involves the recognition that governments are 
entitled to some leeway In determining whether a domestic situation is so 
serious as to warrant temporary departure from accepted standards of 
rights269. While not willing to be construed as attempting to establish 
an alibi for the disrespect for human rights or pleading a case for the 
permanent elasticization of the "margin of appreciation" to African human 
rights performance, It Is submitted that in evolving universal and 
regional standards for the measurement of human rights compliance, we 
must observe objective margins for the underdeveloped states. 
(d) Complementary Measures to Constitutional Protection of Human 
Rights 
Attempts to rid Africa of underdevelopment must be accompanied by a 
progressive maximization of human rights protection in evolving effective 
structures for asserting and safeguarding human dignity in the larger 
African society. In the light of African State practice, what sort of 
structures can be evolved to complement the Constitution and the 
Judiciary in ensuring effective promoting and protection of human rights? 
In responding to this question, we should first consider the prevailing 
situation in most African States. The foregoing analysis of African State 
constitutions reveals that many OAU Member States have set relatively 
high standards for the promotion and protection of human rights. A 
minority of States, have either set the tone for the protecting of human 
rights by making preambular references to international human rights 
instruments or have simply omitted human rights provisions In their 
-------------------- 
269 See T. A. O'Donnell, "The Margins of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights". Human Rights Law Quarterly 1982. 
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respective constitutions. Human rights provisions In several African 
constitutions have had to endure the hazard of frequent suspension or 
outright abrogation by military governments270. One of, the main 
reasons, proffered by perpetrators of military coups d'etat, for this 
phenomena, is that since an emergency situation exists In the State, 
strict adherence to legal norms serve to undermine State security and 
political stability271. Consequently, one of the major problems of human 
rights protection in Africa is the frequency of military coups d'etat and 
the ensuing repressive methods of governance. 
The causes of military takeovers in Africa are numerous and should be 
deduced from the circumstances peculiar to each putsch272. However 
suffice It to say that they can be generally attributable, first, to 
underdeveloped political, social and economic Institutions, and secondly, 
to domestic discontent and In some cases external interventions273. 
The legality of coups d'etat has been addressed elsewhere274 however 
suffice it to say that it Is a fundamental philosophical and juristic 
contradiction to refer to fundamental rights In a military era. The 
-------------------- 
270 The Constitutions of the following countries have suffered 
suspensions consequent upon military takeovers: - Burundi (1976); Ghana 
(in 1966,1972 and 1981); Ugnda (in 1971); Ethiopia (1974); Niger 
(1974); Burkina Faso (1983); Guinea (1984); Central African Republic 
(1966) and Nigerian (1966 and 1983). 
271 Murtala Mohammed A Time for Action: Collected Speeches (Third 
Press International, Lagos, 1980) p. 1-2. 
272 Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York, Panthean Books) p. 2-23. 
273 Esko Antola "Roots of Domestic Military Intervention In Black Africa" 
Instant Research on Peace and Violence Vol. V (1975) pp. 207-27. See 
also Ruth First, Power in Africa, Ibid. 
274 Steffan Wiking Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How toJustify 
the Illegal Assumptions of Power (Uppsala Sweden: Scandinavian Institute 
of African Studies, 1983). See also Dr. Olu Onagoruwa Fundamental 
Human Rights Under the Military: Violation of Machinery for 
Enforcement. Paper delivered to the Human Rights Committee of the Nigeria Bar Association held at Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria, 23 May 
1987. 
335 
reason is that military governments in all their ramifications are the very 
antithesis of fundamental Human Rights. Military Government by its 
very essence and characteristic is a denial of the right of the majority of 
the polity to govern themselves according to a constitution promulgated 
by their collective will. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
consecrates the rights of peoples to control their destinies through self- 
government. The AFCHPR. ratified by most African States Imposes a 
legal obligation on States to practise democratic government. Article 
13(1) of the Charter states that "Every citizen shall have the right to 
participate freely in the government of his country either directly or 
through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions 
of the law"275. 
Thus any form of government or political arrangement which makes it 
impossible for the majority of the polity to positively express their will to 
vindicate their national sovereignty Is a violation of one of the most basic 
fundamental rights - the right to national independence and self- 
government according to the will of the people. 
However by gaining both de facto and subsequent de lure control of the 
machinery of the State. military forces are effectively recognized as 
legitimate rulers. Some States have attempted to adopt constitutional 
provisions which declare coups d'etat as Illegal; but such solutions have 
276 
. proved futile 
-------------------- 
275 See also Articles 20(1) and (2) which refer to the Inalienable right to 
self-determination. 
276 Section 1(2) of the Nigerian Constitution of Nigeria (1979) states 
that: "The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall 
any person or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria. or any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution". Despite this provision, the democratically elected 
civilian government of Nigeria was overthrown by the military in December 1983. The military government is still in power and proposes to remain In power until October 1992. 
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The effective protection of human rights in military governed African 
States is therefore dependent on three main factors. Firstly, the extent 
to which the government is prepared to accommodate individual rights 
and freedoms; secondly, the courage and independence of the judiciary, 
and thirdly, the initiative, resource and courage of the public and the 
press. 
Most military regimes in Africa jettison all or most constitutional 
provisions on human rights on assuming power. For instance, in Nigeria 
when the military first took over power in 1966, it suspended and 
modified the provisions of the 1963 Republican Constitution, Including 
parts of the Chapter on Human Rights and Futdamental Freedoms277. 
The military remain In power in Nigeria till October 1979 when a new 
constitution was adopted and a democratically elected government assumed 
power. However in December 1983, the military once again took control 
of the government, suspended and modified some of the provisions of the 
Constitution of 1979 Including parts of the Chapter on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms278. As earlier shown in the case of E. O. Lakanmi 
and others v Attorney-General (West) and Others279, the retention of 
human rights provisions In the constitution, is not necessarily an 
efficacious barometer with which we should measure human rights stance 
of military regimes280, but it does reflect the apparent Inclination of the 
military government to preserve individual rights and freedoms. 
-------------------- 
277 Constitution (Suspension and Modifications) Decree 1960 See also A. Aguda and o. Aguda "Judicial Protection of Some Fundamental Rights In Nigeria and the Sudan Before and During Military Rule". Journal of African Law Vo1.16,1972, p. 131. I" M-LL 278 Constitutions (Supervision & Modification) Decree 1984 and Constitution (Supervision & Modification) (Amendment) Decree 1985. 
279 
S/C (58/1969). 
280 
A. O. Aihe "Fundamental Human Rights and the Military Regime InNigerial, Journal of African Law (1971) Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 219. 
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The apparent disposition of some military governments to subscribe to 
national and international human rights instruments can only be tested 
by a courageous and independent judiciary, especially in the light of 
military decrees which have the effect of abridging personal freedoms. 
For instance, the right to personal liberty as specifically guaranteed by 
Section 32(5) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria which stipulates the 
maximum number of hours under which a person can be legally detained, 
has been suspended. Thus by virtue of the State Security (Detention of 
persons) Decree 1984 and the State (Detention of Persons) (Amendment) 
Decree 1986 the Chief of General Staff or Inspector General of Police can 
incarcerate any person if either of them Is satisfied that such a person 
is "or has been concerned in acts prejudicial to. State Security or has 
contributed to the economic adversity of the nation". Consequently, 
since the detention decree does not define "State Security" or "economic 
adversity" the authorities seem to have a wide and arbitrary power to 
curtail the personal liberty of the Individual. 
In the light of the curtailment of individual rights in authoritarian 
military regimes In African States, which ostensibly retain Constitutional 
Bills of Rights, the judiciary should be courageous enough to ensure 
individual rights and freedoms. Admittedly, the jurisdiction of the 
courts are invariably ousted by certain military decrees281 and edicts, 
however courts can justifiably assume jurisdiction even in such cases. 
This submission substantiated by the opinion of Kayode Esho JSC in 
Governor of Lagos State v Chief Emeka Ojukwu282. 
"By virtue of the Constitution (Suspension and Modifications) 
Decree 1984 (No. 1), a good number of provisions of the 
Constitution were suspended. Indeed what was left was what 
had been permitted by the Federal Military Government to 
-------------------- 
281 
State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No. 2 (1984). 
282 (1986) 1 Nigeria Weekly Law Reports 55 at p. 634. 
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exist. All the provisions relating to the Judiciary were 
saved. Section 6 of the Constitution, the most important 
provisions in so far as the institution known as the Judiciary 
is concerned, which rests courts the judicial powers of the 
Federation was left extant. The military Government had the 
power and still has to put an end to the existence of that 
provision. It has not done so, and that must have been 
advisedly for it does intend that the Rule of Law should 
pervade. It is the clearest indication against rule by 
Tyranny, by sheer force of arms against a presumption 
subjecting the nation to the rule of might as against rule of 
right". 
A similar opinion was rendered by Oputa J. S. C. who added that: 
"here In Nigeria even under a military Government, the Law 
is no respecter of persons, principalities, governments or 
powers and that the courts stand between the citizens and 
the government alert to see that týbstate or government is 
bound by law and respects the law" 
Much as these judicial opinions reflect the determination of some members 
of the judiciary to ensure individual freedoms many judges are unable to 
uphold the rule of law and fundamental human rights because of the 
threatening posture of the military, exemplified by draconian decrees 
which declare themselves unchallengeable. For Instance. the Nigerian 
Court of Appeal delivered one of the worst blows against the protection 
of human rights In the recent case of Wang Ching-Yao v Chief of 
Staff284. The Court affirmed as lawful, the detention of five Chinese 
businessmen and further held that "detention orders are In their true 
nature subsidiary legislation enacted under the State Security (Detention 
of Persons) Decree (No. 2) 1984". The Court also held that courts 
should take judicial notice of detention orders by virtue of Section 
73(1)(a) of the Evidence Act. This decision has discouraged many 
Nigerian lawyers from taking detention cases to court, and has laid 
precedent for other courts to follow. 
283 Ibid at P. 640. 
284 Suit No. CA/L/25/85 dated 1 April 1985 (unreported). 
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In view of the clearly ineffective and limited scope within which the 
judiciary can operate under military regimes, the press and the public 
can evolve structures of the protection and promotion of human rights in 
Africa. 
The public can enhance the protection of human rights by forming 
pressure groups for the purpose of promoting and protecting human 
rights. Such pressure groups may be formed by religious societies. 
professional associations in collaboration with the press to effectively 
disseminate information to the largely semi-illiterate peoples regarding 
their fundamental rights. These groups should also ensure the 
protection of rights by evolving mechanisms to rgspond to human rights 
violations and seek redress when Infringements occur. 
The need to evolve such local organisations is underlined by the AFCHPR 
which imposes an obligation on State Parties "to promote and ensure 
through teaching, education and publication, the rights and freedoms 
contained in the... Charter"285. The AFCHPR also provides inter alia 
that states "... shall allow the establishment and Improvement of 
appropriate national Institutions entrusted with the promotion and 
"286 protecting of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the... Charter. 
As regards the enforcement of human rights provisions by human rights 
pressure groups, the AFCHPR permits the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights to receive communications from groups of 
Individuals297. The Commission is also authorised to "interpret all the 
provisions of the... Charter at the request of a State Party, an 
-------------------- 
285 
Article 25, AFCHPR. 
286 
Article 26 Ibid. 
287 Article 55 Ibid. 
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Institution of the OAU or an African or¢anisation"288 
As a direct result of this writers initial research into human rights in 
Africa289 and in response to the atrocities perpetrated against human 
rights by the military regime of General Buhari (December 1983 - August 
1985) in Nigeria, we presented a blueprint290 for the establishment of a 
human rights council In Nigeria to a select group of eminent Nigerian 
jurists and scholars. The response to our blueprint was encouraging 
and this led to the formation of the Planning Committee of the Nigerian 
Council For Human Rights (NCHR) In December 1985291. The 
Constitution of the NCHR was formally approved on 19 February 1987. 
The public response to the establishment of the NCHR Is exemplified by 
the growth of the membership of the Council from nine In 1985 to four 
hundred subscribed members as at 31 December 1987. 
The main object of the NCHR Is to secure throughout Nigeria, the 
observance of Human Rights generally and as guaranteed in the Nigerian 
Constitution, the AFCHPR and In the Universal Declaration of Human 
292 Rights by various methods. These methods Include providing legal 
-------------------- 
288 Article 45(3) Ibid. (Underlines for emphasis) 
289 M. Abdul-Razaq The OAU and the Protection of Human Rights In 
Africa - LL. M Dissertation of the University of Hull (1983). 
290 For the objectives of the Nigerian Council for Human Rights, See 
Appendix IX. 
291 The original founding members of the NCHR are Alhaji G. F. Abdul- 
Razaq S. A. N. (Chairman of the Nigerian Body of Benchers); Dr. A. 
Aguda (Director of the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and 
Former Chief Justice of Botswana); Dr. G. O. Olusanya (Director- 
General, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs); Dr. Simi Johnson 
(Vice President, Nigerian National Council for Womens Societies); 
Professor M. Ogundipe-Leslie (Vice President Women in Nigeria 
Organization); Professor Osita Eze (Imo State University, Nigeria); 
Professor Agbede (Faculty of Law, University of Lagos); Dr. T. M. 
Salisu (Librarian, University of Lagos) and the present writer. 
292 Article 2 Constitution of the Nigerian Council for Human Rights. See 
Appendix IX. 
341 
advice on Human Rights293, making representations on Human Rights to 
governments and other relevant authorities294 and educating and 
disseminating publicly individual entitlement to Human Rights 
295 
enjoyment 
Since Its formation In 1985, the NCHR has made public 
pronouncements 
296 
and formal representations to the Nigerian Government 
on human rights issues. The response of the present Ni gerian 
Government to the existence of the Council has been favourable. This 
may not be unconnected with the deliberate policy of the NCHR to adopt 
the method of formal representation to the government rather than public 
condemnatio n of government measures which appear to violate human 
rights. 
On the continental level, the Inaugural Congress of the African 
Association for Human and Peoples Rights in Development (AAHPRID)297 
was held In Harare, Zimbabwe, 29 August to 3 September 1987. The 
main objectives of the Association are: 
(a) to eliminate apartheid and achieve peace In Africe; 
(b) to act in solidarity with all those In Africa struggling 
for Peoples Rights and to give every support and 
assistance to more sacrifice In the cause of human 
rights throughout Africa; 
-------------------- 
293 Article 2(b) Ibid. 
294 Article 2(c) Ibid. 
295 Article 2(f) Ibid. 
296 The Guardian (Lagos, Nigeria) 15 July 1986; See also, "The Nigerian 
Council for Human Rights" in Rights & Humanity Vol. 1 No. 2 (Summer 
1987) p. 43. 
297 At the Inaugural Congress of the AAHPRID the following were 
elected; President - Professor Leonard Ngcongcom, University of 
Botswana; Secretary-General - Professor Kwesi Prah. Institute of 
Southern African Studies, University of Lesotho; Treasurer - Professor P. Takirambudde, Department of Law, University of Botswana. See also 
E. Khiddu-Makubuya "Africa Rises to the Challenge" In Commonwealth 
Judicial Journal, Vol. 7 No. 3 (June 1988) pp. 6-9. 
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(c) to monitor and encourage the respect for and promotion 
of human and peoples rights in Africa at all stages of 
the development process. 
Full membership of the Association is open to all Africans and African 
human rights related organisations whereas associate membership is open 
to interested non-Africans as well as to non-African human rights-related 
organisations. 
In summation, therefore, we submit that the enforceable constitutional 
human rights provisions as contained in the constitutions of many African 
States are the foundation for effective protection of human rights and 
liberties. However, constitutional guarantees alone cannot enhance 
human rights. Authoritarian African regimes, both civilian and 
especially the military, have exhibited a propensity to abridge and 
Indeed abrogate fundamental rights through executive measures and 
Draconian decrees. Consequently there is a need for the formation of 
human rights pressure groups in African States to complement the efforts 
of the judiciary and the Bar in upholding the rule of law and 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
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Chapter Six 
Regional Promotion & Protection of Human Rights 
(a) Introduction 
Our analysis of the evolution of the OAU reveals that the concerted 
struggle for independence by African statesmen was essentially a 
struggle for individual liberties in reaction against the injustices inherent 
In colonialism. These struggles for self-determination and human dignity 
were waged on three levels, international, regional and national. On 
achieving independence many African countries through their respective 
constitutions subscribed to the obligations under the various International 
instruments which established universal human rights standards. 
Post independence of pursuits of regional promotion and protection of 
human rights were eclipsed by the imperative task of the newly 
independent African States to consolidate their sovereignty. 
Consequently, while many independence constitutions loosely subscribed 
to international- human rights instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the scope and degree of enforcement of 
such internationalised rights were severely limited by domestic laws and 
the OAU Charter. The constitutional provisions emphasised absolute 
sovereignty of the State over all matters especially those trading upon 
human rights and the administration of justice. African States sought to 
balance, firstly, the rights and duties of Individual and secondly, those 
of the individual vis-a-vis his society and the State. The OAU Charter 
In addition to upholding the sovereignty of Member States, emphasises 
the principle of non-interference in the Internal affairs of states'. 
These principles and policies formed a formidable barrier against 
international and regional supervision and enforcement of human rights in 
Africa. It is pertinent to stress that these principles and policies were 
-------------------- 
1 Article III(1)(2) and (3) OAU Charter. 
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informed by the apparent absence of confidence In the western oriented 
global system In which African States had limited influence; a system 
which had earlier condoned colonialism. A leading African legal luminary 
and President of the ICJ, Keba Mbaye categorically states that "a fact 
that no-one would attempt to deny Is that human rights were not a major 
concern of African States after each had gained Independence nor of the 
OAU at the time it was set up"2. 
Notwithstanding the reluctance of African States to subscribe to 
international supervision and enforcement of human rights, African 
jurists were more receptive to the idea of a regional system of human 
rights protection. Consequently, a confluence of several factors evolved 
over two decades led to the establishment of an African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights and an African Commission for Human Rights. 
(b) The African Conference on the Rule of Law (1961) 
The Idea of establishing a regional machinery for Africa was launched at 
the African Conference on the Rule of Law organised by the International 
Commission of Jurists and held In Lagos between 3-7 January 1961. The 
Conference was declared open by Dr. Nnamdl Azikime (President of the 
Republic of Nigeria) who coincidentally had earlier advocated the 
adoption of an African Convention of Human Rights as far back as 1943 
"3 in his memorandum on "The Atlantic Charter & British West Africa. 
-------------------- 
2 Keba Mbaye "Keynote Address on the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights" in Report of ICJ Conference on Human and Peoples 
Rights in Africa and the African Charter; Nairobi 2-4 Dec 1985; ICJ 
Cherie- Bougerles/Geneva, p. 19. 
3 See Maurice Glele Ahanhanzo "Introduction ä la Charte africalne des 
Drolts de 1'homme et des peuples" in "Droh et Libertes ä la fin du XXe 
siede, influence des donnees economigue et tech nologiques" (Studies 
offered to Claude-Albert Lolliard, Pe-done, 1984) p. 313. 
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The Conference involved 194 jurists from 23 African and 9 non-African 
countries. The theme of the Conference, the Rule of Law, was chosen 
In response to the mounting threats and violations of individual rights 
and liberties by new governments. Indeed, the Conference was 
described as a response to "the realisation of the deep rooted level of 
justice inherent in African tradition; the intention was to measure against 
this tradition the legal systems which are the legacy of the colonial 
powers, and to assess the colonial situation in the newly Independent 
"4 states In the light of the guiding principles of the Rule of Law. 
The Conference adopted a resolution, titled, The Law of Lagos which 
declared inter alla: - 
"that fundamental human rights especially the right to 
personal liberty, should be written and entrenched in the 
constitutions of all countries and that such personal liberty 
should not in peacetime be restricted without trial in a Court 
of Law; 
"that In order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948, this Conference Invites the African 
Governments to study the possibility of adopting an African 
Convention on Human Rights In such a manner that the 
Conclusions of this Conference will be safeguarded by the 
creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that 
recourse thereto be made available for all persons under the 
jurisdiction of the signatory States" . 
The Conference also evolved comprehensive safeguards on individual 
rights and defined the powers and competence of the executive, 
legislature and judiciary6. The jurists unanimously agreed on the 
principles of justice considered minimal for the protection of human 
-------------------- 
4 Jean-Flaven Lavite In Foreward to "African Conference on the Rule of 
Law": A Report on the Proceedings of the Conference, Lagos, Nigeria, 
3-7 January, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1961 p. 5. 
5 African Conference on The Rule of Law... Ibid p. 11. See Appendix I, 
Post, for the text of the Law of Lagos. 
6 See Conclusions of Committee I on Human Rights and Government Security - The Legislative, Executive & Judiciary Ibid. 
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rights in the criminal and administrative law systems7. Finally, the 
Conference emphasised the responsibility of the judiciary and of the Bar 
for the protection of the rights of the individual in the society8. Some 
of these conclusions were more comprehensive in protecting human rights 
than the provisions of the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights. 
The conclusions and resolutions of the Conference set the tone for the 
adoption of a regional machinery for the protection of human rights on 
the continent, however they failed to propel African nations to act 
accordingly, probably because the Conference did not have formal 
affirmation of African States. 
Immediately after the Conference, President of Nigeria, Dr. Azikiwe in a 
speech in London, appealed to African States to enact an African human 
rights convention as a pledge of their, faith In the supremacy of the 
law9; his was a lone voice in a wilderness In which African Statesmen 
were preoccupied with the problems of their fragile independence. 
(c) Human Rights and the Establishment of the OAU (1963) 
The OAU was established In 1963. The 30 founding Member States were 
signatories to the OAU Charter which reaffirmed the adherence of 
African States to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
10 Rights 
-------------------- 
7 See Conclusions of Committee II on Human Rights and Aspects of 
Criminal & Administrative Law: Ibid. 
8 See Conclusions of Committee III on the Responsibility of the Judiciary 
and the Bar, Ibid. 
9 Karel Vasak "Les Drolts de 1'Homme el 1'Afrique", Revue Juridique et Politigue (1967) at p. 282., cited In del Russo, International Protection of Human Rights (Lerner Law Books Co., Washington DC, 1971) p. 248. 
10 9th Preambular paragraph and Article II of*the OAU Charter. 
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The Heads of African States and Governments that met. in Addis Ababa In 
1963 were convinced that it Is the Inalienable right of all peoples to 
control their own destiny and were conscious of the fact that freedom, 
equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement 
of the legitimate aspirations of African peoples. However, the African 
statesmen placed a higher premium on the need to safeguard and 
consolidate the hard won Independence as well as the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of their States to fight against neo-colonialism In all 
its forms. Consequently, the recommendations of the 1961 Lagos 
Conference for the adoption of regional machinery on human rights could 
not be adopted by the OAU. 
The 1963 Addis Ababa Conference did approve the formation of an 
African Commission of Jurists as a specialised commission of the OAU 
11 
consequent upon the recommendations of the OAU Council of Ministers. 
Preparatory meetings for the creation of the Commission commenced with 
a Conference of African Jurists which took place in Lagos in August 
1963. The Inaugural Conference of the Commission was held in Lagos in 
196612. 
The functions of the Commission Included the promotion of the 
development of the concept of justice, the encouragement of study of 
African Law and international law, and the promotion of understanding 
and cooperation among African jurists13. 
-------------------- 
11 Under Article XX of the OAU Charter, the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government has a facilitative power to create Specialised 
Commissions. 
12 For the approved Statute of the Commission see L. B. John (ed) Basic 
Documents on African Regional Organisations: Constitutional Foundations 
Vol. 1 (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publicaflons 1971-72) p. 98-104. 
13 Article I, Charter of the African Commission of Jurists, Ibid. 
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According to Dr. Elias the Commission had a mandate "to study African 
political constitutions and legal ideas with particular reference to the 
promotion of the rule of law and the observance and protection of 
fundamental human rights through the continent"4 
The Charter of the Commission of Jurists did not develop or define the 
scope of the "concept of justice" alluded to in Article I. In any event, 
the Commission failed to function due to the lack of quorum and was 
eventually dissolved in November 1966. The relatively short existence of 
the African Commission of Jurists may be regarded as attributable to the 
lack of will of African Statesmen to pursue the establishment of a 
regional machinery for the protection of human rights on the continent. 
Notwithstanding the lethargic attitude of the majority of African States 
towards the establishment of a regional system, some States continued to 
campaign for a regional approach. At the UN General Assembly's debate 
in 1963 on "Measures of Implementation of the Covenants", Nigeria, 
Ghana and Somalia submitted observations common in their appeal for the 
establishment of regional human rights machinery for Africa. The 
Somalian observation encapsulates their common view: 
"So far as human rights are concerned, differences between 
regions are often more pronounced than differences within 
regions, and it could be much easier for states within a 
region to come to an understanding regarding the guarantee 
of human rights than with all members of the United Nations. 
Regional Organisations, like the Council of Europe and the 
Organisation of American States have set up their own organs 
for the purpose of ensuring human rights, thereby 
contributing greatly towards the implementation of the human 
rights programme of the Untied Nations... This Government 
-------------------- 
14 T. O. Elias "Background paper for the UN Seminar on the 
Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special 
Reference to AFrica; Monrovia, Liberia, 10-21 September 1979, p. 8. 
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considers it desirable that a similar system should be 
established for Africa, as part of the Organisation of African 
States" 
The significance of the regional system was also emphasised by Senegal. 
At the World Veterans Federation meeting held in Paris in 1904, the 
Senegalese Ambassador to France stated that the entire range of African 
values of civilisation would be better defined in a regional charter of 
human rights. He appealed for a charter which would portray the 
combination of universal humanism and African humanism - "a charter 
which would provide a veritable system of references in which the 
African would be able to discover his modern personality, basically 
attached to his country but wide open to the world"16. These appeals 
received little response from African States. The United Nations 
however responded and seized the initiative in leading the movement 
towards the establishment of a regional machinery for human rights in 
Africa. 
-------------------- 
15 proceedings of the UN General Assembly Debate on item 48 dealing 
with Measures of Implementation of the Covenants. Doc A/5411/Add2 of 
25 Oct 1966. 
16 Quoted in 'Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights', Report of 
the 21st Council Meeting, World Veterans Federation, Paris 1964 p. 68-69. 
See also del 'Russo op cit at p. 248. 
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(d) The UN efforts towards the Evolution of a Regional Human Rights 
Protection Machinery for Africa. 
The UN's influence on the evolution and development of regional 
organisations in the world has not been confined to Europe17, the 
18 19 Americas and Arabia. 
In realisation of human rights for all, without discrimination to race, 
sex, language or religion as laid down by Article 13(2) of the United 
Nations Charter, the UN has achieved noteworthy results in Africa. It 
is desirable to undertake an examination of the UN contributions to the 
evolution of a regional machinery in Africa, in a bid to appraise these 
efforts. 
The establishment of a regional commission for human rights in Africa, 
outside the UN Human Rights protection system is consistent with 
Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter. With these articles as a basis 
20 
and pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 926(X) and ECOSOC 
-------------------- 
17 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, which entered Into force on 3 September 1953 was 
largely Influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See T. 
Higgins "The European Convention on Human Rights in T. Meron (ed) 
Human Rights in International Law Legal & Policy Issues (1985 Clarendon 
Press Oxford) p. 496-7. 
18 The American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force on 8 
July 1978 and was largely influenced by both the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the European Convention. See T. Buergenthal and 
ors; Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Selected Problems, (1986, 
N. P. Engel, Strausbourg) p. 13. 
19 The Permanent Commission on Human Rights of the Arab League 
(1968). See Arab League Council Resolution 2443 of 3 September 1968. 
The Arab League was encouraged to establish this Commission by the 
UN's efforts under ECOSOC Resolution 1159(V) of 1 Nov 1950 and UN 
Recommendation 6(XXIII) of 23 March 1967. See further S. I. Marks "La 
Commission Permanente Arabe Des Drois de l'Homme" Human Rights 
Journal Vol. 111 1970. 
20 See D. W. Barrett, The Law of International Institutions, (2nd ed 
London 1970) pp. 280-3; See also A. H. Robertson, "The International 
Protection of Human Rights by Regional Organisations", Selected 
Readings in International and Comparative Law of Human Rights, 
(Strausbourg, International Institute of Human Rights, 1974). 
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Resolution 605(XXI) the Secretary General of the UN organised in 
Dakar, Senegal, a Regional Seminar on Human Rig hts in Develop ing 
Countries, from 8-22 February 196621. The Seminar deliberated on the 
desirability of establishing an African Convention on human rights within 
the framework of the OAU. The seminar prescribed a 3-stage approach 
towards a regional system. First, the encouragement of national systems 
of promotion and protection of human rights; secondly, the adoption of 
bilateral and/or multilateral agreements on human rights by States. 
Finally, the formation of a regional system in the long term22. This 
staggered approach to regionalism was informed by the obvious obstacle 
created by the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in the 
Internal affairs of states. The seminar also resolved that it was 
essential to remould and redefine certain human rights principles and 
standards to accord with the realities of the African regional, a factor 
not fully reflected In the Universal Declaration and the subsequent 
23 International Covenants. 
Thus the 1966 UN Seminar in Dakar kept the subject alive in the minds 
of various interested groups in African especially the African Jurists. 
It probably encouraged the International Commission of Jurists to 
sponsor another conference in Dakar In January 1967 to examine the 
Function of Law in the Development of Human Communities with special 
reference to Africa24. The Conference was restricted to jurists from 
-------------------- 
21 
All Member States of the Economic Commission for Africa of the UN, 
were invited to participate. Seminar on Human Rights in Developing 
Countries, UN Doc ST/TAO/HR/25; 1966. 
22 Ibid Paragraph 241. 
23 The Seminar cited the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination as an example of UN practice in adopting and 
adapting special instruments on particular rights or groups of rights. 
Ibid paras 237-238. 
24 Conference of French Speaking African Jurists, Bulletin of the 
International Commission of Jurists (1967) Vol. 28 p. 1. 
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French-speaking Africa, and about 80 jurists from 15 countries were in 
attendance. The Conference adopted many resolutions out of which two 
were of significance to human rights in Africa: 
- African States were urged to enhance the respect for human 
rights in practice by ratifying the International Covenants 
and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination. 
- The Conference requested the International Commission of 
Jurists in cooperation with competent African Organisations 
to study the feasibility of creating a regional system for the 
protection of human rights in Africa; an Inter African 
Commission on Human Rights, with consultative jurisdiction 
and power to make recommendations should be the primary 
25 
factor in such a regional body. 
It has been observed that the 1967 ICJ Dakar Conference was* restricted 
to Francophone jurists because of "tactical reasons" and not a reflection 
of divisions between Francophone and Anglophone jurists on methods 
26 towards evolving a regional machinery for human rights. 
Indeed during the twenty-third Session of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights in March 1967, the Nigerian delegation introduced a 
resolution, co-sponsored by Congo (Zaire), Dahomey (Benin), , 
the 
Philippines, Senegal and Tanzania, asking the United Nations to consider 
establishing regional human rights commissions for regions without such 
-------------------- 
25 Ibid p. 11. 
26 See K. Mbaye "Keynote Address on the Charter on Human & Peoples 
Rights". op cit p. 21. 
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systems27. The UN Commission by its resolution 6(XXIII) adopted the 
proposal and established an Ad Hoc Study Group of eleven members to 
consider the proposal28. 
It is noteworthy that during its deliberations, the Study Group received 
memoranda from the Council of Europe and the Organisation of American 
States. The OAU and other intergovernmental organisations did not 
submit any documents, despite invitations from the Study Group. 
The Ad Hoc Study Group established at the twenty-third session of the 
UN Commission submitted its report to the Commission on Human Rights 
at its twenty-fourth session in 196829. The views of the members of the 
Ad Hoc Study Group were sharply divided but they agreed on some 
issues. It was generally agreed that if further regional commissions 
were to be established, this should be done on the initiative of states in 
the region and not to be imposed by the UN or some other external 
organisations. After dwelling on the report, the Commission In its 
resolution 7(XXIV) of 1 March 1968 requested the UN Secretary-General 
to transmit the report to Member States and to regional Inter- 
governmental organisations for their comments. The UN Secretary- 
General was further requested to consider the possibility of arranging 
suitable regional seminars under the programme of advisory services In 
the field of human rights in those regions without commissions for the 
purpose of discussing the usefulness and advisability of the 
-------------------- 
27 
UN Doc/E/CN. 4/L. 940, Draft Recommendation II, Report of the 
twenty-third Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (E/4322; 
p. 109-125) 1967. 
28 The Ad Hoc Study Group was composed of representatives of Chile, 
the Congo, Iran, Jamaica, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, the 
United Arab Republic (Egypt), the USSR, and the United States. 
29 UN Doc/E/CN. 4/4.66 and addendum 1 (Report of the UN Ad Hoc 
Study Group established under Resolution 6(XXIII) of the Commission on Human Rights). 
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establishment of such commissions30 
During the intervening period between the UN Commissions twenty- 
fourth session and its twenty-fifth session in March 1967, some factors 
convened to brighten the prospects for the establishment of a regional 
Commission in Africa. Firstly, the Permanent Arab Commission on 
Human Rights had just been established under the aegis of the League 
of Arab States; secondly, the Government of the United Arab Republic 
had invited the UN to hold a Seminar in Cairo under the framework of 
advisory services to discuss the questions of the establishment of a 
regional commission for Africa. 
The Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human 
Rights with Special Reference to Africa31 was held from 2-15 September 
1969 In Cairo and participants were invited from forty-one African 
States, the specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental 
organisations. 
The agenda of the seminar was to investigate: - 
(a) the usefulness and advisability of establishing regional 
commissions in the field of human rights and the main 
functions such regional commissions may'-perform 
32. 
-------------------- 
30 Commission Resolution 7(XXIV) of 1 March 1968. 
31 UN Doc ST/TAO/HR38 1969. 
32 Towards this end, the UN Secretariat suggested the following possible 
functions: - 
(I) Education and information activities, 
(ii) Undertaking research and studies, 
(iii) Performance of advisory services, 
(iv) Holding seminars and awarding fellowships, 
(v. ) Fact-finding and conciliation, 
NO Consideration of communications from states, individuals and 
groups of individuals and the kind of action to be taken. 
355 
(b) The geographical scope of such a regional commission, the 
method for its establishment and its membership. 
(c) The desirable forms of relationship of the regional commission 
with the UN, the specialised agencies active in the field of 
human rights and other intergovernmental organisations and 
33 
commissions . 
There was a high degree of unanimity on the desirability of establishing 
a regional Commission on Human Rights for Africa. This "turn around" 
can be attributed to the desire by the participating African States to 
achieve a greater respect for human rights throughout the African 
Continent. A. H. Robertson, however, attributed this new attitude to 
the fact that human rights had become an accepted basis in the UN for 
attacking ones political opponents whether as regards the Israeli- 
occupied territories, the practice of apartheid, the situations In Namibia 
or elsewhere34. The fact that the conference was held at the instance 
of the United Arab Republic and that she took particular interest In 
those proceedings is probably instructive of the contention. 
During the Conference however, differences of opinion occurred on two 
issues, namely: 
- fact-finding and conciliation, and 
- the consideration of communications from States, individuals 
or groups of individuals and the kind of action to be taken 
thereon. 
Some participants emphasised that the Commission could not achieve its 
goal unless the two foregoing functions were performed by it. On the 
-------------------- 
33 
Ibld p. 4-7. 
34 A. H. Robertson Human Rights in the World: An Introductin to the 
Study of the International Protection of Human Rights (Manchester 
University Press, 1982) pp. 151-7. 
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other hand, others believed that because sovereignty and non- 
intervention were very important principles in most African countries, 
efforts should be made to avoid creating situations which may make 
States fearful of intervention in what they considered their reserved 
domain. The solution proffered was to endow the contentious provisions 
with an optional character thereby allowing states to subscribe to them 
35 
whenever they were prepared so to do 
The seminar envisaged an African Commission on Human Rights that 
would greatly enhance Africa's international and moral Image, thus a 
practical demonstration by African countries that they were concerned 
36 
with the promotion and protection of human rights on the continent. 
As regards the geographical scope of the proposed Commission, the 
seminar agreed that it should include all African States, members of OAU 
which were committed to the unity of the African Continent but to the 
exclusion of Governments practising the apartheid and racial 
discrimination37. It was also agreed that the African Commission should 
be created by a resolution of the OAU rather than by the conclusion of 
a Convention. 
38 
The seminar ended its deliberation by unanimously adopting six 
conclusions39, the most significant ones being: - 
-------------------- 
35 
UN Doc ST/TAO/HR/38 1969 p. 8-10. 
36 Ibid p. 10. 
37 Ibid p. 11-12. 
38 Ibid p. 13. 
39 Ibid p. 18. 
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(a) To request the Secretary-General of the UN to 
communicate the report of the seminar to the 
Secretary-General of the OAU and the governments of 
Member States so that the OAU might consider the 
appropriate steps including the convening of a 
preparatory committee representative of OAU 
Membership with a view to establishing a regional 
commission for Africa. 
(b) To appeal to all Governments of Member States of the 
OAU to give their support and cooperation in 
establishing a regional commission on human rights for 
Africa. 
(c) To request the Secretary-General of the UN to offer all 
assistance under the programme of advisory services in 
the field of human rights established by General 
Assembly Resolution 926(X) in any effort towards 
establishing a regional commission on human rights for 
Africa such as by providing experts and fellowships. 
(d) To request the Secretary-General to arrange for full 
consultation and exchange of information between the 
Commission on Human Rights and the OAU concerning 
the establishmenl0 of a regional commission on human 
rights for Africa . 
It was also unanimously agreed that the proposed regional commission 
should undertake essentially promotional functions in the area of human 
rights. These activities were to include "(a) educational and information 
activities; (b) research and studies; (c) performance of advisory 
41 
services; (d) holding seminars and awarding scholarships" 
The rationale for the decision opting for a commission with essentially 
promotional functions was that a commission with judicial functions might 
not be generally acceptable to African States which jealously guarded 
their sovereignty. The impact of the report of the Ad Hoc Study Group 
to the twenty-fourth session of the Commission on Human Rights is 
40 Ibid p. 18, Para. 65. It is worth noting that despite being invited to 
this seminar, the OAU was not represented. The OAU's indifference to 
efforts towards the establishment of a regional human rights system in 
Africa is also reflected In the fact that the OAU did not attend the 24th 
Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights which deliberated upon 
the report of the Ad Hoc Study Group, despite being invited. 
41 Mid p. 7. 
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reflected in the Seminars decision that regarded the OAU as the suitable f 
authority to initiate and establish a Commission on Human Rights for 
Africa42. At its twenty-sixth session in 1970, the UN Commission 
considered the report of the Cairo Seminar and passed a resolution 
reiterating the conclusions of the Cairo Seminar43 
The UN organised a Seminar on the Realisation of Economic and Social 
Rights, with Particular Reference to Developing Countries in Lusaka, 
Zambia from 23 June -4 July 1970. 
Previous Human Rights Seminars and Conferences on Africa and the 
Developing World had relied heavily on the classical civil and political 
eights for the substance of their proposals. The conclusion reached at 
the Lusaka Seminar stressed that the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights is as important as civil and political rights. The Seminar 
also regarded both sets of rights as interdependent and interrelated. 
The Lusaka Seminar emphasised the need for regional programmes for 
the promotion of human rights to highlight the economic, social and 
44 cultural rights. 
Following the Cairo and Lusaka Seminars, the baton of the crusade for 
the establishment of an African Human Rights Commission was picked up 
next at the Addis Ababa Conference of African Jurists on African Legal 
Process and the Individual, held under the auspices of the Economic 
Commission for Africa of the United Nations (ECA) from 19-23 April 
1971. 
-------------------- 
42 Ibid p. 12-13. 
43 Res. 6(XXVI) of the UN Commission on Human Rights 26th Session, 
(1970). 
44 UN Doc ST/TAO/HR/40. 
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Although the ECA is not conceived as an institution for the protection of 
human rights, its mandate, Resolution 671(XXV), could be translated to 
include promotional activities in the field of human rights as long as 
they correspond to national policies and objectives of States45 . 
Since 
the constitution of most African States subscribe to the promotion and 
protection of human rights in one form or the other, it would seem that 
the ECA's sponsorship of the Conference of African Jurists is in order. 
An analysis of the papers presented at this conference reveals that the 
Issues debated were more related to the protection of human rights 
within African countries rather than the establishment of a regional 
commission46. However, it its conclusions the Conference adopted 
Resolution No. 3 in which they supported the tecommendations of the 
Cairo Seminar of 1969 and made the following specific recommendations: 
(i) that an African Commission on Human Rights be 
established and charged with the responsibility of 
collecting and circulating information relating to 
legislation and decisions concerning human rights In 
annual reports devoted to the question of civil rights 
in Africa; 
(ii) that an African Convention on Human Rights be 
concluded; 
(iii) that every effort be made to harmonise legislation In 
the different African countries in this regard; 
(iv) that an Advisory Body be established to which 
recourse may be had for the interpretation of the 
terms of the African Convention on Human Rights; 
(v) that the various African States be urged to take 
speedy measures to accede (sic) to or ratify the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination and the 
OAU Convention governing Specific Aspects of 
Problems in Africa; 
-------------------- 
45 ECOSOC Res. 671(XXV) of 29 April 1958. For an analysis of the 
relationship between the OAU and the ECA, see Chapter 3, above. 
46 Thierry G. Verhelst (ed) Legal Process and the Individual: African 
Source Materials, op cit. 
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(vi) that the OAU should hasten the implementation of the 
recommendations of the UN Cairo Seminar of 1969 
taking account of existing international instrumerýtýs 
that have been drafted by the UN in this connection 
It is pertinent to note that the Conference departed from the 
recommendations of previous UN Seminars by proposing for the first time 
that an African Convention on Human Rights be established. 
Despite these purposeful and well defined objectives, nothing practical 
was achieved to concretize these aspirations, unless perhaps one 
considers the subsequent seminars and conferences on the issue as 
accelerating procedures towards the goal of establishing an African 
Commission on Human Rights. 
The next 
Study of 
seminar 
New Wa 
in this accelerating process was the 
ys and Means for Promoting Human 
UN 
Rig 
Seminar 
hts with 
on the 
Special 
Attention to the Problems and Needs of Africa held in Dar-es Salaam, 
Tanzania from 23 October -5 November 197348. The Seminar accepted, 
In principle, the need for the establishment of an African Commission to 
promote and protect human rights, and agreed with the recommendations 
of the Cairo Seminar that the OAU might consider appropriate steps, 
including the convening of a preparatory committee representative of the 
OAU Membership with the object of establishing such a commission. 
-------------------- 
47 
The Conference noted that as at April 1971, no effort had been made 
by the OAU with respect to the recommendations of the Cairo Seminar, 
and that, In fact, no Member State of the OAU (including those States 
represented at the Cairo Seminar) had placed recommendations of the 
Seminar on the Agenda of the OAU's Conference of the Council of 
Ministers. Ibid p. 372-373. 
48 See Report In UN Doc/ST/TAO/HR/48; 1973. 
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As regards the scope and definition of the rights to be protected by the 
regional commission, it was suggested during the debate that the 
functions of the regional commission should encompass the promotion and 
protection of the whole scope of human rights, whether economic, social, 
cultural, political or civil, their handling of questions relating to the 
right of self-determination and to economic development, assistance in 
the spread of education in the field of human rights, the conduct of 
49 
research and training programmes, and the award of fellowships 
The Seminar also emphasised the need for the proposed Convention to 
reflect Africa's peculiar problems of which economic underdevelopment 
was the most important. It was also recommended that the Convention 
should clearly set down the conditions under Which State Parties may 
legitimately impose limitations on human rights. The Seminar suggested 
that the drafting of the Convention, be initially entrusted to an OAU ad 
hoc body of experts for Africa to be assisted, if need be, by experts 
50 drawn from the UN and other specialised agencies 
During the course of the debates reasons for the lethargy of the OAU 
and Its Member States towards the setting up of the Regional System 
emerged. It was suggested that the lack of response to the calls such 
as those made at the Cairo Conference were due to the obsession with 
national and parochial problems, fragile political institutions, and 
divergence in legal systems and political philosophies which had 
prevented the development of meaningful economic cooperation at the 
sub-regional level with the notable exception of the East African 
51 Community 
-------------------- 
99 Ibid Para 108. 
50 Ibid Para. 90. 
51 Ibid Para. 91. 
: 
. 
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Although the conclusions reached at UN Dar-es Salaam Seminar basically 
reiterated the recommendations of the Cairo Seminar, it however went 
further by raising pertinent, but unresolved, issues concerning the 
competence of the Commission to review and consider individual and state 
communications, and whether the Commission should have 'advisory' or 
'compulsory' powers52. More importantly, the Seminar intensified the 
awareness of the need to establish the regional system in Africa. 
The complement the efforts of the UN towards the creation of an African 
Commission on Human Rights, non-governmental organisations, the 
African Bar Associations and other interested groups organised seminars 
and conferences on regional protection of human rights in Africa53. For 
instance, the International Commission of Jurists played a leading role in 
the campaign to establish a regional system of human rights in Africa. 
In addition to having arranged the 1961 Lagos Conference and the Dakar 
Conference of 1967, the international Commission of Jurists in 
conjunction with the Association Senegalaise d'Etudes et Recherches 
Juridiques held the Dakar Colloquium on "Development and Human 
Rights" in September 1978. The Colloquium in its conclusions called for: 
"(a) The establishment at the Pan-African level of a 
Convention on human rights. 
(b) The creation of sub-regional institutes of human rights 
for their promotion by information, documentation, 
research, and the awakening of public opinion. 
(c) The creation of one or several inter-African 
Commissions on human rights composed of independent 
judges authorized to examine complaints concerning 
violations of human rights. 
-------------------- 
52 Ibid. 
53 For a chronological list of Human Rights Conferences and Seminars in 
Africa leading up to the adoption of the African Charter on Human & 
Peoples Rights in June 1981, See Appendix VII post. 
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(d) The creation within African States of mass 
organisg4ions capable of effectively defending human 
rights" 
The Dakar Colloquium concluded its deliberations by requesting the 
Organisation of African Unity and all African States to do everything 
possible to establish a system of guarantees and verifications of human 
rights in Africa"55. 
The Dakar Colloquium reverted to the formulae of previous Seminars by 
couching its conclusions as urgent requests to the OAU. However, 
unlike the previous seminars, the Colloquium was exceptional in forming 
a "follow-up" committee, composed of four eminent Africans to ensure the 
implementation of its conclusions and recommendations. The committee 
embarked on shuttle of strategically chosen African capitals to impress 
upon Heads of State the importance and urgent need, for a regional 
human rights commission. Judge Keba Mbaye56 states that it was as a 
result of the "follow-up"- committees efforts that the President L. S. 
Senghor of Senegal agreed to present a resolution for the establishment 
of an African human rights commission to the next session of the OAU 
and he also mandated the President of the Supreme Court of Senegal, as 
President of the Committee responsible for preparing the draft text57. 
-------------------- 
54 See Y. Kushalani "Human Rights in Asia and Africa" in Human Rights 
Law Journal Vol. 4, No. 4 1983, p. 433. 
55 Ibid. 
56 President of the ICJ and former President of the Supreme Court of 
Senegal. 
57 Keba Mbaye "Keynote Address: Introduction to the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights op cit p. 22. It is pertinent to note that the Senghor draft, as amended by the addition of "peoples rights", formed the basis of Resolution 115(XVI) (July 1979) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU which instructed the Secretary-General 
of the OAU to form a Committee of African Legal Experts to be 
responsible for the preliminary draft of an African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights. 
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An examination of the foregoing seminars reveals that the overwhelming 
majority of participants, at the UN and ICJ conferences on the 
enhancement of human rights were mostly academics, diplomats and 
judges; there was a noticeable absence of practising barristers58 . It 
is 
indeed surprising that legal practitioners who are at the vanguard of the 
clinical aspects of the defence of human rights in Africa were not 
prominent in the call for the establishment of a regional commission for 
Africa. A number of reasons could be proffered for this state of 
affairs; the most significant being that the age old dichotomy between 
International law and municipal law discouraged the practitioners of the 
latter from reaching beyond the frontiers to the former. 
However at the Third Biennial Conference of the African Bar 
Association59 at Freetown, Sierra Leone, in August 1978, practitioners 
debated the issue of human rights in Africa and resolved to call on 
national governments and the OAU to seek a more effective way for the 
promotion of . human rights in Africa. They reiterated the 
recommendations of previous UN Seminars by calling for the 
establishment of an African machinery for the promotion and protection 
of human rights. 
In February 1978, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a 
Nigerian resolution that the UN Secretary-General "take appropriate 
steps to give the Organisation of African Unity, if it so requests, such 
-------------------- 
58 
A possible exception was the 1st ICJ Lagos Rule of Law Conference in 
1961 which was organised in conjunction with "Liberty" (the now defunct 
Nigerian Chapter of the ICJ) a body composed mostly of barristers. 
59 See Amnesty International Newsletter Vol. 8 No. 10 (1978). 
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assistance as it may required in facilitating the establishing of a regional 
60 
commission on human rights for Africa" 
This resolution laid the foundation for probably the most important UN 
Seminar on human rights to take place in Africa61. The UN Seminar on 
The Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special 
Reference to Africa, unlike previous seminars, was held under a very 
congenial atmosphere; this was due to the fact that barely a month 
preceding the seminar, the OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and 
Government of the OAU had also met in Monrovia from 17-20 July 1979. 
The Assembly had adopted a "Decision on Human Rights and Peoples 
Rights in Africa"62. 
During the deliberations of the Assembly leading the adoption of the 
Decision, references were made to obstacles63 in the OAU Charter which 
prevented the efficient promotion and protection of human rights in 
Africa. Alluding to the failure of the OAU to comment on widely 
publicised human rights violations in Uganda and her failure to intervene 
-------------------- 
60 It is significant that 10 years earlier, Nigeria had introduced a similar 
resolution In the Commission on Human Rights (passed 28-0-3) 
establishing an 'ad hoc' group to "study in all its aspects the proposal to 
establish regional commissions on human rights within the United Nations 
family". 26 January 1968. UN Doc E/CN 4/966. 
61 
The UN Seminar on "The Establishment of Regional Commissions on 
Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa" Monrovia, Liberia 10-21 
Sept 1979, UN Doc ST/HR/SER. A/4. Attended by participants from 30 
African States as well as observers from specialized agencies, regional 
organisations and NGO's. It is of interest to observe that this was the 
very first UN Seminar to be attended by the OAU, represented by the 
OAU Secretary-General, Mr. Edem Kodjo, and the OAU Chief Legal 
Adviser, Mr. C. O. Egbunike. 
62 Decision on Human Rights and Peoples Rights in Africa: Decision 
115(XVI) Rev. i OAU Doc AHG/115 XVI. 
63 The major obstacle being the OAU principle of non-intervention In the 
domestic affairs of Member States. For an analysis of this principle see Chapter 2, above. 
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in the Tanzanian/Uganda 
remarked that: 
war early in 197964, President Tolbert 
64 Wani I. J. "Humanitarian Intervention and the Tanzania Uganda War" 
Horn of Africa Vol. 3, No. 2 (1980) p. 18-27. 
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"All of us are convinced that the Charter of the OAU needs 
to be examined and sense made so that matters such as this 
(UgandpiTanzania issue) can be handled appropriately in 
future" 
In the final analysis, the Assembly took the Decision on Human Rights 
and Peoples Rights in Africa which inter alia called on the OAU 
Secretary-General to: 
"(a) draw attention of Member States to certain international 
conventions whose ratification would help to strengthen 
Africa's struggle against certain scourges, especially 
apartheid and racial discrimination, trade Imbalances 
and mercenarism. 
(b) organise as soon as possible, in an African capital, a 
restricted meeting of highly qualified experts to 
prepare a preliminary draft of an "African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Right" providing, inter alia for the 
establishment of bodes to promote and protect human 
and peoples rights" . 
Encouraged by this "historic decision"67, the UN Dakar Seminar 
proceeded on an incisive analysis of the problems of promoting and 
protecting human rights in Africa, and emerged with the "Monrovia 
Proposal for the setting up of an African Commission on Human 
68 Rights" 
In his opening address to the UN Dakar Seminar, T. Van Boven In his 
capacity as the Director of UN Division on Human Rights, emphasised 
the need for a "grass roots" approach to human rights whereby African 
peoples should adopt measures best suited to their respective needs in 
-------------------- 
65 Keesings Contemporary Archives (Bath) p. 19463A. 
66 Decision 115(XVI) Rev. 1 OAU Doc AMG/115. XVI. Article 2 Para. (b). 
67 The OAU Secretary-General described this decision as "historic" 
because It was the first time that the OAU had taken a concrete step on 
human rights. See Keesings Contemporary Archives op cit p. 29842. 
68 UN Doc ST/HR/SER A/4. 
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enhancing the promotion and protection of human rights69. The seminar 
noted that the OAU Member States did not show the political homogeneity 
which characterized the members of certain other regional organisations. 
It was also observed that the African States were mainly concerned with 
improving the living conditions and basic education of their peoples. It 
was decided that the recommendations should be undertaken within the 
framework of the OAU Decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of 
70 State and Government in July 1979. 
Whilst the UN Seminar agreed that the function of an African Commission 
on Human Rights should be primarily promotional, it also insisted that 
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
state should not exclude international action when human rights are 
71 
violated in a particular African State. 
As regards the procedural, fact finding and Investigative functions, the 
participants were divided in their opinions. Doubts were expressed over 
whether the proposed Commission should consider Individual petitions. 
Some participants considered that the petition procedure was the heart 
of any protective system; while others believed that to deal ' with 
individual complaints would be premature, because It was necessary to 
72 initially educate and enlighten people of their Individual rights. 
There was, however, general agreement that the OAU Council of Minister 
or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU might 
wish to ask the commission to undertake fact-finding in cases involving 
-------------------- 
69 Theo Van Boven, People Matter: Views on International Human Rights 
Policy (1982 Meulenhoff, Nederland bv) p. 165. 
70 Ibid Para. 63. 
71 Ibid Para. 70. 
72 Ibid Para. 58. 
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reports of serious violations of human rights, and that this function 
73 
should be provided for when setting up the African Commission. 
Bearing in mind the plight of previous UN Seminars, the working group 
decided to prepare concrete proposals for the establishment of an 
African Commission. It saw the advantage of the proposals being useful 
to the OAU Meeting of Experts which was scheduled to be convened in 
accordance with the Decision of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. 
Thus a comprehensive "blueprint" for the proposed Commission was 
drafted and labelled the "Monrovia Proposal" by the UN Seminar. The 
Monrovia Proposal contained 15 draft articles in six parts viz: (1) the 
functions of the Commission; (ii) applicable standards; (iii) membership 
and elections; (iv) the Secretariat; (v) matters of procedure; and NO 
annual report. 
The Monrovia Proposal states that the function of the African Commission 
shall be "to promote and protect human rights in Africa" by undertaking 
studies and research in the field of human rights, promoting education 
seminars, disseminating information, encouraging national and local 
74 human rights organisations and rendering advice to Governments. 
The applicable standards by which the Commission shall be guided are 
the provisions of specific African Instruments on human rights which 
may be concluded, such as a declaration, a charter or convention, the 
provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of the OAU, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the provisions of other UN and African 
-------------------- 
73 Ibid. 
74 Article 1, Monrovia Proposal UN Doc ST/HR/SER. A/4 Annex I. 
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75 instruments in the field of human rights. 
The Monrovia Proposal also provided that membership of the African 
Commission on Human Rights shall consist of sixteen experts chosen from 
among "persons of high moral character and Integrity and recognized 
competence in the field of human rights"76. 
On the method of establishing the Commission, the majority of 
participants were in favour of a commission to be established within the 
institutional structure of the OAU, but functioning independently. It 
was agreed that the Commission should be established by a decision of 
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government under Article 20 of 
the OAU Charter or by treaty77. 
Thus the Monrovia Proposal states that "the Secretary-General of the 
OAU shall designate a Secretary of the Commission and provide the 
necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the 
functions of the Commission. The cost of providing such staff and 
facilities shall be born by the OAU"78. 
As regards the Procedure and Reports of the Commission, the Monrovia 
Proposal charges the Commission with the responsibility of adopting Its 
own Rules of Procedure 
?9 
and states that an annual report shall be 
-------------------- 
75 Ibid Article 2; Article 60 of the African Charter on Human & Peoples 
Rights is a restatement of Article 2, Monrovia Proposal. 
76 Ibid Article 4; cf Article 31 of the African Charter on Human & 
Peoples Rights which states that the Commission shall consist of eleven 
Members. 
77 UN Doc ST/HR/SER. A/4 Para. 63. 
78 Monrovia Proposal, Article 10 Ibid. It is interesting to note that 
Article 41 of the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights is almost an 
exact reproduction of Article 10 of the Monrovia Proposal. 
79 Ibid Article 14. 
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submitted by the Commission through the Secretary-General to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. 
80 
A comparative analysis of the Monrovia Proposal and the African Charter 
on Human & Peoples Rights reveals that most of the proposals of the 
former are reflected in the latter. In an interview with this writer, 
Professor Osita Eze81, stated that the UN Monrovia draft "provided a 
useful precedent" by which the OAU Meeting of Legal Experts were 
guided in their task of drafting an African Charter. 
82 
The intention of the UN Seminar was to transmit the Monrovia Proposal' 
to the Chairman of the OAU, President Tqlbert of Liberia, for 
consideration by the OAU Meeting of Experts on the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights. However this plan was pre-empted by a 
military coup d'etat which overthrew his government. Despite this 
temporary setback the Monrovia Proposal was eventually submitted to the 
OAU Secretariat which duly incorporated it as one of the working papers 
for the OAU Committee of African Legal Experts to Draft the African 
Charter. The Ministerial Conference of the OAU, as its meeting in 
Banjul, Gambia, in June 1980, was presented with the draft African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. We shall consider the progress 
of the Draft Charter under the auspices of the OAU in the next 
chapter. 
-------------------- 
80 Ibid Article 15; cf Article 54 of the African Charter on Human & 
Peoples Rights which requires the Commission to submit a report to each 
ordinary Session of the Assembly which meets annually. 
81 Professor of Law, Imo State University, Nigeria and a member of the 
Group of 20 Experts appointed by the OAU to prepare a preliminary 
draft of an African Charter. 
82 See also, O. C. Ete Human Rights in Africa: Some Selected Problems 
op cit p. 211. 
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From the foregoing, the invaluable contribution of the UN towards the 
evolution of a regional organ for the protection of human rights in 
Africa is manifest. In the light of the fact that the pace towards this 
metamorphosis was slow, it is pertinent to inquire into factors 
responsible for this delay. 
(e) Obstacles to the Establishment of a Regional Machinery for the 
Protection of Human Rights in Africa 
The twenty-year process83 seems a very long time in evolving a regional 
human rights protection machinery for Africa. Several reasons can be 
proferred for this slow evolution. 
One of the main reasons for the delay in achieving this objective, 
probably lies In the nature and organization of the seminars. The 
conferences and seminars on human rights in Africa were not sponsored 
by the OAU and they lacked effective participation by African States, 
consequently there was an absence of political will to ensure follow-up 
action. This conclusion is derived from the fact that despite the 
express Invitations extended to the OAU Secretariat to attend the 1969 
and 1973 UN Seminars, the OAU was not represented. Furthermore, a 
perusal of the status of member-states delegates at the Seminars reveals 
that about one-half were members of the diplomatic corps. One would 
have expected a higher cadre of political officers, who wield more 
political influence, to have been the representatives of African 
Governments at these Seminars. 
The fact that the other delegates were mainly academics lends credence 
to the contention that the academic tone in which the UN Seminar 
recommendations were drafted posed an obstacle to the establishment of 
-------------------- 
83 From the 1961 Rule of Law Conference In Lagos to the 1981 adoption 
of the AFCHPR. 
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an African Commission because they were not drafted In sufficiently 
action-oriented terms to facilitate the process of decision making. 
Secondly, the difference in the methods of protecting human rights in 
legal systems of African States have created obstacles despite the fact 
that most African constitutions have a common Judaeo-Graeco orientation. 
These differences have also been amplified by the various political 
ideologies adopted. Thus there was an absence of effective African 
consensus on the form that fundamental rights In a regional charter on 
human rights should take. Much as the majority of African States 
proclaim the policy of nonalignment in foreign relations, the political 
reality differs. The western liberal capitalist ideology, and the 
socialist/Marxist Ideology have influenced and continue to Influence the 
domestic laws and policies of African States. The dichotomy of political 
ideologies has Invariably influenced the evolution of the African Charter 
of Human and Peoples Rights. For instance, during the deliberations of 
the OAU Council of Ministers 37th Ordinary Session, on the draft 
AFCHPR, the debate on the provisions on property rights unduly 
prolonged the meeting84. The compromise arrived at Is couched in 
Article 14 of the AFCHPR. We shall examine the drafting history of the 
provisions of the AFCHPR in the following chapter. 
Thirdly, the strong aversion of African States to interference in their 
internal affairs has contributed to the delay In evolving a regional 
Charter on human rights. African States have hitherto regarded 
questions of human rights as matters of domestic jurisdiction. The 
attitude of the OAU towards massive violations of human rights In Africa 
underlines this view. For instance, during Id! Amin's massive violations 
-------------------- 
84 Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (37th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers June, 1981); OAU Doc. C/M/1149(XXXVII) 19811, p. 12, para. 57. 
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of human rights in Uganda, the organization failed to react or condemn 
the practices. 
The fragility of African States occasioned by internal destabilization 
forces of ethnicity85 and military intervention amongst others, have been 
obstacles to the evolution of a regional human rights machine. Military 
intervention in African politics has resulted In the brutalization of 
African societies and the degradation of human dignity, manifested by 
the suffering of the mass of African populace86. Thus, where human 
rights practices of States have been dismal, there exists a vivid 
reluctance to subject these practices to a regional or International 
periscope. African States have, thus, hitherto been unwilling to lift the 
vent of sovereignty for human rights considerations. Whether these 
States will raise the defence of "domestic domain" to regional perusal of 
human rights violations under the AFCHPR remains to be seen. 
The prevailing economic underdevelopment of Africa has been a major 
stumbling block to the evolution of a regional machinery for human 
rights in Africa. At least twenty out of the thirty "least developed" 
and poor countries of the world are in Africa87. Professor Osita Eze's 
contention, that the very existence of rich and poor nations is by Itself 
a negation of the very concept of human rights88 Is Indicative of the 
need for the developed nations to reappraise their attitude to the 
establishment of a New World Economic Order. In the absence of a 
determined international effort to redress the world economic Imbalance, 
-------------------- 
85 For a discussion on ethnicity in Africa, See Chapter 4. 
86 Zdenek Cervenka "The Effects of Militarization of African on Human 
Rights" Africa Today 1st/2nd Quarter 1987, p. 77. 
87 UNCTAD Press Release TAD/INF/1120,26 Nov 1979. 
88 O. Eze "Prospects for International Protection of Human Rights in 
Africa", op cit P. 88. 
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African States have been and will be prepared to sacrifice the 
observance of civil and political rights for the purpose of achieving 
89 
economic progress . 
It is therefore suggested that the prerequisites for an effective regional 
machinery for the protection of human rights in Africa are: 
(a) the reappraisal of African constitutional provisions and 
domestic laws, relating to human rights in alignment with the 
AFCHPR; 
(b) the democratization of the political processes in African 
States through periodic elections90; 
(c) the establishment of a New World Economic Order and the 
pursuance of the policy of self-reliance by African States. 
These factors should to a large extent enhance the regional protection of 
human rights in Africa. 
In his appraisal of human rights and the rule of law In Africa, Professor 
E. Bello contends that "a Charter on Human Rights acceptable to 50 
Members of the OAU Is illusory and unworkable"91. Much as that 
illusion has been dispelled to an extent by the adoption and entering 
into force of the AFCHPR, we submit that the practicability or 
enforceability of the Charter may yet succumb to some of the obstacles 
enumerated above. 
89 
For a discussion of Socio-Economic Self-Determination in Africa, see 
Chapter 3, above. 
90 
cf Professor 0. Eze however contends that periodic elections are not 
necessarily more democratic than military regimes, nor are multiparty 
states more in consonance with the aspirations of the people than one- 
party states - 0. Eze; Human Rights in Africa - Some Selected Problems 
op cit p. 207. 
91 E. C. Bello "Human Rights: The Rule of Law in Africa" Vol. 30 ICLQ 
July 1980. 
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(f) African Response to UN Programmes and Procedures for the 
Protection of Human Rights 
African States have shown a great deal of interest In human rights and 
their promotion through the United Nations. Since their Independence In 
the early 1960's African countries have used their voting power to 
influence the General Assembly debates towards a greater consideration 
of human rights issues. 
The UN Commission of Human Rights was created by virtue of Untied 
Nations Charter's Article 68, as the central UN organ for dealing with 
human rights violations. It was established in 1946 by the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC)92. At its Second Session In May 1946, the 
Commission was empowered to create a sub-commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which has come to 
play an Important role in attempts to create effective machinery for 
implementing the protection of human rights. Unfortunately, the 
Commission decided at the onset that neither itself nor the Sub- 
Commission had "power to take any action In regard to complaints 
concerning human rights"93. This self-restraining role approved by the 
ECOSOC, was to remain In effect until 1967. The effect therefore was 
that complaints sent to the UN concerning violations of human rights 
were shut out by the Commission on the basis of Its 1947 decision that It 
was not competent to investigate or take any action on these 
94 
complaints 
-------------------- 
92 Sir Samuel Hoare, "The UN Commission on Human Rights" In Evan 
Luard (ed) The International Protection of Human Rights: (New York: 
Praeger, 1967) p. 59. 
93 Ibid at p. 63. 
94 William Korey, "The Key to Human Rights Implementation" 
International Conciliation, No. 570 (November 1968) p. 18. 
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However, the situation was changed in 1966 as a result of the growing 
African vote at the UN and an intensification of the interest in apartheid 
on the African continent. 
In March 1967, the Commission requested that ECOSOC authorise it and 
its Sub-Commission "to examine communications received by the United 
Nations for information relevant to 'gross violations' of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms"95 ECOSOC acceded to the request by adopting 
Resolution 1235(XLII) on 6 June 1967. The Commission also requested 
for authorisation to undertake a thorough study and investigation of 
situations that reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights 
and to report with accompanying recommendations concerning them to 
96 ECOSOC. ECOSOC Resolution 1235 approved this request. 
In October 1967, the Sub-Commission acted under the new powers 
granted to the Commission to study information and report on cases 
which might Indicate "situations which reveal a consistent pattern of 
violations of human rights as exemplified by the policy of apartheid... 
and racial discrimination"97. The Sub-Commission relied on the reports 
supplied to the UN by Amnesty International, dealing with human rights 
violation in Greece and Haiti. The Sub-Commission recommended to the 
Commission that it consider both cases. 
98 
As its February 1968 Session, the Commission heard Haiti's 
representative argue that his country was cited in an attempt to divert 
the Commission's attention from the consideration of apartheid. The 
------------------- 
95 Commission on Human Rights, Res. 8 (XXIII) 16 March 1967. 
96 W. Korey, op cit p. 18. 
97 ECOSOC Res. 1235(XLII), 16 March 1967. 
98 W. Korey, op cit, p. 21. 
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Nigerian delegate raised the issue of domestic jurisdiction while Tanzania 
expressed anger over the Sub-Commissions decision to review violations 
outside Southern Africa. Tanzanias reservation was that the Sub- 
Commission had transgressed the resolution passed at the 1968 Session of 
the Commission which requested the Commission to consider "all 
situations, which it has a reasonable cause to believe reveal a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms" as limited to those cases "as exemplified by the policy of 
apartheid in South Africa and social discrimination In Southern 
Rhodesia"99. The Tanzanian delegate also successfully proposed that 
the Sub-Commission which consists of Independent experts, be expanded 
from eighteen twenty-six experts100. The additions were mostly from 
Afro-Asian States. Although critics expressed doubts as to whether the 
Sub-Commission would consider violations other than those In South 
Africa, the Sub-Commission did discuss cases outside South Africa, 
albeit rarely in open session. 
From the foregoing it is evident that violations in Southern Africa was 
one of the main factors that geared a greater Interest In human rights at 
the UN. This development was not unconnected with the impact of the 
presence of African States at the UN. Some critics'01 have accused 
African States of a selective approach to the protection of human rights 
at the UN. " While African States have, on the one hand, called for 
-------------------- 
99 
Ibid at p. 23. 
100 The Sub-Commission is composed of 7 nationals from Africa, 5 from 
Asia, 5 from Latin America, 3 from Eastern Europe and 6 from Western 
Europe. 
101 Warren Weinstein "Africa's Approach to Human Rights at the UN". 
Issue Vol. VI No. 4 (Winter 1976) p. 16. 
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investigation of human rights violations in South Africa, on the other 
hand, they have resisted public debate of violations in other areas with 
102 the exception of Israeli Occupied Territories 
While we accept that plausible grounds do exist for such criticism, it is 
contended that the inherent procedural restrictions on the UN's human 
rights protection systems are largely responsible. Nevertheless, African 
States have been instrumental to the redefinition of the protection 
systems to ensure a greater protection of human rights. 
A significant development in this wise was the authorization to the 
Commission of Human Rights by ECOSOC in 1970 to establish procedures 
for investigating gross violations of human rights103. Two of the most 
important items on the agenda of the Commission and Sub-Commission are 
entitled respectively "violation of human rights" (a public procedure) 
and "examination of communications" (a confidential procedure). " The 
public procedure may be divided into a "country oriented" and a 
"thematic" method. The latter relates to a particular type of human 
rights violation; the former gives special attention to human rights 
violations in a particular country104 Since these procedures were 
established, the Sub-Commission has drawn the attention of the 
Commission to cases other than violations In Southern Africa. 
102 Ibid; cf. Eddison J. M. Zvogbo "The Abuse of Executive Prerogative: 
A Purposive Difference Between Detention in Black Africa and Detention 
in White Racist Africa", 'Issue' Vol. VI No. 4 Winter 1976. E. Zvogbo 
argues that there are striking differences between human rights 
violations in Black Africa and South Africa. 
103 ECOSOC Res. 1503 XLVIII 27 May 1970. See further; Jakob Th. Moller 
"Petitioning the United Nations". Universal Human Rights Vol. 1 No. 4 
1979 p. 62. See also Maxime Tardu "United Nations Response to dross 
Violations of Human Rights: the 1503 Procedure, Santa Clara Law Journal 
(1980) p. 559. 
104 See Marc J. Bossuyt "The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights" HRLJ Vol-8 No. 2-4 (1985) 
pp. 179-210. 
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Between 1978 and 1985 the Commission has dealt with the situation of 
human rights in 29 countries within the framework of the 1503 
confidential procedure. Despite the confidential nature of the 
procedure, the following African Countries were declared as subjects of 
the decisions of the Commission: Equitorial Guinea (1978); Ethiopia (in 
1978,1979,1980 and 1981); Malawi (1978 and 1979); Uganda (1978,1979, 
1980 and 1981); Central African Republic (1980,1981); Benin (1984) and 
Zaire (1985). 
One of the main criticisms against the 1503 Procedure is the "veil" of 
confidentiality that surrounds the substance of the Commissions 
decisions. It should however be emphasized that despite the 
confidentiality that veils the 1503 procedure, Its effectiveness is 
enhanced by the fact that State subjects of the procedure are known not 
only to the 26 independent experts of the Sub-Commission but also to 
the 43 Governments which comprise the constantly renewed Commission. 
Thus all the relevant UN and State Members of the UN human rights 
organs are aware of the human rights situation in the countries 
concerned; a significant factor which should prove embarrasing to the 
governments concerned. 
Under the regime of the public procedure ("violation of human rights") 
which is based on ECOSOC Resolution 1235(XLII) of 6 June 1967, the 
members of the Commission and Sub-Commission can, during a debate in 
public session, mention violations of human rights in any part of the 
world. This procedure has led to the adoption of resolutions and in 
105 special cases to the establishment of special procedures. In addition 
-------------------- 
105 For instance, under this procedure, the Commission established a 
"Special Working Group of experts in Southern Africa" with a mandate on 
human rights issues in Namibia and South Africa (Res. 2(XXIII) of 6 
March 1967). See M. Tardu, Human Rights: The International Petition 
System (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana, 1980) Vol. II part Six, XI1,24. 
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to the foregoing, the "country oriented" approach has also been adopted 
under the public procedural regime. The only African State subjected 
to this regime was Equitorial Guinea. The cumulative effect of the 
Commissions resolutions106 under this procedure led to the improvement 
of human rights in Equatorial Guinea and the modification of its 
Constitution through the adoption of 25 out of the 37 recommendations 
proposed by the Commission. 
Under the regime of the public procedure, the "thematic" approach was 
developed through the establishment of a Special Working Group on 
missing persons (since 1980), and Special Rapporteurs on mass exoduses 
(1981), on summary executions (1982) and on torture (1985). While the 
issue of missing persons has not been raised in connection with any 
Independent African State, it is significant that the Special Rapporteurs 
on mass exoduses and summary executions have collected data on these 
phenomena in Africa107. With regard to summary executions, the Special 
Rapporteur collects data which are used for a general survey of the 
phenomenon. Recently, however, the Rapporteur has adopted a more 
action oriented method which includes the dispatching of urgent appeals 
by telegram. The Third Report108, of the Special Rapporteur, reveals 
that no replies had been received from Iran, Libya and Malawi; and that 
106 Res. 33(XXXVI) of 11 March 1980; Res. 31(XXXVII) of 11 March 1981; 
Res. 1982/34 of 11 March 1982; Res. 1983/32 of 8 March 1983 and 
Res. 1985/30 of 11 March 1985. See R. Fegley "The UN Human Rights 
Commission: The Equatorial Case" 3 Human Rights Quarterly (1981) 
pp. 34-47. 
107 The report of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the Special Rapporteur on 
Mass Exoduses laid particular emphasis on the amplitude of Mass 
Exoduses in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Indo China and Mexico. (UN 
Doc. E/CN 4/1503, Annex II). See also Lee, L. "The UN Group of 
Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of 
Refugees" American Journal of International Law Vol. 1 78 (1984) pp. 480- 
484. 
108 UN Doe E/CN. 4/1985/17. 
382 
urgent telexes were sent to 13 States including 6 African States109 
The evolving procedures of the UN Commission on Human Rights have 
significant advantages. The "thematic" approach, though laying 
particular emphasis on categories of violations of human rights, 
encapsulates a larger number of States than the case of the "country 
oriented" approach. The "thematic" approach also reduces the hazard of 
politically engineered approaches. 
From the foregoing it is evident that while the announcement of 
'decisions' may sufficiently embarrass many States to mend their ways, 
some may need publication 
110, 
while others, the 'big stick"ll. 
We share Professor Zvogbo's contention that "all evidence suggests that 
people can usefully combine to denounce human rights violations in Black 
Africa because African Governments are sensitive to such 
denunciation... They can be shamed Into modifying or even abandoning 
their present lapses... As for South Africa... the white regimes will 
not - cannot - be shamed Into abandoning terror, torture and 
112 detention" 
The sensitivity of African States to such denunciations and their 
propensity to preserve State sovereignty is probably Instructive in their 
relatively poor response to ratifying International human rights 
-------------------- 
109 The African States are: Angola, Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia 
and Sudan - Ibid para 18 (only Somalia sent a reply). 
110 For instance, in the case of Equatorial Guinea, the Commission has 
adopted the public procedure under Commission Resolution 8(XXIII) and 
Council Resolution 1235 XLVII; see UN Doc. E/DEC/1979/35. 
111 See UN General Assembly Resolution 3411 D(XXX) of 1975 by which 
the UN Security Council unanimously imposed an embargo against South 
Africa. 
112 E. Zvogbo, op Clt P. 42. 
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instruments. Out of some 50 such instruments113 African States have 
concertedly responded only to human rights Instruments relating to 
apartheid, racial discrimination and the Status of Refugees; not 
surprisingly, these are matters that are of immediate concern to most 
African States. 
However, just beneath the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration In 
1 importance are the two international Covenants14 An examination of 
the list of ratifications of the two Covenants reveals that the African 
response has been dismal. 
As of 31 December 1987 out of 51 African Member States of the UN only 
22 States had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights while 24 States ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social & Political Rights115 In comparison, the Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees and Protocol thereto has been ratified by 44 
African States, while the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination has been signed by 42 African 
States116 It is instructive here to note that as at 12 May 1987,33 
African countries had ratified the African Charter on Human & Peoples 
Rights. 
-------------------- 
113 United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilatin of International 
Instruments UN Doe ST/HR/1/Rev. 2 (1978). 
114 International Covenant on Economic & Social Cultural Rights, and The 
International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights General Assembly 
Resolution 2200 UN AGR, Supp (No. 16) 49,52 UN Doc A/6316 (1966). 
The Economic Covenant entered into force 3 January 1976 and the 
Political Covenant entered into force 23 March 1976, both having been 
opened for signature ten years earlier. 
115 For the Table on the Pattern of Ratification of Regional and Selected 
International Instruments on Human Rights by African States, see 
Appendix X at post. 
116 Ibid. 
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The failure of the majority of African States to ratify the two Covenants 
at least in tandem with their positive response to the African Charter on 
Human & Peoples Rights raises some issues. 
Firstly, the concordance of the substantive provisions of the African 
Charter with the provisions of the Covenants; secondly, the obligations 
undertaken by States on ratifying the Covenants. 
An examination of these two issues should reveal the reasons for the 
apparent reluctance of the majority of African nations to ratify the 
Covenants. 
The International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Political Covenant") and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Economic Covenant") are essentially composed of the rights enumerated 
1 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights17. 
The Political Covenant (and the Universal Declaration) include the 
following civil and political rights: the right "to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or though freely chosen 
representatives" with "genuine periodic elections" by universal suffrage; 
the freedoms of expression, religion, assembly, and association which 
include (as in the Economic Covenant) the right to form and join trade 
unions, freedom of movement, provisions for the protection of family life 
and the right of privacy, the right to life, liberty, and security of the 
person; the prohibition of slavery, torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, the right to a fair trial in both 
-------------------- 
117 The African Charter expressly Includes the "Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other international human rights instruments" as some 
of the "applicable principles" from which the African Commission on 
Human & Peoples Rights" shall draw inspiration" Article 60. 
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criminal and civil matters; the presumption of innocence and the 
prohibition of retroactive laws and penalties In criminal matters; and as 
in the Economic Covenant, the exercise of rights without discrimination. 
The Economic Covenant, inter alia recognises the following substantive 
rights: the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health; the right of everyone to education; the right to freely chosen 
work; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to social 
security, including social insurance; the protection of the family, 
mother, children, and young persons; the right to take part in cultural 
life; and the exercising of rights without discrimination. 
Our analysis of the concordance of the foregoing Covenant of rights and 
freedoms with those contained in the African Charter on Human & 
Peoples Rights reveals that the latter contains corresponding 
provisions 
118 
albeit subject to some modifications ' and style of 
119 drafting 
Consequently, the nature of the substantive rights protected by the 
Covenants cannot be plausibly advanced as a reason for the reluctance 
of African States to ratify the Covenants. Even if this were so, such 
an argument cannot stand against the fact that States are permitted to 
enter reservations to the provisions of the Covenants that do not meet 
-------------------- 
118 See the Comparative Table of the Provisions of the African Charter 
with corresponding provisions in Selected International Human Rights 
Instruments, Appendix V. post. 
119 One significant exception is that the African Charter does not have a 
provision comparable to Article 4 of the Political Covenant which 
absolutely forbids derogations from certain rights; these include right to 
life, freedom from torture, or cruel inhuman or degrading treatment as 
punishment; freedom from slavery; freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. 
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120 
with their approval 
This brings us to the question of the legal obligations of governments 
which ratify the UN Covenants. 
The two Covenants impose different legal obligations on States which 
ratify them. The Political Covenant imposes obligations on, which may 
be divided into National and International Measures of Implementation and 
Supervision. As regards National Measures, the Political Covenant, 
immediately imposes several obligations on a State Party. First, if a 
State Party does not already have sufficient legislative or other measures 
for the implementation of the Political Covenant In Its municipal law, It 
must take necessary steps to adapt such measures with a view to give 
effect to the rights recognised therein. Secondly, a State Party has the 
duty to ensure that any Individual whose rights or freedoms are violated 
shall have an effective remedy. Thirdly, where a State Party has the 
choice to make those remedies available through judicial, administrative, 
legislative, or other competent authorities, it shall provide a judicial 
remedy as soon as possible. Finally, a State Party Is under an 
obligation to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such 
remedies when granted. 
With reference to international measures of Implementation, the Political 
Covenant requires State Parties to submit "reports on the measures they 
-------------------- 
120 
For instance, the Congo, on ratification of the Political Covenant, 
entered a reservation to Article 11, which states that "No one shall be 
imprisoned merely on the grounds of inability to fulfil a contractual 
obligation". Congo's reservation was based on the fact that the article 
was incompatible with the provisions of the Congolese Code of Civil, 
Commercial, Administrative and Financial Procedures (Act 51/83 of 21 
April 1983) which allows imprisonment for civil debts in excess of 20,000 
CFA and when other means of enforcement have failed. However see the 
objection of Belgium to the Congolese reservations - In UN Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with the UN Secretary-General as at 31 December 
1986, p. 137. 
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have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized (therein) and on 
the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights" 
121 
. These reports 
are considered by a special Human Rights Committee which may make 
comments thereon to the State Parties and can transmit them also to the 
122 Economic and Social Council. 
Furthermore, the Political Covenant includes an optional provision 
permitting a party to declare that it recognises the competence of the 
Human Rights Committee, established by the Political Covenant, to 
receive and consider communications to the effect that the State Party is 
123 
not fulfilling its obligations under the Political Covenant, 
The reluctance of the African States may be appreciated in the context 
of obligations required of State Parties to the Political Covenant. A 
significant proportion of African States are governed by military regimes 
few of which are benevolent. Consequently, ratification of the Political 
Covenant may be interpreted firstly as surrendering aspects of State 
sovereignty to International perusal. Secondly, ratification by many an 
African government, being military, implies an admission that its 
existence Is illegal, since it is not composed of "freely chosen 
J24 representatives elected... at genuine elections. 
-------------------- 
121 Political Covenant, Article 40(1). 
122 Ibid Article 40(2). See Dana Fisher, "Reporting under the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: the first five years of the Human Rights 
Committee" American Journal of International Law (1982) p. 142; Jhabuala 
Faurkh, "The Practice of the Covenants Human Rights Committee 1976- 
1982: review of state party reports" Human Rights Quarterly (1984) 
Vol. 6 p. 81. 
123 Political Covenant, Article 41(l). The same article states that the 
Committee shall not accept a communication if it has been made by a State Party which has not made a similar declaration recognising the 
competence of the Committee in regard to Itself. 
124 Article 25, Political Covenant. 
388 
We submit that since most military regimes in Africa describe themselves 
as "temporary" and "corrective" in order to prepare grounds for return 
to democracy, they ought to ratify the Political Covenant as a symbol of 
their commitment to their perceived goals. 
The Optional Protocol to International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights125 has been ratified by only 9 African States126. The very 
dismal response of African States to the Optional Protocol may be due to 
the fact that individuals who are subject to the jurisdiction of a State 
Party and who claim to be victims of a violation by that State of any of 
the rights set forth in the Political Covenant may send direct 
communications to the Human Rights Committee12? d However the Optional 
Protocol, not unlike other international human rights Instruments that 
allow individual communications, requires the exhaustion of local remedies 
before communications can be submitted to the Human Rights 
128 Committee. 
African Nations may be encouraged by Louis Sohn's conviction that "the 
procedure under the Political Covenant and the Optional Protocol is less 
likely to Involve gross violations of human rights, and is probably 
destined to deal primarily with the difficulties caused by the Imperfect 
125 General Assembly Resolution 2200 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 16) 59, UN 
Doc A/63166 (1966). 
126 The following African States are parties to the Optional Protocol; 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Niger, Senegal, Zaire and Zambia. (Guinea has signed the Optional 
Protocol. ) as at 15 January 1988. 
127 Optional Protocol, Article 1. 
128 Optional Protocol, Article 5(2); For a discussion on the Exhaustion 
of Local Remedies, see Report of the International Law Commission, 32 
UN GAOR, Supp (No. 10) 67-116, UN Doc A/32/10 (1977) reprinted in 
1977 2(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 67-116 UN Doc 
A/CN. 4/Ser. A. 1977/Add. 1 Part 2. See also Y. Adede; a Survey of Treaty Provisions on the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies 18 Harvard International Law Journal (1977). 
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introduction of international human rights provisions into domestic legal 
129 
systems" 
Furthermore, obligations assumed by State Parties to the Political 
Covenant do not prevent them. "from having recourse to other 
procedures for settling a dispute In accordance with general or special 
international agreements in force between them"130 With regard to 
communications from individuals, the Optional Protocol prohibits the 
Human Rights Committee from considering such communications when 'the 
same matter' Is being examined by another 'procedure of International 
131 investigation or settlement' 
Consequently, we may safely assume that where a matter is under the 
consideration of a regional commission such as African Commission of 
Human & Peoples Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee is unlikely to 
examine the same matter. Whether the same matter can be examined, as 
in exhaustion of local remedies, by the UN Human Rights Committee after 
being unsatisfactorily resolved at the regional level is not clear. What 
is clear is that the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights does not 
adopt the exclusive approach of the European Convention on Human 
Rights under which State Parties undertake that "they will not avail 
themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force between them 
for the purpose of submitting by way of petition, a dispute arising out 
-------------------- 
129 Louis B. Sohn, "Human Rights: Their Implementation and Supervision 
by the United Nations" in T. Meron (ed) Human Rights in International 
Law: Legal Policy Issues, op cit p. 392. 
130 Political Covenant, Article 44. 
131 Optional Protocol, Article 5(2)(a). 
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of the interpretation or application" of the Convention to "a means of 
settlement, other than those provided in the European Conventionºº132 
Consequently, whether by accident or design, the African Charter has 
placed its Commission on Human & Peoples Rights in the position 
whereby its recommendations and indeed the decision of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government on a communication deemed unsatisfactory 
by a party may be subject to review by UN procedures. 
We submit that there is a need for the General Assembly of the UN to 
clarify the relationship between the parallel procedures of the specialised 
agencies and regional organisations. 
The obligations assumed by a State Party to the Economic Covenant, 
differs from those assumed under the Political Covenant. The Economic 
Covenant obliges a State Party to "take steps... to the maximum of its 
available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant by all appropriate 
means ..., 1133 
Although the provisions of the Economic Covenant are to be exercised 
134 
without discrimination, the Covenant permits flexibility to developing 
-------------------- 
132 European Convention of Human Rights, Article 62. However parties 
to the European Convention are free to use the procedure of the Political 
Covenant with respect to rights not covered by the European 
Convention - See generally Committee of Ministers Resolution (70)17, 
reprinted in A. Eissen "The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Problems of 
Coexistence", in 22 Buffalo Law Review 181,205-05 (1972); See also 
Directorate of Human Rights, Council of Europe, Proceedings of the 
Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights in Relation to 
other International Instruments for the Protection of Human Rights, 
Athens, 21-22 Sept 1978 (Strausbourg 1979). 
133 Economic Covenant, Article 2. 
134 Ibid Article 2(2). 
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countries. The Covenant thus states that "Developing countries, with 
due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine 
to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognised in 
135 the present Covenant to non-nationals". 
Furthermore, African countries should be attracted to the Economic 
Covenant by virtue of Article 2(1) thereof which calls upon each State 
Party to achieve "progressively" the "full realization" of rights in the 
Economic Covenant "to the maximum of Its available resourcesýý136 
The implementation procedures of the Economic Covenant rely on 
persuasion of State Parties and to a large extent on their disposition to 
provide factual information. There are no provisions concerning 
complaints. State Parties to the Economic Covenant undertake to submit 
to the Economic and Social Council "reports of the measures which they 
have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the 
137 
rights recognized" in that Covenant 
We submit that due to the lack of immediacy of the obligations 
undertaken under the Economic Covenant and the presence of an inbuilt 
margin of economic appreciation therein, African States should be more 
------------------ 
135 
lbid Article 2(3). 
136 However, by virtue of Article 4 of the Economic Covenant, "in the 
enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the 
Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as 
are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the 
nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society" (Underlines for emphasis. ) 
137 Ibid Article 16; Under Article 17 thereof, these reports "may Indicate 
factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations" 
undertaken. 
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amenable to it138. An examination of the pattern of ratifications of the 
two Covenants reveals that an equal number of African States have 
139 
ratified both instruments Two main deductions may be made from 
this status quo: 
Firstly, the equable ratification by African States of the two Covenants 
undermines what Jack Donnelly refers to as the predominant view at the 
UN, which is that the exercise of all economic and social rights is a 
140 
prerequisite for the exercise of civil and political rights. 
The limited but equal response of African States to both Covenants 
underscores the thesis for the interdependence of basic rights141 
Secondly, the failure of many African States to ratify the Covenants 
cannot be viewed In the context of primacy of economic and social rights 
over civil and political rights. If so, the number of African States 
acceding to the Economic Covenant would have overwhelmed the number 
of ratifications of the Political Covenant. The comparatively dismal 
response of African States should be viewed in the context of the 
-------------------- 
138 For an analysis of the compliance Tanzania and Kenya to the 
International Covenants - See Allen McChesney, "The Promotion of 
Economic and Political Rights: Two African Approaches" In (1980) Journal 
of African Law Vol. 24 No. 2 p. 163-205. 
139 As at 1 January 1988,22 African States had ratified the Political 
Covenant while 4 States had signed it. The Economic Covenant has been 
ratified by 24 African States and signed by 2 States. See Appendix X 
post, for the Table on the Pattern of Ratification of Regional and 
Selected international instruments on human rights by African States. 
140 J. Donnelly "Recent Trends in UN Human Rights Activity: 
Description and Polemic, in International Organisations Vol. 35 (1981) 
No. 4, p. 640. See also Philip Alston, "The Alleged Demise of Political 
Human Rights at the UN: A Reply to Donnelly" International Organisation 
Vol-37 (1983) No. 3. 
141 The Preambles of both the Political Covenant and the Economic 
Covenant recognize that human rights Ideals "can be only achieved If 
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social 
and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights". - 3rd 
Preambular Paragraph (Political Covenant and the Economic Covenant). 
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prevailing wind of military interregnums on the continent. This 
contention is underlined by the fact that most of the African State 
Parties to the Covenants are either single or multi-party democracies. 
Consequently, there is a need to enlighten Africans on the implications 
and benefits of the Covenants. In the absence of an "exclusion clause" 
In the AFCHPR, African States should regard the ratification of the 
Covenants as pertinent measure toward enhancing the human rights 
provisions and measures prescribed by the AFCHPR. The AFCHPR 
refers to the provisions of the Covenants as subsidiary measures which 
the African Commission on Human & Peoples Rights shall take Into 
consideration to determine principles of law in so far as they lay down 
"rules expressly recognized by Member States of the OAU1'142. By 
virtue of Article 60 of the AFCHPR, the African Commission wis 
empowered to "draw inspiration" inter alia from the UN Charter and, by 
implication, the Covenants being "instruments adopted by the United 
Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples 
rights". The implications of these provisions shall be examined In the 
next chapter, but suffice it to say that, even for non-parties, the 
content of the Covenants represent authoritative evidence of the content 
143 
of the concept of human rights as it appears in the UN Charter. 
The UN Human Rights Committee may very well not receive further 
communications from citizens of African State Parties to the Optional 
Protocol, provided the new African regional system lives up to 
-------------------- 
142 Article 61, AFCHPR. 
143 Ian Brownlie (ed) Basic Documents in International Law (OUP, 1981) 
p. 150. 
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expectations144 Nevertheless, the existence and availability of an 
alternative human rights complaints procedure under the Optional 
Protocol should prove reassuring to the citizens and peoples of African 
State Parties thereto, in the event of a resurgence of the regional 
obstacles earlier alluded to. 
(g) Relevance of Other Regional Approaches to Human Rights 
The United Nations has been the main spur to the development of human 
rights institutions at the regional levels. In addition to Identifying 
themselves as, the local champions of the universal cause, regional 
organisations have encouraged the cross-fertilization of efficient human 
rights promotion and protection methods. The existing regional human 
rights institutions have evolved in response to local circumstances 
peculiar to each region. 
There are four notable regional institutions for the protection of human 
rights; these are the European Convention on Human Rights145, the 
146 American Convention on Human Rights, the Permanent Arab 
-------------------- 
144 The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHR Committee) has received 
several communications from Individuals in some African States under the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. For instance, see Communications No. R. 28/132 submitted by 
Monja Jaona against the Government of Madagascar. In its decision of 1 
April 1985, the UNHR Committee was of the view that M. Jaona's 
communication revealed violations of the Covenant (Articles 9(1) and (2) 
and 19(2) by Madagascar - [HRLJ Vol. 6 Nos. 2-4 (1985) p. 233]. See also 
the Decision of the UNHR Committee on Measures against Former Zairean 
parlimentarians, and the Decision on Candidacy for presidential elections 
in Zaire (Communications No. 138/1985 and No. 157/1983 respectively) - in 
HRLJ Vol. 7 No. 2-4 (1986) p. 277,280. 
145 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov 1950,213 UNRS, 1953, Gr. Britain TS 
No. 7 (Cond. 8969) (entered into force 3 Sept 1953) (hereinafter referred 
to as the "European Convention"). 
146 The American Convention on Human Rights, No. 22 1969, OAT TS 
No. 36 at 1 OAS Doc OEA/Ser. L/V11.23 Doc. 21 Rev. 6 (entered Into force 
8 July 1978), reprinted in 9 ILM (1970) hereinafter referred to as the 
"American Convention". 
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Commission on Human Rights147 and the African Charter on Human & 
Peoples Rights. 
(1) The European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention is regarded as the "best established" and 
"most advanced", human rights system within the framework of the 
classical Western human rights concept 
148 
The European Convention represents a common ideology and value 
system, which evolved in reaction to several factors; the atrocities and 
obscenities of Nazi Europe, communist expansionism and most 
149 
significantly, the need for the integration of Western Europe. K 
Vasak states that: 
"whenever anyone tries to grasp the political significance of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and to replace lt 
in the context of European unification for that purpose, he 
realises that the Convention feeds on European Integration 
and at the same time nourishes it. The supranational 
elements it contains (particularly the rights to Individual 
appeal and the decision making powers of the Court) would 
certainly not stand up for long in an organic structure of a 
-------------------- 
147 The Permanent Commission of Human Rights of the Arab League 
(1968). See Arab League Council Resolution 2443 of 3 Sept 1968. 
148 R. Higgins "The European Convention on Human Rights' in T. Meron 
(ed) 'Human Rights in International Law: Legal & Policy Issues op cit 
p. 495; - see also L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal International Protection of 
Human Rights, Chapter 7 op cit. 
149 The idea of the integration of Europe had its genesis In more ancient 
times but the first deliberate step was taken In 1638 by Sully, Chief 
advisor to Henry IV of France who in his Grand Design proposed a 
permanent Council of 15 leading Christian States of Europe whose 
function would include the discussion of matters of common concern, 
mediation of disputes and the direction of all civil, political and religious 
affairs of Europe. See - European Movement and Council of Europe (European Movement Publications, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. 1950) pp. 20-30. 
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purely Intergovernmental nature, or one which did not 
contain the seeds of its own redundancy thks to a process 
of legal and even constitutional integration" 
The European Convention not only translates the Universal Declaration 
into a European one, it guarantees rights as well as states them. 
However, not all the rights contained in the Universal Declaration are 
found in the European Convention. 
Economic and social rights were not included in the Convention because 
they were "too controversial and difficult to enforce even in the 
changing state of social and economic development of Europe... and their 
Inclusion involved jeopardising the acceptance of the Conventions" 
151. 
However on 18 October 1961, a European Social Charter was signed 
which proclaims 19 rights including the right to work, fair remuneration 
and the right to benefit from social welfare services. The rights 
proclaimed in the Social Charter can be regarded as mere statements of 
152 
social policy and goals than obligations or restraints on state policy 
-------------------- 
150 K. Vasak "Problems Concerning the Setting Up of Regional 
Commissions on Human Rights with Special Relevance to Africa", 
background paper for United Nations Seminar on the Establishment of a 
Reginal Commission on Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa, 
Cairo, 2-15 Sept 1969 p. 18-19. 
151 Gordon Weil, The European Convention on Human Rights (The 
Hague: Nijhoff) (1966) p. 28. See also A. H. Robertson Human Rights in 
Europe, op cit p. 149. 
152 The Social Charter is a separate legal instrument and thus lacks the 
enforcement machinery essential to the Conventions. The rights 
proclaimed in the Social Charter are not justiceable and establish a 
minimum standard of state behaviour while recognizing the varying levels 
of social and economic development of the Member States. The Social 
Charter ensures a measure of control through a complex system of 
reports from governments, employer groups and trade union 
organisations. See further Jacobs "The Extension of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to include Economic, Social & Cultural 
Rights" 3 Human Rights Review (1978) p. 163. 
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The Convention places emphasis on the promotion and protection of civil 
and political rights and on the rights of individuals to present petitions 
to European Commission153 
The European Convention essentially covers the following rights; the 
right to life154; prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment155; prohibition against slavery, servitude, and 
forced or compulsory labour 
156; liberty and security of the person157; 
fair trial and public hearings by an independent and impartial tribunal 
in the determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal 
charges 
158; 
prohibition of retrospective criminal liability 
159; 
respect for 
private life and family life, home and correspondence 
160; freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion 
161; freedom of expression162; freedom 
of peaceful assembly and association 
163; 
and the right to marry and 
found a family164 Although these rights are limited in scope the 
potential for their effective enforcement is enhanced by other 
--------- 
153 Article 
--- 
25 
-------- 
of the European Convention provides that the parties may 
recognise the competence of the European Commission to receive petitions 
"from any person, non governmental organisation or group of individuals 
claiming to be a victim of a violation of one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention". The majority of 
parties to the Convention have agreed to the operation of Article 25. 
154 Article 2, European Convention. 
155 Article 3, Ibid. 
156 Article 4, Ibid. 
157 Article 5, Ibid. 
158 Article 6, Ibid. 
159 Article 7, Ibid. 
160 Article 8, Ibid. 
161 Article 9, Ibid. 
162 Article 10, Ibid. 
163 Article 11, Ibid. 
164 Article 12, Ibid. 
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provisions 
165 It has been observed that although the European 
Convention protects civil and political rights "necessary in a democratic 
society", and it does not include rights "one might wish to see 
guaranteed in an ideal commonwealth" 
166 The European Convention also 
contains qualifying clauses that are attached to most of the foregoing 
substantive rights. Furthermore, Article 15 of the Convention allows 
certain rights to be derogated from in periods of war or other major 
emergency but the measures of derogation must be limited to those 
167 
strictly necessary to meet the situation. 
One of the essential features of the European Convention is found in the 
machinery for the enforcement of rights. 
In addition to the defined scope of the guaranteed rights, the European 
Convention established both the European Commission of Human 
-------------------- 
165 For instance, Article 13 states that everyone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in the Convention "shall have an effective remedy 
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting In an official capacity". This may be taken 
to mean that legal actions based on the violation of the European 
Convention shall be available within the legal systems of State Parties - 
See Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) Yearbook of European Convention on 
Human Rights (European Court on Human Rights) 612. See also - 
Goslong, The European Convention before Domestic Courts, 38 BYIL 
(1962) p. 445. 
166 A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in the World, (New York, St. Martins 
Press, 1982) p. 83. 
167 See the 'Lawless' Case (1961) Y. B. European Convention on Human 
Rights 430,432 (European Convention of Human Rights) and Ireland v 
United Kingdom (1978) Y. B. European Convention on Human Rights 602, 
608 (European Convention of Human Rights). See further T. Higgins 
Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1976-1977) p. 281. See also - Jacobs "The Restrictions 
and Limitations on the Exercise of Rights and Freedoms Guaranteed by 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 International Colloquy on 
the European Convention on Human Rights; Council of Europe Doc M/Coll 
(75) (1975) 5. 
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Rights168 and the European Court of Human Rights169 as the machinery 
for ensuring the observation of these rights. 
The European Convention1? 0 itself, including its Commission, Its Court, 
and its body of case law and procedures constitute a formidable legal 
system171. Several European states have incorporated the European 
172 
Convention into their domestic laws. However in the States that have 
not done so, the Convention Is usually cited as a persuasive source of 
173 law In domestic courts. 
-------------------- 
168 Articles 20-37 of the European Convention set out the provisions for 
the Commission. Article 24 provides that any party to the Convention 
can refer any alleged breach of the Convention to the Commission. 
Article 25 permits any individual or non-governmental organisation to 
petition the Commission, provided the party against which the complaint 
is lodged recognises the competence of the Commission to receive such 
petitions. 
169 Parties to the European Convention are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Greece, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Spain and Portugal. 
170 Articles 38-56 of the European Convention set out the provisions for 
the Court. Article 44 provides that only parties to the Convention shall 
have the right to bring a case before the Court. Article 52 states that 
the decision of the Court is final, and Article 54 provides that the 
Committee of Ministers shall suprvise its execution of the Courts 
judgements. 
171 For an analysis of the practise and procedure of the Commission on 
the advisability of applications see Sohn & Buergenthal The International 
Protection of Human Rights, op cit p. 1008-1238. See also Schimels "On 
the Operation of the European Convention of Human Rights", 18 
International Organisations, (1964) p. 558. 
172 See Drzenczewski "The Domestic Application of the European Human 
Rights Convention as European Community Law" 30 Int'l & Comp L. Q. 
(1981) 118. 
173 With regard to the UK for instance, Lord Denning M. R. states that 
"if there is any ambiguity In our statutes or uncertainty in our law, 
then courts can look to the Convention as an aid to clear up the 
ambiguity or uncertainty, seeking always to bring them into harmony 
with it". (1976) 3 A11ER 843,847 ff. (1976) 1 WLR 979,989. Se also 
Duffy "English Law and the Convention of Human Rights" ICLQ, Vol. 29 
(1980)p. 585. 
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It is pertinent to briefly examine the procedure of the Commission. The 
Commission receives all applications made by individuals and has a final 
say on admissibility. On receipt of an application found admissible, the 
Commission acts as the fact finder174 and mediator seeking a friendly 
175 
settlement between the state and the applicant 
If settlement is not reached, the Commission must draw up a report and 
make a finding as to whether a violation of the European Convention has 
occurred176. This report Is submitted to the Committee of Ministers and 
177 the States concerned, but is not published at this stage. During the 
following three months, an appeal to the Court can be made by either 
the Commission of the States1? 
8 
provided the State either consents or 
170 has accepted the Courts compulsory jurisdiction. 
If the case is not brought before the Court, by the State or the 
Commission, the Committee of Ministers can make a final 
determination. Where the Committee of Ministers finds that a violation 
180 
has occurred, it expressly states the corrective measures which the 
174 The Commission also has wide powers of investigation. European 
Convention, Article 28. 
175 Where settlement is reached, the Commission must present a report 
confined to a brief statement of the facts and the solution. This is sent 
to the States Involved and the Committee of Ministers, and to the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe for publication. European 
Convention, Article 30. 
176 Article 31, Ibid. 
177 Article 32, Ibid. 
178 Article 48, Ibid. 
179 It must be emphasised that the court proceedings constitute an 
entirely new hearing and not simply an appeal on a point of law. See 
Rules 37-42 - The Rules of Procedure of the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
180 Article 32(1), European Convention. 
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offending State must take within a prescribed time181. If these 
measures are not complied with, the Committee may determine what effect 
shall be given to the original decision of the Commission and then 
182 
publish its final report. 
The protection of human rights under the European Convention has been 
expanded and enhanced by the Protocols. The First Protocol of the 
European Convention183 provides for the following additional freedoms; 
the peaceful enjoyment of individual possessions184, the right to 
education185 and the right to free elections186. The Second Protocol 
confers upon the Court, competence to give advisory opinions187. The 
Fourth Protocol188 further expands the scope of protected rights and 
freedoms to include the right to liberty despite inability to fulfil a 
189 190 
contract, liberty of movement and choice of residence, and freedom 
-------------------- 
181 Article 32(2) Ibid. 
182 Article 32(3) Ibid. 
183 Protocol 1 to the Conventin for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 1952 213 U. N. T. S. 262. 
184 Protocol 1, Article 1, Ibid. 
185 Article 2, Ibid. 
186 Article 3, Ibid. 
187 Protocol 2 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 6 May 1963, Europ. T. S. No. 44. Under Article 1, 
the Court Is permitted, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, to 
give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the Interpretation of 
the Convention and the Protocols but not on the content or scope of the 
protected rights and freedoms. 
188 Protocol 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 16 September 1963, Europ T. S. No. 46. 
189 Ibid Article 1. 
190 Ibid Article 2. 
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from expulsion for nationals191 as well as from the collective expulsion 
192 for aliens 
One of the most significant aspects of the European Convention is the 
right of individual petitions notwithstanding the fact that this right is 
restricted by the admissibility criteria of the Convention193. This 
procedure has enhanced the prospect for mitigating the exposure of the 
individual in the face of the State. Other existing human rights 
organisations have been guided, to a large extent, by the procedural 
framework of the European Convention. 
(ii) The American Convention on Human Rights 
The American Convention evolved from an integhation process that can 
be traced to the 1826 Congress of Panama where Simon Bolivar urged 
Latin American States to consider forming a confederation. The Latin 
American States to an extend shared a common ideology and culture with 
North America, in that the elites of Latin America were emigres from 
Europe in common with the predominant settlers in North America. 
The Organisation of American States (OAS) was established at Bogota in 
1948. The nucleus of the OAS was "The International Union of American 
Republics" which convoked some six decades earlier in 1890 as a 
commercial information organ. 
--------------- 
191 Ibid Article 3. 
192 Ibid Article 4. 
193 
The Convention requires, inter alia, the exhaustion of local remedies 
and the submission of a petition within six months of the final domestic 
decision; European Convention Articles 26-27. See further, Cancado 
Trinidade, "Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: An Appraisal" 10 Revue des Droits de 
1'Homme (1977) 141. 
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The OAS was created mainly for the purpose of enhancing peace and 
security, ensuring peaceful s ettlement of disputes, providing a common 
action in event of aggressi on, and promoting economic, social and 
cultural development of the region. Thus, the 1948 OAS Charter 
contained very few provisions relating to human rights and whereso they 
were phrased In very general 
194 terms 
The 1948 Bogota Conference that produced the OAU Charter, also 
adopted the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man195, 
however the latter did not form part of the OAS Charter itself. 
It was within the framework of the OAS that the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights was created in 1960196 The 1960 Statute 
established the Commission as an "autonomous entity" of the OAS having 
the functions "to provide respect for human rights"197. The Statute 
defined human rights as "those set forth in the American declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man". Consequently, the "non-binding" nature 
of the American Declaration became the basic normative instrument of the 
Commission. 
Originally, the competence of the Commission was very limited. Its 
powers included the following: - 
-------------------- 
194 See Article 5(j) of the OAS Charter 1948 (now Article 3(j) in the 
revised OAS Charter). 
195 Resolution XXX. Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of 
American States, Bogota, Colombia, 3 March -2 May 1948 at p. 48 (PAU 1948). 
196 The 1960 Statue of the American Commission on Human Rights - 1960 Annual Report of the OAS Secretary-General, OEA/Ser. D. /II1.12 
(English) 1961 pp. 19-20. 
197 Article 1, Ibid. 
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"(a) To develop an awareness of human rights among the people 
of America. 
(b) To make recommendations to the governments of the Member 
States in general, if it considers such action advisable, for 
the adoption of progressive measures in favour of human 
rights within the framework of their domestic legislation and 
in accordance with their constitutional precepts, appropriate 
measures to further the faithful observance of those rights. 
(c) To urge the Governments of the Member States to supply it 
with information on the measures adopted by them in matters 
of human rights. 
(d) To serve the Organisation of American States as an advisory 
198 body in respect of human rights. " 
These limited powers were enlarged in 1965 to enable the Commission to 
199 
receive individual petitions 
The hitherto haphazard human rights system of the OAS based on a 
shaky constitutional foundation was significantly bolstered by the "Pact 
of San Jose, Costa Rica" more popularly referred to as the American 
Convention on Human Rights adopted in 1969 at an Intergovernmental 
-------------------- 
198 Article 9, Ibid. 
199 Resolution XXII Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio de 
Janero, Brazil, 17-30 November 1965. Final Act OEA/Sec. C. 1.13 (English) at 32-34 (1965). 
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conference convened by the OAS200. The American Convention entered 
into force in July 1978, after the eleventh instrument of ratification had 
201 been deposited 
The Convention contains 82 Articles, which guarantee and protect over a 
score of distinct. rights including the following: - the right to judicial 
personality202, to life203, to humane treatment204, to personal 
205,206,207,208 liberty to a fair trial to privacy to a name, to 
nationality209, to participate in government210, to equal protection of 
the law211, and to judicial protection212. In addition, the convention 
213 
guarantees freedom of conscience, religion , thought and expression, 
-------------------- 
200 See American Convention Article 74(2). For the American Convention 
see L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal, Basic Documents on International 
Protection of Human Rights (1973) op cit. On the American Convention 
generally, see "Symposium (on) the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 30 American University Law Review 1-187 1980, see also T. 
Buergenthal, R. Norris & D. Shelton Protecting Human Rights in the 
Americas: Selected Problems (N. P. Engel, Kohl. 1986). Se also, PP. 
Camarago "The American Convention on Human Rights" Human Rights 
Journal 3: 2 (1970) 333-356; see also A. H. Robertson "The American 
Convention on Human Rights" in Robertson (ed) Human Rights In the 
World 2nd Ed. New York (St. Martins Press 1982) 132-160. 
201 
American Convention, Article 74(2). 
202 
Article 3, Ibid. 
203 
Article 4, Ibid. 
204 
Article 5, Ibid. 
205 
Article 7, Ibid. 
206 
Article 8, Ibid. 
207 
Article 11, Ibid. 
208 
Article 18, Ibid. 
209 
Article 20, Ibid. 
210 
Article 23, Ibid. 
211 
Article. 24, Ibid. 
212 
Article 25, Ibid. 
213 
Article 13, Ibid. 
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freedom of association214, movement and residence215, as well as 
prohibition of slavery216, and the application of ex post facto laws and 
217 
penalties. 
The State Parties to the American Convention218 have an obligation "to 
respect" the rights guaranteed in the Convention as well as "to ensure" 
219 the free and full exercise of those rights. 
In addition to the foregoing civil and political rights enshrined in the 
American Convention, the Charter of the OAS promotes economic, social 
220 
and cultural rights. 
The rights proclaimed under the American Convention establish more 
advanced guarantees than the European Convention and the UN Political 
221 Covenant. However, in his treatise, Buergenthal doubts the potential 
of any OAS State to fully comply with the provisions of the 
222 Convention. 
-------------------- 
214 Article 16, Ibid. 
215 Article 22, Ibid. 
216 
Article 6, Ibid. 
217 Article 9, Ibid. 
218 Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights are: Argentina, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Grenada, Guatamala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
219 Article 1(1), Ibid. 
220 Charter of the OAS, Article 31 
221 
For instance Articles 4,5,17(5), 23 and 25, American Convention. 
222 T. Buergenthal "Inter-American System for the Protection of Human 
Rights" in T. Meron (ed Human Rights in International Law: Legal & 
Policy Issues, op cit p. 442. 
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The Convention allows derogations from certain rights In time of war, 
public danger or other emergency that threatens the independence or 
223 
security of a State Party. However, the following rights cannot be 
suspended: right to life, to humane treatment, right to participate in 
224 
government, rights of the child and freedom from ex post facto laws. 
The derogation clauses in the American Convention are not as stringent 
as those of the European Convention and the UN Political Covenant. 
However derogations from the provisions of the American Convention 
225 
must comply with Articles 29 and 30 thereof. 
The American Convention sets up two organs to ensure its 
Implementation: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rlghts226 and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights227. The American Convention 
stipulates that a State Party is automatically subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Commission to deal with private complaints deposited against that 
State228. However, as regards interstate complaints, the Inter-American 
Commission may only consider such complaints if both parties in addition 
to ratifying the American Convention, have submitted a further 
-------------------- 
223 
American Convention Article 27(1). 
224 
Article 27(2), Ibid. 
225 Articles 29 & 30 of the American Convention set up values and 
criteria that must be observed in the interpretation of all the provisions 
of the Convention. For instance Article 30 states that "(t)he restrictions 
that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised herein may not be applied 
except in accordance with laws enacted for reasons of general interest 
and in accordance with the purpose for which restrictions have been 
established". 
226 American Convention, Chapter VII; See further R. Norris "The New 
Statue of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights" Human Rights 
Law Journal 1 (1980), Parts 1-4, pp. 379-383. 
227 American Convention, Chapter VIII. See further T. Buergenthal 
"The Inter-American Court of Human Rights", AJIL 76: 2 (April 1982) 
pp. 231-35. 
228 American Convention Article 44. 
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declaration recognizing the interstate jurisdiction of the Commission229. 
With regard to locus standi, unlike the European Convention where only 
the victims of a violation may file private petitions, the American 
Convention allows "[a]ny person or group of persons or any non- 
governmental entity legally recognized in one or more Member States of 
the Organisation" to lodge petitions with the Commission against a State 
230 
Party 
The jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is both 
adjudicatory and advisory. In the former sense it decides on disputes 
involving charges that a Member State Party has violated the human 
rights protected by the Convention231 . In its advisory 
jurisdiction, 
Article 64 empowers the Court to Interpret the American Convention and 
other human rights instruments at the request of OAS Member States 
and other OAS organs. 
The Inter-American System for the protection of human rights Is thus 
unique by Its dual institutional structure. The first one having evolved 
from the Charter of the OAS and the other established by the coming 
into force of the American Convention. Consequently an OAS Member 
State that has not ratified the American Convention is nevertheless 
subject to the human rights regime which has Its juridical basis in the 
OAS Charter. 
-------------------- 
229 
Ibid Article 45. This approach is a reversal of the traditional 
procedure of the European Convention where the right of individual 
petitions is optional - See European Convention, Article 25(1). 
230 American Convention, Article 44. 
231 Article 61 Ibid. This provision indicates that a State Party does not 
subject itself to the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court 
by merely ratifying the American Convention; it must file a declaration 
or conclude a special agreement. 
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The main activities of the Inter-American Commission as an OAS Charter 
organ involve onsite investigations232, the compilation of country 
studies233 and the processing of individual complaints as well as wide 
promotional functions. As regards individual complaints, the 
Commission, under its new statute, may act on all communications lodged 
against a non-state party provided only that the petitioner alleges the 
infringement of a rights that is protected by the American 
234 Declaration 
A State which has not ratified the American Convention Is not subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, 
by virtue of the Courts advisory capacity, It mqy receive requests and 
grant advisory opinions to any OAS Member State or OAS organ in 
matters concerning the interpretation of the Convention of other treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights. 
From the foregoing, it Is evident that the Inter-American System for the 
promotion and protection of human rights Is unique in certain aspects. 
However, the impact of both the Universal Declaration and the European 
Convention is conspicuous. 
232 For example, IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in th 
Republic of Nicaragua: Findings of the "on site" Observations, 3-12 Oct 
1978, OAS Doc. OEA Sec. L/V/11.45, doc 16, Rev. 1 1978. 
233 For Country Studies on Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic see Sohn & Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights, op cit at 1293-1339. 
234 Regulations of the Inter-American Commissin on Human Rights (as 
amended by Res. 508 of Nov 1980) Article 70; reproduced in T. 
Buergenthal and Others, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: 
Selected Problems op cit Appendix 5 p. 351. 
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(iii) The Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights 
The Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights235 was created in 1968 
mainly from the cooperation between the League of Arab States and the 
UN in the field of human rights, borne primarily out of the 
determination of Member States to protect the interests of the Arabs in 
territories occupied by Israel. In this respect, in 1969 the Arab 
Commission established a programme of activities to deal with Arabs In 
occupied territories and also to promote respect for human rights in the 
Arab World generally. 
With a view to achieving Its programmes, the Commission invited State 
Members of the League to establish national commissions of human rights 
to cooperate with the regional Commissions. The Commission also 
proposed the coordination of the activities of the national commission at 
the regional level and Invited the Secretary-General of the Arab League 
to establish a Special Department of Human Rights. At the international 
level, the Commission is generally empowered to deal with Arab relations 
with Israel and to ensure the application of humanitarian law to Arab- 
236 Israel conflicts 
The Commission adopted an Arab Convention on Human Rights that 
closely reflects the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights237 
-------------------- 
235 
S . P. Marks 'La Commision Permanente arabe des droits de 1'homme" 
OP cit p. 101-108, see also B. Boutros Ghali 'La Ligue des Etats Arabes', 
in Les dimensions internationales des droits de 1'homme, K. Vasak (ed) 
o cit pp . 636 et s q. 
236 B. Boutros-Ghali Ibid p. 367. 
237 The League of Arab States Special "Committee of Experts" adopted the Convention in 1971. 
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At the Symposium on "Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the 
Arab Homeland" held at Baghdad, Iraq from 15-20 May 1979, the Draft 
Arab Covenant on Human Rights238 was deliberated upon. The 
Covenant which is to come into force on being approved by nine Arab 
States239 provides for a standing committee entrusted with following up 
the implementation of its provisions. The Committee is also responsible 
for the examination of periodic reports which States are obliged to 
240 deliver to the Committee 
It would seem, therefore, that the implementation of the provision of the 
convention will rely mainly on the States themselves. 
The text of the Draft Arab Covenant reveals that the Committee's 
jurisdiction will not Include the receipt of individual complaints nor the 
hearing of disputes between parties. 
However, if the League of Arab States accept the recommendations of the 
Baghdad Seminar, the Committee's jurisdiction would thus be extended to 
include the receiving of complaints from individuals and groups 
concerning violations of rights and freedoms and the sending of missions 
to inquire into such violations. 
The delay in the operation of the Arab Convention on Human Rights is 
not unconnected with the intractable political problems of the Middle 
East. 
-------------------- 
238 
For the text of the Draft Arab Covenant on Human Rights, see 
Human Rights Internet Newsletter, Vol. 5, Nos. 2 &3 pp. 76-78. 
239 Draft Arab Covenant on Human Rights, Article 31. 
240 Article 29, Ibid. 
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(h) An Overview 
The foregoing review of regional Conventions, serves as a useful 
backdrop to the analysis, in the following chapter, on the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. It is evident that the regional 
organisations evolved in reaction to the prevailing socio-political events 
in their respective regions and consequently the institutions and 
provisions were devised to suit the consensus of members of the relevant 
regions. Thus, It would be inappropriate to recommend a wholesale 
adoption of the European or the Latin American experiments by Africa. 
Professor Brownlie's observation in this wise, is particularly apt: "[T]he 
social conditions in Africa and indeed Latin America entail inequalities 
and deprivations on such a scale that recourse tq guarantees of classical 
Western political and civil rights is manifestly Inadequate.. " 
241 
Nevertheless, the impact of these regional conventions have been felt in 
Africa. On analysis of the constitutions of African States242 reveals 
that the constitutions of Anglophone African States provide for human 
rights along the lines of the European Convention. Some of these rights 
have been filtered and adapted to suit the African consensus as 
reflected in the AFCHPR. 
The main advantage of regional institutions on human rights, viz a viz a 
universal system is that the former characterized by States sharing 
common historical, and cultural traditions, as well as political 
experiences and geographic proximity possess a greater capacity to 
broach human rights problems peculiar to their region. The UN system 
of human rights is handicapped by its highly politicized environment 
where the prerequisites of sovereign statehood overwhelm democratic 
values and undermine universal human rights protection. It has been 
-------------------- 
241 I. Brownlie (ed) Basic Documents on Human Rights, (Oxford), 
Clarendon Press 1971) pp. 387-388. 
242 See Chapter 5, above. 
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observed that despite the efforts of the UN Commission of Human Rights 
to overcome these problems, the UN system is still bedevilled "with 
numerous procedural obstacles and legal pitfalls, all designed to protect 
governmental interests and to effectively impede the ability of individuals 
and private groups to enforce governmental respect for human 
rights"243. We submit that these obstacles have been scaled with some 
success, especially with the introduction of new procedures such as the 
"Thematic" approach and the Optional Protocol. 
Despite some operational weaknesses of the European Convention and the 
American Convention, these regional systems present a qualitative and 
quantitative advance over the UN system and prgvide useful beacons for 
the guidance of future development of both global and regional systems 
of human rights. Our examination of the African Charter will reveal the 
main impact of the American and European Conventions thereon. 
The relevance of the Regional systems (the European Convention and the 
American Convention) to the evolution and adoption of the African 
Charter on Human & Peoples Rights is threefold. Firstly, the organs 
established by the African Charter for protection of human rights In 
Africa bear a notable semblance to the organs of the European 
Convention244. Secondly the rules of procedure of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights regarding communications and 
admissibility thereof are similar in many respects to those contained In 
------------------ 
243 
T. Buergenthal & J. V. Thorney, International Human Rights and 
International Education (UN National Commission for UNESCO: Washington 
DC. 1976) p. 50. 
244 To ensure the observance of the provisions of the European 
Convention, a European Commission of Human Rights and a European 
Court of Human Rights was established (Article 19 European 
Convention). The AFCHPR similarly established an African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights (Article 30), but does not provide for a 
court. 
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245 the European Conventions, thirdly, the AFCHPR appears to have 
taken the cue from the American Convention and OAS Charter by laying 
emphasis on socio-economic rights In addition to protecting political and 
civil liberties as well as the UN/ECOSOC resolution 1503 procedure. 
The impact and relevance of the regional Conventions on the AFCHPR 
are in the main confined to the aforementioned areas. It was prudent to 
allow these exogenous influences on the AFCHPR since they Invariably 
represent, firstly international human rights procedures of proven 
viability and secondly they encompass human rights norms solemnly 
adopted in various international instruments by States including a fair 
number of African countries. 
In contradistinction to the other regional Conventions246, the AFCHPR 
expands upon the classical concept of human rights by providing for 
collective or peoples rights, individual duties to the State, and by 
couching social and economic rights in legally enforceable terms, thus 
imposing corresponding and immediate obligations on States. 
In the following Chapter, we propose to analyse the AFCHPR with a view 
to appraising the efficacy of its provisions and proffering suggestions, 
where appropriate, for enhancing human rights promotion and protection 
on the continent. 
-------------------- 
245 
See the provisions pertaining to the European Commission of Human 
Rights (Articles 24-37, European Convention) and the AFCHPR provisions 
relating to the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (Articles 
46-59). 
246 In the course of the following Chapter, the essential differences 
between the AFCHPR and the existing regional human rights Convention 
shall be highlighted. 
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Chapter Seven 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR): 
A Legal Analysis 
(a) Introduction 
Although the history of the evolution of the AFCHPR is spread over 
twenty years, the actual drafting took two years. We propose to 
examine the drafting history of the Charter and undertake a legal 
analysis of AFCHPR adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government on 17 June 1981. In the course of our discourse, we shall 
highlight the significant aspects of the AFCHPR that coincide or depart 
from the regimes of other existing regional human rights conventions. 
In the foregoing chapter we analysed the UN "Monrovia Proposal" for the 
Establishment of a Regional Commission on Human Rights. The adoption 
of the Monrovia Proposal by the UN Seminar1 was inspired by OAU 
Assembly Resolution 115 of September 19792. The OAU Resolution 
instructed the OAU Secretary-General to convene a meeting of leading 
African legal experts to be responsible for the preparation of "a 
preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
providing inter alia for the establishment of organs for the promotion and 
protection of human and peoples rights". It is significant that the OAU 
Assembly had at the same session addressed the Uganda/Tanzania conflict 
and endorsed the Guinean Presidents statement that the OAU was "not a 
tribunal which could sit in judgement on any Member States internal 
affairs"3. Thus the subsequent adoption of Resolution 115 may be 
-------------------- 
1 UN Seminar on the Establishment of a Regional Commissin on Human 
Rights held at Monrovia, Liberia in September 1979. 
2 OAU Resolution 115(XVI) Rev, 1 adopted by the 16th Ordinary Session 
of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Monrovia, 
Liberia, September 1979. 
3 African Research Bulletin (Political, Social & Cultural Series) (1979) 
p. 5329B. 
416 
regarded as a tacit confirmation by the Assembly that the OAU does not 
perceive any conflict between the establishment of a regional system for 
the protection of human rights and the OAU principle of non-interference 
in the Internal affairs of Member States4. 
In compliance with Resolution 115, the OAU Secretary-General convened a 
"Meeting of African Experts for the Preparation of a Draft Charter of 
Human and Peoples Rights", at Dakar, Senegal from 28 November to 8 
December 1979. The working documents of the Meeting of Legal Experts 
included the UN 'Monrovia Proposal' and a draft African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights prepared by three eminent Senegalese 
jurists5, labelled the "OAU Draft AFCHPR". The OAU Draft working 
paper was largely drawn from the provisions of the UN International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rightss. The justification for incorporating 
substantial parts of these two resource papers was based on the 
7 
conviction that they could be applied to the peoples of Africa. 
The need to incorporate African values and traditions in the Charter was 
emphasised by the President of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, in his 
Opening Address to the Meeting of Experts. The President stated that: 
-------------------- 
4 Several African States notably, Sudan, Liberia and Nigeria were highly 
critical of Tanzanias invasion of Uganda and the consequent overthrow of 
the Idi Amin regime. Prosident J. Nyerere of Tanzania invoked the 
right of self-defence to justify his action. Tanzanias apparent omission 
to invoke the more plausible justification of humanitarian itnervention may 
be hinged on her awareness that such a justification may have invited 
international perusal of Tanzanias human rights record. See Ibrahim I. 
Wani "Humanitarian Intervention and the Tanzania/Uganda War" Horn of 
Africa Vol. 3 No. 2 p. 18. 
5 Judges Keba Mbaye and Mohammadou Mbacke, and Professor Ibrahim 
Fall. 
6 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67.1. 
7 Ibid p . 1. 
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"In Africa, the individual and his rights are wrapped in the 
protection the family and other communities ensure 
everyone..., ... should 
be made for this African tradition in 
our Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, while bathing in 
our philosophy which consists in not alienating the 
subordination of the individual to the community, in 
coexistence in8 giving everyone a certain number of rights 
and duties... " . 
The Meeting of Experts recognised the necessity to evolve a Charter that 
will serve African needs, thus the following guiding principles were 
evolved: 
- to be inspired by the traditions of African society and the 
principles upon which such traditions are based; 
- to respect the political options of States and consequently to 
ensure a balance between the various doctrinal systems 
current in Africa; 
- to avoid favouring in one way or another individual or 
collective rights, civil and political or economic, social and 
cultural rights; 
- to give a content acceptable to all the peoples' rights to 
which express reference was made in Resolution 115 of the 
OAU; 
- to ensure the protection and promotion of the human rights 
declared and accepted as such through the activities of a 
commission, although reserving the powers of the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government which must be associated 
with the final decision; 
- not to exceed that which African States were ready to accept 
in the field of the protection of human rights. 
9 
-------------------- 
8 Opening Address of the President of Senegal to the Meeting of African 
Experts for the Preparation of the Draft African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights, 28, November 1979; OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/5 p. 6. 
9 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/5, p. 10. 
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The Meeting of Legal Experts thereafter Issued a preliminary Draft of the 
Charter (hereinafter referred to as the "Dakar Draft")10. The text of 
the Dakar Draft comprised of two main parts namely: "Rights & Duties", 
and "Measures of Safeguard". The text also contained the following 
features: 
(1) It gave importance to the principle of non-discrimination; 
(ii) It emphasised the principles and objectives of the OAU as 
defined in Article 2 of the Charter of the OAU with 
particular reference to respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of each State; and to the absolute 
dedication to the total emancipation of African territories 
which are still dependent; 
(Iii) It placed "peoples rights" alongside Individual rights. 
(iv) It included the duties of each person towards the community 
and more particularly towards the family and State. 
(v) It reflected the significance of African values and morals. 
NO It incorporated economic, social and cultural rights as well as 
the rights to development, peace and the protection of the 
environment. 
It is significant that the foregoing features are maintained in the adopted 
AFCHPR since they basically distinguish the AFCHPR from existing 
international and regional human rights instruments. The AFCHPR Is 
thus the first legal instrument to encapsulate three generations of 
rights, namely civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural 
-------------------- 
10 The "Dakar Draft" Is so called because the Meetings of Legal Expert 
were held in Dakar, Senegal. 
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rights, the right to development11 and peoples rights. 
The Dakar Draft of the AFCHPR was submitted to the First Session of 
the OAU Ministerial Conference on the Draft African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights held at Banjul, The Gambia from 9-15 June 1980. 
The Meeting was attended by 39 Member States of the OAU, represented 
mainly by their respective Ministers of Justice and Legal Affairs. The 
first session was only able to deliberate on the Preamble and Articles 1 
to 11 of the Dakar Draft. Thus at its 35th Session held In Sierra 
Leone, the OAU Council of Ministers requested that a second session of 
12 
the Ministerial Conference be held to complete the draft AFCHPR13. The 
OAU Assembly confirmed the resolution of the Council of Ministers and 
urged the Ministerial Conference to complete Its examination of the draft 
and ensure that the final text is submitted to the 18th Session of the 
OAU Assembly 14 
The Second Session of the OAU Ministerial Conference on the AFCHPR 
was held at Banjul, from 7-11 January 1981. Forty out of the fifty OAU 
Member States attended this conference and the cordial atmosphere that 
11 K. Vasak as head of the Division of Human Rights, UNESCO, 
proposed the "third generation of human rights", (otherwise referred to 
as "solidarity rights") which include the rights to development, to the 
common heritage of mankind, to peace and to a healthy environment. - 
K. Vasak "For the Third Generation of Human Rights: Rights of 
Solidarity" Inaugural Lecture to the Tenth Study Session of the 
International Institute of Human Rights, Strausburg, 1979. See also 
"Pour les droits de 1'homme de la troissieme generation: les droits 
solidarite" - Revue des Droits de'Homme 12 (1979) p. 3; See Marko 
"Emerging Human Rights: a New Generation for the 1980's" 33 Rutgers 
Law Review (1980-81) p. 435. See also Hecto Gros Espiell "The Right to 
Development As a Human Right" 16 Texas International Law Journal 
(1981) p. 189. 
12 18-20 June 1980. 
13 OAU Doe CM/Res. 792(XXV). 
14 Proceedings of the 17th Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1-4 July 1980, OAU Doc. 
ACAB/LEG/AHG/17. 
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pervaded the meeting ensured that the conference completed its task of 
15 
approving the draft Charter 
The Ministerial Conference thus submitted the completed Draft Charter to 
the 37th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers. The Council of 
Ministers took note of the Draft Charter and decided to submit it with 
no amendments to the 18th Summit Meeting of the OAU Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government for its final approval and adoption. On 17 June 
1981, the 18th OAU Assembly adopted the Charter. 
According to Article 63(3) of the AFCHPR, the Charter shall enter into 
force three months after the OAU Secretary-General receives notice that 
a simple majority of OAU Member States (i. e. 26 Member States) have 
16 become party to the treaty 
On 24 July 1986 the OAU Secretary-General received notice that Niger 
had become the 26th State to deposit its Instrument of ratification. 
Thus, the Charter entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
(b) The Draft Charter: Legal Efficacy or imperatives for Political 
C, rn.. falla 
Before we proceed to analyse the Charter, It Is pertinent to highlight 
the basic differences between the Dakar Draft Charter and the adopted 
text of the AFCHPR. The essence of this exercise is to spotlight the 
basic changes undertaken by the African Ministers of Justice on the 
-------------------- 
15 Report of the OAU Secretary-General on the Draft AFCHPR, OAU Doe 
CM/1149(XXXVII) 1981, p. 2. 
16 Although some States unsuccessfully attempted to introduce the two- 
thirds majority requirement, the simple majority procedure is still a 
difficult hurdle to scale as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has 
shown. (The Covenant required only thirty five states out of one 
hundred and thirty five, yet it took ten years to come into force. ) 
Similarly, the American Convention came into force nine yers after its 
first signature at San Jose, Costa Rica. 
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Dakar Draft, the latter document having been the product of academics 
(and judges) and ostensibly devoid of political compromise. 
Two Sessions of the Ministerial Meeting of OAU Member States were 
convened in Banjul, Gambia, the first, from 9 to 15 June 1980 and the 
second, from 7 to 19 January 1981. The purpose of the Meeting was "to 
consider the preliminary draft of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (Dakar Draft) prepared by the Meeting of African Experts 
17 held in Dakar, Senegal from 28 November to 8 December 1979". 
The main characteristic of the Dakar Draft was the concise and general 
formulations adopted by the experts especially In relation to the second 
generation of rights being the economic, social and cultural rights. The 
concise approach was meant to spare the young African States too many, 
albeit important, obligations18. Basically, the rights of second 
generation entail benefits from the state to citizens and since African 
States were not economically buoyant enough to provide all such rights, 
the experts were constrained not to impose burdensome obligations. 
Nevertheless, the Ministerial Meeting proceeded to amend and water down 
some of the clauses in the Preamble concerning the economic, social and 
cultural rights. For instance, in the preamble to the Dakar Draft, the 
relevant clause states that: 
"Considering the importance that African peoples have always 
attached to the respect for human dignity and fundamental 
human rights, bearing in mind that human and peoples rights 
are not confined to civil and pqi tical rights but cover 
economic, social and cultural rights" 
-------------------- 
17 Rapporteurs Report on the 1st Session of the OAU Ministerial Meeting 
on the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Banjul, The 
Gambia 9-15 June 1980. CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapporteurs Report (II) 
Rev. 4 p. 1. 
18 See Statement of Keba Mbaye, Chairman of the Committee of Experts 
to the 1st Session of the OAU Ministerial Meeting, Ibid p. 4. 
19 2nd Preambular Paragraph, Dakar Draft OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/1. 
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The above attempts by the legal experts to equate the first and second 
generation rights was rejected by the OAU Ministerial Meeting which 
redrafted the relevant paragraph as follows: 
"Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay particular 
attention to the right to development and that civil and 
political rights cannot be disassociated from economic, social 
and cultural rights In their conception as well as 
universality, and that the satisfaction of economic, social and 
cultural rights a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights" 
Much as this redrafted paragraph stresses the Importance of three 
generations of rights, primacy Is given to social and cultural rights as 
against civil and political rights. An authoritative interpretation of this 
paragraph may have to await a pronouncement by the African Commission 
21 
on Human and Peoples Rights. 
The African Commission's capacity to interpret provisions of the Charter 
informs the deliberate briefness and simplicity of the Dakar Draft. The 
Chairman of the Committee of Experts acknowledges "the relative simple 
form In which some of the articles were drafted so as to enable the 
future users of the legal instrument to apply and Interpret them with 
some flexibility. It is left to the protective organs of Human Rights to 
complete the Charter"22. Furthermore it is not unlikely that the Experts 
had taken heed of Justice Elias's advice that the African 'Convention' 
"should... be like a lady's skirt, long enough to cover the subject 
-------------------- 
20 See 7th Preambular Paragraph AFCHPR, Appendix III. 
21 Article 45(3) of the AFCHPR gives the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples Rights the power to interpret all the provisions of the Charter. 
22 Report by the Secretary-General on the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights OAU Doc CL/Plen Rapt(XXXII) p. 59 para. 210 and Rapporteurs Report OAU Doc. CM/1149(XXXVII) Annex 1, p. 4 para. 13. 
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matter, but short enough to be fascinating"23 
With a view to emphasizing the regional character of the Charter, the 
provisions of the preamble to the Dakar Draft which referred to the 
cooperation with non-African States in the field of human rights, was 
rejected by the Ministers. However the Ministerial Meeting fully adopted 
the Dakar Draft preambular paragraph which reaffirmed the pledge of 
OAU States "to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to 
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa, and to promote 
International cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"24. Although the 
AFCHPR reveals no preference for the appllc4ble standards, namely 
African or UN instruments25 we submit that by virtue of the Ministerial 
Meetings rejection of the provisions on cooperation with non-African 
States, and the general regional bias of the language of the AFCHPR, 
the African Commission will be constrained to draw inspiration primarily 
26 from the provisions of the AFCHPR and the OAU Charter. 
This conclusion is underlined by the fact that the regional character of 
the AFCHPR was reinforced by the Ministerial Meeting's introduction of 
-------------------- 
23 T. O. Elias, Background paper delivered at the UN Seminar on the 
Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special 
Reference to Africa, Monrovia, Liberia, 1979, Doc HR/LIBERIA/1979/EP. 1 
at p. 4. para. 13. 
24 3rd preambular paragraph, AFCHPR. 
25 See Article 60 Ibid. 
26 With regard to the OAU Charter it is pertinent to note Dr. Cervenka's 
view that although one of the main purposes of the OAU Charter is "to 
promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" 
(Article II(1)(e)), this does not necessarily reflect the adherence of the 
Member States to the principles of the UN Charter nor their need to 
realise the goal of international cooperation in practical terms, since "there is no legal provision in the OAU Charter which Indicates the kind 
of relationship that is to exist between the OAU and UN". Z. Cervenka 
The Organization of African Unity and its Charter op cit p. 110. 
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the preambular paragraph that extols the virtues of the historical 
traditions and values of African civilization 
27. 
The Dakar Draft's 9th Preambular clause on the elimination of colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, apartheid, Zionism28 was adopted by the Ministerial 
Meeting but only after the addition of the provision which imposes a duty 
on States to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases29. In our 
comparative analysis of the main articles of the adopted AFCHPR and 
those of the Dakar Draft we shall not refer to those amendments which 
have a limited impact on the import or substance of the relevant 
30 
provisions . 
The opening article of the Dakar Draft obliges States to "recognise and 
guarantee" the rights and freedoms in the present Convention... and to 
adopt in accordance with their constitutional provisions, legislative and 
31 
other measures to ensure their respect. 
-------------------- 
27 See 4th preampular paragraph AFCHPR. 
28 It is interesting to note that the word "zionism" was placed In square 
brackets both in the Dakar Draft and also the final Draft presented to 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. During this writers 
discussions with Mr. Akinleye, a Nigerian delegate to the Ministerial 
Meeting it was revealed that the Ministerial Meeting resolved that the 
Assembly should take the appropriate decision whether or not the 
brackets should be left. The controversy generated by the inclusion of 
"zionism" was mainly between Libya which introduced the term and 
Botswana which objected thereto on the grounds that Zionism was not an 
African problem. In the final analysis the fact that the term "zionism" Is 
maintained in the final text of the AFCHPR Is not merely a concession to 
the North African States but also a reflection of the fact that the 
majority of African States do not have diplomatic relations with Israel. 
While it may be viewed as evidence of the success of Arab diplomacy it 
is, in the main, a reaction of African States to the continuing economic 
and militarylinks between Israel and South Africa. 
29 8th preambular paragraph AFCHPR. 
30 For instance the phrase "Human beings are sacred" (Dakar Draft) was 
amended to read "Human beings are invoilable (Article 4, AFCHPR). 
31 Article 1 Dakar Draft (underlines for emphasis). 
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The strength and force of this provision was sapped by the Ministerial 
Meetings amendment which removed the words "guarantee" and "ensure" 
therefrom. Thus Article 1 of the AFCHPR provides that State Parties 
"shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this 
Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to 
give effect to them , 
32. This amendment gives the initial impression that 
the AFCHPR is basically a promotional Charter. However, this 
impression is dispelled when the Charter is viewed as a whole. Firstly, 
State Parties to the AFCHPR "undertake to adopt legislative and other 
measures to give effect to the rights and freedoms provided". Secondly, 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights is established to 
"ensure the protection of human and peoples rights under conditions laid 
down by the Charter". Thus, these provisions among others, re- 
emphasize the nature of the AFCHPR as an instrument that imposes legal 
obligations on State Parties not to infringe the protected rights. 
The Dakar Draft, Article 2 reads as follows: 
"Every person and every people shall be entitled to the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized In the 
present Convention without distinction as to race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, political or any other opinion, 
nationah and social origin, fortune, birth or any other 
status" . 
Firstly, it is instructive to note that the Dakar Draft refers to the 
"Convention" rather than the "Charter". Secondly, the clause "ever 
-------------------- 
32 
In comparison, Article 1 of the American Convention provides that 
State Parties "undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized 
under the Convention and to ensure to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms 
without any discrimination". In this regard Article 1, European 
Conventin states that "The... Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdictin the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention". - See Ian Brownlie (ed) Basic Documents In International 
Law op cit p. 206. 
33 (Underlines for emphasis). 
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person and every people" was changed to "every individual". Much as 
the intention of the Ministerial Meeting was to clarify the meaning of the 
provision, this amendment may be viewed as undermining the significance 
of peoples rights. This suspicion is however dispelled by the fact that 
peoples rights are specifically and expressly guaranteed in Articles 20-26 
of the AFCHPR. Furthermore, in the context of the provision the 
phrase "every individual" is more appropriate. 
It is worth noting that the Ministerial Meeting replaced the word 'person' 
in favour of "individual" as the referent of the right whenever the 
former appeared in the Dakar Draft. This uniform amendment may be 
viewed as a deliberate act to avoid the situation whereby evolving 
African jurisprudence might regard the business corporation or Limited 
liability Company as an artificial person with attendant public law 
rights34. While the amendment may have been influenced by the drafters 
cold disposition to multinationals, they have Inadvertently deprived non- 
governmental organisations (NGO's) and other non-profit oriented bodies 
dedicated to human rights, protected status under the emerging human 
35 
rights jurisprudence 
With reference to Article 5 of the Dakar Draft which prohibits all forms 
of slavery, slave trade, torture cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
and treatment; the Ministerial Meeting adopted the provision and 
expanded the prohibition to cover "all forms of exploitation". 
-------------------- 
34 
In comparison, , the European Conventin adopts the term "everyone" 
while the American Convention uses the terms "everyone" and "person" 
interchangeably. 
35 Harry Scoble; "Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisations in 
Black Africa: Their Problems and Prospect in the Wake of the Banjul 
Charter" in C. E. Welch & R. Meltzer (ed) Human Rights & Development 
in Africa, op cit p. 192. 
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A further increase in the level of protection provided by the Ministerial 
Meeting amendments is reflected in Article 14 of the AFCHPR which 
states that: 
"the right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the 
general interest of the community and in accordance with the 
provisions of appropriate laws". 
The Dakar Draft provision was negative and more restrictive in that it 
allowed States to determine whether or not their local laws should 
36 
guarantee basic rights to property. 
As regards the 'due process' provisions, Article 7 of the Dakar Draft, 
provided inter alia for the "right to defence" simpliciter. The Ministerial 
Meeting however strengthened the provision to include the "right to be 
37 defended by a Counsel of ones choice". 
The provisions concerning the freedom of information and expression and 
the freedom of movement in the Dakar Draft were strengthened by the 
Ministerial amendments. Article 9 of the Dakar Draft states that: 
"[1] Every person shall have the right to objective 
information" . 
36 Article 14 of the Dakar Draft states that "Where the right to property 
is guaranteed by State legislation, It mayonly be encroached upon In the 
interest of public need or in the general interest of the community". 
37 Article 7 AFCHPR c. f. Article 14 of the International Conventin on 
Civil and Political Rights, Article 8(2) (d) and (f) of the American 
Convention and Article 6(3)(c) of the European Conventin, which all 
provide minimum rights for persons charged with a criminal offence 
Including free legal assistance by the State. In contrast, although the 
AFCHPR does not provide comprehensive minimum standards for persons 
charged with criminal offences, it nevertheless is unique in providing for 
the right to defence and choice of counsel to individuals In all causes. 
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[21 Subject to therespect of others' honour and 
reputation, every person shall have the right 3AO 
express and disseminate his opinions within the law" . 
The Ministerial Meeting refused to qualify the right to information by 
deleting the word "objective". 
Similarly, with regard to the freedom of expression provision (Article 
9(2) Dakar Draft) the Ministers deleted the words "subject to the respect 
of others honour and reputation". Thus Article 9(2) of the AFCHPR 
states that: "Every individual shall have the right to express and 
disseminate his opinions within the law°39 
It would seem that the Legal Experts were unnecessarily verbose and 
restrictive by expressly providing safeguards for the "honour and 
reputation" of others, the basic rationale for the Municipal Laws of libel 
and slander and a factor accommodated by the words "within the law". 
The Ministerial Meeting also amended the highly restrictive provision of 
Article 12(2) of the Dakar Draft which generally subjected the right to 
leave or return to ones home countryto: 
"restrictions enacted in law essential for the protection of 
national security, law and order public health or morality, or 
other peoples rights and freedoms which are compatible with 
the other rights recognised In the present convention (sic)". 
The inexhaustive and general nature of these restrictions Imposed by the 
Dakar Draft Is evident. Thus the Ministerial amendment confined the 
restrictions to the specified reasons by the insertion of the word "only"; 
consequently, the right to leave or return to ones home country "... may 
-------------------- 
38 
Underlines for emphasis. 
39 Underlines for emphasis. 
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only be subject to restrictions provided by law for the protection of 
national security, law and order, public health or morality""40 
The inexhaustive drafting style of the Dakar Draft Is also reflected In Its 
Article 12(5) which provides that: "The mass expulsion of non nationals 
shall be prohibited. No economic, political or other reasons would justify 
such a measure". The Ministerial Meeting amended the second sentence 
of this provision by providing a precise list defining the scope of 
prohibited 'mass expulsions'. 
Thus Article 12(5) of the AFCHPR states inter alia that "...: Mass 
expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial ethnic or 
religious groups". 
The necessity for a comprehensive provision on mass expulsion Is 
enforced by the spate of reciprocal expulsions of aliens especially among 
West African States over the past two decades41. The phenomenon of 
mass expulsions Is symptomatic of the lack of sensitivity of African 
rulers to the human rights implications of such acts. While most of these 
expulsions have been justified on the domestic legal rights of a nation to 
expel illegal aliens, the mass nature of expulsions constitutes a violation 
of International law. 
40 Article 12(2) AFCHPR (underlines for emphasis). 
41 Ghana expelled Nigerians In 1964, and 1974, and the Voltales in 1961; 
Niger expelled its entire Dahomean (now Beninoise) community in 1964 
and the Senegalese in 1967; and Nigeria expelled all illegal aliens, mostly 
of West African origin in April 1983. In the name of economic 
nationalization, Idi Amin expelled 20,000 British Asians from Uganda in 
1971. See Richard Plende "The Exodus of Asians from East and Central AFrica: Some Comparative and International Law Aspects" AJIL, Vol. 19 
pp. 287-324. See also Homer Jack, "The UN and the Expulsion of Asians from Uganda: A Case Study in Insufficiency" WCRP Report, World 
Conference In Religion for Peace (1972) p. 6. 
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Furthermore, the nature of these expulsions reveals that they were aimed 
at national, ethnic or religious groups. More significant is the fact that 
some mass expulsions have been justified on the grounds of economic 
nationalism42. A comparison of the Dakar Draft and the AFCHPR 
provisions relating to mass expulsions reveals that mass expulsions based 
on economic grounds is expressly prohibited by the former but not by 
the amended Article 12(5) of the latter. To this extent therefore Article 
12(5) of the AFCHPR is defective. 
A major flaw in the Dakar Draft was corrected by the Ministerial 
Conference in relation to the provision on the " peoples right" to "freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources"43. The relevant provision 
of the Dakar Draft was silent on the issue of compensation in the event 
of spoliation of those resources. Thus the relevant article was redrafted 
to read as follows: 
"In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the 
lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate 
compensation" 
44 . 
With reference to the provisions on the procedure of the Commission 
concerning State Communications, both the Dakar Draft and the AFCHPR 
provide that a State Party which has good reasons to believe another 
State Party has violated the Charter provisions, may by written 
45 
communication draw the attention of the accused State to the matter, 
-------------------- 
42 For instance, the Ugandan expulsion of British Asians in 1971. See 
Don Nanjira; The Status of Asians in East Africa (New York/Preager 
1976). 
43 Article 21 Dakar Draft. 
44 Article 21(2) AFCHPR. 
45 Article 47 Dakar Draft; Article 47 AFCHPR. 
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The Ministerial Meeting however went a step further by introducing a 
new provision which prescribes that in similar circumstances, a State 
Party may refer the matter directly to the Commission without first 
presenting a complaint to the other State46. In this context therefore, 
the Ministerial Meeting enhanced the admissibility procedures of the 
Commission by providing a second but direct channel to the Commission 
by State Parties. 
The exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies before 
the Commission may deal with a matter were effectively broadened by the 
Ministerial Meeting. Under the Dakar Draft the exhaustion of local 
remedies may only be dispensed with where the local remedies are 
obviously ineffective or on proof of abuse of procedure47. However 
under the AFCHPR, it will be sufficient to scale the hurdle of exhausting 
local remedies where "it is obvious to the Commission that the procedure 
of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged". 
48 
Furthermore, whereas the Dakar Draft prohibits the acceptance by the 
Commission of communications made other than by Member States where 
they are based "predominantly " on mass media reports, the AFCHPR is 
49 
less restrictive, by barring such communications only when they are 
based "exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media"50. 
-------------------- 
46 
Article 49 AFCHPR. This provision is similar to the Article 24 
procedure of the European Convention. See also Article 45 of the 
American Convention. 
47 Article 49 Dakar Draft. 
48 Article 50 AFCHPR. See also Article 56(5). 
49 Article 55(4) Dakar Draft (underlines for emphasis). 
50 Article 56(4) AFCHPR (underlines for emphasis). 
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The mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
under the Dakar Draft does not include the interpretation of the 
Charter. Although this may have been a deliberate omission, the legal 
experts, however provided an escape valve whereby the African 
Commission may perform Interpretive tasks when they "carry out other 
tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State 
51 
and Government" 
In contrast, the AFCHPR specifically grants the African Commission the 
mandate to interpret all the provisions of the Charter at the request of a 
State Party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organisation 
52 
recognised by the OAU. 
The general approach of the Dakar Draft to the procedure of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights was based strictly on 
adverserial concepts53. The revised procedural provisions In the 
AFCHPR were ameliorated by the subjugation of the Commissions basic 
adverserial procedure rules to the primary consideration of exhausting all 
appropriate means of amicable solution In considering matters submitted 
54 to It. 
-------------------- 
51 
Article 45(5) Dakar Draft. 
52 Article 45(3) ARCHPR. The grant of this power of interpretation to 
the Commission was not without controversy. Several States preferred 
the mandate of the Commission to be limited to where two States were 
involved and in that event differences should be resolved by recourse to 
the OAU Charter. Thus in effect implying that differences between 
Member States would be resolved on the basis of the provisions of the 
OAU Charter which emphasizes diplomatic and political settlement. (See 
OAU Doe CM/1149(000V11) at p. 28 paras. 121-123. The Rapporteurs 
Report of the Ministerial Meeting states that the delegates of Tanzania, 
Burundi and Kenya expressed reservations on the Article 45(3) - OAU Doe CAB/LEG/67/Draft Report (11) Rev. 4 p. 28. As of 12 May 1987, 
only Tanzania (on 9.3.84) of the these States, had ratified the Charter. 
53 The relevant Articles (48 and 52) of the Dakar Draft do not mention the need for the Commission to adopt a peaceful procedure or to initially 
seek amicable solutions to matters referred to it. 
54 Article 48 and 52 AFCHPR. 
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The foregoing analysis reveals the main areas where the regional, nay 
international, protection of human rights has been enhanced or increased 
by the AFCHPR. Against this trend are several areas where some 
reductions have occurred in the AFCHPR provisions vis-a-vis the human 
rights protections offered by the Dakar Draft. 
One of the primary areas where such reductions have occurred concern 
the provisions relating to freedom of association. The Dakar Draft 
provision on the freedom of association provides In absolute and 
unconditional, albeit negative, terms that: "No one may be compelled to 
55 join an association" 
The AFCHPR however, subjects the negative freedom of association 
(Article 10(2)) 56 to the operation of Article 29 which latter article 
imposes several duties on the Individual. For Instance Article 29(4) In 
effect allows the compulsory membership of associations which promote 
national or social solidarity. It would seem therefore that although 
political considerations may apparently be the primary motivation of such 
a clause, we should not loose sight of the fact that the jurisprudence of 
traditional African Law sees the individual privately as a member of his 
community57. The African Commission would thus be well advised to 
construe the provision of the freedom of association in the latter context 
to check the abuse of the freedom of association by States. For 
instance, the provision as it stands would justify the existence of one 
party States in Africa and membership thereof, and may thus encourage 
the perpetuation of the trend in the region. Furthermore, the provision 
-------------------- 
55 Article 10(2) Dakar Draft. 
56 Article 10(2) AFCHPR provides that: "Subject to the obligation of 
solidarity provided for in Article 29, no one may be compelled to join an 
association". 
57 See Chapter One, generally, above. 
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stands to legitimize structures against the evolution of the concept of 
loyal opposition. 
The right of every citizen to participate freely in the government either 
directly or through freely chosen representatives is absolute in the 
Dakar Draft58. This provision is diluted in the AFCHPR; Article 13(1) 
of the AFCHPR allows the exercise of this right only "in accordance with 
the provisions of the law"59. Despite the fact that this right, more than 
any other, is subject to vulnerability the AFCHPR provision does not 
specify the areas that such laws may regulate60. The effect of this 
provision Is that political rights may be encroached upon by domestic 
laws drafted by repressive regimes. 
The effect of the AFCHPR is also reduced vis a vis the Dakar Draft in 
relation to the requirement of publicity regarding reports on violations of 
human rights. The Dakar Draft provides for the agreement of one third 
of the Members of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government before 
the report on violations on human rights can be made publicsi. The 
AFCHPR now requires a majority decision of the Assembly in such a 
62 
case. 
-------------------- 
58 Article 13(1) Dakar Draft. 
59 Article 13(1) AFCHPR. 
60 The relevant provision in Article 23 of the American Convention 
preserves the individuals right to participate in government and allows 
laws to regulate the exercise of the right "only on the basis of age, 
nationality, residence, language, education civil and mental capacity, or 
sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings" (underlines for 
emphasis). 
61 Article 57(2) Dakar Draft. 
62 Article 59(2) and (3) AFCHPR. It is noteworthy that the requirement 
of the OAU Charter on procedural questions is also simple majority. 
Article 10(3) OAU Charter. 
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With regard to the rights of women and children, the AFCHPR enhanced 
the protection of the rights of the former63 but weakened the protection 
of the latter. In the final analysis however, the rights of women and 
64 
children are adequately catered for in the AFCHPR when compared to 
65 
other regional conventions 
One of the major areas where reductions were perpetuated by the 
Ministerial Meeting was in regard to the autonomy of the African 
Commission. 
Firstly; with a view to enhancing the autonomy and independence of the 
Members of the African Commission, the Dakar Draft provides that "the 
members of the Commission shall serve in their Individual capacity"66, 
and that "the office of a member of the Commission shall be Incompatible 
with that of a Government member or a member of the diplomatic 
corps"67. Although the former provision was adopted by the Ministerial 
Meeting, the latter provision was the subject of a two-day debate and 
-------------------- 
63 The Dakar Draft provided inter alia for "the elimination of every 
discrimination against women" (Article 18(3)). The AFCHPR in this 
wise, went further to expressly provide that "the State shall... ensure 
the protection of the rights of the woman and child as stipulated In 
international declarations and conventions" (Article 18(3)). The Dakar 
Draft provides that "The State shall ensure protection of the rights of 
the child as stipulated in international declarations and convention" 
(underlines for emphasis) 
64 The protection for the child is weakened In the sense that the 
AFCHPR deleted the Dakar Draft provision protecting the right of the 
child to "special measures of protection In accordance with the 
requirements of their physical and intellectual well being" - Article 18(4) 
Dakar Draft. 
65 See Articles 8 and 12 European Convention and Articles 17 and 19 
American Convention. 
66 Article 31(2) Dakar Draft. 
67 Article 32 Ibid. 
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was eventually deleted after votes were taken68. The non-adoption of 
this clause may be regarded as an erosion of the autonomous nature of 
the Commission as projected by the Dakar Draft. 
Secondly; in relation to the jurisprudential and legislative functions of 
the African Commission, Dakar Draft provided that Commission "shall... 
[2] Formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at the solution of 
legal problems relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms upon 
which African governments shall base legislation"69. This provision 
obligates States to enact domestic legislation tailored upon "principles and 
rules" evolved by the African Commission. The Ministers however, 
removed this obligation by adopting a liberal phrase: "... upon which 
African Governments n base their legislations"70. The weakening of 
this provision by the Ministerial Meeting reduces the potential of the 
African Commission to perform an effective legislative role. 
Thirdly; the independence of the Commission was further reduced by the 
Ministerial amendments to the Commissions rules of procedure. The 
Dakar Draft states that: "The Commission may resort to all methods of 
investigation"71. Barring any disagreement from Commission Members, 
this provision vests in the Commission, the power to adopt investigatory 
methods utilized by existing regional and international human rights 
Commissions, Including fact-finding, on site inquiries and, where Its 
resources are limited, the utilization of the data banks of existing human 
rights organizations. The Ministers however weakened the provisions of 
-------------------- 
68 
The inclusion of Article 32 (Dakar Draft) in the AFCHPR was defeated 
by fifteen votes to twenty during one of the only votes taken during the 
Ministerial Meeting on the provisions of the Dakar Draft. See OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 p. 12. 
69 Article 45(2) Dakar Draft (underlines for emphasis). 
70 Article 45(1)(b) AFCHPR (underlines for emphasis). 
71 Article 46 Dakar Draft. 
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the AFCHPR by adopting the phrase "any appropriate method"72 In place 
of "all methods". 
The foregoing analysis informs us that much as political considerations 
were a major factor in evolving a Charter, the Ministerial Meeting of 
African Justice Ministers provided a Charter that was more technically 
and legally precise than the Dakar Draft. The African Legal Experts 
that produced the Dakar Draft succeeded In producing a document that 
comfortably accommodated the Ministerial amendments without creating any 
significant political disaffection. With regard to the substantive 
provisions, the Ministerial amendments enhanced the protection of 
property, the freedom of Information and expression, the rights of 
women, the freedom of movement relating to inter-State mobility, but 
weakened the autonomy of the African Commission and the provisions on 
mass expulsions and the right of association. The procedural provisions 
of the African Commission on Human Rights were enhanced by the 
African Ministers of Justice through the enlarment of admissibility 
procedures and the emphasis on the exhaustion of peaceful and amicable 
avenues rather than quasi-judicial or adverserial methods. 
The Ministerial Meeting of African Justice Ministers maintained the major 
features of the Dakar Draft by reconsecrating African values and 
traditions, and the first, second and third generation rights in the 
AFCHPR. However, several provisions of the Dakar Draft were affected 
by primary political considerations, thus undermining the legal efficacy, 
of provisions especially those concerning the freedom of association and 
the autonomy of the African Commission. The legal efficacy of the 
AFCHPR will invariably depend upon the African State practice and 
capacity of the African Commission to resist political pressures. 
-------------------- 
72 
Article 46, AFCHPR. 
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(c) The Basic Philosophy of the AFCHPR 
The basic philosophy of the AFCHPR is reflected in the following 
features of its preamble: - 
Reaffirmation of the principles and aspirations of the OAU as 
stated in the OAU Charter especially those regarding 
freedom, equality, justice and dignity, non-discrimination, 
elimination of colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and 
Zionism. 
- The importance of the historical traditions and values of 
African civilizations which attach significance to human and 
peoples rights. 
- The basic recognition that fundamental human rights stem 
from the attributes of human beings thus justifying their 
international protection and guarantee. 
The emphasis of the fact that the corollary enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms is the performance of duties on the part 
of everyone. 
- The significance attached to the right to development and 
that civil and political rights cannot be disassociated from 
economic, social and cultural rights in their conceptions as 
well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic 
social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights. 
The reaffirmation of the principles of human and peoples 
rights and freedoms as contained in international instruments 
adopted by the OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned 
Countries and the UN, with special emphasis on the UN 
Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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The preamble thus reveals a unique approach by its emphasis on African 
values and traditions without prejudice to international human rights 
norms. The authors of the AFCHPR were inspired by African legal 
philosophy and were urged to evolve a Charter that was responsive to 
73 African socio-economic needs. 
(i) African Philosophy of Law and Human Rights 
The African concept of law allows the general interests of the community 
to override individual claims. This does not necessarily mean that 
individual rights are not protected. African philosophy of law assumes 
harmony, not divergence of interests, and stresses the significance of 
the individuals duties both to the community and other members of the 
society rather than Individual claims against them74. Keba Mbaye 
underscores this point by stating that: "In Africa, laws and duties are 
regarded as being two facets of the same reality: the inseparable 
75 
reality". 
In the West, the law is seen primarily as an opposition between the 
individual and the State. the latter representing the community. The 
legal right, in the West, is a claim which the individual may make against 
the State or other members of society; the corollary of this is that there 
is an obligation on the part of the State to uphold his claim. 
The western phenomenon of the legal subject being the individual 
possessing a bundle of rights which can be asserted against 'the world' 
has limited application within the African concept of law. Although 
-------------------- 
73 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Draft African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights OAU Doe. CM/1149/XXXVII (1981) p. 1. 
74 Clause Ake "The African Context of Human Rights" in 'Africa Today' 
Vol. 34 (1987) p. 5. 
75 K. Mbaye "Keynote Address on the African Charter on Human and 
-11 
Peoples Rights" ICJ Conference Paper op cit p. 27 
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individual in the African context also possesses these bundle of rights he 
asserts then within the framework of his duties to the community76. The 
community provides support for the individual and demands allegiance. 
The interrelation of allegiance and support is a significant factors in 
most African communities77. Hence, the Charters recognition "that 
fundamental human rights stems from the attributes of human beings, 
which justifies their international protection and... that the reality and 
respect of peoples rights should necessarily guarantee human rights" 
? 8. 
The desire to safeguard traditional African values is also reflected In the 
importance attached to the protection of the family79, moral and 
traditional values80, and the definition not only of rights but also of the 
81 duties of man both towards his fellow man and towards his State. In 
this latter respect the AFCHPR differs from the European and American 
Conventions. 
The AFCHPR is the first treaty of its type to contain a comprehensive 
82 list of duties of the individual towards his community. While the 
AFCHPR provides that every "Individual shall have duties towards his 
family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities 
76 Anthropological evidence upholds the concept that "personhood" In 
Africa is enhanced by ones belonging to and fulfilling ones duty or role 
in the community. - See Ifeanyi Menkiti, "Person and Community in 
African Traditional Thought" in Richard A. Wright (ed) African 
Philosophy: An Introduction 2nd ed (Washington DC University Press of 
America 1979) pp. 157-168. 
77 Iba Der Thiam "Human Rights in African Cultural Traditions" Human 
Rights Teaching UNESCO 3 (1982) p. 4. 
78 ARCHPR 5th preambular paragraph (underlines for emphasis). 
79 AFCHPR, Article 12. 
80 Ibid Article 17. 
81 Ibid Preambular paragraph 6. 
82 AFCHPR Articles 27-29. 
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and the international community"83, in the other Conventions, the notion 
of "duties" implies obligations of a State towards its citizens or towards 
foreign nationals within its jurisdiction84. Although the American 
Convention refers to the individuals duties to his family community and 
mankind, it is arguable that "community" in this context, refers to the 
State. 85 
The approach of the AFCHPR which tends to find a balance between 
individual rights and collective rights Is founded upon the fact that in 
Africa the existence of the Individual Is Inconceivable outside the 
community. The individual neither exists nor lives outside "the 
group"86. The socio-economy of most of Africa is devoid of social 
atomizations and individualism since the majority of its people are 
inevitably attached to the traditional ritual of subsistence economies 
managed on communal bases. Consequently, in Africa, the community in 
87 its various forms, is a privileged subject of law. 
The adverserial mode of judicial proceedings is alien to the African 
conception of law. Disputes are resolved through reconciliation and non- 
contentious procedures. This characteristic may have informed the 
-------------------- 
83 Ibid Article 27(1). The AFCHPR also states that "[t]he enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of 
everyone" - preambular paragraph 6. 
84 E. Daes "Study of the Individuals Duties to the Community and the 
Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" UN Doc E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432. Rev. 1 
Add 1-6 (1979). 
85 See the American Convention, Article 32. Similarly the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[e]very one has duties to his 
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality 
is possible" - Article 29(1). 
86 Rapporteurs Report CM/1149(XXVII) Annese II OAU Council of 
Ministers 37th Session at Nairobi (June 1984) p. 3. 
87 The community in Africa may take the form of clan, lineage, ethnic 
group, tribe etc. 
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emphasis of amicable and reconciliatory procedures adopted by the 
AFCHPR regarding complaints brought before the African Commission88. 
The African aversion to judicial procedures in also reflected in the OAU 
Convention Covering the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(1969)89. Whereas, the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 UN Refugee Protocol90 provides for judicial 
solutions to problems, arising from application thereof, the OAU 
Convention on the other hand confines itself to conciliatory 
procedures. 
91 
(ii) The AFCHPR: A Response to African Socio-Economic Conditions 
Due to the acute nature of underdevelopment in Africa, particular 
attention is given to economic, social and cultural rights92. Although 
the preambular paragraph 7, ostensibly equates civil and political rights 
with economic, social and cultural rights, nevertheless, the phraseology 
betrays deference to economic, social and cultural rights where they 
come into contention with civil and political rights. The exigencies of 
economic growth thus serves a justification for the subordination of civil 
and political rights In preference for socio-economic rights. President 
Nyerere of Tanzania succinctly states the position thus: 
"what freedom has our subsistence farmer? He scratches a 
bare living from the soil provided the rains do not fail; his 
children work at his side without schooling, medical care, or 
even good feeding. Certainly he has freedom to vote and to 
speak as he wishes but these freedoms are much less real to 
him than his freedom to be exploited. Only as his poverty is 
88 AFCHPR Articles 48 and 52. 
89 OAU Doe CM/267/Rev. 1, February 1969. 
90 UN Doc HCR/IP/10/ENG. 
91 Article IX, OAU Convention on Refugees op cit. 
92 AFCHPR preambular paragraph 7, See also Articles 15,16 and 18. 
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reduced will his existing political freedom become meaningful 
and his93right to human dignity become a fact of human 
dignity" 
The foregoing pronouncement from a leading African statesman has been 
echoed by other political leaders94 seeking to justify the postponement of 
political liberties until economic development is achieved. However there 
Is no guarantee that the one will follow the other. The arguments based 
on the exigencies of economic growth are likely to serve as justification 
for the subordination (albeit temporary) of the rights of the Individual to 
the interests of the State. We endorse Rhoda Howards view that the 
proponents of subsistence or -economic rights priority over civil/political 
rights are rhetorics seeking the perpetual political monopoly of a self- 
95 
serving elite. 
We submit that, although economic subsistence ought to be a right96, 
economic and social rights ought not to be a prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights97. Consequently we endorse the 
thesis of the interdependence of basic rights. The protection of civil 
and political rights are needed for the achievement of basic needs, 
economic subsistence and social and cultural rights. 
-------------------- 
93 Julius K. Nyerere "Stability and Changes in Africa" (an Address to 
the University of Toronto, 1969) printed in African Contemporary Record 
2 (1969-70) C. 30-31. 
94 Col. Ignatius Achaempong proclaimed that "One man, one vote, Is 
meaningless unless accompanied by the principle of one man one bread" 
See Amnesty International, "Background Paper on Ghana" (London: 
mimeo 1974) p. 9. 
95 Rhode Howard: The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take 
Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Human Rights Quarterly p. 469. 
96 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign 
Policy (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press 1980) Chapter 1. 
97 An apt but extreme scenario is painted by R. J. Vincent who doubts 
whether any suggestion that remuneration for public holidays, as an 
economic and social rights, is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of the 
civil and political right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, would be taken seriously. R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge University Press 1986) p. 89. 
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Since the AFCHPR reposes in the African Commission the power of 
interpreting clauses of the Charter, it is pertinent that the African 
Commission interpretes Clause 7 of the Preamble98. In a manner cognisant 
of the interdependence of basic rights. The movement to separate the 
two groups of rights or indeed establish a hierarchical structure of 
rights is a response to Ideological and political pressures which the 
African Commission should resist. The spirit of the AFCHPR invites the 
Commission to maintain distance from both the East and West and their 
conceptions of the ideological function of human rights. 
The response of the AFCHPR to socio-economic needs is reflected in 
provisions made for economic, social and cultural rights. Member States 
are required to make provision for the achievement of this category of 
rights with 
99 
particular emphasis on the 
100 
right to development 
We can discern, therefore, from the foregoing that the preamble of the 
Charter gives us a spectoral vision of the major-themes that traverse the 
Charter. Firstly, the AFCHPR derives its Inspiration mainly from the 
African historical, legal and cultural sources without sacrificing the 
external influences of Judeao-Greco jurisprudence presented by existing 
international human rights Instruments. Secondly, while Individuals are 
entitled to certain rights under the Charter, they are also bound to 
fulfil duties towards the community and State. Finally, although the 
preamble seems to lay more emphasis on economic, social and cultural 
rights, over civil and political rights, the degree of priority of the 
former over the latter will have to be determined by the African 
Commission. 
-------------------- 
98 AFCHPR states inter alia "... that the satisfaction of economic, social 
and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights" - preambular Clause 7. 
99 Article 1, AFCHPR. 
100 Article 22 Ibid. 
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Whether or not the preambles unique articulation of the African approach 
to human rights in response to African needs finds support in the main 
provisions of the Charter remains to be demonstrated. We propose to 
examine, in the following discourse, the substantive provisions of the 
AFCHPR that reflect these major themes. We shall also consider, where 
appropriate, relevant provisions of other international and regional 
human rights conventions with a view first, to test the efficacy of the 
provisions of the AFCHPR and secondly, to determine whether the 
AFCHPR has omitted pertinent provisions which ought to have been 
incorporated. Thus our criteria for evaluating the AFCHPR is based 
primarily on the existing international standards of human rights 
protection with a reasonable margin of appreciation In respect to African 
values, needs and problems. 
(d) The Basic Structure of the Charter 
The AFCHPR is divided into three parts. Part I Is subdivided Into 
Chapters I and II. Chapter I sets out the human and peoples rights to 
be protected under the Charter101, while Chapter II delineates the 
individuals duties towards "his family and society, recognised 
communities and the international community"02. 
Part II of the Charter comprises four chapters which set out detailed 
measures to safeguard and protect rights enshrined in Part I. Chapter I 
thereof provides for the establishment of the African Commission on 
103 Human and Peoples Rights. Chapter II deals with the functions of 
-------------------- 
101 Ibid. Articles 1-18 set out the rights of the individual; Articles 1- 
14 concern civil and political rights; Articles 15-18 relate to economic, 
social and cultural rights. Articles 19-26 deal with "peoples" rights. 
102 
Ibid, Article 27. 
103 Ibid, Article 30. 
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the Commission104 while Chapter III provides for the procedure of the 
Commission105 Chapter IV enumerates the applicable principles by 
which the Commission will ensure the protection of human rights in 
Af rica106 
Finally, Part III enshrines the general provisions relating to the 
107 
commencement of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 
It is pertinent to state that there is no specific text in the Charter that 
serves as a declaration of Rights. The AFCHPR adopts a unified 
108 
approach to the declaration, promotion and protection of rights, be they, 
individual or peoples' rights, political or economic rights. 
We shall now embark on an analysis of the substantive principles of the 
Charter. 
(e) Non-Discrimination 
The Charter consecrates the principle of non-discrimination. Article 2 of 
the AFCHPR provides that: 
"every individual is entitled to the protection of the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any 
kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, 
religion. political or any other opinion, national or social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status". 
--------------- 
104 Ibid, Article 45. 
105 Ibid, Article 47-54 concern communications from States, and Articles 
55-59 deal with communicatins from other sources such as individuals and 
non-governmental organisations. 
106 Ibid, Articles 60-63. 
107 Ibid Articles 64-68. 
108 Unlike the "American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man" 
which is the cornerstone of the inter-American system for the protection 
of human rights. See OAS Res. XXX adopted by the Ninth International 
Conference of American States, Bogota 1948. 
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This provision is unique in the sense that although the American 
Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contain similar 
clauses109, neither includes "ethnic group" within the categories 
protected from discrimination. 
The Charters non-discrimination provision has finally provided an answer 
to the critics who accuse African States of applying the Universal 
Declarations non-discrimination principles only to the racist regimes of 
Southern Africa, and not to themselves110, The Inclusion of an express 
prohibition against discrimination along ethnic lines is a major attempt at 
scaling the hurdle of tribalism in Africa. Tribalism or ethnic favouratlsm 
Is a phenomenon that has effectively denied politically disadvantaged 
groups from exercising their rights'11. The AFCHPR, by Including 
"ethnic group[s]", has thus manifestly complemented the principle of the 
OAU Charter "to promote understanding among our peoples and 
cooperation among our States... in a larger unity transcending ethnic 
and natural differencesýý112 
(f) The Rights of the Individual 
The rights of the individual under the AFCHPR can be classified as 
personal security rights, civil and political rights, and economic, social 
and cultural rights. 
(i) Personal Security Rights 
Article 3 of the AFCHPR protects the individuals right to equality before 
the law, and equal protection of the law. 
109 See, Article 14, European Convention; Article 1 American Convention 
and Article 2, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
110 See Glenn Mower JR, "Human Rights in Black Africa: A Double 
Standard? " Human Rights Journal (1976) p. 51. 
111 See Chapter 4 generally above. 
112 Preambular paragraph 4, OAU Charter. See Appendix II, post. 
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Article 4 provides for the inviolability of the "human being", respect for 
life and the integrity of his person and that "[n]o one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of this right". The drafting of this clause caused some 
controversy resulting in several socialist/Marxist African States making 
reservations thereto113 The reasons for the reservations are not 
unconnected with the violent methods utilized by these States to eliminate 
'Lassaire faire' capitalism and organised opposition movements with a view 
to installing repressive and doctrinal Marxist methods of rule. 
The provision that "no one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right" 
implies that derogations will be permissible where municipal laws so 
provide. Most African States operate laws that allow capital punishment 
not only for crimes but also for political offences and other miscellaneous 
offences, sometimes euphemistically referred to as "economic sabotage"114 
In several States, summary executions are prevalent115 Quasi-judicial 
organs which are politically motivated are formed outside the established 
judicial system to dispatch death sentences which are often executed in 
public. 
-------------------- 
113 These countries were Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and 
Mozambique. Rapporteurs Report, OAU Doc CM/1149(XXXXVII) 
Annex 11, p. 8 para. 38. 
114 Under the provisions of the Nigerian Counterfeit Currency (Special 
Provisions) Decree No. 22 of 1984 and the Supreme Military Council 
Decree 20, Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree of 1984, the 
death penalty is prescribed for, counterfeiting, drug trafficking and 
illegal oil sales. However in response to International criticism, the 
Government in July 1986 decreed the abolition of death sentences 
regarding the aforementioned issues but retained the death penalty for 
armed robbery. See also, Article 38 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1986 
(entered into force 12 Sept 1986) of Mauritius which imposes a mandatory 
death sentence for any person convicted of Importing "dangerous drugs". 
115 See "Third Report of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Special 
Rapporteur on "Summary Executions" UN Doc. E/CN. 4/1985/17. 
449 
The majority of African States retain the death penalty for one form of 
116 
offence or the other Furthermore the spate of extrajudicial killings 
has not abated117. In the light of the foregoing, It Is submitted that 
derogation permissible under Article 4 of the AFCHPR leaves room for 
States to continue practices that violate human life as long as they prove 
that municipal laws and decrees authorize these actions. The Charter 
ought to have placed a ban on the death penalty or at least subscribed 
118 to the gradual abolition of the death penalty. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the American Convention, the AFCHPR omits 
the controversial sentence of the American Convention which states: 
"This right (to life] shall be protected by law and in general from the 
moment of conception"119. The AFCHPR, by omitting this phrase thus 
leaves to individual OAU Member State Parties to the Charter, the 
regulation of abortion and the definition of the term "abortion". 
Article 5 of the AFCHPR Is closely linked with the preceding article in so 
far as it protects the Individuals dignity and legal status. Article 5 also 
prohibits the degrading treatment of the Individual as well as torture, 
cruel and Inhuman punishment of the individual. Although, Article 5 
120 
does not contain a clause prohibiting "Involuntary servitude". In 
-------------------- 
116 See Report of Amnesty International 1987, Amnesty International 
Publications, London p. 21 ff. 
117 Ibid. 
118 The following international human rights instruments place 
restrictions on the death penalty to varying degrees: Article 2 European 
Convention; Article 6 The UN Convention Civil and Political Rights; and 
Article 4 American Convention (which has exceptionally detailed 
restrictions on the death penalty). 
119 Article 4(1) American Convention. 
120 During this writers discussions with Mr. Akinleye, a member of 
Nigerias delegation to the Ministerial Conference on the Draft Charter, it 
was revealed that the curious omission of "involuntary servitude" was at 
the instance of two socialist countries, Ethiopia and Mozambique who were 
insistent on the exclusion of the term. 
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comparison the American Convention121, the European Convention122 and 
the International Covenant123 expressly forbid servitude. However, the 
AFCHPR expressly prohibits slavery and slave trade124. The exclusion 
of the term "involuntary servitude" is unfortunate, although its inclusion 
would almost certainly have conflicted with the liberal interpretation of 
the Charters provisions regarding the duties of the individual to his 
125 
national community 
The application of Article 5, is significant and apt, especially in relation 
to torture, inhuman and degrading punishment as perpetuated by 
government organs against persons in police custody and prisons126. A 
purposeful application of the Charters provision in this regard may 
reduce the occurence of such practices, including summary executions, 
the corporal punishment of adult and juvenile offenders, and lately, 
customs search of body cavities. 
Article 6 of the AFCHPR provides for the right of the individual to 
liberty and to the security of his person Including freedom from 
arbitrary arrest or detention. Due to the existence of authoritarian 
governments in Africa, the majority of Africans live in a perpetual state 
of siege. Authoritarian governments impose legislative restrictions on 
the personal security rights in the form of detention laws, deportation 
acts and other internal security legislation. Ruling elites believe that 
-------------------- 
121 The American Convention, Article 6(1). 
122 The European Convention, Article 4(1). 
123 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 
8(2). 
124 Article 5, AFCHPR. 
125 Article 29(2) Ibid. 
126 Isabella E. Okagbue "The Law and Human Dignity: Some Aspects of 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment" Nigerian Current Law Review (1985) 
p. 213. 
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certain types of personal security rights jeopardize national unity and 
political stability127. Most authoritarian governments believe that 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention together with the freedom of 
movement may facilitate the overthrow of the status quo by organized 
political opposition groups. The political and legal tool most frequently 
used by African leaders to silence political dissent has been preventive 
detention Acts128. Thus while detention laws are used by authoritarian 
regimes to disintegrate the opposition129, they are also utilized by 
ostensibly "benevolent" or democratic governments as a "damocles sword" 
to conscript members of the opposition. We recognise the genuine need 
for State security however it should not be used as an excuse, at every 
turn, for depriving the citizen of his liberty and personal security. An 
Independent judiciary is a sine-qua non for the effective enforcement of 
the provisions of Article 6, and thus challenge the unwarranted exercise 
of power by governments. The judiciary should be prepared to grant 
habeas corpus, mandamus and ceteriorari orders as effective modes of 
contesting the legality of detention orders. In cases where the courts 
have been prepared to grant such orders, they have in certain cases 
been precluded from presiding over such matters by Decrees ousting 
their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the fact that most African 
-------------------- 
127 M. Haile, "Human Rights, Stability, and Development in Africa: Some 
Observations on Concept and Reality" In Virginia Journal of International 
Law (1984) Vol. 24 p. 602. 
128 John K. Ebiasah "Protecting the Human Rights of Political Detainess: 
The Contradictions and Paradoxes in the African Experience", in Harvard 
Law Journal, Vol. 22 (1979) p. 262. 
129 For instance, in Malawi, the Preservation Public Security 
Regulations, 1965 allows detention without trial if the President deems it 
necessary "for the preservation of public order". Detention is allowed 
for up to 28 days on the authority of an "authorized officer", 
subsequently the detainee may be held indefinitely on the orders of the 
President. More remarkable is the fact that the Public Security 
Regulations make it an offence to publish anything likely "to undermine 
the authority of, or public confidence in the government". See also 
Togo: Political Imprisonment and Torture. Amnesty International 
Publications, London, (1986) pp. 4-33. 
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Constitutions provide guarantees for personal security rights130, these 
violations continue to occur. In some cases the relevant provisions of 
the constitution are suspended while in others they are simply Ignored. 
For instance in Ghana where the constitution Is presently suspended, the 
Preventative Custody Law 1982131 empowers the ruling Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC) to authorize the Indefinite detention 
without trial of anyone "in the interest of national security or in the 
interest of the safety of the person". The African Commission will thus 
be expected to apply the provision of Article 6 to infringements 
emanating from the foregoing scenario. 
Article 7 of the AFCHPR contains the essential pre-requisites for the 
Rule of Law. By virtue of Article 7, an Individual Is endowed with the 
right to have his cause heard132, the right to appeal133, to be presumed 
134 Innocent until proven guilty, to defence (including the right to be 
defended by counsel of choice)135, and to be tried within a reasonable 
time by an impartial court or tribunal136 Article 7 further prohibits the 
prosecution of, or imposition of fines on individuals under ex post facto 
137 laws 
-------------------- 
130 See Chapter 6 (above). 
131 Provisional Natinal Defence Council (PNDC) Law No. 4, (1982). 
132 AFCHPR, Article 7(1). 
133 Ibid; Article 7(1)(a). 
134 Ibid; Article 7(1)(b). 
135 Ibid; Article 7(1)(c). 
136 IbId; Article 7(1)(d). 
137 Ibid; Article 7(2). 
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The final sentence of Article 7(2) has no parallel in other existing human 
rights documents as it provides that "Punishment is personal and can be 
imposed only on the offender". This legend is axiomatic of Western 
human rights jurisprudence but an option in traditional African law. As 
earlier discussed, punishment in traditional Africa invites both personal 
liability or collective liability of the family or clan138, the latter being a 
legitimate method of social coercion. Thus, the express inclusion of the 
"personal punishment" clause in the Charter, though not uncommon in 
African legal instruments139, is pertinent for interpretative and 
jurisprudential clarity. 
Article 7, however, does not include certain safeguards which are vital 
to the protection of the individual. These safeguards can be found in 
the European and American Conventions, viz. the right of the accused to 
aid where language is a problem140, detailed notification of the charges 
against the accused 
141, the obligation of the State to provide Counsel if 
the accused does not defend himself or Is unable to pay for Counsel142, 
143 
and the right to request witnesses. It Is therefore suggested that 
these omitted rights be included in the AFCHPR through amendment144, 
145 
or by their Inclusion in the working rules of the African CommissIon. 
138 See our discussion on human rights in Pre-Colonial traditional Africa, 
Chapter 1 above. 
139 For Instance see Article 14 of the Constitut ion of Uganda. 
140 The European Convention, Article 6(3)(e); The American Convention, 
Article 8(2)(a). 
141 The European Convention, Article 6(3)(a); The American Convention, 
Article 8(2)(b). 
142 The European Convention, Article 6(3)(c); The American Convention, 
Article 8(2)(e). 
143 The European Convention, Article 6(e)(d); The American 
Convention, Article 8(2)(f). 
144 By virtue of Article 68 of the AFCHPR. 
145 Ibid Article 45(1)(b). 
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Furthermore, Article 7 of the AFCHPR reveals a loophole which may 
encourage trials in camera or secret trials before ad-hoc tribunals, since 
the Charter does not expressly grant the individual the right to a "fair 
and public hearinR"46 Furthermore the legal principle of 'nemo judex 
in sua causa' is regularly infringed by African Government organs 
through the practice of having civilians appear before secret military 
147 tribunals, a practice which the Charter apparently does not prohibit. 
The AFCHPR also omits the provision of the American Convention which 
guarantees the right to financial compensation in the event of miscarriage 
of justice148 This omission Is remarkable especially as such a provision 
149 Is not alien to African constitutional law. 
The right to privacy and family life as guaranteed under Articles 17,8, 
and 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
European Convention and the American Convention, respectively is 
absent from the AFCHPR. This provision contemplates the absence of 
interference by means of secret surveillance and other methods. It may 
however, be argued that rather than impose a negative duty, the 
AFCHPR imposes a positive duty on the State "to assist the family which 
is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the 
-------------------- 
146 See Article 6, European Convention (underlines for emphasis). The 
European Convention provides specific instances when the public may be 
excluded from all or part of a trial; these instances include 
considerations of morals, public order, national security or where 
publicity may prejudice the interest of justice. 
147 For instance, in Angola, during 1986, some 30 political prisoners 
received unfair trials before military tribunals and at least 17 people 
were sentenced to death - Amnesty International Report 1987; op cit 
p. 21. 
148 Article 10, American Convention. It Is pertinent to note that the 
constitutions of several African Countries, notably, Nigeria, Kenya and 
Zambia, provide guarantees for personal security rights which are more 
detailed than the AFCHPR. See Chapter 5 above. 
149 For instance see Section 32 Nigerian Constitution 1979. 
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Community"50. 
The provisions of Article 7 will, despite it shortcomings, have a 
reasonable impact on the legal institutions of African States which are 
devoid of such protections. The feasibility of the omitted provisions Is 
however, questionable because of the substantial costs that would 
accompany the provision of adequate judicial institutions and legal 
personnel 
151 In the light of the diminishing resources of African 
States, these factors may explain the AFCHPR authors restraint from 
incorporating such desirable provisions In the Charter. 
The Charter reflects some appreciation of the political as well as financial 
problems of the African Judiciary, by Imposing an obligation on State 
Parties to: 
"guarantee the independence of the Courts and... allow the 
establishment and Improvement of appropriate national 
Institutions entrusted with the promotion and protectIq92 of 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ... Charter" 
In summation, we submit that the protection of personal security rights 
as provided by Articles 3 to 7 of the AFCHPR Is a significant 
achievement considering the competing claims of different political 
ideologies and legal systems such as the Islamic Shari'a153, Common Law, 
and the Napoleonic Code. However, It is pertinent to state that the 
-------------------- 
150 
Article 18(2) AFCHPR. 
151 H. Hannum The Butare Colloquium on Human Rights and Economic 
Development in Francophone Africa 1 Universal Human Rights 63 (1979) 
p. 77. 
152 Article 26, AFCHPR. 
153 For an analysis of human rights in Islam -I Coulson "The State, and 
the Individual in Islamic Law", International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 6 (1957) p. 49. See also P. Dudley "Human Rights Practices in 
the Arab States: The Modern Impact of Shari'a Values" Georgia Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 12 (1982) p. 55. 
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constitutions of several African States notably, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe provide guarantees for personal security rights which are 
more comprehensive than the AFCHPR provisions. The deficiencies of 
the relevant provisions of the Charter may be corrected by virtue of the 
power of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights "to 
formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at solving legal 
154 
problems relating to human and peoples rights.. , 11. 
Finally, while financial constraints may affect the proper administration 
of justice especially with regard to some of the foregoing personal 
security rights, we submit that guarantees against torture, inhuman 
treatment and the observance thereof, should not extract more than a 
widows mite from State Treasuries. 
(ii) Civil and Political Rights 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR) contains 
provisions that guarantee the following civil and political rights: freedom 
of conscience and religion155, freedom of information and opinion156, the 
right of association157, the right of assembly158, the right to freedom of 
movement and asylum159, the right to free participation in the 
government including equal access to the public service and the use of 
160 161 
public property and services, and the right to property. 
--- 
154 
----------- 
Article 45(1) 
------ 
AFCHPR. 
155 AFCHPR, Article 8. 
156 Ibid, Article 9. 
157 Ibid, Article 10. 
158 Ibid, Article 11. 
159 Ibid, Article 12. 
160 Ibid, Article 13. 
161 Ibid, Article 14. 
457 
The foregoing rights are already guaranteed in the constitutions of many 
162 African States to varying degrees 
Article 8 of the AFCHPR guarantees the "freedom of conscience, the 
profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed... ". 
The relevance and applicability of this provision is apt In considering the 
wave of religious unrest and persecution In several African States. In 
Malawi, for instance, the Government has since the late 1960's persecuted 
Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious conviction prevents them from joining 
political groupings and who refused to subscribe to the membership of 
the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the country's sole party163, Thus 
the Malawi Penal Code which prohibits "unlawful societies" has been 
utilized to Imprison Jehovah's Witnesses. Religious clashes have also 
been reported in northern Nigeria between Islamic fundamentalists and 
Christians164 The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights will 
have to ensure that the freedom of religion is not infringed by 
-------------------- 
162 See Chapter 5, above. 
163 Amnesty International Report 1987 op cit p. 70-71. 
164 See This Week; Lagos Vol. 8 No. 4 4 April 1988, p. 14. 
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States165 
In traditional Africa, where consensus ensured effective societal cohesion 
especially in acephalous societies, freedom of expression is a fundamental 
right166 Thus the right to receive information and to express and 
disseminate ones opinion as guaranteed in Article 9 of the AFCHPR is a 
reflection of the African conception of human rights. The "right to 
express and disseminate ones opinion" must be exercised "within the 
law"167. Consequently, this right may be regulated by domestic 
legislation, presumably those of libel and slander and sedition where they 
exist. This is however without prejudice to the application of Articles 60 
168 
and 61 of the AFCHPR by the African Commission. African 
165 The approach of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) is relevant inthis regard. In "The Case of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses", (Case 2137 of 9 Sept 1976) the IACHR received a complaint 
from some Jehovahs Witnesses In Argentina, specifially denouncing Decree 
No. 1867 Issued by the Argentine Government on 31 August 1976 which 
"prohibits in all the territory of the nation, the activities of the religious 
association known as "The Jehovah's Witnesses"". 
The Argentine Constitution provides in Article 14, the right of every 
Inhabitant of the Country "to freely profess his religion"; and Article 20 
thereof guarantees the civil rights of citizens including "the free 
exercise of religion". 
The IACHR undertook an on-site observation and passed Resolution 02/79 
which inter alia declared that the Government of Argentina had violated 
the right to freedom of religion (Article V of the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man) and recommended to the Government of 
Argentina that it re-establish the observance of religious freedom, and 
repeal Decree 1867 of 31 August 1976 and put an end to the persecution 
of the Jehovah's Witnesses. 
The General Assembly of the Organisation of American States at Its 9th 
Regular Session on 22-32 Oct 1979 considered the Report of the IACHR 
and passed a resolution which appealed "to the Member States not to 
present any impediment to the exercise of the right to freedom of 
religion and of worship withintheir respective judicial provisions. 
Concerning Jehovah's Witnesses... to urge the re-establishment of their 
right to freedom of religion and worship based on the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man" 
- IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights In Argentina, OAS 
Doc, OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 49. doc 19 corr. 1,11 April 1980,251-54. 
166 See Chapter One, above. 
167 AFCHPR Article 9(2). 
168 Articles 60 and 61 of the AFCHPR in effect empower the African 
Commission to consider inter alia, international human rights instruments 
and conventions as subsidiary means to determine principles of law. 
459 
Governments, especially the authoritarian military dictatorships and one- 
party States, have put this freedom in jeopardy because they are 
hypersensitive to criticism and apprehensive of their political stability. 
Some of these Governments exercise both formal and informal censorship 
institutions and laws169 The American Convention provides detailed 
provisions governing the freedom of expression, Article 13(2) of which 
expressly prohibits prior censorship. The American Convention also 
guarantees a detailed right of reply, thus protecting "anyone Injured by 
Inaccurate of offensive statements or Ideas disseminated to the public In 
general by a legally regulated medium of communication" 
170. Both the 
AFCHPR and the European Convention are devoid of such elaborate 
safeguards. 
Articles 10,11 and 13 of the AFCHPR are Interrelated as they guarantee 
respectively the right to free association; the right of assembly; the 
right to free participation in government including equal access to the 
public service and the use of public property and services. 
We consider the general effect of these articles as unsatisfactory on 
three grounds. 
Firstly, since they are the basic prerequisites for democracy, the 
provisions ought to have been endowed with greater detail. The 
vagueness of Article 13(1) for instance is evident: 
"Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in 
the government of his country, either directly or through 
freely chosen representatives in accordance with the 
provisions of the law". 
-------------------- 
169 For instance The Malawi Preservation of Public Security Regulations 
1965. 
170 American Convention Article 14. This provision alsoprovides a right 
to reply or to make a correction using the same communications outlet, 
under such conditions established by law. A corrolary to Article 14 Is 
Article 18 which provides for a right to a name. 
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The foregoing provision does not provide for regular and genuine 
elections by universal and equal suffrage nor does It provide for a 
government accountable to the people171. The liberal interpretation of 
this provision, may be undertaken by the Commission under Articles 60 
and 61 of the AFCHPR. Thus, for instance, only the African State 
Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be 
required to conform to the wider obligations Imposed therein. We submit 
that the literal, albeit restrictive, Interpretation of Article 13(1) of the 
AFCHPR will legitimize the existence of authoritarian one-Party States, 
encourage the tenacity to power and validate the Institution of life 
Presidency in Africa. 
Secondly, the limitation attached to these rights by the operation of law, 
to varying degrees, leaves much to be desired. We shall discuss this 
issue shortly under the sub-chapter on Limitations. 
Thirdly, Article 10 which guarantees the right to free association, 
despite being curtailed by the operation of the law and "the obligation of 
solidarity"172, does not expressly provide for the rights to form trade 
unions. Indeed, the opposite may occur under Article 10(2) whereby, 
under Article 10(2) individuals may be compelled to join state-controlled 
trade union organisations not unlike the practice in Communist Countries. 
In comparison, both the American Convention and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressly guarantee the "right to 
----------------- 
171 
Article 25 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressly provides 
that "Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any 
of the distinctions In Article 2 (non-discriination) and without 
unreasonable restriction:... 
.. (b) To vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal sufferage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors". 
See also American Convention, Article 23. 
172 AFCHPR, Articles 10(1) and (2). 
461 
form and join trade unions"173. It is indeed surprising, that despite 
OAU efforts towards protecting the interest of trade unions In Africa174, 
such a pertinent clause was omitted. It may be argued that the rationale 
for the comparatively restrictive AFCHPR provision on the right to 
participate in government Is in accord with the traditional African value 
of political rule by consensus, thereby justifying one party States. We 
submit that, although this traditional value existed in Africa, it operated 
only within culturally homogenous groups. However, in present day 
Africa, most States embody several distinct ethnic groups. The Interests 
of these different groups cannot be and has not been effectively 
sustained In single party States; thus the need for multi party politics 
and genuine and periodic elections. 
Article 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
guarantees the right to freedom of movement and residence 
175, the right 
to leave and return to ones country176, the right to asylum'??, and the 
prohibition of mass expulsion of non-nationals. The traditional 
178 
-------------------- 
173 Article 22(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
See Article Article 16 of the American Convention which guarantees the 
"right to associate freely for.. . labour.. . purposes". 
See also Article 8 of 
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Political Rights. 
174 In the field of social affairs, the General Secretariat of the OAU has 
since 1963, serviced the Conference of African Labour Ministers, a 
permanent institutin within the framework of the OAU charged with the 
formulation of the overall policies for African Labour. Under the auspices 
of the OAU, independent trade union organisations met in Addis Ababa 
from 20-24 Nov 1972 to study a draft Charter and to prepare a 
constituent Congress of Pan-African trade union organisations. The 
meeting of the Constituent Congress led to the establishment of-the AU 
African Trade Unity (AATUU) with its headquarters In Accra - See 
further U. G. Damachi The Role of Trade Unions in the Development 
Process: with a case study of Ghana (New York, Praeger Publishers) 
1974. 
175 AFCHPR, Article 12(1). 
176 Ibid, Article 12(2). 
177 Ibid, Article 12(3). 
178 Ibid, Article 12(5). 
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African custom of granting safety seekers protection and assistance even 
at the greatest sacrifice, is a significant African contribution to 
179 international standards of humanitarianism. 
Under Article 12(3) of the AFCHPR the right to asylum is guaranteed 
but subject to the laws of Member State Parties and international 
conventions. General international law reserves to States, the right to 
grant or not to grant asylum. Similarly, under the Conventions on 
refugees it Is the State which must decide whether or not it will grant 
asylum. Some 22 African Statesl8l have municipal laws governing the 
180 
right to asylum and refugee status182. The OAU Convention Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa permits Member States 
encountering difficulties in granting asylum to refugees to appeal directly 
to another Member State, whereupon that other State "shall in the spirit 
of African Solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate 
measures to lighten the burden. .. "183 This provision 
implies that the 
OAU Convention aims to provide for a duty to receive asylum seekers on 
State Parties. 
-------------------- 
179 Peter Nobel "Refugees, Law and Development in Africa" In Michigan 
Yearbook of International Legal Studies (1982) p. 265. See G. 
Oguntomisin and Toyin Falola "Refugees in Yoruba-land In the Nineteenth 
Century" op cit p. 165. 
180 See the Articles I and II of the OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. OAU 
Doe. CAB/LEG/24.3. /26. See also The 1951 UN Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto: 189 UNTS 137 and 
606 UNTS 267. Goran Melander and Peter Nobel (eds) International 
Legal Instruments on Refugees in Africa (Scandinavian Institute of 
Human Rights/Upsalla, 1970). 
181 These countries are Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, The Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. 
182 For instance, the Regulations of Asylum Act 1974, Sudan Gazette 
No. 1162, Legisl. Supp. (1974). See also the Refugees (Declaration) 
Order, 1968, [1968] Subsidiary Legislation (Tanzania) Govt. Notice 
No. 433. 
183 OAU Convention, IbId, Article 11(2). The Convention also provides 
a stipulation for temporary asylum to refugees pending arrangements for 
their resettlement In another State - Article II(5). 
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A State Party to the AFCHPR granting the right of asylum is required, 
in the interest of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, 
to ensure that those granted asylum shall not engage in subversive 
activities against their countries of origin or any other State Party to 
the AFCHPR, nor shall 'their territory be used as bases for subversive 
or terrorist activities against the people of any other Party to the 
Charter184. The AFCHPR thus reflects the existing rules of customary 
185 
conventional law. 
Article 12(4) of the AFCHPR provides that a non-national legally admitted 
into a territory or a state may only be expelled by virtue of a decision 
taken in accordance with law. The cumulative effect of Article 12(3) & 
(4) of the AFCHPR seems to be the Incorporation of the principle of non- 
refoulement (the prohibition against expulsion or return) of a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever, to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, or political opinion186. State Parties to the AFCHPR and the 
OAU Convention would thus be estopped from expelling refugees. 
It is pertinent to highlight the fact that the AFCHPR provides a wider 
protection for the refugee than the American Convention. For example, 
the American Convention restricts the right of the individual to seek and 
obtain asylum in a foreign country to situation where he Is "being 
184 AFCHPR Article 23. 
185 Article III(1) & (2) of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems provide that refugees shall abstain from 
subversive activities against any OAU Member State and that signatory 
States to be Convention undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their 
respective territories from attacking any OAU Member State. It is 
significant to note that 32 out of 57 OAU Member States have ratified the 
OAU Convention (as at 31 Dec 1987). 
186 Article 33 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). 
See also Article 11(3) OAU Convention. 
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pursued for political offences or related common crimes"187. On the 
other hand, the AFCHPR is less restrictive in providing that an 
individual shall have the right to seek and obtain asylum "when 
persecuted" 
188. 
Nevertheless, both the African and American human rights instruments 
represent a significant departure from the hitherto restrictive approach 
of international norms which failed to give due recognition to the legal 
189 
right of the individual to seek and obtain asylum. 
The AFCHPR expressly prohibits the mass expulsion of non-nationals 
under Article 12(5) of the AFCHPR. Mass expulsion is defined to mean 
that directed against national, racial, ethnic, or religious groups. This 
provision is aimed at curtailing the phenomenon of mass expulsion of 
aliens frequently experienced in Africa. The creation of sub-regional 
economic cooperation agreements such as the ECOWAS (Economic 
Community of West African States) and the Protocol on Freedom of 
Movement are expected to ameliorate inter-state movement of persons 
through the removal of the legal obstacles that occasion the mass- 
expulsion of non-nationals190. The Nigerian Government In 1983 expelled 
over a million illegal aliens in response to the strains on the local 
employment market, social services and the resultant high crime rate. 
Nigeria's action was deemed not to be in breach of the ECOWAS Protocol 
-------------------- 
187 American Convention, Article 227. 
188 AFCHPR Article 12(3). 
189 S. P. Sinha Asylum & International Law (Martinus/Nijhoff: The 
Hague) 1971 p. 91. 
190 Osita C. Eze "ECOWAS and Freedom of Movement: What Prospects for 
Nigeria" Nigerian Forum April 1981 p. 12; See H. A. Amankwah "The 
Alien, Freedom of Movement and the Law: A Transnational and 
Comparative Re-appraisal", Zambia Law Journal Vol. 14 (1982) pp. 1-20. 
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on the Free Movement of Persons191, nor would it in our opinion, have 
fallen foul of Article 12(5) of the AFCHPR. W e submit therefore that 
AFCHPR should be amended to ensure that mass expulsion is prohibited 
on any grounds192, African States may be able to continue mass 
expulsion on economic grounds, if Article 12(5) remains unchanged. 
It is relevant here to note that, unlike the American Convention, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR) does not 
include the right to a nationality and the prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality193, The significance of these provisions is 
reflected In the fact that their Inclusion In the AFCHPR would have 
reinforced the confidence of ethnically distinct minorities of European and 
Asian origins in the security of African State naturalization processes194. 
The importance of such provisions to the countries of East and Southern 
Africa is particularly relevant In the light of the policy of Africanization 
of the socio-economic institutions in these regions. However, the African 
Commission may by reference to international conventions ensure this 
195 
additional protection, 
(iii) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The AFCHPR does not particularly reflect the zeal with which developing 
States promoted the incorporation of second generation of rights in the 
-------------------- 
191 Dr. Abubaker Quatara (Executive Secretary of ECOWAS) announced 
that the Nigerian "quit order did not in any way conflict with any 
provision of ECOWAS Protocol of free movement of persons within the 
community" Nigerian Chronicle 29 Jan 1983 at p. 16- 
192 See for instance, Article 22(9) of the American Declaration which 
states that; "The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited". 
193 See the American Convention, Article 20; and The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15. 
194 For a discussion of the legal problem of aliens in Africa see D. Dan 
Nanjira The Status of Aliens in East Africa: Asians and Europeans in 
Tanzania, Uganda & Kenya (Praeger/New York 1976) p. 221-229. 
195 See AFCHPR Articles 60 & 61. 
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International Convention for Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. The 
rationale for this may be gleaned from the statement of the Chairman of 
the Meeting of Legal Experts which drafted the AFCHPR: "The concise 
and general formulation adopted... Is in line with the concern to spare 
our young States too many but important obligations. In effect these 
rights of the second generation are rights which entail benefits from the 
196 State", 
The AFCHPR thus provides guarantees for the following rights: - the 
197 198 
right to property, the right to work and equal remuneration, the 
right to physical and mental health including medical attention for the 
sick199, the right to education including the free participation in the 
cultural life of ones community200, and the protection of the family, the 
20 
aged and disabled1 
The right to property is guaranteed by Article 14. The incorporation of 
this right is a significant departure from the traditional African concept 
of ownership of property which is mainly communal202. The right to 
property may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or 
in the general interest of the community and In accordance with the 
provisions of appropriate laws203. No provision is made for compensation 
in the event of acquisition of property. 
196 Statement of Keba Mbaye to the OAU Ministerial Meeting on the Draft 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 7-19 January 1981, 
Rapporteurs Report OAU Doc CM/1149(XXXVII) Annex 1 p. 4. 
197 AFCHPR, Article 14. 
198 Ibid, Article 15. 
199 Ibid, Article 16. 
200 Ibid, Article 17. 
201 Ibid, Article 18. 
202 See Chapter One above. 
203 AFCHPR, Article 14. 
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The constitutional provisions of several African States provide for the 
payment of compensation in the event of appropriation. It would seem 
204 
that the AFCHPR does not confirm the controversial traditional 
205 international law rule on expropriation and nationalization. The 
classic western standpoint is that compensation shall be "prompt, 
effective and adequate"206. While the UN consensus is that it should be 
"appropriate"207 or reasonable. 
It Is pertinent to highlight the imbalance between the provisions of 
Article 14 and Article 21of the AFCHPR. The latter provision provides 
for the peoples right to dispose of their wealth and natural resources 
and the right of dispossessed peoples to the lawful recovery of its 
property as well as to compensation. A reconciliation of these two 
208 
provisions is necessary. 
The American Convention guarantees the right to the use and enjoyment 
of property, and deprivation thereof must be upon payment of just 
compensation. The absence of a provision on compensation including 
209 
this quantum for its measurement in event of encroachment on the right 
to property under the AFCHPR is a lacuna which may be exploited by 
0 
204 For instance, Article 40(1) of the Nigerian Constitution 1979, Article 
18(1) Zambian Constitution, Article 16(1) Zimbabwe Constitution. 
205 Osita C. Eze The Legal Status of Foreign Investments in East African 
Common Market: (Sijthoff, Leiden), 1975 pp. 296-304. 
206 Note of 3 August 1938, reproduced in US Department of State, 
Compensation for American-owned Lands Expropriated in Mexico (Inter- 
American Series No. 16 1939). 
207 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 
December 1962. 
208 AFCHPR, Article 21(2). 
209 Americal Declaration, Article 21; Although the European Convention 
did not initially provide for this right, the First Protocol thereof 
provides in Article 1, that each person is entitled "to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions". 
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States to the detriment of individuals. Furthermore, Article 14 of the 
AFCHPR allows each State a reasonable margin to adopt domestic 
legislations on private property, which will inevitably reflect the States 
ideology. 
The AFCHPR guarantees the right to work under equitable and 
satisfactory conditions, and the right to receive equal pay for equal 
work210. The AFCHPR is the only regional human rights instrument that 
guarantees the right to work211, thus placing an obligation on 
governments to provide jobs. On the other hand the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in recognizing the right to work, 
urges State Parties to take steps towards the "full realization" of the 
right. The obligations created by Article 15 of the AFCHPR have led 
some academics to conclude that the provision is likely to be honoured 
more in breach than in observance212. The lack of adequate financial 
resources, unbridled population explosion in Africa213 coupled with the 
unfair international trading system Informs the pessimism surrounding the 
feasibility of this provision. However, it would not detract from the 
spirit of the Charter if States strive to give effect to the right to work. 
The provision of the AFCHPR consecrating "equal pay for equal work" 
should not necessarily be undermined by the inadequacy of economic 
resources. What matters here, is that once work is provided, the 
principle to be observed is that workers be given their fair share. 
-------------------- 
210 
AFCHPR, Article 15. 
211 The Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Articles 6 
and 7) and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Articles 23 & 24) 
provide for the right to work. 
212 U. O. Umozerike "The African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights" in 
AJIL Vol. 77 (1983) p. 906. 
213 See Population and Human Rights, Proceedings of the UN Symposium 
on Population and Human Rights, Vienna, 29 June-3 July 1981 UN Doc 
ST/ESA/SER. R/51. 
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African socialists have re-echoed the socialist ideal that to achieve 
relative, not absolute wealth, the inequalities of wealth should be 
demolished214. Christian Bay argues that: "the general Issue of equality 
of incomes is not as important as It has been supposed to be... First 
there must be a right to a minimum income... enough to achieve security 
for everyone... Second, there must be a right to equal pay for equal 
work... [But] (w)hat matters concerning equality is equal respect and 
equal dignity, not the dollars and cents value of equal pay... ... What 
matters Is not equal treatment... what matters is treatment as 
equals"215. 
The right to physical and mental health including medical care for the 
sick as provided by the AFCHPR216 Is a unique provision in the regional 
human rights regime217. The enforceability of this provision is 
doubtful, in the light of the prevailing climate of economic 
underdevelopment and natural disasters in Africa. Its practical 
significance will, at least for the time being, be limited to a standard of 
achievement. 
The AFCHPR guarantees the right to education including the free 
participation in cultural life of ones community218. Article 17 also states 
that the promotion and protection of morals and traditional values 
recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State. 
-------------------- 
214 Christian Bay "Self Respect as a Human Right: Thoughts on the 
Dialectics of Wants and Needs in the Struggle for Human Community" 
"Human Rights Quarterly" 4 (Spring 1982) pp. 70-71. 
215 Ibid p. 74. 
216 AFCHPR, Article 16. 
217 Neither the European nor the American Conventions provide for the 
right to medical care. This right, however, is provided for in Article 12 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
218 AFCHPR, Article 17. 
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We submit that the rights to work, medical care and education impose 
obligations on States, which the African Commission will find it difficult 
to enforce. It is doubtful that the provisions on socio-economic rights 
can be regarded as creating legal rights stricto-sensu, otherwise the 
AFCHPR will not be in force today. Socio-economic rights are "State- 
sensitive" since they touch on the public policies of States. Several 
African States have incorporated socioeconomic provisions in their 
219 
constitutions but in a manner that does not lend itself to adjudicatibn 
The rationale for the absence of socio-economic rights in some African 
Constitutions was succinctly stated by Nigerias Constitution Drafting 
Committee while defending the non-justiceability of the Fundamental 
Objectives under the Nigerian Constitution: 
"By their nature, they are rights which can only come Into 
existence after the government has provided facilities for 
them. Thus if there are facilities for education or medical 
services, one can speak of the 'right' to such facilities. On 
the other 'hand it would be ludicrous to re ga the 'right' to 
education or health where no facilities exist" 
Consequently, in enforcing soclo-economic rights the African Commission 
may utilize the procedures under Articles 1 and 62 which require State 
Parties to undertake to adopt legislative and other measures to give 
effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the AFCHPR and to 
submit every two years a report on the measures taken with a view to 
giving effect to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the AFCHPR. 
Progressive achievement, of the economic and social rights may thus be 
-------------------- 
219 Ostensibly justiceable socio-economic rights are already guaranteed In 
the Constitutions of a few African States, notably, Algeria and Republic 
of Benin. However in other States like Nigeria, socio economic rights 
are couched in non-justiceable terms as contained in the Chapter on 
Fundamental Objectives as Directive Principles of State Policy" of the Nigerian Constitution (1979) - (Articles 13-22). 
220 Report of the Nigerian Constitution Drafting Committee, (Lagos: 
Federal Government Printer 1978). 
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tested by the Reports which may reveal the good faith of States towards 
implementing the relevant measures. Failure by a State Party to submit 
a Report should certainly be regarded as bad faith, and apathy, thus 
corroborating any allegation of the violation of socio-economic rights. 
Article 18 of the AFCHPR regards the family as the "natural unit and 
basis of society and Imposes a positive duty on the State to protect and 
"to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional 
values recognized by the community"221. 
In this context the AFCHPR does not have a provision analogous to 
Article 17(5) of the American Convention which recognizes equal rights 
for children born out of wedlock and those born in wedlock. The non- 
Incorporation of such a clause In the AFCHPR may be attributed to the 
fact that express recognition of the rights of illegitimate children may be 
disagreeable to Islamic222 and Christian conceptions of morality. 
Although the rights of the Illegitimate child are not expressly protected 
in the AFCHPR, the African Commission may take cognisance of the 
approach adopted in the case of Marckx v Belgium223. Despite the fact 
that the European Convention contains no clause similar to Article 17(5) 
of the American Convention, the European Court of Human Rights held 
that there was no objective and reasonable justification for treatment In 
which the illegitimate child had no entitlement on intestacy in the estate 
of members of her mothers family. 
The implication of this decision, therefore is that any law that creates 
distinction between the legitimate and the illegitimate child will be 
-------------------- 
221 
Article 18(2) AFCHPR. 
222 Under Islamic Law of Succession, an illegitimate child is not entitled 
to any part of his deceased putative fathers estate. 
223 Series A, No. 31, Judgement of 13 June 1979. 
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contravening Article 14 of the European Convention224. Mutatis 
Mutandis, the corresponding Article 2 of the AFCHPR may be interpreted 
225 likewise, thus granting equal status to children irrespective of 
circumstances of birth. 
By virtue of Article 18(3) of the AFCHPR, the State Parties undertake to 
ensure the elimination of any discrimination against women and also 
ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as 
stipulated in International Declarations and Conventions226. Although 
the legal effect of the UN Charter is not in doubt, it will be futile to 
invoke the provisions of international Conventions against African States 
that have not acceded to these instruments. It may however be argued 
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights227 as well as 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights228 
have elevated to the level of legal norms, womens rights that are 
-------------------- 
224 Article 14 of the European Convention provides that the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed therein "shall be secured without discrimination on 
any grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status" (underlines for emphasis). 
225 Article 2 of the AFCHPR guarantees the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms in the Charter without distinction of any kind, "such as race, 
sex... language,... birth or other status" (Underlines for emphasis). 
226 The relevant international instruments dealing with the rights of 
women and their implementation include the UN Charter (Article 1(3), 8,55 
and 56), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 
2,7,16,21,22,23,25 and 26) ; Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 
1952; the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957; the 
Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages, 1962; Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, 1967. Others Include the Equal 
Remuneration Convention, 1951 of the ILO; the Discrimination 
(Occupation and Employment) Convention, 1958 of the ILO; the 
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960, of UNESCO; the 
Recommendation concerning the Employment of Women with Family 
Responsibilities, 1965, of the ILO; the Recommendation Concerning the 
Status of Teachers, 1966, of UNESCO; the Proclamation of Tehran, 1968, 
and the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, 1969. 
227 
Articles 2(2), 24 and 26. 
228 Articles 2(2), 3,7 and 10. 
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generally absent from African legislative instruments. We submit that 
the protection accorded womens rights in the AFCHPR Is grossly 
Inadequate, especially in the light of the discrimination and prejudices 
perpetuated against women in Africa229. The AFCHPR does not provide 
for the free choice of marriage partners230, the right to marry and 
found a family231. Although most constitutions of African States 
guarantee equal opportunities to every citizen232, very few have special 
provisions protecting womens rights, and where these provisions exist 
they reflect the ideology or religious inclination of the State233. It 
therefore appears that the need to ensure African regional consensus and 
the viability of the Charter informs the relative weakness of the 
provision on womens rights. 
We submit that besides the constitutional handicap of African States, the 
Charters haphazard "draw-bridge" method of linking its concise clauses 
to the relative clarity and detail of international instruments, will allow 
African States that are not signatories to these instruments, to escape 
the desired toll. The imperatives for political consensus thus explains 
why the protection of womens rights in the AFCHPR is severely 
-------------------- 
229 
For discussions on the Status of Women In Africa, see Rhoda Howard 
"Womens Rights in English Speaking Africa" in C. E. Welch and R. 
Meltzer (eds) Human Rights and Development In Africa op cit pp. 46-74; 
D. Paulume (ed) Women in Tropical Africa (London: Rutledge & Kegan 
Paul/Berkeley University of California Press, 1963). See also "Women: 
the Neglected Human Resource for African Development". Paper 
prepared by the Human Resources Development Division, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, July 1972 in Canadian 
Journal of African Studies Vol.!! 1972. 
230 See Article 17(3) American Convention. 
231 See Article 17(2) Ibid; and Article 12 European Convention. 
232 
For instance see the Constitution of Liberia, Section 18; Constitution 
of Burundi, Section 11. 
233 For instance the Constitution of Egypt states that "the State shall 
guarantee the proper coordination between the duties of woman towards 
the family and her work in the society, considering her equal with man in the fields of political, social, cultural and economic life without 
violation of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence" - Article 11. 
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restricted in comparison to the OAU's comprehensive recommendation on 
234 
women as incorporated in the Lagos Plan of Action. A comprehensive 
catalogue of justiceable womens rights, probably in the form of a Protocol 
to the AFCHPR235 is required to counteract the discrimination 
experienced by African women. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the AFCHPR endeavours 
to guarantee individual rights in the form of personal security rights, 
civil and political rights and social economic and cultural rights. The 
deficiency of these provisions vis-a-vis those of other international 
human rights instruments may be attributed to two main factors. 
Firstly, the general desire of the authors of the Charter not to alienate 
African States by imposing too stringent a regional human rights 
Charter. Secondly, consideration of the depressed regional economic 
condition informs the lack of detail attached to individual rights. This 
factor is underlined by the Charters' preambular clause which states that 
"the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights Is a guarantee 
for the enjoyment of civil and political rights". 
In addition to these practical restrictive influences on the AFCHPR, the 
effectiveness of the protection of individual rights is also hindered by 
stipulations specified therein, which allow limitations of Individual rights; 
to those limitations we now propose to turn. 
-------------------- 
234 
Lagos Plan of Action, Chapter III, paras. 295-325. Resolution 
ECM/ECO/9(XIV) Rev. 2 of April 1980 Doc E/CN. 14/698 Add. 2. See Jane 
L. Parpart "Womens Rights and the Lagos Plan of Action" Human Rights 
Quarterly (1986) Vol. 8 p. 180. 
235 Article 66 of the AFCHPR states that: "Special protocols or 
agreements may, if necessary, supplement the provisions of the... 
Charter". 
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(g) Limitations on Individual Rights 
The effect of an international legal Instrument, such as the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, on States Parties Is that they are 
estopped from disallowing the regional, nay the international, community 
to inquire into the alleged breaches of the instrument. State sovereignty 
Is no longer inviolable in this context. By virtue of the principle of 
236 
pacta sunt servanda, a State is bound by its treaty obligations. 
The effect of an international human rights instrument Is more or less 
based on the obligations imposed on the ratifying States. However, 
these obligations are eroded by derogation clauses and limitation clauses 
(otherwise referred to as "claw-back"237 clauses) which consequently 
determine the effectiveness of an International human rights instrument. 
Derogation clauses stipulate the circumstances In which derogation may 
occur and also define the rights that are non-derogable. 
The AFCHPR has no provision entitling a State to derogate from its 
obligations and/or temporarily suspend a right guaranteed under the 
Charter. The absence of a derogation clause In the AFCHPR Is In 
marked contrast to the provisions of the American and European 
Conventions which not only deal with the suspension of rights in time of 
war or state of emergency but also provide for non-derogation from 
certain rights. 
-------------------- 
236 
The principle of pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary 
international law codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Article 26. UN Doc A/Conf. 39/37 at 289 (1969) entered into 
force 27 January 1980, See 8 ILM 679 (1969). 
237 Rosalyn Higgins coined the term "claw-back" to refer to a clause 
"that permits, in normal circumstances, breach of an obligation for a 
specified number of public reasons". See "Derogations Under Human 
Rights Treaties" 48 BYIL (1978) p. 281. 
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Thus in several international human rights instruments, State Parties 
thereto are permitted to suspend and restrict certain rights in time of 
war or public emergency which threatens the life of the nation 
238 
occurs. 
In defining the rights that are non-derogable, the American Convention 
239 
contains the most comprehensive list of non-derogable rights. 
With a view to checking the abuse of derogation provisions, the American 
and European Conventions provide several safeguards. Firstly, it is 
required that derogations must be within the period strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation. Secondly, the measures taken must not 
be discriminatory or Inconsistent with the State Party's other 
international obligations under international law240. Thirdly the State 
Party availing itself of the right of suspension must immediately inform 
the other State Parties through the Secretary-General of the provisions 
suspended, their reasons and the date set for the termination of such 
-------------------- 
238 See Article 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
Article 15, European Convention; Article 27, American Convention. 
239 The American Convention provides for the following non-derogable 
rights: - the Right to Judicial Personality; right to life; right to Humane 
Treatment; freedom from Slavery; freedom from ex post facto Laws; 
freedom of conscience and religion; rights of the family; right to a name; 
rights of the child; right to nationality; right to participate in 
government; and the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of 
such rights - Article 27(2). 
The European Convention provides for only four non-derogable rights: 
namely, the right to life, the right to human treatment, freedom from 
slavery or servitude, and freedom from ex post facto laws - Article 
15(2). 
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
expressly prohibits derogations from the guarantees of Article 6 
(including arbitrary deprivation of life), Article 2 (freedom from torture 
and inhuman treatment), Article 8 (prohibition of slavery), Article 11 
(freedom from imprisonment for breach of contract), Article 15 
(guarantees against ex post facto criminal laws), Article 16 (the right to 
personhood), and Article 18 (freedom of thought conscience and 
religion). 
240 American Convention Article 27(1), European Convention Article 
15(1). 
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suspension241. Furthermore, as an additional safeguard the American 
and European Conventions expressly prohibit the restrictive 
interpretation on the rights provided for In their respective 
242 Conventions. 
Although Article 4 of the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights has not evolved its own case law, the derogation provisions of 
both the American243 and European Conventions244 have been invoked by 
States. The procedural rules governing the review of derogations by 
the respective commissions differ. The European Commission cannot 
inquire into a derogation unless it arises as an Issue of an individual 
-------------------- 
241 American Convention, Article 27(3); and European Convention, 
Article 15(3). 
242 American Convention Articles 27-30; and European Convention, 
Articles 17-18. 
243 For instance, El Salvador - (9 May 1980) and Nicaragua - (23 Jan 
1980) notified the Secretary General of the OAS of their Invokations of 
Article 27 of the American Convention. On 17 July 1980, Bolivia was 
queried by the IACHR for failure to notify the Secretary-General of the 
OAS of the suspension of human rights. Similarly In response to an 
individual petition against Colombia, the IACHR requested Colombia to 
comply with Article 27 of the American Convention. See also T. 
Buergenthal et al, Human Rights in the Americas: Selected Problems, op 
cit pp . 217-237 . 
244 For instance, in the Greek Case 12 Y. B. European Convention on 
Human Rights 72 (1969) (European Convention on Human Rights) the 
European Court enumerated four factors that constitute a "public 
emergency threatening the life of a nation" under the European 
Convention; these are (1) Actual or imminent emergency; (2) involving a 
whole nation; (3) threatening the continuance of the organized life of the 
community; (4) for which the normal measures and restrictions permitted 
by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health or order 
are plainly inadequate - (p. 72 Ibid. ) The European Court in Ireland v 
United Kindgom interpreted the derogation provisions of the European 
Convention thus: - 
"It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its 
responsibility for "the life of the nation", to determine whether that life 
is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far is it 
necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency... In this 
matter Article 15(1) leaves those authorities a wide margin of 
appreciation.. Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect... The domestic margin of appreciation is thus 
accompanied by a European supervision" - (1978) European Convention 
on Human Rights Ser. A No. 25 Judgement of 18 Jan 1978 p. 78-7a (underlines for emphasis). 
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petition or inter-state application. On the other hand, the Inter- 
American Commission can review suspected derogations 'sua sponte' thus 
endowing it with the capability of spontaneous response to human rights 
violation245 
The failure of the AFCHPR to provide for the suspension of rights and 
to define non-derogable rights will Invariably create problems for the 
African Commission. 
The AFCHPR, however, contains "claw-back" clauses, which do not give 
the individual the same degree of protection provided by derogation 
clauses contained on other international human rights Instruments246 
Derogation clauses define the limits of State behaviour towards citizens 
during national emergencies, and permit the suspension of granted 
rights. Cclaw back clauses, on the other hand, restrict rights as initio. 
The "claw-back" clauses in the AFCHPR, though generally vague, permit 
encroachment on individual rights by reference to rules of law (both 
domestic and International), public order or public Interest, and other 
formulations thereof as more particularly described hereunder. 
(a) The Right to Liberty: (Article 6) AFCHPR 
The "claw-back" clause restricting the right to liberty states that: 
"... No one may be deprived of his freedom except for 
reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In 
particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained". 
-------------------- 
245 
T. Buergenthal, R. Norris & D. Shelton "Protecting Human Rights in 
the Americas: Selected Problems op cit p. 217-218. 
246 Some academics believe that the distinction between the two clauses is one of degree. Hartman interprets derogation clauses as a restrictive form of "claw-back"clause. See Hartman, Derogations from Human Rights 
Treaties in Public Emergencies 22 Harvard Journal of International Law (1981) p. 5-6. 
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Article 6 of the AFCHPR reveals a significant omission when compared to 
the European and American Conventions. Although the AFCHPR grants 
every person "the right to liberty and to the security of the person", 
yet-it restricts this guarantee with the claw-back provision that; "No one 
may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions 
previously laid down by Law"247. The AFCHPR does not prescribe 
specific guidelines as to what reasons and conditions should obtain. In 
contrast, the American Convention provides minimum procedural 
requirements to be observed when a person is being deprived of his 
personal liberty, namely: - 
(i) That deprivatic8of liberty cannot be effected by ex 
post facto laws 
(ii) That there 249sha11 be no arbitrary arrest or imprisonment 
(iii) That anyone detained must be informed of the reasons 
for his detention, 2SUd promptly notified of the 
charge(s) against him 
(iv) That the detained person must be brought promptly 
before a judge and shall be entitled to trial within a 
reasonable time or be released without prejudice to the 
continuation of the proceedings. Such release may be 
subjES1 to guarantees to assure his appearance for 
trial 
(v) That anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be 
entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order 
that the court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his arrest or detention and2ffder his 
release if the arrest or detention is unlawful 
-------------------- 
247 
AFCHPR, Article 6. 
248 American Convention, Artricle 7(2). 
249 Ibid Article 7(3). 
250 Ibid Article 7M. 
251 Ibid Article 7(5). 
252 Ibid Article 7(6). 
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(vi) That in the countries which permit a person threatened 
with arrest or detention, to have recourse to a 
competent court for a ruling on the legality of such 
threat, jch a right cannot be restricted or 
abolished 
(vii) That an interested party or another person his 
behalf is entitled to seek the foregoing remedies 
255 (viii) That no one shall be detained for debt 
Similarly, the European Convention sets out detailed procedural 
256 
safeguards for the protection of the individuals liberty_ 
The significance of providing these comprehensive procedural safeguards 
seems to have been lost on the authors of the AFCHPR. Under the 
AFCHPR, the right to liberty is subject to national law, thus depriving 
the AFCHPR of any effective external safeguard on domestic laws which 
may encroach upon the right. The main rationale for adopting 
comprehensive procedural requirements Is that they provide external 
restraints on governmental actions, both by subjecting the Issue to an 
extra-governmental forum and secondly they ensure State conformity with 
the minimum conditions set out. We cannot overemphasise our conviction 
that the absence of procedural safeguards in Article 6 of the AFCHPR 
especially undermines the effectiveness of the AFCHPR. 
-------------------- 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid Article 7(7). 
256 European Convention, Article 5. 
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(b) Freedom of Religion and Conscience (Article 8) AFCHPR 
The freedom of religion is restricted in the AFCHPR by virtue of the 
"claw-back" clause which states that: 
"... No one may, subject to law and order be submitted to 
measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms". 
The AFCHPR thus, subjects the freedom of religion and conscience to the 
general regime of domestic law and order. No guidelines are provided 
regarding the specific circumstances that the laws limiting these freedoms 
may be applied. 
In contrast, under the American Convention the freedom of conscience 
and religion is subject "only to the limitations prescribed by law that are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
rights and freedoms of others"257 . Consequently under the American 
Convention the limitation of the freedom of conscience and religion cannot 
be restricted other than for the specific reasons given. As an added 
protection, the American Convention expressly grants parents or 
guardians the right to provide for the religious and moral education of 
their children or wards that is in accord with their own convictions. 
The exercise of the freedom of religion under the AFCHPR may thus be 
subject to erosion by local laws outside the influence of the AFCHPR. 
-------------------- 
257 Ibid Article 12(3). See also the European Convention Article 9(2) 
which states that: "Freedom to manifest ones religion on beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals or for the protection fo the 
rights and freedoms of others". 
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(c) The Right to Receive Express and Disseminate Information 
(Article 9(2); AFCHPR) 
The "claw-back" clause restricting the right to receive and disseminate 
information statement states that: 
"... Every individual shall have the right to express and 
disseminate his opinion within the law". 
Under Article 9(1) of the AFCHPR, the right to receive information is 
absolute and unqualified. However by virtue of Article 9(2) the right to 
express and disseminate Information Is qualified as It must be exercised 
"within the law". 
The American and European Conventions on the other hand, provide a 
more comprehensive definition of this right. For Instance, the American 
Convention states that the freedom of thought and expression will "not 
be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent 
imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established to the extent 
necessary to ensure: (a) respect for the rights or reputation of others; 
or (b) the protection of national security, public order or public health 
258 
or morals". 
Under the European Convention, the freedom of expression may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national 
security, t erritorial Integrity or public safety, for th e protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
Information received in confidence or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality 259 of the judiciary,, 
-------------------- 
258 
American Conventin, Article 13(2). 
259 European Convention, Article 10(2) (underlines for emphasis). 
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From the foregoing, although the European Convention subjects freedom 
of expression to conditions "prescribed by law", such a limitation must 
be necessary in a democratic society for the stated interests. A 
comparison of the AFCHPR with the Conventions reveal that the freedom 
of expression in the former is certainly more restricted than in the 
latter. The African Commission will therefore find it difficult to restrain 
the promulgation of restrictive laws in certain African States which do 
not possess, domestic constitutional guarantees that accord greater 
safeguards for the freedom of expression. 
(d) Freedom of Association (Article 10(1) & (2)) AFCHPR 
Under the AFCHPR, the freedom of association Is curtailed by the 
following "claw-back" clauses260: 
(1) Every individual shall have the right to free association 
provided that he abides by the law". 
(2) "Subject to the obligations of solidarity provided for in 
Article 29 no one may be compelled to join an 
association" . 
The freedom of association provision in the AFCHPR has one of the most 
restrictive clauses in the Charter. The right to free association may be 
limited or withdrawn by State Regislation. Under the American and 
European Conventions the freedom of association can be subject to 
restrictions established by law as may be necessary in a democratic 
society in the interest of national security, public safety or morals and 
the rights and freedoms of others261. Thus the arbitrary deprivation of 
the freedom of association Is forbidden and the limitations on the exercise 
-------------------- 
260 
European Convention Article 19(2) (underlines for emphasis). 
261 American Convention, Article 16(2); European Convention, Article 
11(a). Under the American Convention, legal restriction may be imposed 
on members of armed forces and the police depriving them of the 
exercise of the freedom of association, without conforming to the 
safeguards of Article 16 - Article 16(3), American Convention. 
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of this freedom under both Conventions must conform to the prescribed 
guidelines. 
The omission of these guidelines in the AFCHPR, may lead to the 
unfettered use of domestic laws to suppress freedom of association 
262 including the right to form trade unions. 
The second limitation on the freedom of association in the AFCHPR Is 
provided by the obligation of solidarity in Article 29263. Consequently, 
it is possible for the State to compel Individuals to join groups formed 
for any of the purposes under Article 29. Furthermore, In a one-Party 
State, the provision of Article 10, protecting the freedom of association, 
will not avail the individual who Is compelled by State Legislation to be a 
party member. 
(e) The Freedom of Assembly (Article II) AFCHPR 
The AFCHPR subjects the freedom of assembly to the "claw-back" clause 
which provides that: 
"The exercise of his right (to assembly) shall be subject only 
to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular 
those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, 
health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others". 
The claw back clause restricting the freedom of assembly is more specific 
than other claw-back clause in the AFCHPR because it delimits the scope 
of permissible State restrictions. 
-------------------- 
262 
Both the Conventions expressly grant the right to form labour 
unions - See American Conventin Article 16(1); European Convention, 
Article 11(1). 
263 Under Article 29 (AFCHPR) the individuals duties Include, the duty 
to serve his natinal community by placing his physical and intellectual 
abilities at its service, and the duty to preserve and strengthen social 
and national solidarity. 
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The effect of Article 11 Is wider when compared with the corresponding 
provisions of the American and European Conventions. The Conventions 
provide that the restrictions placed on the exercise of the right of 
assembly must be "in conformity with the law and necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, public safety and 
public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or 
264 freedoms of others11 
It has been submitted that the phrase, "in conformity with a democratic 
society" imposes a qualifying and narrowing influence on open-ended 
criteria such as national security, public order; factors which would 
265 
otherwise permit repression. Thus freedom of assembly under the 
AFCHPR may, despite its relatively detailed claw-back clause, be 
subjected to encroachment by local laws passed ostensibly in the interest 
of national security. Nevertheless, the standards applicable to African 
States, with constitutional provisions on the freedom of assembly266 
which are similar to those of the Conventions, will be higher than those 
applicable to AFCHPR State Parties without such provisions. 
(f) Freedom of Movement (Article 12) AFCHPR 
The relevant "claw-back" clauses of Article 12 are as follows: 
- "Every individual shall have the right to freedom of 
movement and residence with ih ýhe borders of a State 
provided he abides by the law 
- "This right (to leave and return to ones country) may 
only be subject to restrictions provided for by law for 
-------------------- 
264 
American Convention, Article 15; European Convention, Article 11. 
265 
Hartman "Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in Public 
Emergencies" op cit p. 6. 
266 For Instance, the Constitutions of Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe. See 
Chapter Five above. 
267 AFCHPR, Article 12(1). 
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the protection of nation&Lo security, law and order, 
public health or morality" . 
"Every individual shall have the right of asylum... in 
accordance with the l&s of those countries and 
international conventions . 
"A non national legally admitted in a territory of a 
State Party... may only be expelled from it b _virtue 
of a decision taken in accordance with the law" . 
It is evident from the foregoing that the freedom of rnoverient and 
residence within the borders of a State are restricted by the application 
of domestic law, whereas the right to leave and return to ones country 
may only be curtailed by local laws on grounds of national security, law 
and order, public health or morality. Thus the right to leave and 
return to ones country, unlike the freedom of movement, is not subject 
to the unrestricted scope of domestic legislations. Nevertheless. the 
remarkable effect of Article 12(2) is that a citizen of a State can be 
denied the right to return to his own country on the grounds of national 
security, law and order or public morality. We submit that the right of 
citizen to return to his own country should be an absolute right271 
The general public purposes through which the right may be restr°cted 
are susceptible to abuse. Consequently, in formulating new gu: deines, 
the African Commission may be willing to draw Inspiration f vom the 
recently concluded Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and 
Return272. The significance of ensuring adequate safeguards foc the 
-------------------- 
268 Ibid Article 12(2). 
269 Ibid Article 12(3). 
270 Ibid Article 12(4). 
271 For Instance the American Convention expressly states that No one 
can be expelled from the territory of the State of which he is a national 
or deprived of the right to enter" - Article 22(5). See also Article 2(2) 
of the Fourth Additional Protocol to the European Convention. 
272 Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return adopted on 
26 November 1986; reprinted in Human Rights Law Journal Vol. 8 No. 2-4 
(1987) p. 481. 
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right to leave and return to ones own country is underpinned by the 
practice among developing States which impose restrictions on this right 
for political and economic reasons such as stemming the "brain drain" 
The right to seek and obtain asylum is recognised by the AI~CHPIR but is 
subject to the regimes of domestic law and international conventions. 
Although a ^ii; HHifieant proportion of African States have domestic laws 
governing the grant of asylum, the restrictions therein would 
pre, umably, he of iirim. irv signirieFiºce when such n matter is con; ideied 
by the African Cor., ii: icr; in. r. The primacy of local legislation hi matt(-rs of 
a: ylurn is recognised by Articlc ii(1) of the OAU Coi vehiion Governing 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa "7' . Nevrri 
heýt. s ,, in 
vice, of thf, fact that th(. OAII ('; ) ii vrººtIon has ijre^n raLIrºed by an 
ov. ýý hF 11I in ºr:; jor i`y of AfI iC) fl `' L10 31 , one tvoulc] exp :ct 
the Af i"icr+ii 
Cotnm: ssioti to n, T1,, lc taýict r' Pruscrihecl by tl, '" C onvri 'ion to the 
71 
'1 iii; r. ram, . i, unz -ratio' ? ýý, ally ar.... c`ri In tc a 
i wrt r\7 may ON ,,, Q ,d 0, 
ii 1",: `1. I, (fir , 
'( (. %i"i . L" I, 
air. ýf, t "llý r', -, y 
of Lý u; 
i)til:. th 1" : tt r( 'IIL ,, U 21 4) nu RjA 
i0 '1` wool : 1, 
1nootihn ^, ith the prMs 'onc o 'he )\U Convention. h'es;, iiV the Jrr't 
that the OAU ConventOn p""ovi(Jps ex tensive protection kn he rr"iur; re, 
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Article I1(1) of the Convention states that "Member States of the 
OAU shall use their best endeavors consistent with their respective 
legislation to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those 
refugees who, for well founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin or nationality" 
274 
The obligations imposed on signatories to the OAU Convention include 
the condition that - "No person shall by subjected to a Member State to 
measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which 
would compel him to remain in a territory where his life, physical 
integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons [of being a 
refugee] ... " Article 11(3). 
1I 
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.' 
it also recognises the duties of every refugee "to the country in which 
he finds himself in particular that he conforms with its laws and 
regulations as well as the measures taken for the maintenance of public 
order. lie shall also abstain from any subversive activities against any 
L7 Member of the OAU"5 
Consequently, the cumulative effect of the provisions of the AFCIIPR and 
OAU Convention on the rights of a (non-national) or refugee legally 
admitted in n territory of a State Part<< is that they may be e pclled for 
contr-ver, ing the (iomesi e laws of the host country especial':, those rule-, 
or ri, easures cffectin f, the inairntenar, ce of public order of the hest state 
or fur undermining the security of any Member of the t)AU. 
(g)light Right to ". 'artie ate_ Fr(-el v_i: i (4uvornment (h rlicic ] 3) AFCIIr'P, 
'I`hr right to partik ipate frec1y in Guvt: ritment is restricted by thr "claw- 
b'wl; " clause whých states ! tint. 
"JF: vcry -l ý,? "i,, hl tc, 
ý, `", t tart e it r- ý11ý ý", ' .. ('ý' 
1! 1 ' 'Cýýt Cj%iill', 
ry .. 
iý i. 
The ''it ! Cneo, diai1C. ý v. It1.1 iff. ' 
1!.! ` 
r: 1C' al"[ ; 
de iO Gl. iý>: i 
a'(ý). SI"ýl ýlil r'. _ý1'., 
ii'I=ý ýlrý' r'ijý 
.i 
1- J 
Gfý1 
go'. e rnrnent with: ), ''L neccs°arily '-r. nfurn, irlc to any uý'l+nýý' sf ýndýr"citi 
save do; nesUc laws. 
(h) The Right to Property (Article 14) AFCIIPR 
The AFCHPR provides that the "right to property... may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of the community or in the general 
---------------------- 
275 
Article III, OAU Convention. 
276 See Article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of the 
app ropriate laws"277 . 
The right to property is thus subjected to a "claw-back" clause 
restricting its application in the interest of public need or in the general 
interest of the community, and in accordance with the provisions of the 
appropriate laws. An OAU Member Stale could thus severely delimit the 
application of the right to property by adopting relevant measures 
decl iced necessary in the eneral interest of the community or for public 
need. The limitation placed on the right to properly is further 
exaecrhaterl first by, the absence: of r provision on compciisation and 
secondly by the non-inclusion of specific guidelines throligil which a 
State ºiay utilize its powers of requisition. 
The foregoing analysis of Ihre "claw-hack" c'lauces in the AVCHPP. reveals 
that they estah11ý. h vague standards which acs: excinplific. d by phrases 
such :, s "in ::, c'. ýrdar e mill) the law", by of. Lv. '" end "prov; ý. lcd he 
chide" . hý tltr lrw' 
7"I,, nt,; providr tilt ncr'essary 
C'Si (i aJ t. ý: ll r(Ii l'. St nt! 1C Ab': itll: ' ' i_i? "t 
j^ 1 äl; ýt' (I 1)l 'ý" t'i.? f::, i, 
,:? ( 
IHi', tni 
., L 
ev(r"C II litl! '): ',, C' :1 t)Tl IIl 
lie , , iarlrt . 
T`', F be . asked tht tý , n; ,. 
flow co Ewe inici (ACC'`. these "Clap: - bACk" Ci US"S to achle%e rnaximuni 
protection, under the circumstances, for the individual? 
Before we address this issue, it is pertinent to highlight the additional 
limitations. placed on the rights protected in the AFCHPR. Article 27(2) 
thereof, provides a general limitation to the rights and freedom of each 
-------------------- 
277 
AFCFIPR, Article 14 (underlines for emphasis). 
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individual by stating that "The rights and freedom of each individual 
shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others collective 
security, morality and common interest" 
A similar clause can be found in Article 32(2) of the American 
Convention which states that "the rights of each person are limited by 
the rights of others by the security of all and the just demands of the 
general welfare, in a democratic society". 
We submit that because of the general nature of the restrictions of the 
AFCHPR, a provision should have been Incorporated therein expressly 
giving the African Commission the power to examine the limitations placed 
by Member States on the rights protected, to ensure that they are within 
the permissible ambits and conform with the spirit of the Charter. Such 
a provision would check the arbitrary use of "claw-back" clauses by 
States especially in the light of the absence of a clause securing the 
validity and non-derogability of certain basic rights. The "claw-back" 
clauses as they stand, provide an opportunity for States to justify 
measures severely restricting the application of these rights. 
The Interpretation of Claw-back Clauses in the AFCHPR 
We submit that it is possible to adopt either a narrow or a wide 
interpretation of such phrases as "in accordance with the law" and "by 
the law"278. 
By adopting a narrow interpretation, the African Commission will have to 
confine itself to the consideration of only domestic law, thus subjecting 
the rights consecrated in the Charter to the vagaries and restrictions of 
local laws. 
-------------------- 
278 See AFCHPR, Articles 6,9(2), 19(2), 11,12(4) and 13(1). 
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On the other hand, the Commission could undertake a wider 
interpretation of the Charter. This method entails the interpretation of 
"claw-back" clauses in the light of international law. 
The inadequacy of using domestic law as guidelines for the interpretation 
of "claw-back" clauses is exemplified firstly, by restrictive local laws 
such as the various detention and Public Safety laws279 and secondly by 
the suspension and derogation provisions of the Constitution of many 
African States280. For Instance, the Constitution of Zaire provides that 
"if serious circumstances imminently threaten the Nations independence or 
integrity... or jeopardise vital State Interests... the President of the 
Republic may proclaim a state of emergency, with the consent of the 
Political Bureau"281. In such circumstances, the President Is empowered 
"to take all measures required by the circumstances" and "restrict the 
existence of individual liberties and certain fundamental rights , 
282. The 
Constitution does not define the phrase "serious circumstances imminently 
threaten(ing) the Nations Independence" thus allowing the executive 
latitude to abuse the power with obvious implications for Individuals 
rights. The ostensible safeguard provided by requiring consent of the 
Political Bureau is very weak since the members of the Political Bureau 
are appointed and dismissed by the President283. This fact is further 
underlined by the International Commission of Jurists statement that in 
Zaire "power is over-centralised at the level of the Head of State and 
one may without hesitation speak of an absolute monarchy in which the 
279 See for instance, Preservation of Public Security Act Cap. 57, Laws 
of Kenya.. 
280 See Chapter 5, above. 
281 Zaire Constitution, Article 48. 
282 Ibid. Article 49. 
283 Ibid, Article 40. 
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284 rulers will is practically without limits". 
The need for the adoption of a wider interpretation of the "claw-back" 
clause in the AFCHPR is imperative in the light of the ICJ's conclusion 
on the State of Emergency in Zaire which states that: 
"these violations of human rights may have been worse 
during the periods of tension which have led to states of 
emergency of one kind or another, but they are due not so 
much to an abuse of emergency powers as to the normal 
powers of a dictatorial regime which is not subject to any 
effective gheck by an independent legislature or 
1128 judiciary 
As earlier discussed, despite the provision of constitutional guarantees 
for human rights in many African countries, the vulnerability of the 
judiciary to the excesses of the executive In Africa underlines the need 
to adopt a wider interpretation of the "claw-back" clause In the AFCHPR. 
The adoption of a wider Interpretation of the Charter would entail the 
Interpretation of the Charter in the light of principles of International 
law. By virtue of Article 60 of the AFCHPR, the Commission Is 
empowered to "draw inspiration" from international human rights 
principles, including the provisions of the UN Charter, and other 
instruments adopted by African Countries In the field of human and 
peoples rights as well as provisions of various instruments adopted 
within the specialised agencies of the UN of which the parties to the 
286 AFCHPR are members. 
-------------------- 
284 
"State of Emergency in Zaire" International Commission of Jurists 
Research Report In 'States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human 
Rights - ICJ 1983 Geneva p. 384. 
285 Ibid p. 385. 
286 AFCHPR, Article 60. 
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We therefore suggest that when the Commission is considering whether an 
act or measure is "within the law" or "in accordance with the law", it 
should refer to the Instruments and principles, outside the African 
Charter, that restrict government action to a greater degree than the 
Charter itself. For Instance, Article 6 of the AFCHPR states that "no 
one may be arbitrarily arrested" but an individual may be deprived of 
his freedom "... for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law". 
The equivalent provisions In the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights goes further than the AFCHPR provision by 
comprehensively describing the limits within which domestic law must 
remain, thereby guaranteeing the continuance of certain rights287 . The 
African Commission can thus use its powers of Interpretation under the 
Charter by adopting Article 9 [International Covenant] as an 
interpretation of Article 6 [AFCHPR]. 
In addition to Interpreting the Charter by reference to international 
instruments, the Commission could also directly apply the provisions of 
the International Covenant for example, as long as the State Party has 
an obligation thereunder - pacta sunt servanda. For instance, under 
Article 6 of the AFCHPR which allows the arrest of an Individual only for 
"reasons and conditions previously laid down by law", the Commission 
-------------------- 
287 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9. 
Article 9 of the International Covenant provides Inter alia... 
(2)"Anyone who Is arrested shall be Informed, at the time of his arrest, 
of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any 
charges against him. 
(3)Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be entitled to 
a trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general 
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained In custody, but release 
may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of 
the judicial proceedings and, should circumstances arise, for execution of 
the judgement. 
(4)Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest of detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings before a court, In order that that court may 
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his 
release If the detention is not lawful. 
(5)Anyone who has been a victim of unlawful arrest of detention shall 
have an enforceable right to compensation". 
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could apply the provisions of Article 9 of the Covenant as constituting 
"conditions previously laid down by law". 
The foregoing broad interpretative module could similarly be applied to 
288 
other provisions of the AFCHPR, thus achieving a greater overall 
substantive and procedural protection for the individual. , 
(i) Overview 
In summation, it is evident that the AFCHPR guarantees without 
qualifications, the following civil and political rights: the right to 
equality, a fair hearing and personal dignity. However, the following 
rights are qualified: the right to life, liberty, freedom of conscience, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, assembly and movement. 
These rights may be restricted or derogated from by law. The extent 
to which the limitation imposed on the rights by "claw-back" clauses will 
depend upon the mode of interpretation adopted by the African 
Commission. 
The economic, social and cultural rights are couched in relatively non- 
derogative terms. The only exception Is of the right to property which 
may be encroached upon In the Interest of public need or In the general 
interest of the community. The right to work, the right to education, 
the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health, 
and the right to participation in cultural life, Impose onerous obligations 
on States. Consequently, it will not be unreasonable to expect a general 
acceptance of the broader mode of interpreting the obligations created by 
these socio-economic rights. Such an interpretation would suggest that 
288 The relevant provisions of the AFCHPR that may be modified by the 
wider interpretative mode include the right to liberty (Article 6), the 
right to express and disseminate opinions (Article 9), the right to 
assembly (Article 11), the freedom of movement (Article 12), the right to 
participate in government (Article 13), the right to property (Article 
14). 
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these rights should be achieved as per the regime of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The International 
Covenant requires each State Party to take steps "to the maximum of its 
available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the... Covenant by all appropriate 
means including particularly the adoption of legislative measures". 
We submit that where the African Commission subjects the provisions of 
the AFCHPR on social, economic and cultural rights to the wider 
interpretive regime of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, mutatis mutandis, the same mode of Interpretation 
should be applied to the Charters provisions on personal security, and 
civil and political rights by the application of the regime of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Furthermore, in the absence of a derogation clause In the AFCHPR, we 
suggest that the African Commission may be able to secure the rights of 
the individual in a state of emergency, by applying the derogation 
provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights289. 
This approach would in effect check the excess of governmental measures 
during a state of emergency. It Is pertinent to acknowledge the 
difficulty in applying this standard to States that are not parties to the 
Covenants. However, R. Gittleman states that in the Interest of 
consistent judicial determination, the Commission should apply the same 
"reviewable standards" to those States not party to the Covenants290 
We submit that while the uniform method is desirable, its legal efficacy is 
doubtful. However as regards State Parties to the Covenant as well as 
-------------------- 
289 
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
290 
R. Gittleman. "The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: 
A Legal Analysis" Virginia Journal of International Law Vol. 22: 4 1982 
p. 707. 
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non-state Parties thereto, which have Constitutional derogation provisions 
291 
similar to the Covenant, the Commission will be able to enforce the 
standard of compliance subscribed to by these States. 
The essence of seeking guidelines in local laws and international 
instruments to interpret the AFCHPR is to ensure that adequate 
safeguards are erected to protect individual rights particularly during a 
state of emergency. However, these solutions should be viewed as 
interim or ad hoc measures. The most desirable scenario would be the 
incorporation of a comprehensive derogation provision in the AFCHPR 
either by amendment or the adoption of protocol thereto. Such a 
protocol (or amendment) should also review the current "claw-back" 
clauses and clarify their general vagueness. 
In the unlikely event of an immediate adoption of such a protocol, we will 
have to await the evolution of the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission which should clarify the limits of the permissible incursions 
into individual rights by State measures. Finally, it is pertinent to 
highlight the positive aspect of "claw-back" clauses. The restrictions or 
291 For instance see Art 4(2)-(3) of the Constitution of Nigeria; Nigeria 
is not a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. The derogation provision of the Nigerian Constitution provides: - 
"An Act of the National Assembly shall not be invalidated by reason only 
that it provides for the taking, during periods of emergency, of 
measures that derogate from the provisions of Section 30 (right to life) 
or 32 (right to personal liberty) of the Constitution; but no such 
measures shall be taken in pursuance of any such Act during any period 
of emergency save to the extent that those measures are reasonably 
justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists 
during that period of emergency: 
Provided that nothing In this section shall authorise any derogation from 
the provisions of Section 30 of this Constitution, except In respect of the 
death resulting from acts of war or authorise any derogation from the 
provisions of Section 33(8) (freedom from ex post facto laws) of this 
Constitution. 
(3) In this section "period of emergency means any period during which 
there is in force a Proclamation of a state of emergency declared by the 
President... ". 
See also Article 48 of the Constitution of Zaire which contains a similar 
provision. Zaire, however, is a State Party to the International 
Covenants. 
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limitations imposed by such clauses may reinforce individual rights 
because such restrictions may be used to invalidate State action -taken, 
for instance, without the necessary legislation292. In this regard, it is 
apt to refer to the Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights on the word "laws" in Article 30 of the American 
Convention293. The Court stated that Article 30 cannot be regarded as 
a general authorisation to establish new restrictions to the rights 
protected by the Convention. The Court, thus opined that "the word 
"laws"... means a general legal norm tied to the general welfare, passed 
by democratically elected legislative bodies established by the 
Constitution, and formulated according to the procedures set forth by 
the constitutions of the State Parties for that purpose"294. We submit 
that it will be legally imprecise to adopt this definition to interpret the 
phrases such as "in accordance with law", "by the law" and "within the 
law" In the AFCHPR. However, the Inter-American Courts opinion may 
serve a useful guideline In determining the legality of restrictions placed 
on the rights and freedoms established in the AFCHPR, especially where 
such restrictions are required to be in conformity with the law and 
295 
necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public good. 
-------------------- 
292 
For example, under Article 12(4) of the AFCHPR, "a non-national 
legally admitted in a territory of a State Party ... may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law". 
293 Article 30 of the American Convention states that "The restrictions 
that pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or 
exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied 
except in accordance with laws enacted for reasons of general interest 
And in accordance with the purpose for which such restrictions have 
been established". (Underlines for emphasis) 
294 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, San Jose, Advisory Opinion 
of 9 May 1986 No. -OC-6/86; See Decisions and Reports, Vol. 7 No. 2-4 (1986) HRLJ p. 231. 
295 For Instance, See Articles 11,12(2) and 14 AFCHPR. 
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(h) Peoples Rights 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR) represents 
the first international human rights instrument to provide a 
comprehensive protection for peoples' rights. The significance of 
peoples' rights is emphasized by incorporation of the term in the title of 
the Charter. The philosophical rationale for the incorporation of the 
concept of peoples rights is reflected in the Rapporteurs Report: 
"Noting that in Africa, Man is part and parcel of the group, 
some delegations concluded that individual rights could be 
explained and justified only by the rights of the community. 
Consequently, they wished that the Draft Charter made room 
for the Peoples' Rights and adopt a more balanced approach 
to economic, social and cultural rightigen the one hand and 
political and civil rights on the other" 
African customary law emphasises the importance of the group or the 
community within which the individual derives his Identity, and exclusion 
297 therefrom Is regarded as a very severe punishment. 
The Preamble of the AFCHPR further spotlights the rationale by 
"recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from 
the attributes of human beings which justifies their international 
protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of peoples 
298 
rights should necessarily guarantee human rights". 
The AFCHPR thus lists a catalogue of "all peoples' rights"; namely: the 
299 
equality of all peoples and the principles of non-domination, the 
rights to self-determination including the right to free themselves from 
-------------------- 
296 
Rapporteurs Report, op cit p. 3 para. 10. 
297 D. K. C. Mumba "Prospects for Regional Protection of Human Rights" (1982) Holdsworth Law Review p. 105-106. 
298 AFCHPR, 5th preambular paragraph. 
299 AFCHPR, Article 19. 
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300 
colonial and other oppression, the right to dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources, which 
interest of the people301 
development302, the right 
right shall be exercised in the exclusive 
the right to economic, social and cultural 
to national and International peace and 
security"', and the rights to a general satisfactory environment 
304 favourable to their development 
Is is therefore evident that the AFCHPR breaks new ground by going 
beyond the traditional areas of peoples rights to self-determination and 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources305. Within the regime of 
the UN human rights instruments the concept of peoples rights is not 
unfamiliar, especially as regards the right of self-determination and the 
right of all peoples to freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
306 
resources. 
Although the presence of "peoples' rights" in the AFCHPR derives its 
philosophical inspiration from the emphasis placed on the group or 
community In African Customary Law, the articulation and awareness of 
the concept in universal terms was projected by the Universal Declaration 
-------------------- 
300 Ibid Article 20. 
301 Ibid Article 21. 
302 lbid Article 22. 
303 Ibid Article 23. 
304 Ibid Article 24. 
305 L. Henkin, R. C. Pugh, 0. Schacter, H. Smith, International Law: 
Cases and Materials, (St. Paul, Minnesota) 1980 p. 209. 
306 Articles 1(1) and 1(2) of both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Political 
Rights. In the Charter of the United Nations, the rights of self- determinatin of peoples is mentioned in two places; viz; in Article 1(2) 
as one of the purposes of the UN, and in Article 55 relating to the 
specific purposes of the UN in the promotion of economic and social 
cooperation. 
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on the Rights of Peoples, Algiers 1976307. The Declaration provides for 
twenty one Universal Rights of Peoples under six chapters: the Right to 
Existence; the Right to Political Self-Determination; Economic Rights of 
Peoples; Right to a Culture; Right to Environment and International 
Resources; and Rights of Minorities. The Declaration also provides 
guarantees and sanctions. The Declaration has had limited impart on 
existing human rights regimes, however the authors of the AFCHPR seem 
to have taken cognisance of the Declaration by incorporating some of its 
provisions in the Charter. 
(I) Political Self Determination and the AFCHPR 
The AFCHPR states that "All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the 
same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the 
domination of a people by another, 
308, 
The principle of equality of peoples also appears in the Charter of the 
UN309 but without the additional clause that - "Nothing shall justify the 
domination of a people by another". 
The AFCHPR affirms the "unquestionable and inalienable" right of all 
peoples to self-determination, including the free determination of political 
status and the freedom to pursue economic and social development. 
Article 20 of the AFCHPR provides that: 
(1) "... all peoples... shall have the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall 
freely pursue their economic and social development 
according to the policy they have freely chosen". 
-------------------- 
307 See A. Cassease and E. Jouve, Pour un Droit des Peoples: Essais 
sur la Declarationd'Alger (Paris: Edition Berger-Levraut, 1978). 
308 AFCHPR, Article 19. 
309 UN Charter, Article 1(2). 
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(2) "Colonized and oppressed peoples have the right to 
free themselves from the bonds of domination by 
resorting to any means recognized by the international 
community". 
The foregoing provisions represent a major departure from the 
phraseology of International human rights instruments on the Issue of 
self-determination. Furthermore, It raises interesting issues especially In 
the light of the absence of a clause defining the term "peoples" to whom 
the rights attach. In our analysis of the concept of self-determination 
we arrived at the conclusion that although the Charter does not define 
the term "all peoples", a contextual approach Indicates that the term 
refers to the collection of Individuals who constitute distinct communities 
in Africa and to whom the collective rights stated in the Charter apply. 
This conclusion Is Inescapable especially in the light of the provision of 
Article 20 wherein the term "peoples" Is a general category of which 
"colonised or oppressed peoples" constitute a unit thereof. 
Consequently, in the context of the AFCHPR "all peoples" especially the 
"colonised and oppressed" have a right to self-determination. thus 
underlining the conclusion that the Charter recognises the right of 
peoples to political self-determination in the post-colonial context310 
This view finds support in the statement of Dr. Peter Onu, former 
deputy Secretary-General of the OAU, on peoples rights: 
"a liberal interpretation cannot be avoided and it would seem 
to me that the concept (of peoples rights) applies both 
externally and internally... Applied internally, this concept 
rejects the treatment of Africans as sub-humans as is the 
case in apartheid South Africa and it rejects the domination 
of a people by another on whatever grounds, be it that of 
race, colour, or ethnic origin. Since African States, given 
their heterogeneity, are made up of peoples, applied 
-------------------- 
310 
S. K. N. Blay "Changing African Perspectives on the Right of Self- 
Determination in the wake of the Banjul Chater on Human and Peoples 
Rights" Journal of African Law (1985) Vol. 29 No. 2 p. 158-9. 
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internally, the concept ipso facto rejects domination on the 
basis of ethnicity. The reference to "oppressed peoples" 
would necessarily have wider application, for oppression of 
peoples 3ilsl not a monopoly of colonial or colonial-type 
regimes" 
Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that although the OAU Charter and 
several OAU Resolutions affirm the principle of "non-Interference" and 
"territorial integrity"312, the AFCHPR make no express reference to 
these principles, thereby underlining the possibility that Article 20 
AFCHPR may be interpreted liberally to apply to "oppressed" ethnic 
groups within African States. Admittedly, such an Interpretation may 
encourage the adopting of Article 20 as the secessionist Charter. The 
implication of this conclusion was not lost on State representatives to the 
OAU Council of Ministers Meeting on the Draft AFCHPR313, Despite the 
objection of some representatives on the likely misinterpretation that 
Article 20 may attract, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
adopted the provision unamended. The apparent ambivalence of the 
Assembly to the implications of Article 20 may not be unconnected with 
several concrete factors. Firstly, the Heads of State can use the OAU 
Charter principles on non-interference and territorial integrity, as a 
shield against attempted liberal Interpretations of Article 20. Secondly, 
by virtue of Article 23(1) AFCHPR which reaffirms the principle of 
solidarity and friendly relations as affirmed by the UN Charter and 
reaffirmed by the OAU Charter, and Article 23(2) AFCHPR, which 
prohibits subversive activities by an Individual against his country or 
origin and prohibits the use of State territories as basis for such 
-------------------- 
311 
Peter Onu "The Concept of Peoples Rights in the 'Banjul' Charter". 
Paper presented to the Conference on Human Rights in Rural Areas in 
Africa (UNESCO/Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, Nigeria) 11 
November 1985 pp. 5-6. 
312 For example, OAU Res. AHG/161 July 1964 on African State 
Boundaries. 
313 OAU Doc CM Plan. Draft Rapporteurs Report (XXVI) 1981, p. 60. 
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activities, it may be submitted that oppressed peoples do have a right to 
free themselves from domination only as far as it does not amount to a 
breach of the State Sovereignty. Consequently, only the peoples of 
Namibia and South Africa will be recognized as being entitled to the 
right of self-determination on the continent. The effect of such a 
conclusion is that distinct ethnic groups constituting states like Nigeria 
or Ghana will not be recognized as "peoples" permitted to exercise the 
right of political self-determination, if they were oppressed. 
We submit that given the arbitrary and haphazard delimitations of 
boundaries of African States coupled with the hazard of ethnicism in 
Africa, too much emphasis on the liberal Interpretation of "peoples" 
rights in Article 20 may become an unruly horse that will bolt the stable 
gates of the hitherto fragile political status quo of African States. 
Consequently, much as we support the right of oppressed peoples to 
self-determination in the post-independence context, such peoples must 
eschew secession and seek the grant of internal autonomy. We believe 
that the decentralization of political and economic structures toward 
granting autonomy to oppressed peoples should serve to reconcile the 
claims of oppressed peoples and the need to maintain the territorial 
314 Integrity of the State. 
(11) Economic Self-Determination and the AFCHPR 
The principle of economic self-determination In the post Independence 
context enjoys overwhelming regional acclamation as represented In 
Article 21 of the AFCHPR which provides for peoples right to exercise 
sovereignty over national resources in the exclusive interest of the 
people. In case spoliation, the dispossessed peoples have the right to 
314 Articles 1 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights imposes an obligation on States to grant relative autonomy to 
minorities. For a discussion on Political Self Determination in Africa, See 
Chapter 3 abova. 
504 
the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate 
315 
compensation 
The concept of economic self-determination has been addressed316 
however, suffice it to say that the provision of Article 21 of the AFCHPR 
on permanent sovereignty over natural resources reinforces the African 
trend towards eliminating "all forms of foreign economic exploitation 
particularly that practised by International monopolies so as to enable 
their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their 
317, 
national resources1, 
The AFCHPR departs from the provision of the International Covenants 
In several ways. Article 21(3) of the AFCHPR states that: 
"The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be 
exercised without prejudice to the obligations of promoting 
international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, 
equitable exchange and the principles of international law". 
The International Covenants on the other hand provide that: 
"All Peoples may... freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic cooperation. baseýq8on the principle of 
mutual benefit and international law... " . 
It is therefore evident that whereas the AFCHPR limits the obligations to 
the promotion of international economic cooperation, under the 
International Covenants the right is qualified by those obligations. 
-------------------- 
315 
AFCHPR, Article 21(2). 
316 
Chapter 3, above. 
317 AFCHPR, Article 21(5). 
318 Article 1(2) of both International Covenants. (Underlines for 
emphasis) 
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Furthermore, Article 21(2) of the AFCHPR provides that "in case of 
spoliation, the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful 
recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation". In 
comparison, the International Covenants simply state that "[i]n no case 
may a people be deprived of its own means to subsistence"319, without 
any reference to recovery of property or compensation. This significant 
advance by the AFCHPR over the provision of the International 
Covenants underlines the effort of African States to protect the continent 
from foreign economic domination. 
It is safe to predict that the provisions of Article 21 will be one of the 
most patronized clauses of the Charter in the light of recent regional and 
sub-regional resolutions on self-reliance and Africanization320. Article 
21 will also be particularly apt to the issue of Namibia where the wealth 
and natural resources of the Namibian peoples are being pillaged by 
South Africa and international capitalist monopolies, notwithstanding the 
fact that the United Nations Council for Namibia, under Decree 1 for the 
Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, established Its authority 
on Namibia to protect the rights of the Namibian people to their natural 
321 
resources. 
The provision of Article 21 may only be invoked by African States on 
behalf of their peoples and for their exclusive benefit since it is stated 
the right to free disposal of wealth and natural resources cannot be 
-------------------- 
319 
Ibid. 
320 See, for instance, the OAU Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic 
Development of Africa adopted by the 2nd Extra Ordinary Assembly of 
OAU Heads of States and Governments 28-29 April 1980, Lagos, Nigeria. 
OAU Doe ECM/ECO 9(XIV) Rev. 2 (UN Doc A/S. 11/14, Annex 1). 
321 Decreee No. 1 for the Protection of the National Resources of Namibia, 
adopted by the UN Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974 and 
approved by the UN General Assembly at its 29th Session on 13 
December 1974. 
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exercised by the people322. Consequently Article 21(4) of the AFCHPR 
provides that "State Parties shall individually and collectively exercise 
the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a 
view of strengthening African Unity". This provision takes into 
cognisance the main strategy for the realisation of the guidelines and 
measures in OAU Lagos Plan of Action which includes State exercise of 
meaningful and permanent sovereignty over natural resources through 
"national and collective self-reliance in economic and social development 
323. for the establishment of a new International economic order,, 
The AFCHPR states that "in the case of spoliation the dispossessed 
people shall have the right to lawful recovery of its property as well as 
to an adequate compensationýý324 
This article may be construed as excluding multinational companies from 
claiming compensation for property lost during armed uprisings because 
of the term "people" used therein. However, foreign investors may seek 
solace in Article 14 of the Charter. Although Article 14 "guarantees" 
the right to property, it may be "encroached upon in the Interest of the 
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws". 
The Charters recognition of the "obligations of promoting International 
economic cooperation based on mutual respect. equitable exchange and 
the principles of international law"325 enhances the proprietary rights of 
foreign multinationals in African States albeit to a lesser extent than the 
rights of the International Covenants. The rights of the foreign investor 
-------------------- 
322 
Under the UN regime, the right of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources was attributed "nations and peoples" (General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 XVII), whereas, the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties subsequently applied it only to States. 
323 OAU Lagos Plan of Action, op cit, para. 76. 
324 AFCHPR, Article 21(2). 
325 AFCHPR, Article 21(3). 
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will however depend on the interpretation given to Article 21(3) since it 
does not state which principles of International law are relevant. The 
Commission will also have to reconcile the apparent conflict between 
Article 14 and Article 21 of the AFCHPR. The current unsettled state of 
affairs in the arena of international commercial transactions renders 
inadvisable, a formulation that could be interpreted to include customary 
international law, let alone general principles of law, recognized by 
civilized nations In so far as they purpose to deal specifically with such 
transactions326. In any case, there has been a remarkable shift by 
African States from the notion of economic sovereignty to the original 
idea of international cooperation in the sphere of foreign investment. 
Notwithstanding the efforts of African States as reflected in the Lagos 
Plan of Action, and examination of bilateral agreements on specific 
327 investment projects reveals this departure. 
(i) The Rights of Solidarity and the AFCHPR 
The AFCHPR represents the first international human rights instrument 
to consecrate the three generations of human rights. We have reviewed 
the Charters provisions regarding the first generation of rights which 
are civil and political rights based on the principle of liberty; and the 
second generation of rights being economic, social and cultural rights 
derived from the principle of equality. 
The third generation of rights also referred to as "solidarity rights" are 
328 basically the right to development, the right to the ownership of the 
326 O. Eze "Legal Structures for the Resolution of International Problems 
in the Domain of Private Foreign Investments: A Third World Perspective 
Now and in Future. Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, Vol-9,1979 p. 544. 
327 Rudolf Dolzer "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and 
Economic Decolonization in HRLJ 1986 Vol. 7 p. 228-230. 
328 Article 22(1) AFCHPR. 
508 
common heritage of mankind329, right to peace330, and the right to a 
healthy and ecologically balanced environment331 In the context of 
North/South political forum, the emergence of solidarity rights is 
regarded by some scholars as the culmination of the southern doctrine of 
human rights which recognizes and protects the priority of economic and 
social rights, the collective rights of a people to independence of colonial 
rule, the collective right of a people to ethnic autonomy and the right of 
Individuals and groups to such economic and social advancement as might 
332 
make the enjoyment of civil and political rights possible. 
We submit that the essence of the third generation of rights or 
"solidarity rights" can be better appreciated from the standpoint of 
natural progression in the evolution towards an efficient universal human 
rights regime. The first generation of rights (civil and political) were 
supplemented by the second generation of rights (economic and social) to 
enhance and protect human dignity through the principle of equality and 
by requiring States to provide social and economic goods, services and 
opportunities. Therefore, to ensure the effective Implementation of the 
first and second generation of rights, it is necessary to ensure the 
protection and enforcement of the third generation of rights (solidarity 
rights) based on the principle of fraternity at both national and 
International levels, especially in view of the international economic 
imbalance which has handicapped the implementation of the first two 
generations of human rights. The consecration of the three generations 
-------------------- 
329 Ibid. The concept of common heritage of mankind evolved in relation 
to the resources of the seabed of the high seas outside the limits of the 
territoria waters and Exclusive Economic Zones of States - See The UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 of 7 October 
1982. 
330 Article 23(1) AFCHPR. 
331 Article 24 Ibid. 
332 See R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations 
(Cambridge University Press: 1986) p. 83. 
509 
of rights in the AFCHPR may be regarded as the first step, albeit 
regional, towards a universal legal framework to enhance human dignity, 
the essence of which is encapsulated in the right to development. 
(i) The Right to Development 
Article 22(1) of the AFCHPR consecrates the right to development: 
"All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and 
cultural development with due regard to their freedom and 
identity and in equal enjoyment of the common heritage of 
mankind. 
States shall have the duty to individually or collectively, 
ensure the exercise of the right to development". 
The AFCHPR, thus represents the first legal Instrument to provide for 
the right to development. 
What is the right to development? 
In his address to the Meeting of African Legal Experts convened to draft 
the AFCHPR, President Leopold Senghar observed that: 
"Our overall conception of Human Rights is marked by the 
Right to Development since it Integrates all economic, social 
and cultural rights, and, also civil and political rights. 
Development is first and foremost a change of the quality of 
life and not only an economic growth required at all cost, 
particularly In the blind repression of Individuals and 
peoples. J. 3Sneans the full development of every man In his 
community" 
The Right to Development means the progressive attainment of conditions 
in which every individual can enjoy, exercise and utilize all his human 
rights, whether economic, social, cultural, civil or political. The right 
to development embodies all human rights. 
-------------------- 
333 Opening Address of President Leopold Senghor: OAU Secretary- 
Generals Report on the Draft AFCHPR op cit p. 2. 
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The concept of the right to development is recognized by UN General 
Assembly and the UN Commission of Human Rights as evidenced in UN 
334 335 Resolutions and in the Reports of the UN Secretary General 
The concept was given regional prominence by the Algerian Commission 
on Justice and Peace which publicized the -Report on the Right of 
Underdeveloped Peoples to Development336. The idea was developed and 
given international prominence by Judge Keba Mbaye in 1972 through his 
lecture on "The Right to Development as a Human Right". The 
incorporation of the right to development in the AFCHPR owes as much 
to the realisation of African States of the significance of the concept as 
to the personal initiative of Judge Keba Mbaye as the Chairman of the 
Meeting of Legal Experts to Draft the AFCHPR. In a memorandum on the 
concept of the right to development submitted to the Meeting of African 
Legal Experts, Judge Keba Mbaye states that: - 
"The philosophical equality of men stems from his freedom 
and must necessarily be extended to include economic and 
cultural equality; the right of every human being to enjoy 
the fruits of the earth and to ensure the full development of 
his intellectual, moral, cultural and physical qualities. Such 
a right is the offshoot of the most fundamental right: the 
---------------- 
334 UN Commission on Human Rights, Res. 5(XXXV) 1979; and UN 
General Assembly Res. 34/46 (1979), "emphasizes that the right to 
development is a human rights and that equality for development is as 
much a prerogative of nations as of individuals within nations" - para. 8. 
335 The International Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human 
Right in Relation to Other Human Rights Based on International 
Cooperation, Including the Right to Peace, Taking Into Account the 
Requirements of the New International Economic Order and the 
Fundamental Human Needs - Report of the Secretary-General (UN Doe 
E/CN-4/1334 of 2 January 1979); and the Regional and National 
Dimensions to the Rights to Development as a Human Right. See also the 
Regional and National Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human 
Right - Study by the UN Secretary-General (UN Doc E/CN r/1488 of 31 
December 1981). 
336 Commission 'Justice et Paix d'Algerie, le droit des peuples sons 
developpe au developpement, in Rene-Jean Dupuy (ed) : The Right to 
Development at the International Level; Workshop, Hague Academy of 
International Law. The Hague 16-18 October 1979 (Alphen aan den Rijn. 
1980). 
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right to life. Since no one disputes the right to life, the 
right to a better life is equally inalienable. An effort must 
be made to convince people that such an imperative implies 
conditions which... guarantee the security and dignity of 
man and make his power to be free and to his capacity to be 
happy meaningful. These conditions constitute the right to 
development. 
The right to development implies... the right to self- 
determination of peoples. This means the right to freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources which lie 
beneath the earth. This right underlies the right to 
nationalise or expropriate... but subject to any obligations 
arising out of international economic cooperation. 
The right to development is also the right to a worldwide 
redistribution of the fruits of labour of the peoples in 
accordance with the canons of justice and not those of 
economic streit th. These conditions constitute the right to 
development" 
-------------------- 
337 
Keba Mbaye "From the Right to Equality to the Right to 
Development" Report submitted to the Meeting of African Legal Experts 
preparing the Draft AFCHPR. p. 2 1979. 
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The concept of the right to development has attracted considerable 
literature338, some criticisms339 and has been explored by international 
340 
colloquia. 
While the AFCHPR was being drafted, African countries were 
contemporaneously exploring the concept of development as reflected in 
the African Document on Development Strategy for the Third Decade341 , 
the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development of Africa342 and the 
338 
Hector Gros Espiel "The Right to Development" Texas International 
Law Journal 16 Spring 1981 pp. 189-205. Emanuel de Kadt, "Some basic 
questions on human rights and development" World Development 8: 2 
(February 1980): p. 97-105; Robert E. Goodin "The development rights 
trade-off: Some unanswered economic and political assumptions" Universal 
Human Rights 1 (April 1979) p. 31-42; Keba Mbaye Emergence of the 
Right to Development in the Context of a New International Economic 
Order UNESCO Doc. SS-78/Conf. 630/8 16 July 1979; Stephen P. Marks 
"Development and human rights: Some reflections on the study of 
development, human rights, and peace" Bulletin of Peace Proposals 8: 3 
(1977) p. 236-246; James C. N. Paul, "Introduction: Law socialism and 
human rights to development in third world countries" Review of Socialist 
Law (Neth) 7 Sept 1981: p. 235-241; Rich "The Right to Development as 
an Emerging Human Right" Virginia Journal of International Law, 23 
(1983) p. 289. 
339 For Instance, Jack Donnelly regards the right to development as 
"largely a right not to be economically underdeveloped, transforming 
human rights concerns related to development into little more than a 
device to gain ecomonic concessions on largely spurious grounds, or still 
another way to assert the priority of economic and social rights" - J. 
Donnelly "The 'Right to Development': How not to Link Human Rights and 
Development" in R. Meltzer and C. Weld (eds) Human Rights and 
Development in Africa; op cit p. 267. 
340 Keba Mbaye"Le developpement et les drolts de 1'homme rapport 
introductif-Dakar Colloquium, 1978" Revue Senegalaase de droit 11.22 
(Dec. 1977) p. 19-51. 
UNESCO - "Expert Meeting on Human Rights, Human Needs and the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order" Final Report 19-23 
June 1978 SS. 78/CONF-630/COL2, Paris 1978 SS78/CONF 630-12. 
R. J. Dupuy (ed) The Right to Development at the International Level, 
Workshop, (Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague 18-18 Oct 
1979), op cit; Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, (Report 
of a Conference held in Hague 27 April -1 May 1971, Oxford, New York 
1981); Seminar on the Relations that exist between human rights and 
development, (New York, 3-14 August 1981). UN Doc ST/HR/SER-A/10. 
Edward Kannyo "African Seminar on human rights and development" 
Human Rights Internet Reporter 7.5 (June-August 1982) pp. 937-938. 
341 C. M. Resolution 332 (XIV) and Annex A&B of 27 March 1979. 
342 CM Resolution 722 of June 1979. 
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Lagos Plan for Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for 
the Economic Development of Africa343. The cumulative effect of these 
factors Influenced the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1981, to 
establish a working Group of Governmental Experts for the Study and 
Preparation of a draft Declaration on the Right to Development344. The 
draft Declaration will form the basis of a "Universal Declaration of the 
Right to Development as a Human Right". 
-------------------- 
343 Resolution ECM/EC/9(XIV) Rev. 2 April 1980. 
344 Report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right 
to Development /E/CN. 4/1489, E/CN 4.1983/11 the Technical Consolidated 
Text thereto In E/CN. 4. /1984/13 Annex II. 
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The UN draft declaration on the right to development recognizes that 
"the right to development is an inalienable human right of every person, 
individual or in entities established pursuant to the right of association 
and of other groups including peoples,, 
345 In contrast, the AFCHPR in 
recognizing the right to development, expressly refers only to "peoples" 
as the beneficiaries of the right. We submit that the failure of the 
AFCHPR to expressly mention individuals as the beneficiaries of the right 
to development is a lacuna which may be exploited by States to demand 
this right of "peoples", without contributing much to the well-being of 
individual persons. It may however be stated that since "there is no 
real development without fundamental human rights, (and) Individual 
participation"346, lt may be Implied that the right to development of the 
Individual is thus protected under the AFCHPR. The best solution 
however is to expressly incorporate the individuals right to development 
especially in the light of Article 22(2) of the AFCHPR which imposes the 
duty of implementing the right to development on States, Individually and 
collectively. The corollary of this duty is that States will be required to 
observe the principle of equality of peoples347, ergo Individuals, in 
discharging their duty. 
By collective implementation of the right to development, the AFCHPR 
makes a tacit reference to utilization of universal, regional and sub- 
regional institutions such as the UN, OAU, the EEC, Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development 
Coordinating Conference (SADCC) and similar groups towards enhancing 
the right to development. 
-------------------- 
345 E/CN4/1984/13 Annex II. 
346 Address of the former Secretary-General of the OAU EdemKodjo, to 
the Meeting of African Experts preparing the Draft AFCHPR, Dakar, 
Senegal 28 Nov -8 Dec 1979. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG-Vol. 1 p. 3-4. 
347 AFCHPR, Article 19. 
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The enforcement of the right to development will prove difficult 
especially in the light of the absence of a specific implementation 
machinery for this purpose. However, under the existing machinery, 
peoples who are the beneficiaries of the right may be able to submit 
complaints to the African Commission in cases where their right to 
development has been infringed, for instance in a case where a 
Government perpetuates policies or practices which neglect the rights of 
a particular ethnic group to equal opportunities in breach of Article 19. 
The feasibility of this approach, admittedly, will depend on the 
Interpretation given to the word "peoples" by the African Commission. 
However Article 22, (unlike Article 21, regarding the right of peoples to 
free development of natural resources) does not expressly provide for 
the State to claim or represent the rights of peoples thereto. 
Consequently, we may perceive the African Commission accepting 
communications from representatives of peoples or groups348 claiming 
State Infringement of Article 22. 
Furthermore, if the African Commission accepts the view that the right 
to development attaches to Individuals and encapsulates all human rights, 
it should be possible for an individual to claim State-contravention of his 
right to development where any of his human rights have been infringed. 
In the hypothetical scenario, where a State is required to respond to the 
complaint alleging a breach of the right to development, we foresee a 
typical State response to be: "the State recognises Its duty to "ensure 
the exercise of the right to development", however such a right can only 
be ensured as far as the economic resources of the State permit". Thus 
the right to development may encourage the elasticization of the 
permissible margin of appreciation accorded economic and social rights in 
-------------------- 
348 
Under the AFCHPR procedural framework Article 55 grants the 
African Commission power to consider "other communications". 
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international law to cover all rights, particularly civil and political 
rights. 
Herein lies one of the main hazards of the right to development as a 
capsule of all rights. We submit that the right to development, as 
presently couched in the AFCHPR, is too vague a term to constitute a 
legal right. The right to development being a package of human rights 
could lead, at the national level, to progressive detachment from the 
realities of Implementation in particular cases349. Indeed It could be 
used as a political shield to deflect genuine concern for civil and political 
rights, in defence of purely economic imperatives. In defence of our 
thesis that civil and political rights and social and economic rights are 
complementary, It is essential to highlight the possibility that States may 
utilize the right to development as an inroad to erode civil and political 
rights especially in the light of the Preamble of the AFCHPR which 
provides that: "it is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to 
the right to development... the satisfaction of economic, social and 
cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights"350, While we await the definitive Universal Declaration of the 
Right to Development, it is necessary for the African Commission on 
Human Rights to evolve rules, both procedural and substantive, 
applicable to the right to development. Such a solution is Imperative, 
with a view to safeguarding the first and second generation rights from 
encroachment through the possible misinterpretations of the third 
generation of rights, particularly the right to development. The 
vulnerability of the right to development to political misapplication does 
-------------------- 
349 J. Donnelly "The Right to Development" How not to link Human 
Rights & Development" op cit p. 275. 
350 AFCHPR 7th Preambular Paragraph. 
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35 not necessarily diminish its moral1 
352 
or legal basis. 
The moral and legal justifications for the right to. development have been 
challenged353 and explored elsewhere354, however suffice It to say that 
in Africa, our focal point, the AFCHPR has obviated the need to plunge 
Into an interesting controversy rendered foreclosed, albeit concisely, by 
Article 22 thereof and the impending adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of the Right to Development. 
We submit that the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights may 
utilize the device of Article 62 to effectively enhance the right to 
development. Article 62 requires each State Party to submit every two 
years a report of legislative or other measures taken with a view to 
giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by 
the Charter. By "other measures", the AFCHPR Implies, among others, 
social and economic policies pursued by State Parties towards enhancing 
-------------------- 
351 In referring to the ethical basis of the right to development, the UN 
Secretary-General's study states that development Is the condition of all 
social life and therefore an inherent requirement of every obligation. 
The right to development is based on the moral duty of reparation for 
the underdevelopment caused by colonial and neo-colonial exploitation. 
On the basis of moral Interdependence and economic interdependence it is 
in the Interest of all nations to protect the right of development so as to 
preserve world peace. The Regional and National Dimensions of the 
Right to Development as a Human Right: Study by the UN Secretary- 
General op cit (Paras. 40-51). 
352 The UN Secretary-Generals Study outlines a "substantial body of 
principles... which demonstrate the existence of a human right to 
development in international law"; these include Articles 55 and 56 of the 
UN Charter, Articles 22,26(2), 28 and 29(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights especially Articles 1(1), 2(1) and 11; Ibid 
paras 55-78. 
353 According to J. Donnelly there is no legal or moral basis for the 
existence of the right to development. He further states that the right 
to development was devised by developing States as additional leverage 
in the pursuit of development and to deflect attention from national 
responsibility for the violation of humanrights. See J. Donnelly "The 
Right to Development: How Not to Link Human Rights & Development" op, 
cit p. 224. 
354 See footnote 3 at p. 108. 
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the right to development. The Commission may also assess State 
performance against regional and sub-regional social and economic 
standards as adopted by institutions, such as ECOWAS, the ECA and 
under the Lagos Plan for Action. 
The forthcoming Universal Declaration on the Right to Development as a 
Human Right, may also complement the regional strategies as objective 
standards of reference. The effective utilization of Article 62 in this 
context Is particularly relevant, first, because the right to development 
as presently couched is too vague to constitute a legally enforceable 
right; secondly, the right to development should be appreciated as a 
right of every individual and peoples to participate in and benefit from 
development as a process of progressive improvement in the standard of 
living. Consequently, the reporting procedure is presently, the most 
efficacious method of enhancing, nay enforcing, the right to 
development. In the final analysis, the right to development should be 
regarded as a response to the need to look beyond the symptoms of 
human rights problems, to deal with the root causes as well. 
(Ii) Right to Peace and Security 
One of the moral justifications of the right to development Is the 
preservation of world peace. Thus the AFCHPR expressly states that: 
"All Peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and 
security... " based on the principles of solidarity and friendly relations 
355 implicitly affirmed by both the UN and the OAU Charter 
The AFCHPR represents the first international human rights instrument 
to incorporate the right to peace. Peace is a necessary corollary of the 
-------------------- 
355 
Article 23(1). 
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right to development356 because an era of peace and tranquillity should 
obviate the necessity to procure armaments with funds that should be 
better utilized for social and economic development. Africa, today, 
spends about $15 billion (US Dollars) per annum on arms, almost twice 
the amount the sub-Saharan States are receiving In development aid357. 
The fact that several African States are indeed embroiled In military 
conflict, both Internal and external, may seem to justify large military 
expenditure. While this may ring true to an extent, It has been 
established that the enlargement of military budgets in African States Is 
due primarily to the militarization of political institutions of African 
States through coups d'etat358. This observation is based on the fact 
that African States which have not been involved in major military 
engagements have notwithstanding, progressively increased their military 
spending359, no doubt ostensibly to buttress internal security, ergo, 
security of tenure. 
The phenomenon of military rule In Africa, has not only undermined the 
concept of the legality of government but lt has had devastating effects 
on human rights. Consequently, it may be suggested that the existence 
of military regimes in Africa Is a threat to peace and the protection of 
the right to development. Western capital investors are also implicated 
in this trend to militarize Africa. Firstly, they believe that strong 
military dictatorships ensure political stability thus securing their 
356 See UN General Assembly Resolution 38/124 - which emphasizes that 
"international peace and security are essential elements for the full 
realization of human rights Including the right to development" - 
preamble para 14. 
357 Zdenek Cervenka "The Effects of MilitaIzation of Africa on Human 
Rights" In Africa Today 1987 1st/2nd Quarters p. 75. 
358 Nicole Ball "Security Expenditure and Economic Growth In Developing 
Countries" Pugwash Annals 1985 (London Macmillan, 1986). See also 
Baynham Simon (ed) Military Power and Politics In Black Africa (London: 
Croom Helm, 1986). 
359 Nicole Ball Ibid. 
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investments. Secondly, international armaments producers are only too 
eager to sell stockpiled outmoded armaments to the developing States. It 
is indeed a paradox that these investors from liberal political cultures 
are willing to accommodate the sacrifice of civil and political rights In 
return for "stable" military dictatorships In Africa. The perceived 
stability of these authoritarian regimes invariably breeds and is breeding 
a hitherto docile but determined and increasingly agitative citizens who, 
being dissatisfied with western liberal double standards are prepared to 
embrace socialism and Marxism. 
Thus a major step towards effectively protecting the right to peace and 
security in Africa should be through the demilitarization of political 
institutions of African States. The right to national and international 
peace and security will be difficult to enforce as a legal right in the 
absence of details on what the right entails. The Commission will have 
to initially determine which "people(s)" can bring a communication 
alleging a breach of their right to peace. However, it is arguable that 
since the provision refers to the right to "national and international 
peace", the only beneficiaries of this right are the people collectively 
constituting a nation or State, (i. e. Ugandans or Nigerians), and not 
ethnic groups. 
A major advantage of Article 23(1) is that the people of a State 
threatened or in conflict with another State may submit a communication 
to the African Commission alleging a violation of the right to peace. 
Should the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights accept such 
a liberal interpretation, and receives the cooperation of States, it could 
succeed in intervening In African inter-State conflicts, where the defunct 
OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration failed. 
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With a view to strengthening peace and solidarity, Article 23(2) 
expressly imposes obligations on States to ensure that: 
(a) any individual that has been granted the right of 
asylum should not engage In subversive activities 
against his country of origin or any State Party to the 
Charter, and 
(b) State Parties should not allow their territories to be 
used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities 
against the people of any other State Party to the 
Charter. 
The AFCHPR thus recognizes one of the root causes of inter-State 
conflicts In Africa. However, the rendering of assistance to liberation 
movements, recognized by the OAU as exercising their right to self- 
determination, will not be affected by Article 23(2). 
(iii) Right to a Satisfactory Environment 
Article 24 of the AFCHPR provides that: 
"All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment 
favourable to their development". 
This provision is vague In the sense that it does not specify the 
parameters of "a general satisfactory environment". A narrow 
interpretation would suggest that this phrase refers only to the physical 
and natural attributes of the environment, thus limiting its application to 
such matters as pollution, deforestation and ancillary matters360. On the 
other hand, a broad Interpretation of the provision would encapsulate all 
-------------------- 
360 
Deforrestation has been identified as one of the major causes of 
drought In Africa - See Rene Dumont and Marie-France Mottin - Stranglehold on Africa (London Andre Deutsch 1983). See also Odidi 
Okidi, Regional Control of Ocean Pollution. Legal and Institutional 
Problems and Prospects (Alphen aanden Rijn 1978). 
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matters, both institutional 
361 
and natural which create obstacles to 
development, thus requiring States to remove such problems and 
establish conditions favourable to development. It Is however, submitted 
that the problems of interpretation created by the vagueness of the 
provision may reduce the provision to a moral exhortation rather than a 
legal right. In view of the increasing tendency of industrialized nations 
to dump toxic wastes in Africa, the significance of the provision is 
highlighted. It is thus arguable that where a State Party fails to 
prevent such dumping or neglects to take corrective measures to dispose 
of the waste, the people of a State and possibly the community 
proximately affected by such omission may seek to invoke Article 24 In 
domestic courts and possibly before the African Commission. 
The incorporation of peoples rights in the AFCHPR has attracted several 
criticisms362. For Instance Olajide Aluko argues that: - 
"This emphasis on peoples rights... seems to be an attempt 
by African Leaders to continue the near autocratic control of 
their countries and the remorseless exploitation of their own 
peoples, 36[ 
]ho determines the peoples rights and by what 
yardstick? " 
-------------------- 
361 
The institutional problems of development Include corruption and 
misuse of government apparatus, reserved for conserving national 
resources, by elites for private profit - See Lester R. Brown "A False 
Sense of Security" State of the World (1985) (World Watch Institute, 
1985) p. 20. 
362 Rhoda Howard Identifies the danger In extending "grounp-rights" to 
justify scapegoat politics as reflected In the persecution of Asians In East 
Africa. Group rights, according to Howard "failed to recognize that in 
modernizing urbanizing Africa, peoples are less and less members of 
particular ethnic groups and more and more Individuals with a 
multiplicity of associations" R. Howard "The Full Belly Thesis: Should 
Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rlhts? Evidence 
from Sub-Saharan Africa" Human Rights Quarterly p. 467,481. 
363 Olajide Aluko "The Organization of African Unity and Human Rights" 
The Round Table, July 1981 p. 237. 
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In the foregoing analysis we have attempted to respond to the issues 
raised by O. Aluko. We have suggested that the African Commission by 
virtue of its power to interpret the provisions of the AFCHPR, should be 
sufficiently liberal to regard "peoples" as distinct ethnic groups where 
these are 'prima facie' grounds to believe that they are oppressed. 
However the term "people" is such an amorphous term that the meaning 
should be specifically determined by the African Commission in the 
context of each case reported to It. The need to adopt a cautious but 
liberal posture with regard to the Interpretation of "peoples" is 
underlined by the volatility of the heterogeneous States of Africa. 
However, the peoples right to self-determination does not, in this 
context, per se legitimize secession. Thus we suggest the exploration of 
Internal soclo-political solutions such as the granting of autonomy to 
minority or oppressed groups. On the other hand, the word "peoples" 
in the context of the right of peoples to dispose of their natural 
resources refers to the aggregation of groups comprising a nation State. 
This conclusion is derived from the Charters provision that State Parties 
364 
shall represent the interest of the people In that regard 
The incorporation of peoples rights In the Charter is not only a response 
to the needs of the economically deprived rurale subsistence populace 
against the onslaught of the increasingly acquisitive urban ruling elites 
but also a device to protect the ethnically distinct minority groups from 
the oppressive political measures of the ruling majority. 
The foregoing analysis of individual and peoples rights cannot be 
concluded without reference to the duties imposed upon States as well as 
individuals by the AFCHPR. 
-------------------- 
364 
Article 21 AFCHPR. 
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(j) Duties and Obligations 
One of the unique features of the AFCHPR is Its Incorporation of the 
concept of duties within the framework of the Charter. Chapter I of the 
Charter is devoted to human and peoples rights, while Chapter II 
specifically sets out the duties of the Individual "towards his family and 
society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the 
international community"365 The Charter also Imposes duties on the 
State366 The AFCHPR, lays more emphasis on the concept of duties 
than other international and regional human rights instruments In the 
sense that the concept of 'duty' In the latter documents restrict the 
concept to the respect of the rights or reputation of others, and the 
obligations of a State towards Its citizens or of an alien towards the 
State367. However, it should be noted that the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) specifies a list of duties of the 
368 Individual 
The AFCHPR reference to individual duties towards his community is 
consistent with the established values of traditional African societies 
which emphasise the individuals duties towards his family, age group, 
clan or community. The philosophical foundation of the concept of duties 
in African society has been explored369. The 'Introductory Statement', 
-------------------- 
365 
Article 27(1), Chapter II, AFCHPR. 
366 Articles 25 and 26 Ibid. 
367 5th preambular paragraph and Artricle 19(3) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 32, American Convention. 
Article 32(1) of the American Convention states that "Every person has 
responsibilities to his family, community and mankind". 
368 The duties of the individual are to the society, toward children and 
parents, to receive instruction, to vote, to obey the laws, to serve the 
community and nation, to pay taxes, to work and to refrain from political 
activities in a foreign country The American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man (1948) Chapter 2; OAS Rex. XXX adopted by the 9th 
International Conference of American States, Bogota, 1948. 
369 See our discussion on human rights in pre-colonial traditional Africa, 
in Chapter One, above. 
A.. - 
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to the Meeting of African Legal Experts convened to draft the AFCHHPR, 
states that: 
"The conception of the individual who is free and utterly 
irresponsible and opßosed to society Is not consonant with 
African philosophy" 
Similarly, the seventh preambular paragraph of the AFCHPR emphasises 
the consideration: 
"that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the 
performance of duties on the part of everyone... ". 
(i) Duties of Individuals 
Chapter II of the AFCHPR titled "Duties", expressly provides for the 
duties of individuals. Article 27(1) places duties on the individual 
towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognized 
communities and the international community371. Article 27 further 
provides that in the exercise of the Individual rights and freedoms 
protected in the Charter, due regard should be given to "the rights of 
372 
others, collective security, morality and common interest". 
Article 28 elaborates upon Article 27(2) by imposing a duty on every 
individual to respect and consider his fellow being without discrimination, 
and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and 
reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance. 
Furthermore, Article 29 of the AFCHPR spells out in eight paragraphs, 
the specific duties of the individual namely: 
370 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 1, p. 2. 
371 AFCHPR, Article 27(1). 
372 Ibid Article 27(2). 
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(1) to preserve the harmonious development of the family, 
to respect his E, ents at all times and to maintain them 
in case of need 
(2) To serve his national community by p1 Ang his physical 
and intellectual abilities at Its service 
(3) Not to compromise the security of the State whether he 
is a national or a resident. 
(4) To preserve and strengthen social and national 
solidarity. 
(5) To preserve and strengthen national Independence and 
the territorial integrity of his country, and to 
contribute to Its defence according to the law. 
(6) To work to th57Pest of his abilities and competence, 
and to pay tax 
(7) To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural 
values and morals. 
(8) To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times 
and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of 
African unity. 
It is evident that some of the duties enumerated above correspond to the 
provisions of the 1948 American Declaration. However, the latter 
instrument did not have the desired impact on the subsequent 
development of human rights instruments. The practical application of 
the foregoing catalogue of duties enumerated by Article 29, will create 
major problems. For instance, to whom or what will those who breach 
the duties be accountable? Secondly, what are the standards for 
measuring accountability? 
Article 29(1) imposes a duty on the individual to preserve the 
harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and 
respect of the family. The essence of this provision lies In Its moral 
-------------------- 
373 This provision is similar to Article XXX of the American Declaration 
(1948). 
374 See corresponding Article XXIV Ibid. 
375 See corresponding Article XXXVII, of the American Declaration Ibid. 
527 
appeal especially in the light of the existence of divorce and matrimonial 
laws 376 in all African States. 
The second leg of Article 29(1) which Imposes the duty on the individual 
to respect his parents and to maintain them in case of need, reaffirms 
the existence of the traditional African social security system as 
represented by the extended family support system. However we submit 
that the duties Imposed on the Individual to support his parents In case 
of need should be taken in conjunction with the provisions of Article 
18(4) which states that "the aged and the disabled shall also have the 
right to special measures of protection in keeping with the physical or 
moral needs", and Article 18(1) which provides that "the State shall have 
the duty to assist the family... ". Consequently, In the application of 
the duty of the individual towards his family, the State Is required to 
partake in this responsibility. The practical application of these 
provisions will depend upon the criteria adopted by the African 
Commission as to where the duty of the State stops and that of the 
Individual begins or vice versa; or Indeed whether these duties run 
concurrently. 
The effect of Article 29(2) which requires the individual "to serve his 
national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at Its 
service" creates a substantial Inroad to the Individual rights protected 
by the Charter. Ostensibly, the purpose of this provision is to protect 
the State's investment, through educational and technical programmes, in 
its manpower resources, by preventing a "brain drain"377. Although the 
rationale appears legitimate, it may be widely abused by States wishing 
-------------------- 
376 
For Instance see the Matrimonial Causes Act (1975) Nigeria. 
377 For Instance, In 1987 Nigerias premier hospital, the University 
Teaching Hospital, Ibadan, experienced the departure of 40 Nigerian 
medical consultants for greener pastures in the Middle East and 
Europe. - African Guardian 25 April 1988. 
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to mobilize its citizens for purely political purposes against their will378 
The duties required of the individual in Article 29(3)-(6) are duties 
which may be regarded as universally recognized by most States in their 
respective local laws. These duties include the preservation of the 
States national independence, security, defence, national solidarity, and 
the payment of tax in the interest of the society. 
We submit, however, that the loose wording of the provisions give a 
certain amount of leeway that States may seize to restrict individual 
rights, for Instance, "to preserve and strengthen social and national 
solidarity". 
Professor Collomb has observed that living in Africa "means abandoning 
the right to be an individ ual, parti cular, competitive, selfish, 
aggressive, conquering being... in order to be with others, in peace 
and harmony with the living and the dead, with the national environment 
and the spirits that people it or give life to 
379 it". 
Professor Collomb's observation thus Informs the Inclusion In the 
AFCHPR, the Individuals duty "to preserve and strengthen positive 
African cultural values In his relations with other members of the 
society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in 
general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of 
380 
society" 
-------------------- 
378 
Le Combat Pour les Droits de 1'Homme En Afrique: Symposium 
International Sur La Charte Africane Des Crofts De 1'Homme Et Des 
Peuples, Dakar, 25-28 October 1982 In Droit et Culture, No. 5 (1983) 
p. 108. 
379 Quarantieme Congres Medical Francophone (Dakar) 1975 p. 25. 
380 AFCHPR, Article 29(7). 
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The Charter does not define "positive African cultural values", nor does 
it specify who or what will determine these values. However it may be 
suggested that by emphasizing the "spirit of tolerance, dialogue and 
consultation", the Charter's thrust is toward the maintenance of social 
equilibrium through positive African cultural values that enhance social 
interaction. 
The significance of Article 29(8) lies in its projection of the duty of 
promoting and maintaining African unity beyond States to Individuals381 
Thus the Individual is required to contribute to the best of his abilities, 
at all times and at all levels to the promotion and achievement of African 
unity. 
It is significant that the catalogue of duties Imposed on the individual is 
restricted to his family, society, the State and other legally recognized 
communities and the international community. The Charter does not 
specifically mention the individual obligations towards his ethnic group or 
clan, although it may be argued that an ethnic group or people may come 
under the terms "society" or "other legally recognized communities". If 
this interpretation were admissible, the Individuals duty to his ethnic 
group or "society" would be confined to preserving and strengthening Its 
cultural values in relation to other members of the society "in the spirit 
of tolerance, dialogue and consultation"382. Such an Interpretation is 
pertinent in the light of the threat posed by ethnicism to national unity 
and human rights. 
-------------------- 
381 Hitherto, the legal duty to promote and achieve African Unity was 
limited to Member States of the OAU. Article II OAU Charter. 
382 Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
everyone has duties to the community and that Individual rights and 
freedoms are subject to limitations determined by law solely for the 
purpose of seeing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 
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In summation therefore, we believe that the inclusion of individual duties 
in the AFCHPR confirms, the universally acknowledged principle that 
individual rights give rise to corresponding duties. The AFCHPR, 
proceeds beyond this principle by specifically placing duties, which do 
not correspond to specific rights. The Constitution and- legislations of 
several African States reflect some of the duties expressed in the 
AFCHPR. Thus by incorporating the concept of duties into a regional 
human rights instrument the AFCHPR brings within its jurisdiction some 
measure of international control or review of domestic legal duties 
imposed on the individual. The efficacy of these Charter provisions are 
doubtful, since they are couched in generally vague terms, however, is 
will be left to the African Commission to eliminate or reduce the possible 
areas of misuse or abuse. 
States may seek to justify derogations from rights invoking the 
provisions on individual duties such as the duty to serve the national 
community and preserve social and national solidarity. 
The African Commission, armed with its power of Interpretation 
383 
should 
seek to clarify the concept of duties as presented in the African 
Charter. In exercising this power, consideration should be given to the 
recommendation of the study commissioned by the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities384 which 
prescribes that the limitation of human rights and freedoms resulting 
from the enforcement of individual duties have to be interpreted as 
narrowly as possible and that such restrictions have to be laid down or 
-------------------- 
383 
AFCHPR, Articles 60 and 61. 
384 The Individuals' Duties to the Community and the Limitations on 
Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, (A Contributin to the Freedom of the Individual under 
the law), Study prepared by Erica-Irene A. Daes, Special Rapporteur of 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, UN Doc E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/432/Rev. 2. 
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authorized by law385. In the final analysis, African States ought to 
refrain from exploiting the lacuna offered by the concept of individual 
duties since the words of Sldgwicks good friend, John Stuart Mill: "The 
worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals 
composing it". 
(ii) Duties and Obligations of States 
Much as the Individual is burdened with duties, the AFCHPR also 
imposes several duties and obligations of State Parties. By virtue of 
Article 1 of the Charter, State Parties undertake to recognise the rights, 
duties and freedoms enshrined In the Charter and to adopt legislative or 
other measures to give effect to them. Article i thus imposes on State 
Parties absolute and immediate obligations to secure the specified rights. 
Furthermore, the obligations are not expressed as being dependant on 
available resources as in the case for example, in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Thus the efficacy of 
the AFCHPR will depend to an appreciable extent, on legislative and 
other practical measures taken by States to give effect to the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed in the Charter386. Several African States have 
already given legislative effect to the provisions of the Charter by 
adopting local laws in that regard. 
387 
385 Ibid p. 172. 
386 AFCHPR, Article 2. 
387 For example, The National Assembly of Nigeria passed the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 
1983, as far back as 17 March 1983. Article 1 thereof provides that the 
provisions of the AFCHPR "shall have the force of law in Nigeria and 
shall be given full recognition and effect and be applied by all 
authorities and persons exercising legislative, executive or judicial 
powers in Nigeria". 
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In addition to safeguarding the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
AFCHPR, State Parties have an implied obligation to create a general 
satisfactory environment favourable to their realization. 
388 
The socio-economic right to work, to education, health and development 
in the Charter are couched in relatively absolute terms, thus imposing 
389 
corresponding immediate obligations on States to protect those rights. 
However, we submit that since the practical realization of these socio- 
economic rights will invariably depend on the availability of resources, it 
is likely that the African Commission may utilize Article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a 
guide390 and thus cushioning States from the Immediacy of their 
obligation. 
By undertaking to submit periodic (two yearly) reports, to the African 
Commission, on measures taken to give effect to the rights, State Parties 
are thus obliged to submit their efforts towards achieving the rights and 
391 freedoms in the Charter, to the Commissions scrutiny. 
One of the main problems with this provision is that it does not specify 
the form and content of these reports and does not provide a procedure 
according to which they should be reviewed. 
-------------------- 
388 
AFCHPR, Article 24. 
389 Ibid, Article 1. 
390 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
allows States to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights 
protected subject to the maximum of their available resources: - Article 2. 
391 AFCHPR, Article 62. 
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The African Commission may decide to adopt the rules governing such 
reports under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
392 Cultural Rights. 
Articles 25 and 26 of the AFCHPR expressly impose two significant duties 
on States. Firstly, Article 25 provides that State Parties have the duty 
to promote and ensure through teaching, education and publication, the 
respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter and ensure 
that the rights and freedoms as well as corresponding obligations and 
duties are understood. Given the relatively high level of illiteracy in 
Africa, the importance of the States duty of mass enlightenment is 
underlined by the fact that the Commission is also charged with the duty 
393 
to disseminate information regarding human and peoples rights, 
Secondly, by virtue of Article 26, State Parties have a duty to guarantee 
the independence of the Courts and to allow the establishment and 
improvement of appropriate "national institutions" entrusted with the 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
AFCHPR. The frequent Incidents of executive encroachment on the 
Independence of the judiciary In Africa informs the significance of this 
provision394. Although Article 26 lays the foundation for the 
establishment of "national institutions" for the promotion and protection 
of human rights it is not clear whether this refers to independent and 
392 The International Covenant provides that reports may indicate factors 
and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfillment of obligations under 
the Covenant. Such reports are to be furnished in stages In accordance 
with a programme to be established by the Economic and Social Council 
after consultation with States and the specialized agencies concerned - 
Article 17(2) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. See Dana Fisher "Reporting under the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human Rights Committee, 
AJIL (1982) pp. 142-153. 
393 AFCHPR, Article 45(1)(a). 
394 See B. O. Nwabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (New York, 
St. Martins Press) 1977. 
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private institutions or institutions established by the State, or both. 
From our experience, it is necessary that institutions established solely 
for the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights, are totally 
independent of government or State control and influence. The role of 
the judiciary in the protection of human rights cannot be overemphasized 
albeit strictly limited to the clinical issues of law and fact brought before 
the courts. Thus privately established, non-governmental organisations, 
are in a better position to propagate the rights; freedoms and duties 
protected in the Charter, advise and criticize the government when 
appropriate and undertake legal action on behalf of individuals or people 
whose rights and freedoms have been infringed. We are inclined to 
believe that although the State is in a better position financially to 
propagate human rights, through Its existing institutional organs, it will 
invariably be reluctant to do so. However if the Nigerian exercise is 
anything to go by, establishment of the Nigerian Council for Human 
Rights (NCHR) without State Interference, reflects the attitude of the 
present Nigerian military Government to abide by the provisions of 
Article 26 of the AFCHPR. 
The African Charter expressly imposes other duties on States. These 
include the duty to protect the health of their people and ensure that 
they receive medical attention395, the duty to promote and protect the 
morals and traditional values recognised by the community396, the duty 
to assist the family397, and to ensure the elimination of every 
discrimination against women and to ensure the protection of the rights 
of women and children as stipulated In International declarations and 
-------------------- 
395 
AFCHPR, Article 16(2). 
396 Ibid, Article 17(3). 
397 
Ibid, Article 18(2). 
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conventions 
398 
With regard to peoples rights, by virtue of Article 20(3) States have the 
implied duty to render assistance to all peoples in their liberation 
struggle against foreign dominance be it political, economic or cultural. 
This implied duty transforms Into an express legal duty when taken in 
conjunction with Article III(6) of the OAU Charter399 and the Lusaka 
Manifesto400 especially as regards the territories still under foreign 
political domination. 
The State Parties to the AFCHPR also have the duty to eliminate all 
forms of foreign economic exploitation particulirly that practised by 
international monopolies401. Article 22(2) imposes the duty on States to 
individually and collectively ensure the exercise of the right to 
development. With a view to enhancing peace and solidarity, States have 
a duty to ensure that individuals enjoy the right of asylum and that they 
do not engage in subversive activities. State are also under the 
obligation to ensure that their territories are not used as bases for 
subversive and terrorist activities against the people of another State 
402 Party. 
The duties imposed on States by the AFCHPR are necessary and 
desirable for the enhancement of individual and peoples rights. The 
concept of State duties invariably restrain negative effects of the 
-------------------- 
398 lbid, Article 18(3). 
399 Article III(6) of the OAU Charter states that "Member States... 
solemnly affirm and declare their... absolute dedication to the total 
emancipation of the African territories which are still dependant". 
400 See UN Document A17754 of 9 November 1969. See also Chapter 4 
above. 
401 AFCHPR, Article 21(5). 
402 Ibid, Article 23(2)(a) and (b). 
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restrictions placed on the rights and freedoms by the AFCHPR. Much as 
the authors of the AFCHPR have striven to achieve a balance between 
the rights and duties, the delicate act of maintaining this balance while 
enhancing the protection of individual and peoples rights will be the 
responsibility of the African Commission. We thus propose to examine 
the procedure of the Commission as set out by Chapter III of the 
AFCHPR. 
(k) Machinery for the Promotion and Protection of Human & Peoples 
Rights 
We propose to examine the composition, organisation and competence of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as the African Commission) and its procedures for the 
protection and promotion of the rights recognized In the Charter403. 
Unlike the American and European Conventions which provide for a two- 
tier system consisting of a commission and a court, the machinery for the 
promotion and protection of human rights under the African regime, is 
the African Commission. 
(i) Composition & Organisation of the Commission 
Article 31 of the AFCHPR envisages the establishment of an African 
Commission composed of eleven members serving in their personal 
capacity and chosen from amongst personalities of the highest reputation 
known for their high morality, Integrity, Impartiality and competence in 
matters of human and peoples rights4o4 In the appointment of the 
members of the Commission, particular consideration should be given to 
-------------------- 
403 Part II (Articles 30-63) of the AFCHPR deal with the African 
Commissions establishment and organisation (Chapter 1); mandate 
(Chapter II); procedures (Chapter III); and applicable principles 
(Chapter IV). Part III (Articles 64-68) concerns general enactment 
provisions. 
404 Ibid. Article 31. 
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"persons having legal experience", thus non-Lawyers may be appointed. 
Members of the Commission must be nationals of one of the State Parties 
to the Charter. 
At least four months prior to elections, the OAU Secretary-General is to 
405 invite nominations from State Parties Each State may nominate not 
more than two candidates provided that where two candidates are 
406 
nominated, one of them shall not be a national of that State, 
The Secretary-General of the OAU shall make an alphabetical list of the 
persons thus nominated and communicate It to the Heads of State and 
Government at least one month before the elections407. The Members of 
the Commission are then to be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly 
from the list of nominees compiled by the OAU Secretary-General408 
The Commission shall not include more than one national of the same 
409 State 
The Members of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
were elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the 
410 
, twenty-third OAU Summit held In Addis Ababa In July . 
1987 
Once elected, the mandate of the members of the commission lasts six 
years and they may be re-elected. However regarding the first 
elections, the terms of four of the elected members shall terminate after 
--- 
405 
----- 
Ibid, 
------ 
Article 
------ 
35(1). 
406 Ibid, Article 34. 
407 Ibid, Article 35(2). 
408 Ibid, Article 33. 
409 Ibid, Article 32. 
410 The List of Members of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights: Appendix XI, post. 
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two years and the term of the office of the three others, at the end of 
four years411 The Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government shall draw lots Immediately after the first election to decide 
the mandates of two and four years412. The Charter envisages that 
every member of the Commission shall be in office until the date his 
successor assumes office413 After their election, the members shall 
make a solemn declaration to discharge their duties impartially and 
414 faithfully 
In the event of the death or resignation of a member, the seat is 
declared vacant by the Secretary-General of the Commission. 
A member who, in the unanimous opinion of his colleagues ceases to fulfil 
his functions or is incapable of continuing to fulfil them, shall have his 
seat declared vacant unless his failure is due to absence of a temporary 
nature. In the event of a seat becoming vacant due to death, 
resignation or non-fulfilment of his functions, the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government shall replace the relevant member for the 
remaining period of his term, unless the period is less than six 
months415. Unlike the American Convention416, the AFCHPR requirement 
of unanimity for removal should reduce the influence of extraneous 
considerations. 
-------------------- 
411 Ibid, Article 36. 
412 Ibid, Article 37. 
413 Ibid, Article 40. 
414 Ibid, Article 38. 
415 Ibid, Article 39. 
416 The members of the American Commission may remove a member by 
an affirmative vote of five out of its seven members, subject to approval 
of the OAS Assembly. Article 10 Statement of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights OAS Res. 477 of Oct 1978. 
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The Commission is required to elect its own Chairman and Vice Chairman 
for a renewable two year period. The AFCHPR provides that members 
are required for a quorum417 and that in case of equality of votes, the 
Chairman shall have a casting vote418. The status of the Members of 
the Commission is enhanced by the provision granting them diplomatic 
privileges and immunities419 The Charter stipulates that provisions 
shall be made for the emoluments and allowances of the members of the 
Commission in the Regular Budget of the OAU420. The Commission is 
empowered to evolve Its own rules of procedure by virtue of Article 
42(2). The Secretary-General of the OAU Is responsible for the 
appointment of the Secretary of the Commission and he Is to provide the 
staff and services necessary for the effective discharge of the functions 
of the Commission421. The Charter provides that the Secretary-General 
of the OAU "may attend the meetings of the Commission but he shall 
neither participate in the deliberation nor be entitled to vote"422. 
However Judge Keba Mbaye, the Chairman of the OAU Committee of Legal 
Experts for preparing the Draft African Charter, states that the OAU 
Secretary-Generals opinion may be heard orally especially where the 
423 Commission needs to obtain clarification on a particular Issue, 
The foregoing rules on the composition and organisation of the 
Commission invites some comments. 
-------------------- 
417 Ibid, Article 42(3). 
418 Ibid, Article 42(4). 
419 The privileges and Immunities shall be those provided for in the 
General Convention on the Provileges and Immunities of the OAU. Ibid. 
Article 43. 
420 Ibid, Article 44. 
421 Ibid, Article 41. 
422 Ibid, Article 42(5). 
423 Keba Mbaye "Keynote- Address on the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights" op cit p. 37. 
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The Charters provision for an eleven-member Commission may be 
regarded as too small, both for the effective discharge of its extensive 
mandate and for a continent of 51 States. Although this figure 
corresponds to the equitable geographic distribution adopted by the OAU 
namely, North, East, West, Centre and South of Africa, the addition of a 
few more members, may enhance the functioning of the Commission424 
It would be impractical to suggest the system adopted by the European 
Convention which provides for the establishment of a Commission whose 
425 
membership is equal to that of the High Contracting Parties 
Whereas the members of States eligible to subscribe to the European 
Convention are relatively few426, the "AFCHPR anticipates a total 
repetoire of 53 State Parties. Furthermore, under the American 
Convention, although Article 35 thereof states that the Commission shall 
represent all member countries, Article 34 specifically states that the 
Inter-American Commission shall be composed of seven members427. 
Consequently, an Increase in the number of the members of the African 
Commission to bring the ratio of Commission members vis-a-vis State 
Parties to a realistic proportion should be considered. In the 
alternative, the Commission may consider the establishment of Special 
Sub-Commissions on specific human rights areas, thereby enlarging Its 
capacity to undertake Its vast responsibilities. 
-------------------- 
424 It is instructive to note that the UN Monrovia Proposal for the 
Setting Up of an African Commission on Human Rights, recommended that 
the membership of the Commission should consist of 16 experts - Article 
4, UN Doc ST/HR/SER A/4. 
425 European Convention, Article 20. 
426 Presently 17 countries are parties to the European Convention. 
427 Nineteen of the thirty one Member States of the OAS have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which entered Into force in 1978. 
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It has been observed that the absence of incompatibility between the 
quality of a member of the commission and that of a member of 
government or diplomatic corps could compromise the independence of the 
Commission vis-a-vis States428. While this may be true, the current 
composition of the African Commission reveals an overwhelming presence 
of distinguished African judges and lawyers of proven integrity and 
competence. 
With regard to the election of the Commission Chairman and Vice 
Chairman, the members of the Commission In evolving Internal rules of 
procedure should consider adopting the mode of secret (not public) 
ballots in such elections429. Such a method would not only guarantee 
the sincerity of votes but avoid clash of personality among members. 
The eligibility of members of the Commission for re-election not only 
enhances their security of tenure but ensures administrative continuity. 
However, we submit that the eligibility of the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman for re-election to two-yearly terms, does not promote 
democratization within the Commission430, Although the African Charter 
is silent on the specific functions of the Chairman and his Vice 
Chairman, one would expect a detailed provision on this issue In the 
-------------------- 
428 Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Comparative Analysis 
with the European and American Systems - Vol. 6 Human Rights Quarterly 
(1984) p. 150. 
429 The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the African Commission were 
elected by members of the Commission at its first session held in Addis 
Ababa in July 1987. The Commissions Chairman Is Mr. Isaac Nguema of 
Gabon [The Gabonese High Commissioner of State for Public and Civil 
Rights]. The Vice Chairman Is Dr. I. BadawI El-Sheikh of Egypt 
[Deputy Director, Legal and Treaties Affairs, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Egypt, and a former member of the UN Center for Human Rights 
(1978-1986]. 
430 For instance, Article 14 of the American Convention states that the 
Chairman and his two Vice Chairmen whose terms are for a year may be 
re-elected only once in each four year period. 
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Commissions rules of procedure431 
The Charter is equally silent on the location of the Headquarters of the 
Commission. In this regard Article 30 of the Charter merely states that 
the Commission shall be established within the OAU. Does this refer 
only to the legal framework of the OAU or also to Its physical location? 
We are inclined to believe that the Charter envisages the headquarters of 
the Commission to be based in Addis Ababa especially In view of the fact 
that the Commissions staff and services are to be provided by the OAU 
Secretary-General432. The financial constraints of the OAU Secretariat 
may limit the possibility of staff recruitment, thus the Commission may 
have to share common staff and services with the OAU Secretariat. 
Article 44 states that provision shall be made for the emoluments and 
allowances of the members of the Commission in the Regular OAU Budget. 
It is evident that the financial Implications for establishing a Commission 
433 
on Human Rights have not been fully explored 
We submit that the workload of the Commission may not be sustained by 
ad hoc budgetary allocations and the sharing of staff and services of the 
OAU Secretariat. The OAU Secretary-General should anticipate this by 
making adequate provisions both human and material, towards enhancing 
the efficient and speedy functioning of the African Commission. 
-------------------- 
431 Article 10 of the Statue of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights enumerates 13 specific functions of the Chairman including the 
duty to represent the Commission before the OAS organ and other 
international organisations. Res. 447 General Assembly of the OAS - (as 
amended by Res. 508 of Nov 1980). 
432 AFCHPR, Article 41. 
433 See OAU Diary No. 6 of 21 June 1981 - at para. (5) . 
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An examination of the functions and competence of the Commission will 
reveal that such an organ requires not only clerical services but also a 
professional body of legal and research staff to undertake supportive 
roles. 
(ii) Functions & Competence of the Commission 
By virtue of Article 45, the African Commission, has four main 
functions, namely, the promotion and protection of human rights, 
interpretation of the Charter, and the performance of any other tasks 
which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and 
434 Government 
The AFCHPR lays emphasis mainly on the promotional function of the 
African Commission. Towards this end, the African Commission is 
charged with following duties: - 
(a) The formulation of principles and rules directed at 
solving legal problems relating to human and peoples 
rights upon which African Governments may base their 
legislation. 
(b) Cooperation with other African and international 
institutions concerned iýh the promotion and 
protection of human rights 
The Commission is thus envisaged primarily to be a documentation and 
information centre In the field of human rights in Africa. The 
Commission may utilise its data bank to encourage research on human 
rights issues including the awarding of scholarships and prizes in 
cooperation with the OAU Secretary-General. 
434 The European Convention does not stipulate the specific functions of 
its Commission of Human Rights other than charging it with ensuring the 
observance of the Conventions provisions (See Article 19(1)); The 
American Convention endows the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights with a comprehensive list of functions (See Article 41). 
435 AFCHPR, Article 45. 
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By granting the Commission a quasi-legislative function of evolving rules 
and principles on human rights issues, the Commission may serve as a 
useful source for the drafting of State Laws pertaining to human rights. 
In view of the initial difficulties of establishing a data bank on human 
rights, the cooperative functions of the Commission, will enable It to 
explore the existing resources of established International and regional 
human rights institutions including those of non-governmental 
organisations. The performance of the existing OAU Information 
department suggests that It canot effectively handle the dissemination of 
the Commissions Information. Amnesty Internationals suggestion in this 
regard is apt: 
"International NGO's and Regional African NGO's have a 
role... by helping to ensure that those who seek to promote 
and protect human rights at national and locq1l3levels are kept 
informed of the (African) Commission's work" 
The second main function of the African Commission Is to "ensure the 
protection of human and peoples rights under the 'conditions laid down 
by the present Charterýý437. 
The competence of the Commission Is based upon the satisfaction of three 
traditional conditions of 'ratione loci', 'ratione materiae', and 'ratione 
personae'. 
-------------------- 
436 
protectinLy Human Ri 
437 AFCHPR, Article 45(2). 
- F. iv. 
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As regards competence 'ratione loci', the alleged violation must have 
taken place on the territory of one of the State Parties for the 
Commission to be competent. It is however, significant that the AFCHPR 
does not contain a provision similar to Article 1 of the European 
Convention under which the States guarantee the recognized rights to 
persons within their jurisdiction438. Consequently, it can be argued 
that the Commission is competent to handle a violation by a State Party 
where it Involves a protected person outside the national boundary, 
especially in the absence of restrictions regarding the obligations of 
State Parties to protect the rights recognized in the AFCHPR. 
As to competence 'ratione materiae', the African Commission can consider 
any violation of the rights and duties guaranteed by the AFCHPR. 
Indeed the breadth of Article 47 invites the Commission to entertain 
communications revealing the violation of other provisions of the AFCHPR 
as well. 
The competence 'ratione personae' envisages both States and individuals. 
However, the Commission may only be seized of a matter If the alleged 
violations have been committed by a State Party. Thus, violations 
ascribable to individuals and other non-State institutions will not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Individuals, however, do have 
capacity for action since the Commission may receive both inter-State 
communications and "communications other than those of State 
Parties"439 We shall address the issue of communication procedures 
very shortly. 
438 See also Article 1 of the American Convention. 
439 AFCHPR, Article 53. 
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The third main function of the Commission is to interpret the provisions 
of the Charter at the request of a State Party, an institution of the OAU 
or an African Organization recognized by the OAU. As earlier 
discussed, the inclusion of this provision resulted in three States 
entering reservations thereto440 The Commissions power of 
interpretation extends beyond the normal functions undertaken by other 
441 regional human rights commissions. 
Since the African Commission cannot refer matters to itself, the Charter 
grants the Commission the competence to render opinions on matters of 
interpretation generally requested by a State Party, an Institution of the 
OAU or an African Organization recognized by the OAU. Although the 
OAU itself Is not expressly mentioned, In our opinion, nothing prevents 
It from seeking such opinions. Individuals are ostensibly excluded from 
seeking such opinions, however a recognized institution may represent 
the individuals Interest. International non-Government Organizations, 
such as Amnesty International may thus be excluded from seeking such 
opinions. The AFCHPR does not provide for safeguards, regarding 
interpretation, that are designed to protect rights and duties protected 
therein. For instance the American Convention, expressly states that 
none of its provisions shall be Interpreted as permitting any State Party, 
group or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and 
freedoms protected or restrict them to a greater extent than is 
provided442. Quite apt to our case for the demilitarization of African 
political institutions, is the relevant provision of the American 
-------------------- 
440 Tanzania, Burundi and Kenya. 
441 Under the American and European Conventions, the function of Interpretation of the respective Conventions is reposed In the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights (Article 62(3) American Convention) and 
the European Court of Human Rights, respectively (Article 45 European 
Convention). 
442 American Convention, Articles 29(9) and Article 30. 
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Convention that forbids the interpretation of any of its provisions as 
"precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human 
personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of 
443 
government" 
The inclusion of such a clause in the AFCHPR would have strengthened 
the otherwise vague Charter provision on the right to participate in 
444 
government 
In what context, therefore, should the African Commission interpret the 
445 
AFCHPR? without prejudice to different schools of Interpretation, 
Articles 60 and 61 of the AFCHPR envisage that the Commission shall 
"draw inspiration" from international law of human rights including 
African instruments on human and peoples rights, and other subsidiary 
measures such as other general or special international conventions and 
general principles of law expressly recognized by OAU Member States, to 
determine the principles of law. 
The Charter, thus envisages the Interpretation of the provision in the 
context of the international human rights instruments. The Vienna 
Convention states that treaties must be Interpreted "in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
446 
purpose". 
-------------------- 
443 
Article 29(5) Ibid (underlines for emphasis). 
444 AFCHPR, Article 13. 
445 The three main schools of thought on the subject are referred to as 
"the intention of the parties" or "founding fathers" school; the textual 
or "ordinary meaning of the word" school, and the "theological" or aims 
and objects" school. These schools are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. 
446 Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: - See 63, AJIL - (1964) p. 875.. 
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Consequently, where the Charters provisions are vague, as several 
provisions indeed are, the African Commission may adopt supplementary 
means of interpretation especially the provisions of international human 
rights instruments447. This method would certainly minimize the 
utilization of subjective criteria that seek to ascertain only the Intent of 
the Parties. The motive behind the expressed reservation by several 
African States to Article 45(3) granting the African Commission the 
power of interpretation, is informed by their desire to maintain the 
subjective criteria which may likely render the Charters provisions 
obscure and lead to results manifestly absurd or unreasonable. However 
the efficacy of the wide method interpretation will depend upon the 
extent to which State Parties of the AFCHPR have ratified or acceded to 
the relevant international human rights instruments... and also to the 
extent that these principles are reflected In national constitutions. 
Secondly, the effect of the State reservations to Article 45(3) of the 
Charter would invariably limit the Commissions power to render 
Interpretations affecting relevant States. 
The fourth main function of the African Commission Is to " perform any 
other tasks" which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government448. In the absence of any further clarification, 
one can only presume that the African Commission, may for instance be, 
called upon by the Assembly, to examine an issue involving the violation 
of AFCHPR provisions by a State Party in respect of which no 
communication has been received; thus obviating the need to pursue the 
traditional OAU practise of setting-up ad-hoc committees. 
-------------------- 
447 
Article 31(2)(b) Ibid. 
448 
ARCHPR, Article 45(4). 
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Communications before the Commission 
The AFCHPR envisages two methods of lodging "communications" before 
the Commission, namely "Communications from States" and "other 
Communications". The procedural system is graphically illustrated in the 
following page. 
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(iii) Communications from States449 
The AFCHPR provides State Parties, complaining of violations of the 
Charter provisions, with two avenues for action. The first avenue 
provides for a system where the Commission may Investigate a matter 
following a failure in parties efforts to seek a friendly settlement450 
The second channel allows a State Party direct recourse to the 
451 Commission. 
The essence of the first channel is to allow the two States concerned to 
explore and reach a peaceful and friendly settlement through bilateral 
negotiations. In the event of a failure in reaching a peaceful settlement, 
after one State has informed the other of an alleged violation, both 
States can submit the matter to the Commission. Such a notification is 
addressed to the Commission through its Chairman, and also to the State 
concerned and the Secretary-General of the OAU. It is pertinent to note 
that under this procedure, the notification to the Commission is 
permissible if the issues has not been finally settled within three months 
from the date the original communication was received by the State to 
which it was addressed. 
The main defect in this procedure Is that It falls to provide for 
notification, to the Commission and other relevant institutions, on the 
peaceful settlement and/or agreement reached or measures taken to 
conform to the Charter. 
The second channel regarding Inter-State communications enables a State 
Party that considers that another State Party has violated the Charter to 
-------------------- 
449 Ibid, Articles 47-54. 
450 
Ibid, Articles 47-48. 
451 
Ibid, Article 49. 
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refer the matter directly to the Commission by way of a communication 
addressed to its Chairman, the State concerned and the Secretary- 
General of the OAU. 
All inter-State communications, whether channelled directly or indirectly, 
must fulfil three conditions of validity before the Commission can deal 
with the matter. First, the communication must originate from a State 
Party to the Charter and contain allegations against another State Party. 
Secondly, the allegation must Involve the violation of a provision of the 
AFCHPR. Thirdly, the Commission can only deal with the matter after 
making sure that all local remedies, If they exist, have been exhausted, 
unless it is obvious to the Commission that the procedure of achieving 
452 
these remedies would be unduly prolonged, 
Once a matter scales these hurdles, the Commission may proceed to 
investigate It. The Commission may ask the States concerned to provide 
it with all relevant information453 The States concerned may be 
represented before It and submit written or oral representations454. The 
Commission may also resort to "any appropriate method of 
Investigation 455 that is not Inconsistent with the Charter and with 
international law. In exercising this apparently wide Investigative 
power, the Commission may hear from the Secretary-General of the OAU 
or any other person capable of enlightening it. Thus the Commission 
will be able to utilize the expertise and information banks of NGO's and 
-------------------- 
452 Mid, Article 50. The American Convention provides significant 
exemptions to the local remedies rule, namely: when the domestic 
elgislation of the State concerned does not provide due process of law 
for alleged human rights violations or when a denial to remedies under 
domestic law has occurred or there has been an unwarranted delay of 
remedies - Article 46(2). 
453 AFCHPR, Article 51(l). 
454 Ibid, Article 51(2). 
455 Ibid, Article 46. 
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related institutions to assist its deliberation. The parameters of these 
broad investigative powers will have to be spelt out In the Commissions 
rules of procedure whether the Commission will be able to undertake on- 
site observations or fact finding missions will depend upon the evolution 
of the rules by the Commission. It must be emphasised that while the 
Commission is carrying out its investigations, it must attempt by "all 
appropriate means to reach an amicable solution" based on human 
rights456 Where an amicable solution is not reached, the Commission 
must prepare a report stating the facts and its findings "within a 
reasonable time" from when the matter was referred to it457. The 
Commissions report is then transmitted to the States concerned and to 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. While transmitting its 
report to the Assembly the Commission may make any recommendations it 
deems useful458 . It is not clear whether the recommendations will 
form 
part of the report, especially as the Commissions report may be 
published if the Assembly so decides459 whereas "all other measures" 
including recommendations are to remain confidential460. The Assembly 
will then determine the appropriate steps to take on the Commissions 
report and recommendations. One should expect that the ultimate 
sanction will be the publication of the Commissions Report, and possibly 
an OAU resolution addressed to the defaulting State to take appropriate 
measures to rectify the situation. 
--- 
456 
-------------- 
Ibid, Article 52. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Ibid, Article 53. 
459 Article 59(2). 
460 Ibid, 59(1). 
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(iv) Other Communications 
It is universally acknowledged that international and regional systems of 
human rights that do not give individuals and private groups standing to 
file petitions, generally are less effective than those that do grant 
standing461 The effectiveness of the AFCHPR may be tested by 
examining its procedure for receiving "other communications". 
The AFCHPR empowers the Commission to receive "communications other 
than those of State Parties"462. The reference to "other communications" 
is a very broad one. The absence of a definition stating the subjects of 
this procedure leaves a lacuna which hopefully will be filled as the 
Commissions jurisprudence develops. In the meantime, however, two 
issues are clear under this procedure. Firstly, individuals are 
competent to refer matters to the Commission in the event of violation of 
any of the rights recognized by a State Party. Secondly, States not- 
party to the Charter and public institutions dependent on them are not 
entitled to the procedure of Article 55. 
The Commission will however, have to evolve a criteria for accepting 
"other communications". such as those claiming the violation of peoples 
rights or group rights, and indeed communications emanating from 
private organizations alleging the violation of rights. The provision of 
the Charter are instructive on this point. 
By virtue of Article 45(3), the Commission can interpret all the 
provisions of the Charter only at the request of a State Party, an 
institution of the OAU or an African organization recognized by the 
-------------------- 
461 Thomas Buergenthal, "The American and European Conventions on 
Human Rights: Similarities and Differences", in The American University 
Law Review 30 : 1: Fall 1980 p. 159-160. 
462 Article 55(l). 
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OAU. Thus, discounting the applicability of the Article 55 procedure to 
State Parties, it is incontrovertible that the Commission will allow 
communications from "African Organizations" recognized by the OAU. 
The only existing yardstick for "recognizing" or determining "an African 
Organization" is the OAU criteria for Granting Observer Status463. An 
examination of the list of institutions and organizations with OAU 
Observer Status reveals a predominance of public Institutions dependent 
on States464 and are as such excluded from submitting communications to 
the African Commission. 
Among the "recognized" organizations only two organizations have a 
direct bearing on human rights, namely, the Anti-Apartheid Committee 
and the African Jurists Association. Thus by applying existing OAU 
Observer Status criteria the African Commission will severely restrict its 
jurisdiction 'ratione personae'. 
On the other hand, Article 46 of the Charter states that the Commission 
may hear from any person capable of enlightening it in the context of its 
investigative functions. Mutatis Mutandis, the Commission should be able 
to accept communications from any person, group of persons, or 
institution capable of enlightening it that a State Party has violated the 
Charters provisions. Whether such institutions must be legally 
constituted is not clear. The American Convention, for instance, 
provides that: 
-------------------- 
463 For a discussion on Observer Status at the OAU, See Chapter 2 
above. 
464 For a list of Organizations with Observer Status at the OAU. See 
Appendix VIII post. 
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"Any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental 
entity legally recognized in one or more Member States of the 
Organization may lodge petitions with the Commission 
containing denunciations or mplaints of violations of this 
Convention by a State Party" 
It is thus necessary that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
should state precisely whether any non-governmental organization legally 
recognized by a State Party will be permitted to submit complaints. It 
will be interesting to see whether a communication from an international 
non-governmental organizations (NGO's) will be accepted. 
The AFCHPR has nevertheless advanced further than existing regional 
and international human rights rules with regard to capability of 
individuals and private groups to file petitions. Under the European 
Convention the State Party concerned must make a declaration to 
recognize the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. 
Such a declaration may be made for a specific period466. Although the 
American Convention does not limit the capacity of the Individual to file a 
petition to victims of the violation, it however requires the declaration of 
a State recognizing the competence of the Inter-American Commission to 
receive and examine petitions from Individuals or non-governmental 
organizations467. Similarly, under the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Racial 
Convention, the acceptance by States of the rights to private petition Is 
optional. 
-------------------- 
465 
American Convention, Article 44. 
466 Ibid, Article 25(2). 
467 American Convention Article 45(3). For an analysis of the rationale 
for this regulation, see T. Buergenthal, "The American Convention on 
Human Rights: Illusions and Hopes" Buffalo Law Review 21 (1971) p. 130. 
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The AFCHPR does not require petitioners to be victims of violations of 
the rights protected. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the African 
Commission to receive private petitions Is not encumbered by the 
requirement of an additional declaration by State Parties to that effect. 
Despite the advantages of the Charters liberal locus standi provisions, 
its benefits are ameliorated by the procedural rules imposing strict 
conditions of validity which "communications other than those from State 
Parties" must meet. 
The relevant provisions require that before each session of the 
Commission, its members should receive from the Secretary a list of 
communications other than those from State PartIes468. The Commission 
may request for more Information on a communication received and If 
satisfied, a simple majority of the me mbers can decide to consider the 
communication469 However, prior to any substantive consideration all 
communications shall be brought to the knowledge of the State concerned 
by the Chairman of 
470 the Commission 
Before the substantive consideration of any communication, it must 
satisfy seven conditions of validity, namely; 
(1) The author of the communication must indicate his 
identity even if anonymity is requested for personal 
reasons or where the fear of reprisals exist. The 
members of the Commission will, thus have to conceal 
his identity. 
(2) The communication must be compatible with the Charter 
of the OAU and with the AFCHPR. 
-------------------- 
468 
Article 55(1) AFCHPR. 
469 
AFCHPR, Article 55(2). 
470 
Ibid, Article 57. 
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(3) The communication must be written In measured 
language. The language used must not be disparaging 
or insulting against the State concerned, its 
institutions or the OAU. 
(4) The communication must not be confined exclusively to 
news emanating from the mass media. 
(5) The communication must observe the rule of the 
exhaustion of local remedies, unless it is obvious that 
this procedure will be unduly prolonged. 
(6) The communication must be submitted within a 
reasonable period, that Is, from the time local remedies 
are exhausted or from a date decided by the 
Commission in cases where a State concerned tactically 
delays proceedings. 
(7) The facts giving rise to the complaint must not concern 
cases that have already been settled by the State(s) 
concerned under other procedures envisaged by the 
Charter 49ft the UN; the Charter of the OAU or the AFCHPR . 
Some of the foregoing procedural conditions of validity correspond to 
those of the European and American Conventions with some variations. 
For example, both Conventions provide for six months within which 
communications must be submitted after the exhaustion of local 
remedies472, whereas the African Charter envisages "a reasonable 
period". Furthermore, the American Convention473 and European 
Convention474 prescribe rules regarding the exhaustion of local remedies. 
The former provides significant exceptions to the exhaustion of local 
-------------------- 
471 lbid, Article 56. 
472 American Convention Article 46(1)(b); European Convention Article 
26. 
473 Article 46(1)(a); See also Article 37, Regulation of the Inter- 
American Commission of Human Rights. 
474 European Convention, Article 26; the Commission may only deal with 
a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to 
generally recognized rules of international law.. The European Court of 
Human Rights has also developed jurisprudence regarding the issue of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. Donelly et al v United Kingdom (No. 1) 
and (No. 2); 43, Collection of Decisions 149 (1973), 4 Decisions and 
Reports 4 (1976). See also, K. Boyle & H. Hannum, "The Donnelly 
Case, Administrative Practice and Domestic Remedies under the European 
Convention: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back" 71 AJIL (1977) 
p. 316. 
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remedies when the domestic legislation of a State does not grant due 
process of law, or where the victim has been denied access to local 
remedies or prevented from exhausting them or where there has been 
undue delay in litigation475. The existence of domestic laws in some 
African States, which deny access to local remedies and purport to grant 
public officers and institutions immunity from both criminal and civil 
litigations will prevent may individual communications from seeing the 
light of day476. In the absence of comprehensive exemptions to the 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies it will be left to the African 
Commission to determine whether such laws amount to rendering the 
procedure "unduly prolonged". 
The requirement that communication should not be written in disparaging 
or insulting language corresponds to the procedural rules of the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination Protection of Minorities477. 
After the African Commission has deliberated on a matter, It may decide 
not to continue further Investigations into the matter. However, If the 
Commission decides that one or several communications concerning 
specific situations reveal "the existence of a series of massive violations 
of human and peoples rights, the Commission shall draw the attention of 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to them"478. This 
provision is so vague that it may render the procedure for Individual 
petitions futile. The Charter envisages that the Commission cannot 
proceed on a matter unless there exists "a series of serious or massive 
475 American Convention, Article 46(1) and (2). 
476 See the Nigerian Protection of Public Officers (Miscellaneous) Decree 
No. 7 1984 (repealed in 1986). See also the Tanzanian Government 
Proceedings Act, No. 16 of 1967. 
477 Resolution (XXIV) adopted by the Sub-Committee on 14 August 1971 
under Res. 1503 XLVII of 27 May 1970. 
478 AFCHPR, Article 58(1). 
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violations of human and peoples rights". It is evident that the 
prerequisite for "a series of violations" prevents Individual or Isolated 
cases from being considered further by the Commission, especially as the 
violation must also be "serious" or "massive". The AFCHPR does not 
elaborate on what constitutes "serious or massive violations". The 
admissibility rules of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Indicate that communications 
will be admissible only if they "... reveal a consistent pattern of gross 
and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms... "479. 
Consequently an isolated violation, despite being serious, may not be 
referred to the Assembly by the Commission, sinne it does not constitute 
a series of violations or consistent pattern of violations. 
On the other hand, it Is arguable that a series of serious violations, if 
perpetuated against an individual could constitute the basis for action. 
Furthermore, massive violations, even If they are not serious, may 
provide a course of action In accordance with Articles 55 and 58 of the 
AFCHPR. To Illustrate this point. In our opinion, the Commission should 
not be able to consider a communication revealing the prolonged torture 
or detention of an Individual. Furthermore If the Commission receives 
one or more communications revealing a consistent pattern of torture and 
detention of Individuals by a State Party, these should amount to "a 
series of serious violations" thus justifying referral to the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government. While we appreciate the rationale for 
such a criteria, including the need to minimise frivolous communications 
-------------------- 
479 para. l(b), op cit. The UN Commission on Human Rights has utilized 
this phrase to commence action on charges of torture and ill treatment of 
prisoners and detainees or persons In police custody In South Africa - See Commission on Human Rights Res. 2. (XXIII), 42 UN ESCAR, 
Supp. No. 6 76-78, UN Doe E/4322, E/CN. 4/940 (1967). 
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etc. , we cannot overemphasize the essence of any regional system for 
human rights protection which is primarily to prevent violation of 
Individual rights. Therefore, the African Commission must elaborate 
further on the terms: "serious violations", "massive violations" and "a 
series of violations". 
The Charter provides that when these "special cases" are referred by 
the Commission to the Assembly, the latter may request the former to 
undertake an in-depth report. accompanied by its findings and 
recommendations480. The Charter does not define what an "in-depth 
study" entails but existing International practice may provide the 
Commission with precedence481 
The Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government may 
also request such an in-depth study where an urgent case is submitted 
to the Chairman by the Commission482. The rationale for this provision 
is that, since the Assembly convenes only once a year, the current OAU 
Chairman can respond swiftly to emergency cases referred to him. 
The Charter envisages two kinds of Reports on its procedural system. 
Firstly, the State Reports which each State Party must submit once 
every two years, on the legislative and other measures taken with a view 
of giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in 
483 the Charter. Secondly, the Commission is required to publish a 
-------------------- 
480 AFCHPR. Article 58. 
481 See Economic & Social Council, Res. 1503. para. 6(9). 
482 AFCHPR, Article 58(3). 
483 The State Reports procedure envisaged by the AFCHPR Is not unlike 
the practice of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO and the Human Rights 
Committee. See Wolf, Aspects Judicieres de la Protection Internationale 
des Droits de 1'Homme par 1'O. I. T.; 4. Revue des Droits de l'Homme 1971 
p. 781-87. 
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484 
report on its activities after it has been approved by the Assembly 
The frequency of the publication of the Commissions Report Is not stated 
but it is not unreasonable to expect it to be annually485. 
With regard to State Reports, if the experience of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights486 is considered, on may expect that AFCHPR State 
Parties will be reluctant to submit reports. States may regard the 
AFCHPR reporting procedure as violating the OAU Charters prohibition 
of Interference in the internal affairs of a State487. It should however 
be recognized that several African State Parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have submitted their Initial State 
488 
Reports pursuant to Article 40 of the Covenant, 
(v) An Overview 
The foregoing analysis of the Commissions procedural system of 
examining communications reveals that the role of the OAU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government will ultimately determine the effectiveness 
of the system. Since the Assembly Is essentially a political "club of 
heads of states" we can expect emphasis on the promotion rather than 
the protection of human rights. Since the final result of each action, 
taken by the Commission on a violation of human rights, Is the 
production of a report specifically for the Assembly, the prospects of 
-------------------- 
484 AFCHPR, Article 59(2) and (3). 
485 For instance - Acticle 63 of the Statute of the Inter-American 
Commission provides for annual Reports. 
486 L. B. Sohn, Human Rights: Their Implementation and Supervision by 
the United Nations in T. Meron ed. Human Rights in International Law 
op cit pp. 373-5; See Dana Fisher op cit p. 142. 
487 OAU Charter, Article 111(l). 
488 For Instance Tanzania and Kenya submitted their reports in August 
1979, although they were due in 1977. See further Allan McChesney 
"The Promotion of Economic and Political Rights: The African 
Approaches"; in JAL (1980) Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 163. 
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any further publication to the world at large Is severely limited. The 
essence of an effective regional human rights system is the utilization of 
pressures and sanctions to enforce compliance by States to established 
legal standards. The failure of the AFCHPR to provide adequate 
procedural measures for ensuring remedies to Individual victims of 
violations will reduce the Charters effectiveness. Furthermore, the 
sustained veil of confidentiality over the Commissions deliberations as 
violations included in its reports, subject only to a contrary declaration 
by the Assembly, Is not desirable. 
In an ideal situation, the rationale for placing the Assembly at the head 
of the machinery and having deliberations "in camer a" is to encourage 
the diplomatic solutio ns to human rights problems. However In the 
African scenario, It is not unlikely that political considerations will 
overwhelm the human rights issues and thus clog the Commissions 'modus 
operandi'. 
Inter-State Communications will be rare within the African rights regime 
because a plethora of political factors which enter into a governments 
decisions whether to file a human rights complaint against another 
government489. The filing of inter-State complaints are generally 
regarded as unfriendly acts of diplomacy and only the few States with 
strength of conviction will lodge complaints against other States basically 
in the interest of protecting human rights490. It is submitted that since 
interstate complaints are given a far higher profile in the public forum 
than individual petitions, it is necessary that African States appreciate 
-------------------- 
489 For instance, among over 11,000 requests submitted under the 
framework of the European Convention, there are only 7 interstate cases. 
490 T. Buergenthal, "Proceedings Against Greece under the European 
Convention of Human Rights" 62 AJIL p. 450 (1968). See also D. Jessup 
"International Litigation as a Friendly Act" 60 Colombia Law Review, 
(1960) p. 24. 
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that official concern for human rights in other States does not constitute 
interference in domestic affairs and is not contrary to the spirit of 
African Unity. 
It is submitted that the State Parties to the AFCHPR may exploit the fact 
that there is no obligation for a State charged with violation of human 
491 
rights to appear before the Commission. 
The perceived reluctance of African States to lodge complaints coupled 
with the inadequate individual petition procedure under the Charter, 
underlines the need for an African Court of Human Rights. However the 
Charter does not provide for such an institution. The absence of a 
court in the African regional system is predicated on the regional apathy 
towards courts in general. According to R. P. Anand: 
"Asian and African countries are generally reluctant to 
accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 
and are apathetic towards the use of the Court, or even any 
other third partý9ýudgement for the settlement of disputes 
according to law" 
African States are generally reluctant to submit to the regime of 
traditional International law on the grounds that their sovereignty and 
interests cannot be guaranteed. Consequently, the need to sustain 
-------------------- 
491 Under Article 48 of the American Convention, when the Inter- 
American Commission requests for such information, It must be submitted 
by the State concerned within a reasonable period. The practice of the 
American Convention has revealed that States were generally reluctant or 
slow in responding, thus the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, at its 25th Session (March 1971) adopted Article 51 which 
provides that "The occurrence of the events on which information has 
been requested will be presumed to be confirmed if the Government 
referred to has not supplied such Information within 180 days of the 
request, provided always, that the Invalidity of the events denounced Is 
not shown by any other elements of proof". See ACHR Regulation 
Article 51 OAS Doe OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 25/Doc 41/Rev at 25 (1971). 
492 Cited in M. K. Navaz (ed) Essays on International Law in Honour of 
K. Krishna (Rao Sijthoff - Legden 1976) p. 227. 
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political and economic sovereignty overwhelms any impulse to seek 
solutions in the international judicial fora. 
For instance, a former president of the defunct OAU Commission on 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration has observed that: 
"My OAU experience is that they (African States) will always 
show great reluctance in limiting their own political and 
diplomatic freedom beyond what they regard as absolutely 
necessary to secure their immediate objectives. In one 
Interstate dispute after another, secret offers of assistance 
by my Commission could not induce the States involved In the 
disputes to submit to the jurisdiction of a body they 
persistently regard as judicial. The political element in most 
inter-State disputes even where such political element is not 
the predominant one makes States asig that their vital 
interests are at stake in every dispute" 
It may also be observed that some decision of the International Court of 
Justice such as the South West African Case494 have further alienated 
African States from the Courts' procedures495, 
Although the absence of a court in the AFCHPR does not necessarily 
adversely affect the prospects of regional human rights protection, it is 
pertinent that the Commission is protected from the political manoeuvres 
of the Assembly. We submit that the Commission should be endowed with 
greater powers to make binding decisions especially as regards individual 
communications and provide, where appropriate, remedies for the 
violation of Individual rights, without necessarily having recourse to the 
Assembly. Such an amendment is necessary since some of the rights in 
the Charter are not mere aspirations but substantive rights requiring 
-------------------- 
493 
M. A. Adesanya "Reflections on the Pacific Settlement of Inter-State 
Disputes in Africa" a paper to the Third Annual Conference of the 
Nigerian Society of International Law (March 1971) p. 49. 
494 Judgement ICJ Reports 1966 p. 6. 
495 I. Shihata - "The Attitudes of New States Towards the International 
Court of Justice", International Organization Vol. 19 (1965) p. 203. 
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concrete and speedy action to be taken to give effect to them; for 
example, the freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. 
The African Commission should provide comprehensive guidelines on 
procedures and methods of investigation since Article 46 as it stands is 
not effective. Furthermore, to ensure compliance with the Commissions 
recommendations and the Charters provisions, all measures taken by the 
Commission and the Assembly should be made public, unless they affect 
the security of a State. 
Admittedly, some advantages attach to confidentiality such as the 
possibility that publication may hamper the Commissions work and other 
desirable diplomatic manoeuvres, however, the weight of evidence to the 
contrary is compelling. Many objectionable State practices have been 
496 
scuttled precisely because of adverse publicity. 
In addition to the foregoing perfectible procedural provisions, the 
efficacy of the Charter will also depend on Its legal effect. 
(1) Applicable Principles& the Legal Effect of the AFCHPR 
It is evident that only Member States of the OAU are eligible to become 
497 parties to the Charter All State Parties to the AFCHPR have an 
obligation to "recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined [in 
the Charter] and... undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to 
give effect to them 
498 
496 For Instance, in Ireland v United Kingdom, the Government of 
Ireland alleged that the British Security Forces had applied "deep 
interrogation methods" on alleged terrorists. The Government concerned 
promptly abandoned the practice by virtue of the adverse publicity. 
European Court of Human Rights Series A. No. 25. Judgement of 18 
January 1978. 
497 AFCHPR, Article 63(1). 
498 AFCHPR, Article 1. 
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Thus State Parties to the AFCHPR not only recognize the rights, duties 
and freedoms consecrated therein but they also pledge to adopt and 
secure them within their respective jurisdictions by legislation and other 
measures. A literal interpretation of this provision presumes the 
creation of a legal obligation on States. However, since the Charter 
obliges States to "recognize" the rights and freedoms Instead of ensuring 
the "guarantee" of their Implementation, the obligation required of State 
Parties is thus reduced. Consequently, the Charter may be interpreted 
as promoting rather than protecting human rights499. The general 
phraseology of the Charter provisions reveal no express obligation on 
States to guarantee rights and duties. 
It may be however argued that the Charter does impose obligations on 
State Parties to guarantee the rights protected in the Charter since they 
have undertaken "to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to 
(the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter]1,500. 
Nevertheless, the drafting history of the provision upholds the 
contention that the Charters binding effect is reduced501. The efficacy 
of the AFCHPR is dependent upon the idiosyncrasies of State Parties In 
adopting local laws reflecting the Charters provisions. It is Instructive 
to note that the historical development of other Conventions such as the 
Inter-American System began with a legally non-binding American 
-------------------- 
499 For a discussion on the genesis of Article 1- See pp42. 't-s above. 
500 AFCHPR, Article 1. 
501 The reduction In the binding nature of the Charter Is evidenced by 
the amendment of Article 1 of the Dakar Draft of the AFCHPR which 
provided that State Parties "shall recognize and shall guarantee the 
rights and freedoms stated in the present Convention (sic) and shall 
undertake to adopt, in their constitutional provisions, legislative and 
other measures to ensure their respect". See the Draft AFCHPR OAU 
Doc/CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 1 (Meeting of the Experts to Draft the AFCHPR, 
Dakar, Senegal, 23 Nov -8 Dec 1979). It is apparent that the 
elimination of the underlined words ("guarantee" and "ensure")from the 
AFCHPR has dissipated much of the Charters force. 
568 
502 Declaration of the Rights & Duties of Man (1948). 
However, we do not subscribe to the notion of the non-binding nature of 
the Charter, firstly because of obligations of State Parties to adopt 
legislative measures giving effect to the Charters provisions and secondly 
the designated function of the Commission is to "(e)nsure the protection 
of human and peoples rights under conditions laid down by the Charter". 
It however, must be noted that the non-retention of the original 
provision of Article 1 of the Dakar Draft Charter reflects the Inclination 
of African States to fulfil their duties under the Charter through the 
adoption or reformulation of municipal laws. Thus, the application of the 
rights and duties in the Charter will invariably be dependent on national 
legislation of State Parties. 
Our analysis of the Constitutional provisions of African States reveals 
that a considerable number of these constitutions protect and guarantee 
both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. 
In some cases the constitutions confer a broader protection than the 
Charter. Consequently, In such cases States cannot confine the 
interpretation of their national provisions to the narrow scope of the 
Charter provisions. However, where State Constitutions permit self- 
execution of treaties, the AFCHPR will be automatically applicable In the 
domestic context. In other States where the self-execution of treaties is 
not recognized, legislation will have to be enacted to give effect to the 
provisions of the Charter - the domestic sphere. For Instance, in 
Nigeria, the African Charter on Human & Peoples Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act 1983 was enacted Into law as far back as 17 March 
1983. The Act provides that the provisions of the Charter shall have 
the "force of law In Nigeria and shall be given full recognition and effect 
-------------------- 
502 
The American Declaration of the Rights & Duties of Man 2 May 1948, 
OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser/L/V/II, 23 doe 21 rev. 6. 
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and be applied by all authorities and persons exercising legislative 
executive or judicial powers in Nigeria"503. 
4 
A comparison of the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution and the 
AFCHPR reveals that the Charter gives a legal effect to certain non- 
justiceable provisions of the Constitution504. On the other hand, the 
Charters provisions on due process of law, for Instance, are very 
narrow In comparison thereto505, It Is only a matter of time before 
these apparent conflicts are tested both before the national courts and 
the African Commission. 
In this regard, some constitutions empower the Supreme Court to make 
rulings on the compatibility of international treaty obligations with 
constitutional and other municipal laws506 and furthermore to recognize 
the supremacy of treaties once they are legally Incorporated into the 
507 domestic legal regime. However it should be emphasized that some 
constitutions deprive treaties of supremacy over constitutional and other 
-------------------- 
503 The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act 1983, Section 1. 
504 See Chapter II of the 1979 Federal Constitution of Nigeria on the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of State Policy which 
provide for social, economic and cultural rights in non-justiceable terms. 
505 See Chapter 5, above. 
506 See for Instance the Constitution of Madagascar, 1972, Article 92; 
the Constitution of Male, 1974, Article 61. 
507 Ibid. 
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domestic laws508. The efficacy of the Charter will therefore be 
dependent upon the willingness of African States to adopt enabling laws 
or acts incorporating the provisions of the Charter into the municipal 
sphere. This measure is necessary because the ratification of the 
AFCHPR per se does not necessarily render the Charter legally 
enforceable within the domestic legal regime of many States. 
Thus one of the first functions of the Commission will be to encourage 
States to adopt legislative measures giving effect to the Charters 
provisions. In adopting such measures, many State Parties will have to 
reconcile glaring conflicts between the Charters provisions and their 
domestic laws. Such conflicts will Involve, private ownership of property 
against communal or State ownership, womens rights, religious freedom, 
free participation in government through freely chosen representatives, 
the suspension and limitation of guarantees and declarations of 
emergencies by military regimes to mention but a few Issues. 
These obstacles are formidable as they involve not only legal reform but 
also entail the reorientation of social values and institutional practices. 
The latter problem can be surmounted by the promotion of human and 
peoples rights through public enlightenment programmes, while the 
former requires the political will of States to discharge their treaty 
obligations under the AFCHPR. 
-------------------- 
508 For instance, Article 2 of the Constitution of Mauritius 1977 provides 
that "the Constitution is the supreme law of Mauritius and If any other 
law is inconsistent with this Constitution, tht other law shall to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be void". See the Kenyan Case of Republic 
(of Kenya) v Charles Okundo Mushinyi and Another which declared the 
supremacy of the Kenyan Constitution over an International treaty. ILM 
Vol. 9,1970 p. 556-566; See also Republic (of Kenya) v Donald M. Ombisi 
Ibid. These Kenyan cases appear to contradict two decisions of the old 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PICJ) concerning conflicts between International treaties and municipal laws. The PCIJ held that on 
the basis of accepted principles of international law, when such conflicts 
occur, treaties should prevail. See The Greco-Bulgarian Communities 
(PCIJ) Ser B. No. 17,32 and German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia 
(Merits) (M26) Series A No. 7 (1 WCR, p. 510). 
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(i) The International Law of Human Rights and its effect on AFCHPR 
State Parties 
In addition to the obligations imposed on State Parties to the AFCHPR to 
recognize the rights and duties enshrined in the Charter, they are also 
required to conform to certain international standards. 
The Preamble of the AFCHPR reaffirms the pledge of States to achieve a 
better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international 
cooperation having due regard to the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights509. The AFCHPR also reaffirms the 
adherence of State Parties to the principles of human and peoples rights 
as contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments 
adopted by the OAU, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the 
UN510 All Member States of the OAU have undertaken to observe 
international human rights obligations and standards by ratifying the 
OAU Charter511 and the UN Charter512. The relevant provisions of the 
UN Charter impose obligations on all Member States to promote "universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or relIgion,, 
513. 
Despite the debate on the parameters of this obligation, consensus exists 
however, that meaning of "human rights and fundamental freedoms" can 
be determined by reference to the list of rights proclaimed in the main 
UN human rights Instruments namely, the Universal Declaration on Human 
-------------------- 
509 Third preambular paragraph, AFCHPR. 
510 Ninth preambular paragraph, Ibid. 
511 Article 11(e) and eighth preambular paragraph, OAU Charter. 
512 Articles 1(3), 55(c) and 56, UN Charter. 
513 Ibid. 
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Rights514, the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Racial 
Convention. Indeed it may be argued that limits are established by the 
principles of non-Intervention and sovereign equality, with regard to 
enforcement measures. However, gross violations of human rights have 
been consistently regarded by the UN as matters of International 
concern. No State an invoke domestic jurisdiction in order to exclude 
515 international discussion of the States internal human rights situation 
It is a cardinal principle of international law that the demand by one 
State that another State live up to its International obligations does not 
constitute an Illegal intervention (nay interference) into the domestic 
affairs of that State. Since State Parties to the AFCHPR have among 
themselves assumed International obligations relating to human rights, 
disputes among them concerning these obligations are matters of 
international rather than domestic concern. Thus where an AFCHPR 
State Party demands that another Party live up to its International 
obligations, with regard to human rights, such action cannot be deemed 
to violate Article III(2) of the OAU Charter. 
Furthermore, African States have to varying degrees ratified various 
international agreements and conventions which impose specific human 
rights obligations on them. An examination of the pattern of African 
State ratification of major human rights instruments 
516, 
reveals that the 
response of African States to the International Covenants on Human 
-------------------- 
514 Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Is not a 
Convention, it Is characterized as part of international law. An 
examination of the majority of African Constitutions reveals that they 
subscribe to the Universal Declaration and/or expressly guarantee human 
rights which are contained in the Universal Declaration. 
515 See Rudolf Bernhardt, "Domestic Jurisdiction of States and 
International Human Rights Organs" HRLJ Vol. 7 No. 24 pp. 205-216. 
516 Appendix X at post. 
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Rights has not been encouraging517. With regard to the specific human 
rights treaties that African States have subscribed to, they cannot 
invoke domestic jurisdiction to oust the competence of the organs 
established by the respective treaties. The limits of the competence of 
each organ is generally determined by the treaty or the organ 
established, and not by the State concerned. We thus, submit that all 
State Parties to the AFCHPR are subject generally to the regime of the 
international law of human rights. Furthermore the specific human 
rights obligations of these States are defined by the relevant conventions 
they have ratified. 
By virtue of Articles 61 and 62 of the AFCHPR, the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights is empowered to expand the normative 
scope of the AFCHPR by Interpretation and reference to International 
human rights instruments and standards. However, the application of 
these instruments to non-Parties will be predicated on their norm 
creating effect. The capability of the African Commission to evolve a 
jurisprudence based on its wide powers of interpretation will largely 
depend upon the willingness of the majority of African States to 
subscribe to the international human rights covenants and other relevant 
instruments. Consequently, we suggest that one of the major tasks of 
the African Commission should be to inspire African States to ratify the 
major international human rights instruments. 
-------------------- 
517 The Convention for the Protection and Punishment of Genocide of 9 
Dec 1948 (ratified by 14 African States); the Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women of 31 March 1953 (24 African States); the Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28 September 1954 (9 
African States); the Convention relating to the Nationality of Married 
Women of 20 February 1957 (12 African States) ; the Convention against 
Discrimination in Education of 15 December 1960 (19 African States) ; the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 (39 African 
States); and the Protocol thereto of 31 January 1961 (40 African States); 
the ILO Conventions Nos. 29,105 and 111 on Forced Labour, 
Discrimination in Employment and Occupation of 28 June 1930,25 June 
1957 and 25 June 1958 to which 43,39 and 39 African States have 
ratified, respectively (as at 31 December 1987). 
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It is pertinent to spotlight the failure of the authors of the AFCHPR to 
anticipate the likelihood of concurrent and possibly conflicting human 
rights regimes that State Parties may be subject to. For Instance, in 
the event of the Arab Convention on Human Rights being operative, at 
least eight OAU Member States will be subject to both the African and 
Arab human rights regimes. In this context, Article 56(7) of the 
Charter ousts the jurisdiction of the African Commission regarding human 
rights matters that have been settled by the States concerned, in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, the OAU Charter or 
the AFCHPR. An amendment of this provision to Include matters settled 
in accordance with other internationally recognized human rights treaties, 
is desirable. 
(ii) Ratification & Reservations 
The AFCHPR was open to signature, ratification and adherence by OAU 
Member States on 17 June 1981 after the 18th Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government had adopted the Charter. The instruments of 
ratification or adherence are to be deposited with the Secretary-General 
of the OAU518. By virtue of Article 63(3), the Charter Is to come into 
force three months after the OAU Secretary-General has received the 
instruments of ratification of a simple majority of the 51 Mem ber States of 
the OAU; (i. e. 26 States). The AFCHPR entered into force on 21 
October 1986; and as at 12 May 1987,33 States had ratified the 
AFCHPR519. The r ate of ratification is relatively rapid when compared 
to the experience of other conv 
520 
entions, 
-------------------- 
518 
Article 63(2) AFCHPR. 
519 For the List of States that have signed, ratified or adhered to the 
AFCHPR, See Appendix IV post. 
520 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights required a 
simple majority of 35 States, yet it took 10 years to come Into force; 
Similarly, the American Convention came into force 9 years after Its 
adoption in November 1969. The AFCHPR entered Into force only 5 
years after adoption. 
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The legal effect of the AFCHPR on States that have expressed 
reservations to some of its provisions remains to be ascertained521 . It 
is 
however noteworthy that these reservations were made during the 
drafting stage of the Charter, before its adoption. Furthermore none of 
these States are reported to have expressed their reservations on 
depositing their instruments of ratification. This observation may not be 
unconnected with the fact that the AFCHPR, unlike the European and 
American Conventions, has no provision governing reservations. 
However the statement of the Secretary General of the OAU to the 
Ministerial Conference on the Draft African Charter, anticipated 
reservations by stating that "Member States were free to express 
reservations and even not to verify the Charter"522. Disingenuous as 
the statement may be, it nevertheless should be read In the context of 
fiercely competing State Interests In the course of drafting the Charter. 
In the absence of a provision on reservations in the Charter it is safe to 
assume that the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, 1969523, will be applicable. Article 2(1)(d) of the 
Convention defines a reservation as: 
"a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by 
a State, when signing, ratifying, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applications 
to that State". 
-------------------- 
521 The States that have expressed reservations to specific articles of 
the draft AFCHPR include Burundi (Article 45(3)); Ghana (Article 58); 
Kenya (Articles 45(3) and 68); Tanzania (Articles 45(3), 53,58 and "all 
other articles of the Charter relating to the African Commission... with 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government"); Zambia (Articles 58 
and 63); Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique (Article 
4). Rapporteurs Report of the Ministerial Conference on the Draft 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Doc CM/1149(XXXVII) 
Annex 1, p. 28 paras 121-125 and p. 8 para 38. 
522 Reprint of the Secretary-General of the OAU, OAU Doc CM/Phen, 
Rapporteurs Report (XXXVII) p. 59 para 206. 
523 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties - 63 AJIL (1969) p. 876. 
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There have been no reservations made by State Parties while signing or 
ratifying the AFCHPR, other than those reservations expressed at 
drafting states and before the adoption of the treaty. The question 
therefore arises whether a State which has expressed such reservations 
only at the drafting stage can successfully claim the non-applicability of 
a relevant Charter provision to itself? 
The jurisprudence of the Genocide Convention (1948)524 which contains 
no reservations clause Is Instructive. 
In its Advisory Opinion on the "Reservations to the Convention on 
Genocide Case525 the International Court of Justice held that: 
"In this state of International practice, It could certainly not 
be inferred from the absence of an article providing for 
reservations in a multilateral convention that the contracting 
States are prohibited from making certain reservations. 
Account should also be taken of the fact that the absence of 
such an article or even the decision not to Insert such an 
article can be explained by the desire not to invite a 
multiplicity of reservations. The character of a multilateral 
convention, its purpose, provision, mode of preparation and 
adoption, are factors which must be considered in 
determining, In the absence of any express provision on the 
subject, the possibility of 5t king reservations, as well as their validity and effect... " 
Consequently, although the African Charter has no reservation clause, 
the 'traveauax preparatoire' of the Charter acknowledges the existence of 
expressed reservations of certain State Parties, albeit prior to the 
adoption of the treaty; secondly since an OAU Assembly Resolution 
specifically requested Member States to submit reservations to the OAU 
-------------------- 
524 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 1948 (adopted on 9 Dec 1948 and entered into force on 12 Jan 
1951) 45 AJIL Supp. 6 (1951); 78 UNTS. 288. 
525 Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports 1951 p. 15. 
526 Ibid. 
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General-Secretary527, it is arguable that reservations were envisaged by 
the authors of Regional instruments528. 
It is evident that reservations must not be incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Charter529. The reservations made by some OAU 
Member States during the drafting of the Charter pertained mainly to 
the provisions regarding the interpretation of the OAU Charter, the 
representation of African non-State Parties on the African Commission 
and the conditions justifying the Commissions request for in-depth 
studies. We submit that none of the reservations expressed by the 
States, with the possible exception of Tanzania, are basically 
incompatible with the objects and purpose of the Charter. Consequently, 
It may be argued that the reservations submitted by States during the 
drafting stage of the Charter are valid as long as they are not regarded 
as being in conflict with the objects of the AFCHPR. 
The AFCHPR does not make any provision for its abolition, nor does it 
envisage denunciations or withdrawals. However, amendments are 
permitted by Article 68, if a State Party so requests and is approved by 
a simple majority of State Parties. Such an amendment will apply to each 
State that has accepted it in accordance with its constitutional 
procedure. 
-------------------- 
527 The same resolution requested Member States who have amendments 
"to examine their amendments and to resubmit them at the Nineteenth 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government" 
(scheduled for Iripoli, Libya in 1982) See AHS/Resolution on African 
Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Doc AHG/Dft. Res. 5 paras 2- 
4. 
528 The OAU Assembly's rejection of an amendment to Incorporate 
reservation and denunciation provisions (proposed by Congo, Niger and 
CAR) in the AFCHPR, suggests a contrary intention. OAU Secretary- 
General Report AHG/OAU Doc June 1981. 
529 See Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
op cit. 
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In summation, it is evident that the AFCHPR is not too ambitious a 
treaty since it attempts to strike a fair balance between the respect for 
national sovereignty530 and the need for monitoring Implementation of its 
provisions. The Charters emphasis on promotion rather than protection, 
reflects a cautious but reasonable strategy that a pioneering human 
rights instrument in a volatile region should take. The Charter is 
equipped to serve primarily as an educative and enlightening vehicle 
which should make Africans aware of their rights and encourage them to 
seek the protection of their rights. On the substantive level, the 
Charter ensures the protection of civil and political rights as guaranteed 
in the constitutions of many African States. In this respect, the 
AFCHPR does not necessarily impose novel obligations on State Parties 
other than establishing an international, nay regional, jurisdiction for 
their observation. In the monitoring of the social and economic rights 
guaranteed in the Charter, the African Commission should take 
cognisance of Africa's underdevelopment in ensuring their progressive 
achievement. Social and economic rights cannot be Immediately 
attainable, a fact that is recognized In most African State constitutions, 
which either do not contain any socio-economic guarantees or portray 
them as objectives of State Policy. 
530 The AFCHPR accords a fair amount of concessions to State 
sovereignty as reflected in the following articles: 
- Article 57 - requiring that all communications be brought to 
the knowledge of the State concerned before any 
substantive consideration by the Commission. 
- Article 51 -A State concerned has a right of representation 
before the Commission and may submit writter or 
oral representation. 
- Articles 50 & 56(5) - require the exhaustion of local remedies prior to 
the consideration of any communication by the 
Commission. 
- Articles 47 & 52 - both emphasize recourse to friendly settlement 
and the exhaustion of "all appropriate means" to 
breach an amicable solution In resolving human 
rights matters. 
- Article 59(1) The requirement of confidentiality throught the 
procedure of the Commission until the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government otherwise decide. 
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In the final analysis, it is one thing to ratify a treaty, and another to 
implement its provisions. One can only hope that the African States that 
are yet to ratify the Charter will do so, while those that have, will abide 
by their undertaking to promote and protect human and peoples rights, 
and endeavour to adopt legislative measures to implement the Charters 
provisions. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
This thesis is based on the premise that the last ten years, during 
which unprecedented measures were undertaken toward the establishment 
of a regional machinery for the promotion and protection of human and 
peoples rights in Africa, is a period in African nay world history-which 
has significant implications for international law and international politics, 
and which therefore, merits legal research. 
The increasing emphasis on regional rather than universal measures for 
the promotion and protection of h uman rights is highlighted by the 
establishment of the European Convention on Human Rights, the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the recent African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights. The rationale for this shift of emphasis from the 
universal regime to the regional regime is that the Implementation of 
human rights measures are easier at the regional level because the 
number of nations and the sphere of activity is reduced. Regional 
organizations offer the advantage of geographic proximity and a greater 
likelihood of adherence by States to regionally evolved measures. In the 
context of human rights protection, the regional approach removes such 
issues from the highly politicized global arena. Regionally evolved 
institutions tend to have a unified cultural and historical heritage and 
States are more capable of reaching agreement in the context of human 
rights norms and the application thereof. 
The first point which has emerged is that regional systems basically 
conform to the universal human rights principles of the UN but adopt 
local arrangements to achieve greater respect for human rights norms. 
Regionalism can thus be viewed as complementary to universalism In the 
context of human rights protection. 
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" The underlying philosophy of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights encapsulates the historical traditions and values of African 
civilization. The research into the concept of human rights in pre- 
colonial traditional African societies reveals that these societies observed 
the respect for equality, the right to life, right to receive justice, 
freedom of thought, speech and beliefs, freedom of association and the 
freedom to enjoy property. These rights and freedoms were asserted 
through the imposition of both positive and negative customary values 
and rules, the establishment of democratic Institutions and the 
observance of the "rule of. law" in a sense relative but not exactly in 
syncopation with western notions. In traditional Africa individual rights 
were exercised within the framework of the legitimate concerns of the 
community, whereas in the European context, human rights are 
encapsulated in a catalogue of principles essentially favouring the 
Individual against groups to whom they are opposed. In traditional 
Africa, group or collective rights were emphasised as well as the 
individuals duties to the community. The basis of the African concept of 
human rights was distributive justice. The members of a given 
community shared its common wealth and they assumed responsibilities 
towards one another and more significantly towards the community. 
An appraisal of some of the main theories of human rights, revealed 
certain inherent Inadequacies. We thus proposed a normative theory 
derivative of the naturalist, sociological, anthropological 'and justice 
theories. Eclectic though it may appear, the theory Is predicated upon 
the satisfaction of mans needs based on human dignity, social justice and 
development. This conceptualization recognizes that all societies 
acknowledge the need to protect the human dignity Inherent in man. 
Thus to preserve mans dignity. it is essential to fulfil his basic needs 
for subsistence. The concern for social justice and development as 
reflected In the theory, is based on the belief' that these will enhance 
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the recognition and protection of human rights, increase universal 
participation, encourage the provision of basic services and 
infrastructure through the recognition of economic and social rights, and 
provide adequate and vital procedures for the redress of wrongs against 
individuals and groups. A normative theory that encapsulates the 
foregoing characteristics will to a large extent provide a basis for 
accommodating the largely contrasting cultural and Ideological conceptions 
of human rights. Such a theory accommodates the novel incorporation of 
peoples rights, individual duties and the right to development In the 
AFCHPR. 
With regard to the ongoing debate on the hierarchy of human rights 
based either on the priority of soclo-economic rights over civil and 
political rights or vice versa, we subscribe to the thesis of the 
interdependence of human rights. Social and economic rights including 
the right to subsistence are as significant as civil and political rights. 
Both groups of rights have a universal scope since everyone Is entitled 
to them, despite the different obligations they impose. The absence of a 
universally acknowledged right to subsistence can be attributed to the 
western socio-economic and legal system, which has been influenced by 
theories which advocate the primacy of civil and political rights and take 
subsistence for granted. This attitude and the exploitative effects of 
the world economic system on Africa has fuelled the prevailing view in 
Africa that economic and social rights should take preference over civil 
and political rights. Hence. In identifying the minimum content of human 
rights, the basic civil and political rights, and social and economic 
rights, particularly the right to subsistence should be recognized and 
protected. The hazard of adopting a hierarchical approach to human 
rights, especially in Africa, Is that the protection of civil and political 
rights may be adjourned indefinitely, pending the satisfaction of social 
and economic rights, the prospects of which are dim in the prevailing 
inclement regional and international economic climate. 
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Research into the history of the OAU vividly shows that the organization 
was established primarily as an alliance of States endowed with the task 
of promoting continental unity. Article II of the OAU Charter formally 
subscribes to the human rights principles as consecrated in the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. OAU Member 
States thus have a duty to promote and protect human rights through 
inter-State cooperation. The organs established by the OAU Charter are 
not endowed with express powers to pursue human rights promotion and 
protection. However, it is possible to argue that since one of the 
purposes of the OAU Is to promote international cooperation having due 
regard to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, OAU organs are enjoined to pursue human rights Issues. The 
difficulty with such an argument, admittedly, is that all OAU organs are 
subject to the executive power of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. The concentration of power in the Assembly has been a 
restrictive factor In the pursuance of human rights matters within the 
OAU regime, since the Assembly has been reluctant to respond to 
massive human rights violations on the continent. 
Article II of the OAU Charter which emphasises non-interference. 
sovereignty and territorial integrity has been a major obstacle to the 
effective review of human rights violations by Member States. Several 
African States have only been too eager to raise the shield of "non- 
interference" against international concern over such human rights 
violations. The inability of the OAU to effectively review human rights 
violations on the continent may also be attributed to the organisations 
propensity to resolve disputes by compromise and diplomatic dialogue. 
Furthermore, the lack of defined criteria for membership of the OAU and 
the absence of any provision for suspension or expulsion informs the 
relative apathy of OAU States towards human rights issues. Despite the 
absence of such provisions, we submit that since the OAU Is responsible 
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for the interpretation of its own Charter, the organization has the 
inherent right to decide who should be permitted to participate in its 
activities, especially where a Member State violates the organisations 
primary purposes. The OAU has not been willing to adopt the legal 
approach, preferring the political method of resolving disputes, 
Legal, diplomatic, economic and military solutions have however been 
adopted by the OAU in its goal of eliminating colonialism and racial 
discrimination in Africa. An examination of colonial policies and practices 
in Africa reveals that colonial subjects did not enjoy human rights as 
prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the latter instrument having been 
extended to include some of British colonies. The formation of the OAU 
maybe regarded as the culmination of the efforts of Independent African 
States in 1963, to consolidate their hard won Independence and evolve a 
forum for a concerted action to eradicate colonialism and racial 
discrimination on the continent. Towards this end, African States at the 
UN, influenced by adoption of numerous resolutions which regarded the 
eradication of colonialism (a corollary of the right to self-determination) 
as a precondition for the achievement of international peace and security, 
for Instance the General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 
1960, the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. 
An examination of scholarly and political opinion. Including UN practice, 
reveals that self-determination is a basic principle of international law of 
universal application and amounts to a legal right which may be part of 
jus cogens. The ongoing debate In Africa is whether International law 
recognizes self-determination beyond Independence or decolonization. 
The overwhelming African State view is that the basic principle of 
territorial integrity as established by the OAU Charter and various OAU 
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resolutions militate against claims for political self-determination or 
secession within an independent State. OAU resolutions on the 
inviolability of existing boundaries have established a standard of African 
State practice which provide a basis for a rule of regional customary 
international law binding on States which have subscribed to the existing 
boundary regimes at Independence. Notwithstanding the- foregoing 
submission, by virtue of paragraph 7 of the UN General Assembly 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States It may be 
argued that the inviolability of territorial boundaries and the denial of 
the right of secession are predicated upon the observance of the right 
of peoples to self-determination by States. Article 20 of the AFCHPR 
specifically grants all peoples the right to self-determination, and 
provides that all "colonized or oppressed peoples" shall have the right to 
free themselves from the bounds of domination by resorting to any means 
recognized by the international community. In the absence of a 
definition of the word "peoples" in the AFCHPR, It may not be 
unreasonable to conclude that the word includes ethnic groups within a 
nation State, especially in the light of the Charters specific reference to 
"oppressed peoples" and its prohibition of discrimination along ethnic 
lines. There exists a presumption against secession in International law, 
however, we submit that where an ethnic group or people are oppressed 
and as a result seek to express their right to self-determination via 
secession on universally acknowledged humanitarian grounds, the 
presumption may be rebutted subject to the exhaustion of AFCHPR 
procedures. On the practical level. African States will jealously guard 
their hard won independence and resist any international or regional 
trend aimed at establishing a right to secessionist self-determination, the 
Nigerian Civil War being an apt example. Consequently, we suggest that 
oppressed ethnic peoples could utilize the machinery of the AFCHPR 
through which their right to self-determination can be amplified and 
thus hopefully influence the decentralization of socio-political and 
economic structures in multi-ethnic African States. 
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In the investigation into the right of economic self-determination, we 
established the moral, political and legal justifications of the concept. 
however the legal effect of right remains debatable. Recent African 
State practice reveals a significant shift from the progressive stance of 
domestication toward the internationalization of economic or trade 
agreements, a trend not unconnected to the harsh realities of 
contemporary economic problems of African States. This trend is 
remarkable In the light of the professed goal of self-reliance adopted by 
African States in the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development 
of Africa by the Year 2000 (LPA). The essence of self-reliance is that 
African States need to gradually disengage themselves from depending on 
the global economic and ideological networks and re-engage on more 
equitable grounds. The current lip service paid by some African States 
to the total and immediate disengagement from the world financial network 
sounds hollow since no State can successfully embark on such a venture 
alone. 
The LPA can achieve its objectives if African Statesmen can go beyond 
the symbolic endorsement of the Plan and commit themselves to a regime 
of binding r ules and supervisory organs in ensuring the implementation 
of the Plan. The AFCHPR does not refer to the LPA. an omission which 
we consider would have given greater legal force to the enforcement of 
the right to economic self-determination. 
The main obstacles to the protection of human rights In Africa are 
ethnicism, racism, apartheid and militarism. Most African States are 
composed of diverse ethnic groups some of which are traversed by State 
boundaries. Ethnic groups compete for political power and scarce social 
and economic goods. The dominance of a particular ethnic group in a 
heterogeneous State Is predicated upon its ability to monopolise or at 
least control socio-economic and political Institutions. The Implication of 
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this phenomenon on human rights arises where this control or power is 
utilized by the dominant ethnic group to secure advantages for itself to 
the detriment of others and without due regard to established or 
prescribed norms of equality, merit and justice. Ethnic hegemony 
therefore ensures discrimination, subjugation and in some cases, genocide 
as the recent massacres in Burundi have proved. In our examination of 
the problem of ethnicism in Africa, we proffered several solutions; 
firstly, African States should enact constitutional provisions which will 
ensure that ethnically composite entities within a State are granted 
relative self-government. subject to limited central government control or 
supervision. Secondly, there should be the enactment of constitutional 
provisions that will ensure equal representation of diverse ethnic groups 
in national or central social political and economic institutions. Thirdly, 
multi-ethnic African States should introduce Integrated rural development 
and enterprise schemes in the field of agriculture and commerce, to 
ensure the commercial viability of rural areas, thus stemming the 
problems of urbanization. 
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The problems of racism in East Africa, have been fuelled by the cultural 
aloofness and exploitative practices of the settler Asian communities, thus 
inviting nationalization and mass expulsion orders. While the policy of 
Africanization of economic institutions creates job opportunities for the 
hitherto deprived and disadvantaged citizens of African States, it ought 
to be tempered with a liberal "citizenization" policy whereby aliens with 
genuine contributions to the- socio-economic systems, can be integrated. 
States should also encourage the establishment of interracial organizations 
with the object of, promoting goodwill between the various groups. 
The racism and apartheid in South African have remained one of the most 
formidable obstacles to the protection of human rights in Africa, The 
OAU has adopted various strategies towards the elimination of racism and 
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apartheid in Southern Africa. The OAU has adopted diplomatic and 
mandatory economic sanctions against racist regimes in Southern Africa 
as well as supplying Liberation Movements In Africa with military and 
financial assistance. However, a cursory examination of these measures 
raises pertinent issues as to their legality in the light of International 
law. It is universally acknowledged that apartheid not only violates 
international law but, is also regarded as an international crime. It has 
also been established that States have a duty under jus cogens human 
rights norm of racial nondiscrimination, to take separate action in 
implementation of international accountability with regard to apartheid in 
South Africa. However, there exists a lack of universal consensus as to 
the types of 'action' or 'measures' to be employed to deal with apartheid. 
With regard to the OAU's application of diplomatic and comprehensive 
mandatory economic sanctions against racist regimes, there Is no doubt 
that some of these measures have received the approval of both the UN 
General Assembly and the Security Council, with special reference to the 
case of Zimbabwe and the arms embargo in respect of South Africa. The 
failure of the UN Security Council to endorse the General Assembly's 
resolution for the imposition - of mandatory economic sanctions against 
South Africa Is due to the refusal of US, France and the UK to take on 
board the argument that apartheid constitutes a threat to peace and 
security thus making it obligatory to take "action" under Chapter VII. 
Nevertheless, the OAU has proceeded to adopt more drastic measures 
beyond those endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution. The OAU 
established a Co-ordinating Committee and a Special Fund for the specific 
purpose of supplying Liberation Movements in Africa with military and 
financial assistance. The OAU Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 specifically 
underlines the determination of the OAU to utilize these measures for the 
eradication of racism and apartheid in Southern Africa. It is therefore 
in the light- of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which prohibits the use of 
force that the issue of the legality of the OAU's measures arise. 
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Several justifications may be proffered for the OAU's military and 
financial assistance to National Liberation Movements in Africa. For 
instance, it may be argued, firstly that it Is the national liberation 
movements and not the OAU that are engaged in the use of force and, 
secondly, that since Article 2(4) applies to State actions, the OAU being 
a regional organization, and its measures being of an indirect nature, 
cannot be so charged. Furthermore, from a teleological viewpoint, the 
UN General Assembly has through its positive endorsement of OAU 
resolutions such as the Lusaka Manifesto, endowed OAU measures in this 
regard with legal authorization; consequently the actions taken may 
constitute "enforcement action" within Article 53 of the UN Charter. The 
legal efficacy of this argument is, admittedly, doubtful especially In the 
light of the absence of universal consensus on the capacity of the 
General Assembly to legally authorise "enforcement action" with Article 
53(1). 
A more plausible justification for OAU measures in this regard, Is that 
they fall within the proviso of Article 2(4) as far as the assistance 
rendered is in tandem with the purposes of the UN, which include the 
right to self-determination. Furthermore, we have established that self- 
determination is now a legal right which justifies the use of force In self- 
defence of it. This conclusion is supported by UN practice, evidenced 
by the General 'Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970, the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between States. 
It is pertinent to note that the OAU Member States have not regarded 
the campaign against colonialism- and apartheid as a matter confined to 
the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned. However with regard to 
social and political upheavals and consequent massive human rights 
violations within some OAU Member States, these issues have hitherto 
been regarded as matters solely of domestic concern of Member States; 
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especially in the light of Article II of the OAU Charter, and the 
constitutional provisions of State Parties which emphasise the absolute 
sovereignty of the State over all matters especially those touching on 
human rights and the administration of justice. 
The investigation into the human rights provisions In African State 
constitutions reveals that the majority of African States have a 
comprehensive Bill of Rights incorporated into their respective National 
Constitutions. These constitutions also provide for the enforcement of 
the rights guaranteed whereby any person alleging that a fundamental 
right has been, is being or is likely to be contravened In relation to him 
may apply to the High Courts of Justice for redress. The National 
Courts are thus under a duty to hear and determine the justiceable 
issues involved and may in consequence thereof make such orders they 
may consider appropriate. The rights of the individual and the scope of 
judicial review of legislative and executive measures are however, 
curtailed by the complexity and detail of exceptions to the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by these Bills of Rights. The catalogue of human 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by African State Constitutions may be 
derogated from by virtue of legislative and executive measures enacted in 
the interest of defence, public safety. public health and morals and 
public order. Several neo-Nigerian African Constitutions provide the 
vague safeguard that such measures restricting human liberties must be 
'reasonably justifiable ina democratic society'. 
The preponderance of African judicial decisions on fundamental human 
rights tend to be in favour of legislative or executive measures 
purportedly taken in the interest of public good. In a few cases Courts 
have been courageous enough to invalidate such measures and several 
responsible governments have complied therewith. However in many 
instances, the 'State either ignores such rulings or takes the more 
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drastic measure of enacting legislations which reverse such rulings or go 
even further by ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts. 
The constitutional protection of human rights in African States may also 
be encroached upon through the constitutional provisions which exist to 
preserve the security and safety of the State from either actual public 
emergency or some other threatened danger that may face a State. The 
significance of constitutional provisions on State Security and Emergency 
cannot be overemphasised and they hinge on the principle of "Salus 
populi est supreme lex" (the safety of the nation is supreme law). 
The developing States of Africa have to contend with fragile and 
underdeveloped socio-political and economic institutions which are 
vulnerable to the threats posed by competing claims made upon them. 
The majority of African Constitutions expressly provide for the 
derogation of fundamental rights during an emergency, and In practise, 
African States have shown a propensity to proclaim states of emergency 
and invoke Public Security Laws. Human rights are invariably the first 
casualties of such declarations of emergency since the executive and 
legislature invariably have the freedom to derogate from the human 
rights and freedoms consecrated in the constitution. 
An examination of African Constitutions reveals that only the 
Constitutions of Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe provide 
for the preservation of certain rights from encroachment during an 
emergency period or at any time; namely, the right to life, freedom from 
slavery and forced labour, freedom from inhuman treatment and the right 
to the protection of the law. The absence of this safeguard In the 
majority of African Constitutions provides a "carte blanche" for most 
States to derogate from all the human rights and freedoms guaranteed 
under the constitution. It is therefore desirable that African States 
ý' 
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enact constitutional provisions safeguarding basic human rights from 
derogation under any circumstances, especially in the light of the 
absence of a derogation clause in the AFCHPR. 
In the absence of such safeguards, African Courts should be prepared to 
rebut the presumption of constitutional validity of statutes, and the 
legality of executive measures where they appear prima facia to invade 
rights guaranteed by the constitution. African States adopt either the a 
priori or a posteriori procedure for the judicial review of constitutionality 
of laws. It is submitted that African States should emulate the Zambian 
Constitution by adopting both methods of review of the constitution 
validity of statutes and executive measures, thus providing a double 
guarantee for persons whose rights or liberties may be threatened by 
State measures. 
At least nine African States currently have no constitutional human 
rights guarantees. The absence of such provisions Is due either to the 
abrogation/suspension of State Constitutions which hitherto protected 
human rights, for instance Ghana and Lesotho, or purposive State 
policies against the adoption of Bills of Rights as In the case of Ethiopia 
and Malawi. The abrogation or suspension of constitutional Bills of 
Rights and indeed whole constitutions. have invariably been effected by 
military regimes on the assumption of power. In our examination of the 
legality of coup detat, we arrived at the conclusion that Military 
Government by its very essence and characteristics is a denial of the 
right of the majority of the polity to govern themselves according to a 
constitutional promulgated by their collective will. Consequently, It is a 
fundamental philosophical and juristic contradiction to refer to 
fundamental rights in a military era. Nevertheless, by gaining de facto 
and arguably subsequent de jure control of the machinery of the State, 
military forces are effectively recognized as legitimate rulers. A few 
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African States, for instance Nigeria, have adopted constitutional 
provisions which declare coup detat illegal. but such solutions have 
proved futile in preventing the recurrence of military coups. 
We thus submit that the effective protection of human rights in military 
governed African States is dependent on three main factors; first, the 
extent to which the government is prepared to accommodate Individual 
rights and freedoms, secondly, the courage and Independence of the 
judiciary, and thirdly, the initiative, resource and courage of the public 
and the press. In the absence of the willingness of African governments 
to ensure adequate local guarantees for Individual freedoms, the African 
judiciary should be prepared to enhance human rights by the domestic 
application of international and regional human rights norms. 
Admittedly, in most African Countries, international or regional 
conventions are not directly enforceable in national courts unless their 
provisions have been incorporated by legislation into domestic law. 
However, national courts should now be willing to have regard to 
regional and international norms where domestic law Is uncertain or 
inadequate. It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and 
established judicial function for national courts to have regard to 
international and regional obligations which a State undertakes, whether 
or not they have been Incorporated into domestic law, especially for the 
purpose of erasing ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions 
or legislation. Practising lawyers and judges who have hitherto ignored 
the international dimension should take judicial notice of the recent 
comprehensive developments in regional and international human rights 
law, to redress the current inadequate state of domestic human rights 
legal regimes of African States. 
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In view of the limited scope within which the judiciary can operate in 
Africa, the public should evolve institutions for the promotion and, 
protection of human rights within their respective States. Such pressure 
groups may be formed by religious societies, professional associations in 
collaboration with the press, to effectively disseminate Information to the 
largely non-literate populace regarding their fundamental rights. The 
establishment of human rights pressure groups can ensure the protection 
of human liberties by evolving mechanisms to respond to human rights 
violations and seek redress when infringements do occur. Currently, 
only international organisations such as Amnesty International and 
"Rights & Humanity" perform the function of safeguarding the rights of 
individuals particularly in Africa, and the world In general. The 
mandate of such international NGO's are limited, and restricted to 
research and publication of violations of human rights and official 
representations on such violations to governments where necessary. It 
is thus pertinent that privately established regional and national human 
rights organisations are encouraged to flourish in view of the advantages 
of their being able to promptly respond to threats to or violations of 
human rights through publicity and legal redress. The establishment of 
organisations such as the African Association for Human and Peoples 
Rights (AAHPR) and the Nigerian Council on Human Rights (NCHR) 
indicate the feasibility of this solution as complementary to the efforts of 
the judiciary and international human rights organisations In ensuring 
adequate protection of fundamental liberties in Africa. 
The evolution, adoption and entry into force of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (AFCHPR) is a response to the Inadequate 
state of human rights promotion and observance in the region. It is 
pertinent to acknowledge the role of the UN as the single most Important 
catalyst to the evolution of the AFCHPR. From the conception of the 
idea of a regional human rights machinery for Africa at the 1961 IC7 
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Rule of Law Conference (Lagos, January 196: ) to the adoption of the 
AFCHPR, (Banjul, Gambia, June 1981) the US has relentlessly p ursued 
the idea through the organisation of semi nars and conferences on the 
establishment of a regional human rights machinery for Africa. The 
significance of the UN efforts in this regard is further evidenced by the 
adoption of the UN "Monrovia Proposal for the setting up of an African 
Commission on Human Rights", as one of the working papers of the 
Meeting of Legal Experts which drafted the AFCHPR. 
A comparative analysis of the Monrovia Propose: and the AFCHPR reveals 
that most of the basic recommendations of the former are reflected In the 
latter instrument. The twenty year period between the sowing of the 
idea of an African Commission on Human Rights and Its metamorphosis as 
the AFCHPR may be attributed to several factors. These factors Include 
the divergence of political, ideological and legal structures of African 
States, the strong aversion of these States to external Interference in 
local human rights matters which they regard as issues solely of domestic 
domain, and the recurring destabilizing effects of ethnicity and military 
intervention. It has also been suggested that the economic 
underdevelopment of Africa is a major stumbling block to the evolution of 
an effective regional machinery for Africa. We submit that much as the 
economic status of States may affect the protection of socio and economic 
rights, it is less likely per se to undermine the preservation of personal 
security rights and the civil/political rights of citizens. An examination 
of the Charters drafting process, reveals that much as its authors 
endeavoured to produce a legally proficient human rights instrument, 
political factors contributed firstly to the reduction of the several rights 
and freedoms and secondly to the erosion of the independence of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. These reductions 
were perhaps necessary sacrifices for securing the collective adoption of 
the AFCHPR by the majority of African States. Nevertheless the coming 
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into force of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
(AFCHPR), is a remarkable achievement in view of the aforementioned 
obstacles and the hitherto dismal state of human rights protection in 
Africa . 
The AFCHPR derives its inspiration primarily from African historical, 
cultural and legal sources without sacrificing the exogamous Influences of 
Judeo-Greco jurisprudence as represented by existing regional human 
rights conventions and international human rights instruments. The 
impact of these instruments is reflected in the provisions of the AFCIiPR' 
on personal security rights, civil and political rights and the Rules of 
Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. It 
was prudent to allow these external influences on the AFCHPR since they 
invariably represent, firstly, international human rights procedures-of 
proven viability and secondly they encompass universal human rights 
norms solemnly consecrated in various international instruments adopted 
by States including a fair number of African Countries. Thirdly, most 
of the rights protected by these international Instruments are not alten 
to the traditional African concept of human rights. 
However, in contradistinction to existing regional human rights 
conventions and international human rights Instruments, the AFCHPR 
expands upon the classical concept of human rights by protecting peoples 
rights, consecrating the duties of the individual towards his family. 
society, the State and the international community, and by couching 
social and economic rights in legally enforceable terms, thus imposing 
corresponding and immediate obligations on States. The AFCHPR 
therefore represents the first international human rights instrument to 
incorporate the three generations of rights namely, civil and political 
rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and the rights of solidarity 
and peoples rights. 
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It is universally acknowledged that the efficacy of an international human 
rights instrument is dependent upon the degree to which derogations and 
limitations are permissible to the rights and freedoms protected therein. 
A significant flaw in the AFCHPR is the absence of a derogation clause 
which prescribes the modalities for the suspension of rights and freedoms 
in time of war or state of emergency and also safeguard certain basic 
freedoms from encroachment in such circumstances. The AFCHPR utilizes 
the device of limitation clauses, otherwise known as "claw-back" clauses, 
which permit encroachment on individual rights and freedoms in the 
interest of law and public order, public interest and other variations 
thereof. Under the AFCHPR, the rights to equality, personal dignity 
and a fair hearing are guaranteed without qualifications or limitations. 
However, the right to life and liberty and the freedoms of conscience, 
expression, assembly and movement may be restricted or derogated from 
"by the law". The social, economic and cultural rights are couched in 
relatively absolute terms, with the exception of the right to property 
which latter right may be encroached upon in the Interest of public 
need. 
The permissible scope of limitations to personal security rights and civil 
and political rights consecrated In the AFCHPR will depend upon the 
interpretation adopted by the African Commission in determining the 
meaning of such claw-back phrases as "in accordance with the law", and 
"by the law". By adopting a narrow interpretation, the African 
Commission will be confining itself to the consideration of domestic laws 
only, thus subjecting the rights consecrated in the AFCHPR to the 
vagaries and restrictions of local laws. We submit that due to the 
inadequacy of domestic laws, exemplified by the various Detention and 
Public Security Laws, and the susceptibility of African Constitutional 
Bills of Rights to suspension and abrogation, the African Commission 
should adopt a wider interpretation of claw-back phrases. A broad 
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interpretation of these limitation clauses should entail three main 
considerations: first, Member States should not be permitted to adopt 
these clauses as a general authorization to establish new restrictions on 
the rights consecrated in the AFCHPR. Secondly, where a law exists 
that purports to restrict established rights, it must amount to a general 
legal norm linked to the general welfare, passed by democratically elected 
legislative organs established by the Constitution and evolved through 
procedures set forth by the State Constitution for that purpose; thirdly, 
in cases where the constitution or domestic law of a State Party provides 
greater protection for human rights and freedoms than the AFCHPR, the 
State should be estopped from relying entirely on the restrictive 
provisions of the latter. Finally, by virtue of Articles 60 and 61 of the 
AFCHPR which empowers the African Commission to "draw inspiration" 
from international human rights instruments and to utilize general and 
special international conventions as subsidiary measures to determine the 
principles of law, it is submitted that the African Commission may refer 
to these international norms, as "laws" which restrict government 
encroachment on human rights to a greater degree than the AFCHPR. 
In addition to interpreting the Charter by reference to international 
instruments, the African Commission may also directly apply the 
provisions of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for 
instance, as long as the State Party has an obligation thereunder - pacta 
sunt servanda. Thus, for example where an African State being a party 
to both the AFCHPR and the International Covenants, declares a State of 
Emergency, the African Commission should be able to enhance the rights 
of the individual in such a situation by directly applying the provisions 
of Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which secures several basic freedoms from derogation. The adoption of 
this broad interpretation will achieve a greater overall substantive and 
procedural protection for the individual in the light of the AFCHPR's 
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vague "claw-back" clauses and the Charter's catalogue of d. ties of the 
individual towards the State. 
The duties of individuals and States as consecrated in the AFCHPR 
raises some issues. The justificability of the individuals duties is 
questionable in the light of the fact that the individual cannot be 
arraigned before the African Commission. The concept of Individual 
duties however, grants States an opportunity to erode some of the 
individual rights protected by the Charter; for example, where a State 
decides to implement or enforce on the individuals duty to "strengthen 
social and national solidarity" under Article 29(5) of the AFCHPR. 
The AFCHPR consecrates social, economic and cultural rights to 
relatively absolute and legally enforceable terms, thus creating 
corresponding and immediate obligations on States. However by adopting 
the broad method of interpretation which takes into consideration the 
provisions of international human rights instruments, in this context, the 
International Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. it may 
be possible to argue that African State Parties to the Convention will 
only be required to take steps to the maximum of their available 
resources with a view to achieving progressively, the full realisation of 
those rights; thus obviating the immediacy of the obligations imposed by 
the AFCHPR. 
It is pertinent to highlight the fact that since a limited number of 
African States are parties to the international human rights Covenants 
(See Appendix X, post), the evolution by the African Commission of 
consistent and uniform rules in this regard will be jeopardised. 
Consequently, the African Commission should consider recommending the 
incorporation of comprehensive provisions on derogations, as well as 
modalities for enhancing socio-economic rights in the AFCIIPR. either by 
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way of an amendment or through the adoption of a Protocol. In the 
unlikely event of an immediate adoption of such a Protocol, we will have 
to await the evolution of the jurisprudence of the African Commission to 
clarify the limits of permissible incursions into individual rights by State 
measures. 
The incorporation of peoples rights in the AFCHPR is not only a 
response to the needs of the economically deprived rural, subsistence 
populace against the onslaught of the increasingly acquisitive urban 
ruling elites, but also a device to protect ethnically distinct minority 
groups from oppressive political measures of the ruling majority. The 
AFCHPR does not define the word "peoples". We thus submit that by 
virtue of its power to interpret the provisions of the Charter, the 
African Commission should regard the word "peoples" as distinct ethnic 
groups where prima facie grounds reveal that they are being 
"oppressed". Furthermore, since the term "peoples" Is such an 
amorphous concept susceptible to various definitions, It is suggested that 
its meaning should be specifically determined by the African Commission 
in the context of each case reported to it. 
The need to adopt this cautious approach is underlined by the volatility 
of heterogeneous States of Africa. The fact that the AFCHPR protects 
peoples rights to self-determination may be regarded in some quarters as 
a license for secession. We submit that the concept of peoples rights to 
self-determination as consecrated in the AFCHPR does not Per se justify 
secessionist claims of oppressed ethnic or minority groups within a State. 
This is underlined by the fact that the AFCHPR specifically Imposes a 
duty on individuals to pursue national Independence and the territorial 
integrity of his State. The provisions of the Charter may however, 
justify the claim by "oppressed" ethnic or minority groups within a State 
to seek autonomy and devolution of political power of the Central 
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Government through the creation of Federal or confederal political 
systems, where these solutions enhance the equitable distribution of the 
nations resources and secure the rights of the ethnic group or minority 
to self-determination. With regard to peoples rights to dispose of their 
wealth and natural resources, the concept of peoples refers to the entire 
national community, whose interests in this regard is represented and 
protected by the State. 
The AFCHPR makes provision for the establishment of a Commission to be 
composed of eleven individuals to be elected by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government. The major function of the Commission is to 
promote and protect human and peoples rights in Africa. Towards this 
end the African Commission Is empowered to undertake studies and public 
enlightenment exercises and establish principles to guide Member States 
on human and peoples rights legislation. The Commission may also 
cooperate with African and international Institutions. More significantly. 
the Commission can receive complaints from Member States, Individuals or 
organisations, arising from a violation of the Charter's provisions. The 
Commission is empowered to resolve interstate disputes initially through 
the peaceful procedure of negotiations and conciliation. However if the 
peaceful and friendly procedure should fail, this triggers the complaint 
procedure which ultimately results in the referral of the Commissions 
report to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Charters 
overemphasis on the role and power of the Assembly, may undermine the 
effectiveness of this procedure. It will not be unreasonable to expect 
that inter-State communications will be rare, especially in the light of the 
Charters provision that emphasises the exhaustion of bilateral 
negotiations between disputing States before the Commission can be 
seized of the matter. 
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The Charter's provisions as regards communications submitted by parties 
other than Member States are subject to conditions of receivability which 
may forestall their consideration by the Commission. For Instance Article 
56 of the AFCHPR provides that such communications should be 
compatible with the Charter of the OAU. Article 111(2) of the OAU 
Charter emphasizes the principle of non-interference In the domestic 
affairs of States. Consequently, it is possible that a State may raise 
objections to an individual or State complaint on that basis. We have 
argued that since State Parties to the AFCHPR have assumed regional 
and international obligations relating to human rights, disputes 
concerning these obligations are matters of regional and international 
rather than domestic concern. Thus where an individual alleges a 
violation of his rights under the AFCHPR or where a Member State 
demands that another Party live up to its regional and international 
obligations with regard to human rights, such an action cannot be 
deemed to violate Article III(2) of the OAU Charter. 
Individual complaints are subjected to further restrictions such as the 
requirement of the exhaustion of local remedies and the fact that the 
Commission may not undertake an "in-depth" or "thorough study" of a 
communication revealing the existence of a series of serious or massive 
transgressions of human and peoples rights, without the prior approval 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. An 
examination of the domestic statutes and the machineries of justice of 
African States reveals the existence of systems which may be manipulated 
to inhibit an individual from redressing an injustice perpetuated by State 
officials and organs. Thus the African Commission should consider 
laying less emphasis on the exhaustion of local remedies. The 
Commission should pay more attention to the substance of an individual 
petition and should be willing to waive the rule of exhaustion of local 
remedies where the petition reveals the existence of official measures, 
domestic statutes or laws which deny access to local remedies. 
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The requirement of the prior approval of the Assembly before the 
Commission can undertake an "in-depth" or "thorough study" of 
complaints revealing a series of serious or massive violations of human 
rights, creates a major obstacle to the enhancement of the Charters 
effectiveness. The Assembly, composed of Heads of State who have 
hitherto historically glossed over human rights violation on the continent, 
may be unwilling to submit a fellow member to such embarrassing 
Investigations. For instance, the OAU's apathy In the light of the 
deplorable practices of Idi Amin and Bokassa Is instructive. We 
" therefore submit that the Commission should be granted statutory powers 
to embark upon "on-site" observations independent of the Assembly. not 
unlike the power Inter-American Commission on Human Rights under 
Article 41 of the American Convention and Article 55 of the Rule of 
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission. 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights does not posses 
any enforcement power. Unlike its American and European counterparts 
which are empowered to refer cases to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights respectively, the 
AFCHPR does not make any provision for an African Court of Human 
Rights. African States should consider the long-term solution of 
establishing such a court, especially in the light of what we perceive as 
the inherent deficiency of the current deterrent measures of 
investigation, publicity and condemnation of offending States by the OAU 
Assembly. In the meantime, the independence of the Commission should 
be enhanced through the granting of autonomous powers to the 
Commission vis a vis the Assembly thus reducing the likelihood of 
political interference from the latter. 
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It is evident that neither the OAU Charter nor the AFCHPR provide for 
the utilisation of sanction of expulsion from the OAU for matters 
involving massive human rights violations. In the absence of such a 
provision, we submit that the OAU, being a regional organisation is 
responsible for the interpretation of its own Charter, which 
interpretation should give effect to the organisations primary purposes. 
Consequently, a regional organisation such as the OAU, despite the 
absence of a provision on expulsion of its members, should have the 
so inherent right to decide on who should be permitted to participate In its 
ý- activities, thus facilitating the expulsion of members that habitually or 
ývr ý. consistently violate its central purposes which include the promotion and 
ý'ýj protection of human right 
The AFCHPR imposes legal obligations on State Parties to observe Its 
provisions and to adopt legislative measures giving effect to them. The 
constitutional provisions of the majority of African States guarantee the 
protection of human rights in various forms and to varying degrees. 
The constitutional provisions of some African States permit the self- 
execution of international treaties, thus implying automatic applicability 
of the provisions of the AFCHPR in domestic legal regimes. However, In 
most African States regional and international treaties are given the force 
of law only through the enactment of domestic statutes. Thus, the 
enforceability of the provisions of the AFCHPR In most African States 
will depend upon the immediacy with which these States adopt domestic 
measures to give effect them. Furthermore, several African State 
Constitutions empower their respective Supreme Courts to make rulings 
on the compatibility of international and regional treaty obligations with 
constitutional and other municipal laws. In other States, Courts are 
bound to recognise the supremacy of treaties once they are legally 
incorporated Into the domestic legal regime. 
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However, in most Common law African States, where national law is clear 
and inconsistent with the international obligations of the State concerned, 
the judiciary is obliged to give effect to national law. We submit that in 
such circumstances, the judiciary should be willing to invite the attention 
of the relevant authorities to such inconsistency since the supremacy of 
national law does not mitigate a breach of an international legal obligation 
undertaken by a State. It is our considered opinion that the domestic 
application of the AFCHPR will ultimately depend upon the ability of the 
judiciary to have regard to the Charters provisions and those of other 
international human rights instruments, for the purpose of extinguishing 
ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislations or 
common law. 
The AFCHPR entered into force on 21 October 1986. The Members of the 
African Commission for Human and Peoples Rights were elected by the 
OAU Assembly in July 1987. The Commission held its first session at the 
headquarters of the OAU (Addis Ababa) on 2 November 1987 during 
which the 11 members of the Commission elected Isaac Nguema of Gabon 
and Ibrahim Badawi E1-Sheikh of Egypt as President and Vice-President 
respectively for a renewable period of two years. During the meeting 
members were requested to present remarks, comments or amendments on 
the Commissions draft rules of procedure for the next meeting. 
The second session of the Commission was held in Dakar Senegal from 
8th - 13th February 1988 during which the Commission adopted its rules 
of procedure. An analysis of the Commissions Rules of Procedure is 
regrettably, beyond the scope of this thesis due to the constraints of 
our period of reference (the cutoff point being January 1988). However, 
see Appendix XII for the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples Rights. 
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It is to be hoped that the Commissions Rules of Procedure will take due 
cognisance of dark areas of the Charter, some of which we have 
attempted to highlight. Admittedly, most of these problem areas are 
beyond the statutory powers of the Commission to rectify, nevertheless, 
the Commission could utilise its powers of interpretation to surmount the 
vagueness of some of the Charters provisions. The Commission's 
promotional role which should normally be in public will include the 
encouragement of States to adopt legislative measures giving effect to the 
Charters provisions. In adopting such measures, many Member States 
will have to reconcile the glaring conflict between the Charters 
provisions and domestic legislation. The Commission should also 
encourage the formation of local human rights organisations which will be 
better placed to enlighten the public on human rights and spontaneously 
respond to human rights violations in African States. 
It is evident that a new era of human and peoples rights has been 
ushered into Africa. The birth of the African Commission on Human 
Rights and the recent upsurge In the activities of national and 
international non-government human rights organisations on the African 
continent, all coinciding with the 40th Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1988), underline our 
conviction that human and peoples rights are a significant part of any 
future agenda for Africa, a fact which African governments should 
recognise and pursue more vigourously. 
APPENDIX 
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APPENDIX I 
LAW OF LAGOS 
The African Conference on the Rule of Law consisting of 194 
judges, practising lawyers and teachers of law from 23 African nations 
as well as 9 countries of other continents. 
Assembled in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1961 under the aegis 
of the International Commission of Jurists, 
Having discussed freely and frankly the Rule of Law with 
particular reference to Africa, and 
Having reached conclusions regarding Human Rights in relation 
to government security, Human Rights in relation to aspects of criminal 
and administrative law, and the responsibility of the Judiciary and of 
the Bar for the protection of the rights of the individual in society, 
NOW SOLEMNLY 
Recognizes that the Rule of Law is a dynamic concept which 
should be employed to safeguard and advance the will of the people and 
the political rights of the individual and to establish social, economic, /educational 
and cultural conditions under which the individual may 
achieve his dignity and realize his legitimate aspirations in all 
countries, whether dependent or independent, 
Reaffirms the Act of Athens and the Declaration of Delhi with 
special reference to Africa and 
Declares 
1. That the principles embodied in the Conclusions of this Conference 
which are annexed hereto should apply to any society, whether free or 
otherwise, but that the Rule of Law cannot be fully realized unless 
legislative bodies have been established in accordance with the will of 
people who have adopted their Constitution freely; 
2. That in order to maintain adequately the Rule of Law all Governments 
should adhere to the principle of democratic representation in their 
Legislatures; 
3. That fundamental human rights, especially the right to personal 
liberty, should be written and entrenched in the Constitutions of all 
countries and that such personal liberty should not-in peacetime be 
restricted without trial in a Court of Law; 
4. That in order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, this Conference invites the African Governments to 
study the possibility of adopting an African convention of Human Rights 
in such a manner that the Conclusions of this Conference will be 
safeguarded by the creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and 
that recourse thereto be made available for all persons under the 
jurisdiction of the signatory States; 
5. That in order to promote the principles and the practical application 
of the Rule of Law, the judges, practising lawyers and teachers of law in 
African countries should take steps to establish branches of the International 
Commission of Jurists. 
This Resolution shall be known as the Law of Lagos. 
Hone at t. a¢os this 7th day of January 1961. 
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APPENDIX II 
CHARTER OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
Addis Ababa, May, 1963. 
We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 
Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to 
control their own destiny; 
Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and 
dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate 
aspirations of the African peoples; 
Conscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and human 
resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in 
spheres of human endeavour; 
Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding 
among our peoples and co-operation among our States in response to the 
aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger 
unity transcending ethnic and national differences; 
Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into 
a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and 
security must be established and maintained; 
Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence 
as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, 
and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms; 
Dedicated to the general progress of Africa; 
Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we 
reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and 
positive co-operation among States; 
Desirous that all African States should henceforth unite so 
that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured; 
Resolved to reinforce the links between our States by establishing 
and strengthening common institutions; 
Have agreed to the present Charter. 
ESTABLISHMENT 
Article 1 
1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present-Charter establish an 
Organisation to be known as the Organisation of African Unity. 
2. The Organisation shall include the Continental African States, 
Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa. 
PURPOSES 
Article II 
1. The Organisation shall have the following purposes: 
(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; 
(b) to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to 
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; 
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(c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and 
independence; 
(d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and 
(e) to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the 
the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
2. To these ends, the Member States shall co-ordinate and harmonise 
their general policies, especially in the following fields: 
(a) political and diplomatic co-operation; 
(b) economic co-operation, including transport and communications; 
(c) educational and cultural co-operation; 
(d) health, sanitation, and nutritional co-operation; 
(e) scientific and technical co-operation; and 
(f) co-operation for defence and security. 
PRINCIPLES 
Article III 
The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II, 
solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles: 
1, the sovereign equality of all Member States; 
2, non-interference in the internal affairs of States; 
3, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State 
and for its inalienable right to independent existence; 
4, peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation 
or arbitration; 
5, unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination 
as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring Stites 
or anyother State; 
6, absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories 
which are still dependent; 
7, affirmation of a policy of non-alightnment with regard to all blocs. 
MEMBERSHIP 
Article IV 
Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a 
Member of the Organisation. 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBER STATES 
Article V 
All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties. 
Article VI 
The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles 
enumerated in Article III of the present Charter. 
INSTITUTIONS 
Article VII 
The Organisation shall accomplish its purposes through the following 
principal institutions: 
1, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; 
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2, the Council of Ministers; 
3, the General Secretariat; 
4, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 
THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT 
Article VIII 
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme 
organ of the Organisation. It shall, subject to the provisions of this 
Charter, discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to 
co-ordinating and harmonising the general policy of the Organisation. 
It may in addition review the structure, functions and acts of all the 
organs and any specialised agencies which may be created in accordance 
with the present Charter. 
Article IX 
The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State and Government 
or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once 
a year. At the request of any Member State and approval by the majority 
of the Member States, the Assembly shall meet in extra-ordinary session. 
Article X 
1. Each Member State shall have one vote. 
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the 
Members of the Organisation. 
3. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Whether or 
not a question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple 
majority of all Member States of the Organisation. 
4. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Organisation shall form a 
quorum at any meeting of the Assembly. 
Article XI 
The Assembly shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure. 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
Article XII 
1. The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or such' 
other Ministers as are designated by the Governments of Member States. 
2. The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. When 
requested by any Member State and approved by two-thirds of all 
Member States, it shall meet in extraordinary session. 
Article XIII 
1. The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the 
responsibility of preparing conferences of the assembly. 
2. It shall take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly. 
It shall be entrusted with the implemen. tation of the decisions of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall co-ordinate inter- 
African co-operation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly 
and in conformity with Article 11(2) of the present Charter. 
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Article XIV 
1. Each Member State shall have one vote. 
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the 
members of the Council of Ministers. 
3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council of Ministers shall 
form a quorum for any meeting of the Council. 
Article XV 
The Council shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure. 
GENERAL SECRETARIAT 
Article XVI 
There shall be an Administrative Secretary-General of the Organisation, 
who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
The Administrative Secretary-General shall direct the affairs of the 
Secretariat. 
Article XVII 
There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Organisation, 
who shall be appointed by the assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
The Administrative Secretary-General shall direct the affairs of the 
Secretariat. 
Article XVII 
There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the 
Organisation who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government. 
Article XVIII 
The functions and conditions of services of the Secretary-General, of 
the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat 
shall be governed by the provisions of this Charter and the regulations 
approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
1. In the performance of their duties the Administrative Secretary- 
General and the staff shall not seek or receive instruction from any 
government or from any other authority external to the Organisation. 
They shall refrain from any action with might reflect on their position 
as international officials responsible only to the Organisation. 
2. Each member of the Organisation undertakes to respect the exclusive 
character of the responsibilities of the Administrative Secretary-General 
and the Staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their 
responsibilities. 
COMMISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION 
Article XIX 
Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful 
means and, to this end, agree to conclude a separate treaty establishing 
a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and arbitration. Said treaty 
shall be regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter. 
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SPECIALIZED COMMISSIONS 
Article XX 
The Assembly shall establish such Specialized Commissions as it may deem 
necessary, including the following: 
1. Economic and Social Commission. 
2. Educational and Cultural Commission. 
3. Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission. 
4. Defence Commission. 
5. Scientific., Technical and Research Commission. 
Article XXI 
Each Specialized Commission referred to in Article 20 shall be composed 
of the Ministers concerned or other Ministers of Plenipotentiaries 
designated by the Governments of the Member States. 
Article XXII 
The functions of the Specialized Commissions shall be carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the 
regulations approved by the Council of Ministers. 
THE BUDGET 
Article XXIII 
The budget of the Organization prepared by the Administrative Secretary- 
General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers. The budget shall 
be provided by contributions from Member States in accordance with the 
scale of assessment of the United Nations; provided, however, that no 
Member State shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty per cent of 
the yearly regular budget of the Organization. The Member States agree 
to pay their respective contributions regularly. 
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF CHARTER 
Article XXIV 
This Charter shall be open for signature to all independent sovereign 
African and Malagasy States and shall be ratified by the signatory 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
The original instrument, done in English and French, both 
texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of 
Ethiopia which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all independent 
sovereign African and Malagasy States. 
Instrument of ratification shall be deposited with the Government 
of Ethiopia, which shall notify all signatories of each such deposit. 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
Article XXV 
This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by the 
Government of Ethiopia of the instruments of ratification from two- 
thirds of the signatory States. 
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REGISTRATION OF THE CHARTER 
Article XXVI 
This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the 
Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in 
conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CHARTER 
Article XXVII 
Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this Charter 
shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, present and voting. 
ADHESION AND ACCESSION 
Article XXVIII 
1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the 
Administrative Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede 
to this Charter. 
2. The Administrative Secretary-General shall, on receipt of such 
notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member States. 
Admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member States. 
The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Administrative 
Secretary-General who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, 
communicate the decision to the State concerned. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Article XXIX 
The working languages of the Organisation and all its institutions 
shall be, if possible, African languages, English and French. 
Article XXX 
The Administrative Secretary-General may accept on behalf of the 
Organisation, gifts, bequests and other donations made to the Organisation, 
provided that this is approved by the Council of Ministers. 
Article XXXI 
The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immunities 
to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective 
territories of the Member States. 
CESSATION OF MEMBERSHIP 
Article XXXII 
Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a 
written notification to the Administrative Secretary-General. At the 
end of one year from the date of such notification, it not withdrawn, 
the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State, 
which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organisation. 
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AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER 
Article XXXIII 
This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes 
a written request to the Administrative Secretary-General to that 
effect; provided, however, that the proposed amendment is not submitted 
to the assembly for consideration until all the Member States have been 
duly notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an 
amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-thirds 
of all the Member States. 
IN FAITH WHEREOF, We, the Heads of African States and Governments 
have signed this Charter. 
ALGERIA MALI 
BURUNDI MAURITANIA 
CAMEROON MOROCCO 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC NIGER 
CHAD NIGERIA 
CONGO (Brazzaville) RWANDA 
CONGO Leopoldville) SENEGAL 
DAHOMEY SIERRA LEONE 
ETHIOPIA SOMALIA 
GABON SUDAN 
GHANA TANGANYIKA 
GUINEA TOGO 
IVORY COAST TUNISIA 
LIBERIA UGANDA 
LIBYA UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 
MADAGASCAR UPPER VOLTA 
Article XXXIV 
In the absence of any provision in the compromise regarding the 
applicable law, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute 
according to treaties concluded between the parties, International Law, 
the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, the Charter of the 
United Nations and, if the parties agree, ex aequo et bono. 
Article XXXV 
1. Hearings shall be held in camera unless the arbitrators decide 
otherwise. 
2. The record of the proceedings signed by the arbitrators and the 
Registrar shall alone be authoritative. 
3. The arbitral award shall be in writings and shall, in respect of 
every point decided, state the reasons on which it is based. 
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PART VI 
FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article XXXVI 
The present Protocol shall, upon approval by the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, be an integral part of the charter of the 
Organisation of African Unity. 
Article XXXVII 
This Protocol may be amended or revised in accordance with the provisions 
of Article XXXIII of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. 
In Faith Whereof, We, the Heads of African State and 
Government, have signed this Protocol. 
617 
APPENDIX III 
THE AFRICAN QTR Qd WM AH) 1 FI1S' RIQUS 
The African States n thers of the Organization of African Unity, 
parties to the present convention entitled "African Charter on Hunan and 
Peoples' Rights", 
Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, 
from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of a "preliminary draft on an 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights providing inter alia for the 
establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and peop es rights"; 
Considering the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which 
stipulates that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential 
objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African 
peoples"; 
Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said 
Charter to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate 
and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for 
the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having due 
regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Erman Rights; 
Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition 
and the va ues of African cýizaticn which should inspire and 
characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights; 
Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem 
fron the attributes of huren beings, which justifies their national and 
international protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect 
of peoples rights should necessarily guarantee human rights; 
ConsiderLng that the enjoyment of rights and freedans also isplies 
the per orn nce of duties on the part of everyone; 
Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular 
attention to the right to development an that civil and political rights 
cannot be dissociated fran economic, social and cultural rights in their 
conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of econanic, 
social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights; 
Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, 
the peoples of which are still struggling for their dignity and genuine 
independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
apartheid, Zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and 
all forms of discrimination, particularly those based an race, ethnic 
group, color, sex, language, religion or political opinions; 
Reaffinning their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' 
rights and contained in the declarations, conventions and other 
instrurnts adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Nan Aligned Countries and the United Nations; 
Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and 
peoples' rights and freedoms taking into account the importance 
traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa; 
618' 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
PART I: RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
QG1APIIR I 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIC-rls 
ARTICLE 1 
The Nenner States of the Organization of African Unity parties to 
the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedai 
enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other 
measures to give effect to than. 
ARTICLE 2 
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedor recognized and guaranteed in the present ter without 
distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, 
religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, 
fortune, birth or other status. 
ARTICLE 3 
1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 
2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the 
law. 
ARTICLE 4 
mum beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled 
to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be 
arbitrarily deprived of this right. 
ARTICLE 5 
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the 
dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal 
status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly 
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and 
treatment shall be prohibited. 
ARTICLE 6 
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the 
security of his persan. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for 
reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one 
may be arbitrarily arrested or detained. 
ARTICLE 7 
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. 
This ccaprises: 
a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against 
acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and 
guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in 
forces 
b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a 
competent court or tribunal; 
c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by 
counsel of his choice; 
d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an 
irrpartial court or tribunal. 
2. No one may be condemned for an act or anission which did not 
constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was 
camnitted. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for 
which no provision was made at the time it was ccmnitted. 
Punishment is personal and can be iiQosed only on the 
offender. 
ARTICLE 8 
Freedan of conscience, the profession and free practice of 
religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be 
submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms. 
ARTICLE 9 
1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and 
disseminate his opinions within the law. 
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ARTICLE 10 
1. Every individual shall have the right to free association 
provided that he abides by the law. 
2. Subject to the obligations of solidarity provided for in 
Article 29 no one rosy be caºpelled to join an association. 
ARTIGE 11 
ry individual shall have the right to assemble freely with 
others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary 
restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the 
interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and 
freedoms of others. 
ARTICLE 12 
1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement 
and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides 
by the law. 
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country 
including his own, and to return to his country. This right 
may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for 
the protection of national security, law and order public 
health or morality. 
3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to 
seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with 
laws of those countries and international conventions. 
4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State 
Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by 
virtue of a decision taken in accordance withe law. 
5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass 
expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, 
ettnic or religious groups. 
ARTICLE 13 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in 
the government of his country, either directly or through 
freely chosen representatives in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. 
2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the 
public service of his country. 
3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public 
property and services in strict equality of all persons before 
the law. 
ARTICLE 14 
The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be 
encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest 
of the ccmnmity and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws. 
ARTICLE 15 
Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and 
satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work. 
ARTICLE 16 
1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health. 
2. States parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure 
that they receive medical attention when they are sick. 
ARTICLE 17 
1. Every individual shall have the right to education. 
2. Every individual nny freely take part in the 
cultural life of his corm pity. 
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values 
recognized by the caimaiity shall be the duty of the State. 
ARTICLE 18 
1. The family shall be the natural emit and basis of society. It 
shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its 
physical health and moral. 
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is 
the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by 
the canamity. 
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3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination 
against wann and also censure the protection of the rights of 
the wamn and the child as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions. 
4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special 
measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral 
needs. 
ARTICLE 19 
All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and 
shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a 
people by another. 
ARTICLE 20 
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall 
have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self- 
determination. They shall freely determine their political 
status and shall pursue their economic and social development 
according to the policy they have freely chosen. 
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free 
themselves from the bonds of damnation by resorting to any 
means recognized by the international caimiiity. 
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the 
States parties to the present Charter in their liberation 
struggle against foreign domination, be it political, eccmanic 
or cultural. 
ARTICLE 21 
1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive 
interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived 
of it. 
2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the 
right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an 
adequate capensation. 
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be 
exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting 
international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, 
equitable exchange and the principles of international law. 
4. States parties to the present Charter shall individually and 
collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their 
wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening 
African unity and solidarity. 
5. States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to 
eliminate all forms of foreign eccrK nic exploitation 
particularly that practices by international monopolies so as 
to enable their peoples to fully benefit fron the advantages 
derived from their national resources. 
ARTICLE 22 
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and 
cultural development with due regard to their freedan and 
identity and in the equal enjoyment of the cammri heritage of 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to 
ensure the exercise of the right to development. 
ARFICLE 23 
1. All peoples shall have the right to national and international 
peace and security. The principles of solidarity and friendly 
relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the United 
Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African 
Unity shall govern relations between States. 
2. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and 
friendly relations, States parties to the present Charter 
shall ensure that: 
(a) any individual enjoying the right of asylun 
ceder Article 12 of the present Charter shall 
not engage in subversive activities against 
his country of origin or any other State party 
to the present Charter; 
(b) their territories shall not be used as bases for 
subversive or terrorist activities against the 
people of any other State party to the present 
Charter 
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Am'Ic E 24 
All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
envircni nt favourable to their develoxt nt. 
AR I IE 25 
States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to 
pramte and ensure through teaching, education and publication, the respect 
of the rights and freedais contained in the present Charter and to see to 
it that these freedarns and rights as well as corresponding obligations and 
duties are understood. 
AM CIE 26 
States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to 
guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment 
and urp rovement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the 
pramtion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
present Charter. 
Q APIER II 
DUTIFS 
ARTICLE 27 
1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and 
society, the State and other legally recognized carmmities 
and the international coniunity. . 2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised 
with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, 
morality and camui interest. 
ARTICLE 28 
Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his 
fellow beings without discrimination: and to maintain relations aimed at 
prcrmting, safeguarding and reinforcing nutual respect and tolerance. 
ARTIQE 29 
The individual shall also have the duty: 
1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to 
work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect 
his parents at all times, to maintain than in case of need: 
2. To serve his national cam mity by placing his physical and 
intellectual abilities at its service; 
3. Not to carpranise the security of the State whose national or 
resident he is; 
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, 
particularly when the latter is threatened; 
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the 
territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its 
defence in accordance with the law; 6. To work to the best of his abilities and ccrrpetence and to 
pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the society; 7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit 
of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral weil being of society; 
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African 
unity. 
PART II - MEASURES OF SAFEGUARD 
ESTABLISFt¬1T AND QZGANIZATICN OF UE AFRICAN (X]tIISSION CN HUTAN AM 
ZT-Rium 
ARTICLE 30 
An African Camiission on Hunan and Peoples' Rights, hereinafter called "the Ccrtmission", shall be established within the Organization of African Unity to promote hinan and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa. 
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ARTICLE 31 
1. The Commission shall consist of eleven members chosen from 
amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, known 
for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and 
car4etence in tatters of human and peoples' rights; particular 
consideration being given to persons having legal experience. 
2. The members of the Canmission shall serve in their personal 
capacity. 
ARTICLE 32 
The Commission shall not include more than one national of the 
same State. 
ARTIQE 33 
- me mmbers of the Cartnission shall be elected by secret ballot 
by the Assembly of Heads of State and Goverrment, from a list of persons 
naninated by the States parties to the present Charter. 
ARTICLE 34 
Each State party to the present Charter nay not nominate more 
than two candidates. The candidates mist have the nationality of one of 
the States parties to the present Charter. When two candidates are 
nominated by a State, one of than may not be a national of that State. 
ARTICLE 35 
1. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity 
shall invite States parties to the present Charter at least 
four months before the elections to nominate candidates* 
2. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity 
shall make an alphabetical list of the persons this nominated 
and carmmicate it to the Heads of State and Government at 
least one month before the elections. 
ARTICLE 36 
The m rbers of the Ccnnission shall be elected for a six year 
period and shall be eligible for re-election. However, the term of office 
of four of the manbers elected at the first election shall terminate after 
two years and the term of office of the three others, at the end of four 
years. 
ARTICLE 37 
Immediately after the first election, the thairnan of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African 
Unity shall draw lots to decide the names of those mm bers referred to in 
Article 36. 
ARTIQE 38 
After their election, the manbers of the Camtission shall make a 
solenn declaration to discharge their duties inpartially and faithfully. 
ARTICLE 39 
1. In case of death or resi3naticn of a member of the Camiission, 
the Chairman of the Comussion shall immediately inform the 
Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, who 
shall declare the seat vacant fron the date of death or fron 
the date on which the resignation takes effect. 
2. If, in the unaninnus opinion of other members of the 
Caºmission, a mather has stopped discharging his duties for 
any reason other than a tertporary absence, the Chairman of the 
Carmission shall inform the Secretary General of the 
organization of African Unity, who shall then declare the seat 
vacant. 
3. In each of the cases anticipated above, the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Goverment shall replace the member whose seat 
became vacant for the remaining period of his term unless the 
period is less than six months. 
ARTICLE 40 
Every member of the Ccmnission shall be in office until the date his successor assumes office. 
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ARTICLE 41 
The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity shall 
appoint the Secretary of the Carmission. He shall also provide the staff 
and services necessary for the effective discharge of the duties of the 
C mnission. The Organization of African Unity shall bear the costs of the 
staff and services. 
ARTICLE 42 
1. The Catmission shall elect its Chairman and Vice Chairmen for 
a two year period. They shall be eligible for re-election. 
2. The Cannission shall lay down its rules of procedure. 
3. Seven members shall form a quorun. 
4. In case of an equality of votes, the Chairn n shall have a 
casting vote. 
5. The Secretary General nay attend the meetings of the 
Ccamission. He shall neither participate in deliberations nor 
shall he be entitled to vote. The Chairman of the Ccmnission 
may, however, invite him to speak. 
ARTICLE 43 
in discharging their duties, members of the Commission shall 
enjoy diplomatic privileges and imnaiities provided for in the General 
Convention on the Privileges and Imnaiities of the Organization of African 
Unity. 
ARTIQE 44 
ovision shall be made for the emoluments and allowances of the 
nm hers of the Commission in the Regular Budget of the Organization of 
African Unity. 
aiAPTER II 
MANDATE OF 'III X}? 1ISSICN 
ARTICLE 45 
The functions of the Genmission shall be: 
1. To prarote Hunan and Peoples' Rights and in particular: 
a) to collect documents undertake studies and researches on 
African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights, 
organize seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate 
information, encourage national and local institutions 
concerned with human and peoples' rights, and should the 
case arise, give its views or make recommendations to 
Governments. 
b) to formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at 
solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' 
rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African 
Governments may base their legislations. 
c) co-operate with other African and international 
institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of 
human and peoples' rights. 
2. Fnsure the protection of human and peoples' rights under 
conditions laid down by the present Charter. 3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the 
request of a State party, an institution of the OA(J or an 
African Organization recognized by the OAIJ. 
4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
QIAFM III 
. 
PROCEDURE OF R CMMISSIGN 
ARTICLE 46 
The Cannission may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; it may bear fran the Secretary General of the Organization 
of African Unity or any other person capable of enlightening it. 
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OCh u ICATIa FRCM STATES 
ARTICLE 47 
imf a State party to the present Charter has good reasons to 
believe that another State party to this Charter has violated the 
provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written ccmnaiication, the 
attention of that State to the matter. This cam nication shall also be 
addressed to the Secretary General of the OAU and to the Chairman of the 
Cam ission. Within three months of the receipt of the cannaiication, the 
State to which the camunication is addressed shall give the enquiring 
State, written explanation or statement elucidating the matter. This 
should include as auch as possible relevant infonlntion relating to the 
laws and rules of procedure applied and applicable, and the redress already 
given or course of action available. 
ARtICLE 48 
If within three nrnths from the date on which the original 
camunication is received by the State to which it is addressed, the issue 
is not settled to the satisfaction of the two States involved through 
bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure either State 
shall have the right to submit the matter to the Ccnmisslon through the 
Chairman and shall notify the other States involved. 
ARTICLE 49 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 47, if a State party to 
the present Charter considers that another State party has violated the 
provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to the 
Caýmissicn by addressing a cciunication to the Chairman, to the Secretary 
General of the Organization of African Unity and the State concerned. 
ARTICLE 50 
The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after 
making sure that all local remedies if they exist, have been exhausted 
unless it is obvious to the Ccarmission that the procedure of achieving 
these remedies would be unduly prolonged. 
ARTICLE 51 
1. The Cczmission may ask the States concerned to provide it with 
all relevant information. 
2. When the Camiission is considering the matter, States 
concerned may be represented before it and submit written or 
oral representation. 
ARTICLE 52 
After having obtained fron the States concerned and from other 
sources all the information it deems necessary and after having tried all 
appropriate means to reach an amicable solution based on the respect of 
Human and Peoples' Rights, the Ccnmission shall prepare, within a 
reasonable period of time from the notification referred to in Article 48, 
a report stating the facts and its findings. This report shall be sent to 
the States concerned and coma micated to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. 
ARTICLE 53 
While transmitting its report, the Carmission may n ke to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government such recamiendations as it deems 
useful. 
ARTIGE 54 
The Camºission shall submit to each ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government a report cn its activities. 
O1 R OCfl ICATTQIS 
ARTICLE 55 
1. Before each Session, the Secretary of the Carmission shall 
make a list of the communications other than those of State 
parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the 
mmibers of the Camdssion, who shall indicate which 
cosmmications should be considered by the Commission. 
2. A cannmicaticn shall be considered by the Ccmnission if a 
simple majority of its mmbers so decide. 
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ARTICLE 56 
Carmmications relating to hin and peoples' rights referred to 
in Article 55 received by the Commission, shall be considered if they: 
1. Indicate their authors even if the latter request angnymity, 
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity or with the present Charter, 
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed 
against the State concerned and its institutions or to the 
organization of African Unity, 
4. Are not based exclusively on news discriminated through the 
mass media 
5. Are sent a'ter exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is 
obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged, 
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period fron the time local 
remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is 
seized of the matter, and 
7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by these States 
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of 
African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter. 
ARTICLE 57 
rior to any substantive consideration, all cannmications shall 
be brought to the knowledge of the State concerned by the Chaimnn of the 
Ccmnissicn. 
ARTICLE 58 
1. When it appears after deliberation of the Commission that one 
or more camtmications apparently relate to special cases 
which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive 
violations of human and peoples' rights, the Cc ndssicn shall 
draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government to these special cases. 
2. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request 
the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these cases 
and make a factual report, accompanied by its findings and 
recanrendations. 
3. A case of emergency duly noticed by the Ccmnissicn shall be 
submitted by the latter to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government who may request an in-depth study. 
ARTICLE 59 
1. ALL measures taken within the provisions of the present 
Charter shall remain confidential until such a time as the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise 
decide. 
2. However the report shall be published by the Chairman of the 
Caimisslan upon the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government. 
3. The report on the activities of the Commission shall be 
published by the Chairman after it has been considered by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Gover uit. 
CHAFM IV - APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES 
ARTICLE 60 
The Camiission shall draw inspiration from international law on 
huren and peoples' rights, particularly fron the provisions of various 
African instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, other instrurents adopted by the United 
Nations and the African countries in the field of human and peoples' rights 
as well as fron the provisions of various instruments adopted within the 
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the 
present Charter are mathers. 
ARTICLE 61 
the Ccnmission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary 
measures to determine the principles of law, other general or special 
international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member 
states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent 
with international norms on hunan and peoples' rights, custai generally 
accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by African states as 
well as legal precedents and doctrine. 
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ARTICLE 62 
ch state party shall undertake to submit every two years, fron 
the date the present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative 
or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and 
freedans recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter. 
ARTICLE 63 
1. The present Charter shall be open to signature ratification 
or adherence of the marber states of the Organization of 
African Unity. 
2. The instruments of ratification or adherence to the present 
Charter shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the 
organization of African Unity. 
3. The present Charter shall cane into force three months after 
the reception by the Secretary General of the instruments of 
ratification or adherence of a sirTle majority of the member 
states of the Organization of African Unity. 
PART III GENERAL PRWISIQJS 
ARTICLE 64 
1. After the coming into force of the present Charter, mmbers of 
the Urmission shall be elected in accordance with the 
relevant Articles of the present Charter. 
2. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity 
shall convene the first meeting of the Camdssion at the 
Headquarters of the Organization within three months of the 
constitution of the Cannission. Thereafter, the Carmission 
shall be convened by its Chairman whenever necessary but at 
least once a year. 
ARTICLE 65 
For each of the States that will ratify or adhere to the present 
Charter after its caning into force, the Charter shall take effect three 
months after the date of the deposit by that State of its instrunent of 
ratification or adherence. 
ARTICLE 66 
Special protocols or agreements may, if necessary, supplement the 
provisions of the present Charter. 
ARTICLE 67 
The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity shall 
inform member states of the Organization of the deposit of each instrtment 
of ratification or adherence. 
ARTICLE 68 
The present Charter may be amended if a State party makes a 
written request to that effect to the Secretary General of the Organization 
of African Unity. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government nmy only 
consider the draft amendment after all the States parties have been duly 
informed of it and the Ccmnission has given its opinion on it at the 
request of the sponsoring State. The amendment shall be approved by a 
sinple nnjority of the States parties. It shall cane into force for each 
State which has accepted it in accordance with its constitutional procedure 
three months after the Secretary General has received notice of the 
acceptance. 
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APPENDIX IV 
LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SIGNED, RATIFIED OR 
ADHERED TO THE AFRICAN CRARTER ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 
No. COUNTRY DATE OF DATE OF DATE 
SIGNATURE RATIFICATION DEPOSITED 
1. Algeria 10/04/86 01/03/87 20/03/87 
2. Angola 
3. Benin 20/01/86 25/02/86 
4. Botswana 17/07/86 22/07/86 
5. Burundi 
6. Burkina Faso 05/03/84 06/07/84 21/09/84 
7. Cameroun 
8. Cape Verde 31/03/86 
9. Central African Rep. 26/04/86 27/07/86 
10. Chad 29/05/86 09/10/86 11/11/86 
11. Comoros 01/06/86 18/07/86 
12. Congo 27/11/81 09/12/82 17/01/83 
13. Djibouti 
14. Egypt 16/11/81 20/03/84 03/04/84 
15. Equatorial Guinee 18/08/86 07/04/86 18/08/86 
16. Ethiopia 
17. Gabon 26/02/82 20/02/86 26/06/86 
18. Gambia 11/02/83 08/06/83 13/06/83 
19. Ghana 
20. Guinee 09/12/81 16/02/82 13/05/82 
21. Guinee Bissau 04/12/85 06/03/86 
22. Cote d'Ivore 
23. Kenya 
24. Lesotho 07/03/84 
25. Liberia 31/03/83 04/08/82 29/12/82 
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No. COUNTRY DATE OF DATE OF DATE 
SIGNATURE RATIFICATION DEPOSITED 
26. Libya 30/05/85 19/07/86 26/03/87 
27. Madagascar 
28. Malawi 
29. Mali 13/11/81 21/12/81 22/01/82 
30. Mauritania 25/02/82 14/06/86 26/06/86 
31. Mauritius 
32. Mozambique 
33. Niger 09/07/86 15/07/86 21/07/86 
34. Nigeria 31/08/82 22/06/83 22/07/83 
35. Republique Rwandaise 11/11/81 15/07/83 22/07/83 
36. Saharawi Arab 10/04/86 02/05/86 23/05/86 
Dem. Rep. 
37. Sao Tome & Principe 23/05/86 28/07/86 
38. Senegal 23/09/81 13/08/82 25/10/82 
39. Seychelles 
40. Sierra Leone 27/08/81 21/09/83 27/01/84 
41. Somalia 26/02/82 31/07/85 20/03/86 
42. Sudan 03/09/82 18/02/86 11/03/86 
43. Swaziland 
44. Togo 26/02/82 05/11/82 22/11/82 
45. Tunisia 16/03/83 22/04/83 
46. Uganda 18/08/86 10/05/86 27/05/86 
47. Tanzania 31/05/82 18/02/84 09/03/84 
48. Zaire 
49. Zambia 17/01/83 10/01/84 02/02/84 
50. Zimbabwe 02/02/86 30/05/86 12/06/86 
ADOPTED: By the eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
June, 1981 Nairobi, Kenya. 
REQUIRES: Ratification or adherence of a simple majority of the Member 
States, to come into force. 
CAME: into force on 21st day of October, 1986. 
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APPENDIX V 
Comparative Table of Provisions of the African Charter 
with Corresponding Provisions in Major Conventions 
Articles 
African 
Charter 
European 
Convention 
American 
Convention 
Universal 
Declaration 
Covenant on 
Civil and 
PRightsai 
Covenant on 
Economic. 
CuSocial 
& 
ltural 
Rights 
1. 1 1.2 2 2 
2. 14 1 2 2(1). 3.27 2(2). 3 
3. 24 7 26 
4. 2(1) 4 3.1 6 
5. 3,4 3.5.6.11 4,5.6,12 7,8.16,17 
6. 5 7 3,9 9 
7. 6,7,13 8,9,25 8.10.11 14.15 
8. 9 12 18 18 
9. 10 13 19 19 
10. 11 16 20 22 8 
11. 11 15 20 21 
12. 22 13,14 12.13 
13. 23 21 25 
14. 21 17 
15. 23.24 6.7 
16. 25 12 
17. 26,27 13.15 
18. 8.12 17,19 15,25(2) 23.24 10 
19. 1( 1) 2 (3) ) 11 21 
20. ( 25 1 
21. 28 2(1) 2( . 11 22. 28 
23. 28,28 
24. Prambular 
proclamation 
25. 2(3) 
26. 25 
27. 32 29 
28. 
29. 29 
30. 19(1) 33(a) 28 
31. 20.23 34 28 
32. 20 37(2) 31(1) 
33. 21 36(1), 80 29(11 
34. 21 36(2) 29(2 
36. 22(1) 37 32 
37. 22(2) 37 32 
38. 38 
39. 21(2) 23(3) 38 33.34 
41. 37 40 36 
42. 34.36 39 39 
43. 59 70 43 
44. 58 72 43 
45. 19 41 28(1) 
46. 
47. 41 1a 
48. 24 45 41 1b 
49. 24 45 
50. 
51. 
26 
28(a) 
46 47 
48(a), lc)-(e) 
41(1)c 
41(f), (g) 
52. 28(b)-30,31(1)-(2) 48(f). 50 41(e), (h) 
53. 31(3) 50(3) 
54. 4S, Opt. Prot. 6 
55. 25 44 Opt. Prot. 
56. 26,4 46,47 Opt. Prot. 2,3,5(2) 
57. 28 48 Opt. Prot. 4 4 
58. 31.32 51 41(1)h, Opt. Prot. 
59. 32 73 
60. 
61. 
62. S7 40 16 
63. 66 74 48,49 16 
64. 35 79 37 
65. 66(3) 74(2) 49(2) 27(2) 
66. Op. Prot. 77 Opt. Prot. 23 
67. 60(4) 74(3) 3) 48(S) 26(S) 
68. 29 
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APPENDIX VI 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE OAU 
ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT 
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APPENDIX VII 
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCES/ 
SEMINARS IN AFRICA 
CONFERENCE TITLE 
1. UN Seminar an Participation of 
Waren in Public Life 
2. African Conference on the Rule 
of Law 
3. UN Seminar on Status of Waren in 
Family Law 
4. UN Seminar on Human Rights in 
Developing Countries 
5. Ccciference of French-Speaking 
African Jurists 
6. iN Seminar on Civil and 
Political Education of Waren 
7.5th Sunnit Conference of East 
Central African States 
8. UN Seminar on the Establishment 
of Regional Cartnissions on Human 
Rights 
9. LW Seminar on the Realisaticn of 
Social and Economic Rights 
10. UM Conference of African 
Jurists 
PLACE AND DATE SOURCE REFERENCE 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
12-23 Dec. 60 
Lagos, Nigeria, 3-7 
Jan. 1961 
Lane, Togo, 18-31 Aug. 
1964 
Dakar, Senegal, 8-22 
Feb. 1966 
Dakar, Senegal, 5-9 
Jan. 1%7 
Accra, than, 19 Nov. - 
2 Dec. 1968 
Lusaka, Zambia, 16 
Apr. 1969 
Cairo, UAR, 2-15 Sept. 
1969 
Lusaka, Zanbia, 23 
Jun. -4 Jul. 1970 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
19-23 Apr. 1971 
11. UN Seminar on Measures aimed at 
Cathating and Eliminating Racial 
Discrimination 
12. LW Seminar on the Participation 
of Women in Econanic Life 
13. UN Seminar on New Ways and Means 
for Promoting Huren Rights with 
Special Attention to the 
Problemsand Needs of Africa 
14. AACC/World Council of Churches 
Consultation on Violations of 
WxTen Rights 
Yaounde, Cameroun, 16- 
29 Jun. 1971 
Libraville, Gabon, 27 
Jul. -9 Aug. 1971 
Dar as Salaam, 
Tanzania, 23 Oct. -5 
Nov. 1973 
Khartc xn, the Sudan, 
16-22 Feb. 1975 
15. tN Seminar on the thin Rights Tunis, 11misia, 12-2 
of Migrant Workers Nov. 1975 
16. Conference of Algiers on Algiers, Algeria, 4 
Universal Hunan Rights of Jul. 1976 
Peoples' 
Doc. ST/TAO/HR 8 
Report of the Proceedings, 
ICY, Geneva, 1961 
Doc. ST/TAO HR. 22 
ooc. 3T/TAO/HR. 25 
Bulletin of the ICJ, 
Vol. 28 1967 
Doc. ST/TAO/}ät. 35 
The Review (ICJ 
No. 2(1969) 
Doc. ST/TAO/HR. 38 
Doc. sr/TAO/HR. 40 
T. C1. Verheist 
(ed., ), Legal Process and 
Individual African Addis 
Ababa: Faculty of Law, 
1971 UN Doc. ECA/1ßt. wP. 1- 
16 
Doc. ST/TAC/tä2.42 
Doc. ST/TAO/1It. 43 
Doc. sr/TAO/I . 48 
"Structures of 
Injuste"... Report By 
AACC/World Council of 
Churches, Nairobi, 1975 
Doc. ST/TAO/HR. 50 
"Declaration of Algiers" 
in Cassese ed., Pour un 
dorit des peuples. 
Cßerger-Levrault, 1978 
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CONFERENCE TITLE PLACE AND DATE SOURCE REFERENCE 
17. Seminar on Hum Rights in a One Dar as Salaam, Hunan Rights in a One 
Party State Tanzania, Sept. 1976 Party State, ICJ, 1978 
18. The Buttare Colloquium on Hunan Buttare, Rwanda, 3-7 H. Harnmai, Universal 
Rights and Economic Development Jul. 1978 Hunan Rights Vol. No. 2 
(1979). 
19. -African Bar Association Third Freetown, Sierra Amnesty International 
Biennial Conference Leone, 1-5 Aug. 1978 Newsletter Vol. 8 No. 10 
(1978) 
20. Seminar on Hunan Rights and Dakar, Senegal, Sept. Y. Kushalani, Hyman 
Development 1978 Rights Law Journal Vol. 4 
No. 4 1983 
21. Collogquiun on Hunan Rights and Dakar, Senegal, 13-17 Amnesty International 
Right to Legal Defence (Franco- Jan. 1979 Newsletter Vol. 9 (No. 4) 
Phone Bar Association) 1979 
22. International Conference on Cape Town, S. Africa, Forsyth C. F. et al (ed), 
Human Rights in South Africa 22-26 Jan. 1979 Human Rights: The Cape 
Town Conference, Juta & 
Co. 1979 
23. OAU Symposiun "What Kind of Monrovia, Liberia, 12- Final Report of the 
Africa by the Year 2000? " 16 Feb. 1979 Monrovia 
Symposium ... Addis Ababa: 
the OAU, 1979 
24. Conference on African Refugee Arusha, Tanzania, 7-17 L. G. Eriksson et. al. 
Problems May 1979 eds., An Analysis Account 
of the Conference on 
African Refugee Problems, 
Scandinavia Institute of 
African Studies, 1981. 
25. Conference of French Speaking Kigali, Rwanda, 21-22 
African Countries May 1979 
26. OAU Suanit Meeting Monrovia, Liberia, 17- Doc. AHG/Res. 115(XVI) 
21 Jul. 1979 
27. UN Seminar on Regional Monrovia, Liberia, 10- Doc. A/34/359 Annex 1 
Arrangements for Promotion and 20 Sept. 1979 
Protection of Hunan Rights 
28. OAU Meeting of Experts Preparing Dakar, Senegal, 28 Doc. CAB/LM/67/3/Rev-1 
Draft African Charter Nov. -8 Dec. 1979 
29. OAU Ministerial Conference on Banjul, The Gambia, 9- Doc. CAB/lEC/67/3 Rev. 5 
African Charter on Huren and 15 Jun. 1980 and 7-27 
Peoples Rights Jan. 1981 
30. Conference of Organisation of Tunis, Tunisia, 26-28 "Charter of Tunis" 
African Socialist Parties Feb. 1981 
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CONFERENCE TITLE PLACE AND DATE SOURCE REFERENCE 
31.18th Q! J Sunnit Meeting (at Nairobi, Kenya, 24-28 African Charter ... OAU: 
which the African Charter on Jun. 1981 Addis Ababa, 1981, IIM, 
Hunan and Peoples Rights was Vol. XXI No. 1 (1982) 
adopted for ratification by a 
simple majority of states) 
32. Conference on The State and Denver, USA 9-10 Nov. Africa Today Vol. 32 
Human Rights in Africa. 1984 (1985) Nos. 1&2 p. 3 
(Graduate School of 
International Studies, 
University of Denver) 
33. ICJ Conference on Hunan and Nairobi, Kenya 2-4 Report of the Conference: 
Peoples Rights in Africa and the Dec. 1985 International Cc miissicn 
African Charter of Jurists, (ICJ-Geneva) 
34. Fifth African Seminar on Yaounde, Cameroon, 26 Rights & Humanity Vol. 1 
Inteemational Humanitarian Law Nov. -4 Dec 1986 No. 2 Sumner 1987 p. 38 
(Institut Henry Denant, Geneva 
and Caaeroon Red Cross) 
35. Seminar on the Promotion of Windsor Great Park, Rights & Humanity Vol. 1 
Hunan Rights within the Feb. 1982 No. 2 1987 p. 39 
Camiaa 
ealth 
(Camronwealth Legal 
Education Association and the 
Human Rights Unit of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat) 
36. Colloquiun on the African Dakar, Senegal, Jun. International Carmission 
Ccmnission of Human and Peoples 87 of Jurists, (IC) Geneva 
Rights. (International Academy 1987 
of Honen Rights/ICJ/African 
Association of International 
law) 
37. Human Rights Documentation Maseru, Lesotho, Aug. Ccxu xiwealth Judicial 
Conference in Africa (National 1987 Journal Vol. 7 No. 3 1988 
University of Lesotho & Hunan p. 7 
Rights Interest (HRI) Harvard 
law School) 
38. Congress of the African Harare, Zimbabwe, 29 Canunwealth Legal 
Association for Hunan & Peoples Aug. -3 Spt. 1987 Education Association, 
Rights in Development Jan. 1988. 
Cam ciwealth Judicial 
Journal Vol. 7 No. 3 1988 
p. 7 
39. The Pan Nigerian Multi- Calabar, Nigeria, 10- Rights & Hui anity Vol. 1 
Disciplinary Workshop on Hunan 13 Nov. 1987 Jan (1988) 
Rights. (Rights and Humanity 
(African Section) in 
collaboration with the Faculty 
of Law, University of Calabar) 
40. The Pan-African Consultation on Jos, Nigeria, 7-12 Africa Today Nos. 1&2 
the Rights of the Economically Dec. 1987 1987 
and Socially Disadvantaged. 
(Rights &H inanity (African 
Section) in collaboration with 
the Lhiversity of Jos, Nigeria) 
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APPENDIX VIII 
LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS 
GRANTED OBSERVER STATUS WITH THE OAU. 
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NAME OF THE ASSOCIATION DATE GRAYM SESSION 
&H ADQUARTFRS ADDRESS OBSERVER STATUS (OCUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
OF THE QW) 
1. Pan-African Warren Association 
(Organisation Panafricaine des 
Fames) (Conference des Femmes 12 September 1968 11th Session of C. M. 
Africaines) Algiers 
23 Boulevard Colonel Amirouche 
Alger, ALGIltIE 
2. Central African Economic and Customs 
Union (CACE) 12 September 1968 11th Session of C. M. 
B. P. 969 Algiers 
Bangui, Central African Republic 
3. Organisation Carmine Africaine et 
Malgache 12 September 1968 11th Session of C. M. 
B. P. 965 Algiers 
Bangui, Central African Republic 
4. River Niger Curmission 
Secretariat 12 September 1968 11th Session of C. M. 
B. P. 729 Algiers 
Nimy, NIGER 
5. Union des Radios diffusions et 
Televisions Nationales D'Afrique 
(Union of National Radio and 6 September 1969 13th Session of C. M. 
Television Organization for Africa) Addis Ababa 
(Secretaire General) 
B. P. 3237, Dakar, SENEGAL 
6. Association of African Universities 6 March 1970 14th Session of C. M. 
P. O. Box 5734, Accra, GHANA Addis Ababa 
7. Pan-African Youth Movement 
B. P. 72 31 August 1970 15th Session of C. M. 
Plateau Souliere, Alger, AL11UE Addis Ababa 
8. Association of Schools of Medicine 
(Secretary-General) 31 August 1970 15th Session of C. M. 
B. P. 102, Khartoun, SUDAN /mss Ababa 
9. Ccrmission du Bassin du Lac Tchad 
(Secretaire General) 31 August 1970 15th Session of C. M. 
B. P. 727, Ndjamena, TQIAD Addis Ababa 
10. The African Training & Research 
Center in Administratin for 
Development (CAFRAD) 
P. O. Box 310 12 June 1972 19th Session of C. M. (Centre Africaine de Formation et de Addis Ababa 
recherche Administrative pour le 
developpement) 
Tanger, MAROC 
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NAME OF VE ASSOCIATION 
& HFADQUARIFRS ADDRESS 
11. Pan-African Federation of Film 
Makers 
(Federation Pan Africaine des 
Cineastes) 
39 rue Mohamed V 
B. P. 1814, Dakar, SENF AL 
12. Organization of African Trade Union 
Unity (QA'IW) 
(Secretary-General) 
P. O. Box M386, Accra, GHANA 
13. Association for Social Work 
Education for Africa. 
(The President) 
P. O. Box 1176, Addis Ababa 
14. Institut des Relations 
Internationales du Cameroun 
(Institute of International 
Relations of Cameroun) 
B. P. 1637, Yaounde, Cameroun 
15. Anti-Apartheid Camiittee (M. le 
DATE QWTIID SESSION 
OBSERVER STATUS (COUNCIL OF MINISUPS 
OF THE OAU) 
12 June 1972 19th Session of C. M. 
Addis Ababa 
4 April 1974 22nd Session of C. M. 
Kartpala 
4 April 1974 22nd Session of C. M. 
Kanpala 
11 Jame 1974 23rd Session of C. M. 
Mogadishu 
Secretaire Permanent du Ccmite Anti- 11 June 1974 23rd Session of C. M. 
Apartheid) Mogadishu 
B. P. 380, Kinshasa 
16. Union of African Journalists 
(The President) 
Avenue Talaat Harb, Cairo, or 21 February 1975 24th Session of C. M. 
Avenue Haraai AR-Rachid A Dooki Addis Ababa 
B. P. 81 Bab E1-Look Cairo, 
AL-Jizza, Cairo 
17. West African Science Association 
(Secretary-General) 21 February 1975 24th Session of C. M. 
P. O. Box 7 Legon, Accra, Guiana Addis Ababa 
18. Encyclopaedia Africans Project 
(The Director) 21 February 1975 24th Session of C. M. 
P. O. Box 2797, Accra, Ghana Addis Ababa 
19. Association for the Advancement of 
Agricultural Sciences in Africa. 1 March 1976 26th Session of C. M. 
(Administrative Secretary General) Addis Ababa 
P. O. Box 30087, Addis Ababa, EIHIOPIA 
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NAME OF THE ASSOCIATION DATE CRAM) SFSSIQJ 
& HEADQUARTERS ADDRESS OBSERVER STATUS (COUNCIL OF HINISTERS 
OF THE QAU) 
20. Federation of African Organization 
of the Engineers 1 March 1976 26th Session of C. M. 
(Secretary-General) Addis Ababa 
P. O. Box 1588, Cairo, EGYPT 
21. Comite Regional de 1'Organisation 
Mmdiale pour la Promotion Sociale 
des Aveugles 3 July 1976 27th Session of C. M. 
81 Avenue de Londres Mauritius 
(Secretaire-General) 
Tlaiis, IMSIE 
22. Association Internationale pour le 
Developpe mt de la Librairie en 
Afrique 3 July 1976 27th Session of C. M. 
(Secretaire-General) Mauritius 
B. P. 375, Dakar, SENEGAL 
23. African Airlines Association 
(Secretary-General) 3 July 1976 27th Session of C. M. 
P. O. Box 20116, Nairobi, KENYA Mauritius 
24. Center for the Co-ordination of 
Research and Documentation in Social 3 July 1976 27th Session of C. M. 
Sciences. (CERDAS) Mauritius 
(The Director) 
P. O. Box 30123, Kinshasa, ZAIRE 
25. Congres Internationale des Etudes 
Africaines 3 July 1976 27th Session of C. M. 
(The President) Mauritius 
B. P. 11122, Kinshasa, ZAIRE 
26. Inter-African Parliamentary Union 
(Secretary-General) 4 March 1979 32nd Session of C. M. 
B. P. 1381, Abidjan, CUTE D'IWRIE Nairobi 
27. Org. Africaine des Institutions 
Superieures de Controle des Finances 
Publiques 4 March 1979 32nd Session of C. M. 
(Secretaire General) Nairobi 
B. P. 288, Lane, TOGO 
28. Eastern African Center for Oral 
Traditions and African National 15 February 1980 34th Session of C. M. 
languages (EAQäJTANAL) Addis Ababa 
P. O. Box 600, Zanzibar, TANZANIA 
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NAME OF 111E ASSOCIATION DATE QWJIFD SESSION 
& HEADQUARTERS ADDRESS OBSERVER STATUS (COLKIL OF MINISTERS 
OF THE QAU) 
29. L'Unicn des Villes Africaines 
(President) 1 March 1981 36th Session of C. M. 
B. P. 2051, Dakar, SENEGAL Addis Ababa 
30. African Cultural Institute (A. C. I. ) 
(Director-General) 1 March 1981 36th Session of C. M. 
B. P. 01, Dakar, SENEGAL, Addis Ababa 
31. Science, Education Programre for 
Africa 1 March 1981 36th Session of C. M. 
(Executive Secretary) Addis Ababa 
P. O. Box 9169, Accra, GHANA 
32. Societe Africaine de Culture 
(President) 1 March 1981 36th Session of C. M. 
19 Rue Vincent, Addis Ababa 
B. P. 1, Dakar, SEMGAL 
33. Association Internationale du 
Festival Mondial des Arts Negres 
(FESTAL) March 1981 36th Session of C. M. 
19 Rue Vincent, Addis Ababa 
B. P. 1, Dakar, SEMCAL 
34. African Reinsurance Corporation 
P. M. B. 12765 
Book Shop House 1 March 1961 36th Session of C. M. 
50152 Broad Street, Addis Ababa 
Lagos, NIGERIA 
35. Inter-African Coffee Organization 26 Jule 1981 37th Session of C. M. 
B. P. V 210, Abidjan, IVORY-CWM 
36. African Regional Standardization 
Organization 22 February 1962 38th Session of C. M. 
P. 0. Box 57363, Nairobi, KENYA Addia Ababa 
37. Confederation of African Medical 
Association and Societies (CAMAS) 
C/o Dr. 0.0. Adelaaile 4 March 1985 41st Session of C. M. 
Department of Surgery Addia Ababa 
University College Hospital 
Ibadan, NIGERIA 
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APPENDIX IX 
OBJECTIVES OF THE NIGERIAN COUNCIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS* 
(2) CONSIDERING that every member of the human family has the 
right freely to hold and to express his or her convictions and 
the obligations to extend the like freedom to others, the 
object of the NCHR shall be to secure throughout Nigeria the 
observance of Human Rights generally and as guaranteed In 
the Nigerian Constitution, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights, and in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights by: 
(a) taking up cases of infringement of human rights of 
individuals with the appropriate authorities; 
(b) providing Legal Advice on Human Rights; 
(c) making Representation on Human Rights to governments 
and other relevant authorities; 
(d) pressing for law reform towards enhancement of Human 
Rights enjoyment through Legislative Pressure Groups 
and by other constitutional means; 
(e) cooperating with other Human Rights organisations In 
Nigeria and worldwide; 
(f) educating and disseminating widely and publicly 
individual entitlement to Human Rights enjoyment; 
(g) protecting the observance of Human Rights for the 
enjoyment of all persons; 
(h) organising conferences, seminars, lectures and 
sponsoring studies on Human Rights; 
(i) sending observers to trials of major significance to 
Human Rights both within and outside Nigeria; 
(j) sponsoring proposals within the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation of 
African Unity (O. A. U. ), the United Nations 
Organisation (U. N. O. ) and other organisations that 
exist for the improvement and advancement of Human 
Rights; 
(k) publishing books, journals, films and all forms of media 
about its activities and generally about Human Rights. 
*Extracted fron the Cctstituticn of the Nigerian Council for Fh n Rights 
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APPENDIX X 
Pattern of Ratification of Regional 
and Selected International Instrumements on Human Rights 
as at Ist January 1988 
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APPENDIX XI 
MEMBERS OF THE 
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS' 
Isaac NGUEMA 
Ibrahim A. BADAWI EL-SHEIKH 
Gabon 
Egypt 
Mali 
Chairman 
Vice-Chairman 
Elioune Blondin BEYE 
Alexis GABOU 
Mahmoud Abou HADIYA 
Grace IBINGIRA 
Sourahata B. Semega JANNEH 
Habesh Robert KISANGA 
R. M. D. MOKOMA 
C. L. C. MUBANCA-CHIPOYA 
Youssoupha NDIAYE 
Congo 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Uganda 
The Gambia 
Tanzania 
Botswana 
Zambia 
Senegal 
*Note 
1. The Members of the African Caimission on Hunan and Peoples' Rights were elected by 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the twenty-third QAU Sunnit held in 
Addis Ababa in July 1987. (Pursuant to Article 33 of the African Carter on Hunan 
and Peoples' Rights - AFQPR) 
2. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the African Carmissicn were elected by the m umbers 
of the Camlission at its first session held at the headquarters of the QAU (Addis 
Ababa) on 2 November 1987. (Pursuant to Article 42(1) of the AFCHIPR) 
3. Ihre rules of procedure of the Ccamission were adopted at the second session of the 
African Cn ission held in Dakar, Senegal on 13 February 1988. (Pursuant to Article 
42(2) of the AFC-PR) 
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APPENDIX XII 
1ws OF H«XE RE QN AFRICAN OR4lISSICN 
CN HUMAN AND PmPM' RI(ITS 
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General Provisions - Organisation of the Cannission 
CHAP ER I: Sessions 
Number of Sessions 
Opening date 
Extraordinary or Special Sessions 
Place of Meeting 
Notification of the opening date of the Sessions 
CHAVrER II: Agenda 
Drawing up of the Provisional Agenda 
Transmission of the Provisional Agenda 
Adoption of the Agenda 
Revision of the Agenda 
Distribution of the Agenda 
Draft Provisional Agenda for the next Session 
CHAPTER III: Members of the Ccmnissicn 
Conposition of the Carmission 
Status of the meonbers 
Term of Office of the members 
Cessation of functions 
Vacant Seat 
Oath 
CHAPTER IV: Officers 
Election of Officers 
Powers of the Chairman 
Absence of the Chairman 
Functions of the Vice Chairman 
Cessation of the Functions of an Officer 
" CHAFIIIt V: Secretariat 
Functions of the Secretary-General 
Estimates 
Powers of the Secretary-General of the Camtission 
Record of cases 
Financial responsibility 
CHAPTER VI: Subsidiary Bodies 
Establishr nt of Camiittees and working groups 
Establishment of Sub-Cormnittees 
Officers of the Subsidiary bodies 
Rules of Procedure 
CHAPTER VII: Public sessions and private sessions 
,- 
General principle 
Publication of proceedings 
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CKA= VIII: Langvages 
34 Working languages 
35 Interpretation 
36 Languages to be used for the minutes of proceedings 
37 Languages to be used for resolutions and other official decisions 
G AJ7IFR IX: Minutes and reports 
38 Tape recordings of the sessions 
39 Summary minutes of the sessions 
40 Distribution of the minutes of private sessions and public sessions 
41 Reports to be submitted to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
42 Transmission of official decisions and reports 
Q-1APIFR X: Conduct of the Debates 
43 Quorun 
44 General Powers of the Chairman 
45 Points of Order 
46 Adjourruent of debates 
47 Limit of the time accorded to speakers 
48 Closing of the list of speakers 
49 Closure of Debate 
50 Suspension or adjournment of the meeting 
51 Order of the motions 
52 Submission of proposals and amendments of substance 
53 Decisions on competence 
54 Withdrawal of a proposal or of a ention 
55 New consideration of proposals 
56 Speeches (or interventions) 
57 Right of reply 
58 Congratulations 
59 Condolences 
aiAPThR XI: Vote and Elections 
60 Right to Vote 
61 Asking fora vote 
62 Required majority 
63 Method of voting 
64 Explanaticn of vote 
65 Rules to be observed when voting 
66 Division of proposals and amendments 
67 Amendments 
68 Order of vote on amendments 
69 Order of vote on proposals 
70 Elections 
71 Majority required to be elected 
CHAPZiR XII: Participation of Non-Members of the Ccmnission 
72 Participation of non-member States 
73 Participation of National Liberation Movements 
74 Participation of Specialised Institutions and Consultation with the latter 
75 Participation other Inter-Govemnental Organizations 
CHAPI R XIII: Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations and 
Representation of these Organizations 
76 Representation 
77 'Consultation 
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G APIFR XIV: Publication and Distribution of Reports and Other Official 
Documents of the Cannission 
Reports of the Ccnmission 
Periodical Reports of Member States 
Report on the activities of the Commission 
Provisions Relating to the Functions of the Can-dssicn 
ChAP'IIIRR XV: Reports Submitted by State Parties to the Charter Under 
Article 62 of the Charter 
Contents of the reports 
Transmission of the reports 
Submission of the reports 
Non-submissions of the reports 
Verification of information contained in the reports 
Adjc unr nt and transmission of the reports 
ChAPTFR XVI: Camunications fron State Parties to the Charter 
Procedure for the Consideration of the Ccmnmicaticns received in conformity 
with Article 47 of the Charter 
Procedure for camimications-negotiations 
Register of Camiinications 
Reply and Time Limit 
Non-Settlement of the Issue 
Seism of the Cannission 
Procedure for the Consideration of the Carmmications received in conformity 
with Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter. 
Seisin of the Camiission 
Permanent Register of Camtmicaticns 
Seisin of members of the Carmission 
Private Session and Press Release 
Consideration of the Camxamicaticn 
Amicable Settlement 
Additional Information 
Representation of State Parties to the Charter 
Report of the Catmissicn 
CHAPIFR XVII: Other Cannmications 
Procedure for the Consideration of Conmunicaticns received in conformity with 
Article 55 of the Charter 
Transmission of Carmaiications to the Catmissim 
Seisin of the Ccmnission 
List of Cannmications 
Request for Clarifications 
Distribution of Cc mmications 
General Provisions Governing the Consideration of Canznications by the 
Camiission or its subsidiary bodies 
Private Session 
Press Release 
Inccapatibilities 
Withdrawal of a Mather 
Provisional Measures 
Infornnticn to the State Party to the Charter 
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Section III - Procedure to Determine Admissibility 
111 Time Limit for Considering Admissibility 
112 Order of the Consideration of the Crnmaiications 
113 Working Groups 
114 Admissibility of the Ccmninication 
115 Additional Information 
116 Decision of the Commission on Admissibility 
Section IV - Procedures for the Consideration of Ccmixiications 
117 The Proceedings 
118 Final Decision of the Carmission 
FI2vAL QiAF1 R: Amendment and Suspension of the Rules of Procedure 
119 Method of M nanents 
120 Method of Suspension 
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DRAFT RULES OF PROCE: DLRE OF ThE AFRICAN O }MISSICH 
QJ HLMV AND PEOPLES' RiQifs 
ADOPTED CN 13 FEBRUARY I? 86 
The African Cannission on Eiunart and Peoples' Rights. 
Considering the African Charter an Hunan and Peoples' Rights. 
Acting on the strength of Article 42 (2) of the darter, 
Hereby by adopts the present Rules. 
648 
PART CM : (, QNEi L rRCNISIRJS - CRGýNIZATICN OF M CUMISSICN 
CHAPThR I: SESSIRNS 
Rule 1: Dumber of Session 
The African Commission on Hunan and Peoples' Rights hereinafter referred to as "he 
Ca mission" shall hold the Sessions which may be necessary to enable it to carry cut 
satisfactorily its functions in conformity with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as "The Charter"). 
Rule 2: Opening Date 
The Caunission shall normally hold two ordinary sessions a year each lasting two weeks. 
The ordinary sessions of the Commission shall be convened on a date fixed by the 
Cc mnission on the proposal of its Chairman and in consultation with the Secretary-General of 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (hereinafter referred to as "nv Secretary-General"). 
The Secretary-General may change, tinder exceptional circumstances, the opening date of 
a session, in consultation with the Chairman of the Ccmnissicn. 
Rule 3: Extraordinary sessions 
1. Extraordinary sessions shall be convened on decisions of the CaTmissicn. When the 
Cc«miission is not in Session, the Chairman may co vene extraordinary sessions in consultation 
with the manbers of the Camiission. The Chairman of the Canuission shall also convene 
extraordinary sessions. 
a) at the request of the majority of the manbers of the Carmission, 
b) at the request of the Current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). 
2. Extraordinary Sessions shall be convened as soon as possible on a date fixed by the 
Chairman, in consultation with the Secretary-Genera! and the other members of the 
Catmfssion. 
Rule 4: Place of Meetings 
The Sessions shall normally be held at the Headquarters of the Camiissicn. The Carmission may, in consultation with the Secretary-General, decide to hold a Session in 
another place. 
Rule 5: Notification of the Opening Date of the Session 
The Secretary-General shall inform n hers of the Ccnmission of the date of the first 
sitting of each Session and its venue. This notification shall be sent in the case of an Ordinary Session, at least eight (8) weeks and, in the case of an Extraordinary Session, at 
least three (3) weeks, if possible before the Session. 
QIAPIFR II: AGENDA 
Rule 6: Drawing up the Provisional Agenda 
The Provisional Agenda for each Ordinary Session shall be drawn up by the Secretary- 
General, in consultation with the Chairman of the Cannissim in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter and these Rules. 
The Provisional Agenda shall include if necessary, items on: "Cc nxiicaticns fron States", and "Other C am micaticns" in conformity with the provisions of Article 55 of the 
Charter. It should not contain any information relating to such ccm inications. 
Except what has been specified above on the com u ications, the Provisional Agenda 
shall include all the item listed by the present Rules of Procedure as well as the items 
proposed: 
a) by the Ccmnission at a Previous Session; 
b) by the Chaix mit of the Cannission or another miter of the Cartnission 
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c) by a State party to the Charter 
d) by the Assembly of Heads of State and Goverrrmnt (or the Council of Ministers of 
the organization of African Unity) 
e) by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity for every issue 
relating to the functions assigned to him by the Charter 
f) by a national liberation novement recognized by the OAU or by a non-governmental 
organization 
g) by a specialized institution of which the States parties to the Charter are 
menbers. 
The itas to be included in the provisional agenda under sub-paragraphs b c, f and of 
paragraph 3 crust be ca mmicated to the Secretary-General, accarpanied 
ýy 
essential 
documents, not later than eight (8) weeks before the first sitting of each Session. 
5. a) All national liberation movements or non-goverrv ntal organizations wishing to 
propose the inclusion of an item in the Provisional Agenda mist inform the Secretary-General 
at least ten (10) weeks before the opening of the meeting. Before formally proposing the 
inclusion of an item in the Provisional Agenda, the observations likely to be made by the 
Secretary-General mist duly be taken into account. 
b) The proposal, accompanied by essential documents, rtust formally be submitted not 
later than eight (8) weeks before the opening of the Session. 
All proposals made under the provisions of the present pare graph shall be included in 
the Provisional Agenda of the Connission, if a least two-thirds (2/3) of the rtrmbers present 
and voting so decide. 
6. The Provisional Agenda of the Extraordinary session of the Ccamission shall include 
only the item proposed to be considered at that Extraordinary session. 
Rule 7: Transnissicn and Distribution of the Provisional Agenda 
1. The Provisional Agenda and the essential docurents relating to each item shall be 
distributed to the mmbers of the Camtission by the Secretary-General who shall endeavour to 
transmit them to members at least six (6) weeks before the opening of the Session. 
2. The Secretary-General shall came icate the Provisional Agenda of that session and have 
the essential documents relating to each Agenda item distributed at. least six %eeks before 
the opening of the Session of the Camdssion to the m thers of the CaTmission, nether States 
parties to the Charter, to the Current Chairman of the OAU. 
3. The draft agenda shall also be sent to the specialised agencies, to non-govertmental 
organizations and to the national liberation movements concerned with the agenda. 
4. In exceptional cases, the Secretary-General, may, while giving his reasons in writing, 
have the essential documents relating to sane items of the Provisional Agenda distributed at 
least four (4) reeks prior to the opening of the Session. 
Rule 8: Adoption of the Agenda 
At the beginning of each session the carmission shall if necessary, after the election 
of officers in conformity with Rule if adopt the agenda of the Session on the basis of the 
Provisional Agenda referred to in Rule 
Rule 9: Revision of the Agenda 
The Coimission may, during the Session, revise the Agenda if need be, adjourn cancel 
or amend items. During the Session, only urgent and inportant issues ma; be added to the 
Agenda. 
Rule 10: Draft Provisional Agenda for the Next Session 
The Secretary-General shall, at each session of the Carmission, submit a Draft 
Provisional Agenda for the next session of the Carmission, indicating, with respect to each 
item, the doc is to be submitted on that item and the decision of the deliberative organ 
which authorized their preparation, so as to enable the Carmissicn to consider these 
documents as regards the contribution they make to its proceedings, as well as their urgency 
and relevance to the prevailing situation. 
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CHAPIFR III: MDSERS OF ThE OCM{IISSICN 
Rule 11: Curpositicn of the Ccnmissim 
The Camtission shall be composed of eleven (11) marbers elected by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Goverment hereinafter referred to as "the Assembly", in conformity with 
the relevant provisions of the Charter. 
Rule 12: Status of the Member, 
1. The members of the Commission shall be the eleven (11) personalities appointed on 
conformity with the provisions of Article 31 of the Charter. 
2. Each nurber of the Ccmnission shall sit on the Carmission in a personal capacity, No 
member my be represented by another person. 
Rule 13: Term of Office of the M rbers 
1. The term of office of the members of the Catmission elected an July 1987 shall begin 
from the date. Ile term of office of the m thers of the Caunission elected at subsequent 
elections shall take effect the day following the expiry date of the term of office of the 
rr Tibers of the Camiission they shall replace. 
2. However if a member is re-elected at the expiry of his or her term of office, or 
elected to replace a nether whose term of office expired or will expire, the term of office 
shall begin fron that expiry date. 
3. In conformity with Article 39 (3) of the Charter, the uurber elected to replace tumber 
whose term of office has not expired, shall crnplete the term of office of his or her 
predecessor, unless the remaining term of office is less than six (6) months. In the latter 
case, there shall be no replacement. 
Rule 14: Cessation of Functions 
1. If in the unanimous opinion of the other rt ers of the Camdssicn, a mcmber has 
stopped discharging his duties for any reason other than a temporary absence, the Chairman of 
the Ccmnissicn shall inform the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity who 
shall then declare the seat vacant. 
2. In the case of the dense or resignation of a ma ber of the Commission, the Chairnnn 
shall immediately inform the Secretary-General who shall declare the seat vacant from the 
date of the demise or from that on which the resignation took effect. The nurber of the 
Cannission who resigns shall address a written notification of his or her resignation 
directly to the Chairman or to the Secretary-General and steps to declare his or her seat 
vacant shall only be taken after receiving the said notification. The resignation shall make 
the seat vacant. 
Rule 15: Vacant Seat 
Every seat declared vacant in conformity with Rule 15 of the present Rules of Procedure 
shall be filled on the basis of Article 39 of the Charter. 
Rule 16: Oath 
Before caning into office, every rt rber of the Cannission shall make the following 
solerm comnitn t at a public setting: 
"I Swear to carry out my duties well and faithfully in all inpartiality". 
QIAFIER N: OFFICERS 
Rule 17: Election of Officers 
I. The Ccnrnission shall elect a nn its nuthers a Chairman and a Vice-Chain n. 
2. The elections referred to in the present Rule shall be held by secret ballot. Only the 
members present shall vote, the member who shall obtain the two-thirds majority of the votes 
of the members present and voting shall be elected. 
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3. If no member obtains this two-thirds majority, a second and third and fourth ballot 
shall be held. The marber having the largest nunber of votes at the fifth ballot shall be 
elected. 
4. The officers of the Cannission shall be elected for a period of two (2) years. 7 hey 
shall be re-eligible. None of them, may, however, exercise his or her functions if he or she 
ceases to be a manber of the Camiission. 
Rule 18: Powers of the Chairman 
The Chairman shall carry out the functions assigned to him by the Charter, the Rules of 
Procedure and the decisions of the Ccnmission. In the exercise of his functions the Chairman 
shall be under the authority of the Cannission. 
Rule 19: Absence of the Chairman 
The Vice-Chairman shall replace the Chaim an during a session if the latter is unable 
to attend a whole or part of a sitting of a session. 
Rule 20: Functions of the Vice-Chairman 
The Vice-Chairman, acting in the capacity of the Chairman, shall have the same rights 
and the same duties as the thaimmm. 
Rule 21: Cessation of the Functions of an Officer 
If any of the officers ceases to carry out his or her functions or declares that he or 
she is no langer able to exercise the functions of a member of the Ccmnission or is no longer is a position for one reason or another, to serve as an officer, a new officer shall be 
elected for the remaining term of office of his or her predecessor. 
GiAY ER V: SECRETARIAT 
Rule 22: Functions of the Secretary General 
1. IT* Secretary-General or his representative may attend the meetings of the Commission. 
He shall participate neither in the deliberations, nor in the voting. He my however , be called upon by the Chairman of the Ccmnissian to address the meeting. He may treks written or 
oral statements at the sittings of the Carmission. 
2. He shall appoint, in consultation with the Chairman of the Commission secretary of the 
Cannission. 
3. He shall, in consultation with the Chairman provide the Camtission with the necessary 
staff, material means and services for it to actually carry out effectively the functions and 
missions assigned to it under the Charter. 
4. The Secretary-General shall take all the necessary steps for the meetings of the 
Cannission. 
5. The Secretary-General shall bring irmiediately to the knowledge of the mmbers of the 
Commission all the issues that would be submitted to them for consideration. 
Rule 23: Estimates 
Before the Commission shall approve a proposal entailing expenses, the Secretary- 
General shall prepare and distribute, as soon as possible, to the members of the Ummission, 
the financial i ýlications of the proposal. It shall be incurbent on the Chairman to draw 
the attention of the members to those implications so that they discuss then when the 
proposal shall be considered by the Caimissicn. 
Rule 24: Financial Rules 
The Financial Rules adopted pursuant to the provisions of Article 41 and 44 of the Charter, shall be appended to the present Rules of Procedure. 
Rule 25: Powers of the Secretary of the Ccnmission 
The Secretary of the Cczrmission hereinafter referred to as "Secretary" shall be 
responsible for the activities of the Secretariat under the general supervision of the Chairman, and, particularly: 
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a) He/she shall assist the Cannission and its mthers in the exercise cf their functions; 
b) He/she shall serve as an intermediary for all the can ications concerning the 
Co missicn. 
c) He/she shall be the custodian of the archives of the Comiission. 
Rule 26: Records of Cases 
A special record, with a reference number and initialled, in which shall be entered the date of the registration of each petition and come nications and that of the closure of the 
procedure relating to them before the Ccnmissicn shall be kept at the Secretariat. 
Rule 27: Financial Responsibility 
The Organization of African Unity shall bear the expenses of the staff and the means 
and services placed at the disposal of the Carmission to carry out its functions. 
CHAFIFR VI: SUBSIDIARY BODIES 
Rule 28: Establishment of Caimittees and Working Groups 
1. The Catmission nny during a session, taking into account the provisions of the Charter 
and in consultation with the Secretaryxºeral, establish, if it deems it necessary for the 
exercise of its functions, comnittees or wor groups, ca%vsed of the mEnbers of the Cannission and send than any agenda item for consi ration and report. 
2. These Committees or working gras may with the prior consent of the Secretary-General, be authorised to sit when the Cannission is not in session. 
3. The members of the cc mittees or working groups shall be appointed by the Chairmen, 
subject to the approval of the absolute majority of the other manbers of the Carmission. 
Rule 29: Establishient of SU), -Ccmniss ions 
1. The Crnmission may establish sub-Cartnissions of experts after the prior approval of the 
Assembly; 
2. Unless the Assembly decides otherwise, the Catmissicn shall determine the fractions and 
cccrposition of each sub-Cc miission. 
Rule 30: Officers of the Subsidiary bodies 
Unless the Camiission decides otherwise, the subsidiary bodies of the Caimissicn shall 
elect their own officers. 
Rule 31: Rules of Procedure 
The Rules of Procedure of the Carmissicn shall apply, as far as possible, to the 
proceedings of its subsidiary bodies. 
CHAFM VII: AJBLIC SESSIONS AND PRIVAZE SFSSICNS 
Rule 32: General Principle 
The sittings of the Caimission and of its subsidiary bodies shall be private and shall be held "in camera". 
Rule 33: Publication of Proceedings 
At the end of each private sitting, the Cc m issicn or its subsidiary bodies may issue a 
comnmique through the Secretary-General. 
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Q AFAR VIII: IAII. AMS 
Rule 34: Working Languages 
The working languages of the Commission and of all its institutions shall be those of 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU). 
Rule 35: Interpretation 
1. The address delivered in one of the working languages shall be interpreted in the other 
working languages. 
2. Any person addressing the Cannissicn in a language other than one of the working 
languages, shall, in principle, ensure the interpretaticn in one of the working languages. 
The interpreters of tfie Secretariat may take the interpretation of the original language as 
source language for their interpretation in the other working languages. 
Rule 36: Languages to be used for Minutes of Proceedings 
The strmary minutes of the sittings of the Commission shall be drafted in the working language. 
Rule 37: Languages to be used for resolutions and other official decisions 
All the official decisions of the Caimission shall be ccrmunicated in the working language, that shall also apply to the other official docu nts of the Caimission. 
WAFM IX: KBUIFS AND REP'QrrS 
Rule 38: Tape Recordings of the Sessions 
The Secretariat shall record and conserve the tapes of the sessions of the Carmissicn. It may also record and conserve the tapes of the sessions of the committees, working groups 
and sub-crnmissions if the Ccnmission so decides. 
Rule 39: Summary Minutes of the Sessions 
The Secretariat shall draft the summary minutes of the private and public sessions of 
the Commission and of its subsidiary bodies. It shall distribute them as soon as possible in 
a draft form to the mmibers of the Carmission and to all other participants of the session. 
All those participants nay, in the seven (7) working days following the receipt of the draft 
minutes of the session submit corrections to the Secretariat. The Chairmen may, under 
special circumstances, In consultation with the Secretary-General, extend the time for the 
submission of the corrections. 
In case the corrections are contested, the Chairman of the Comnission or the Chairrten 
of the subsidiary body, whose minutes they are shall resolve the disagreement after having listened to if necessary, the tape recording of the discussion. If the disagreement 
persists, the Carmission or the subsidiary body shall decide. The corrections shall be 
published in a distinct volume after the closure of the session. 
Rule 40: Distribution of the Minutes of the Private Session and Public Session 
1. The final sumary minutes of the public and private sessions shall be documents intended for general distribution unless, under exceptional circurstances, the Commission 
decides otherwise. 
2. The minutes of the private sessions of the Commission shall be distributed forthwith to 
all members of the Camiission and to any other participants in the sessions. 
Rule 41: Reports to be submitted after each Session 
The Comnission shall submit to the Current Chairman of the OAU, a report of the deliberations of each session. This report shall contain a brief summary of the reccnmendations and statements on issue to which the Caimissicn would like to draw the 
attention of the Current Chairman and manber States of the QIJ. 
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Rule 42: Submission of official decisions and reports 
The text of the decisions and reports officially adopted by the Caimission shall be 
distributed to all the n fers of the Camission as soon as possible. 
_CHAPTER 
X: OOIdxx -r OF ITE DEBATES 
Rule 43: Quorun 
The run shall be ccristituted by seven (7) mrbers of the Ccmnissicn, as specified in 
Article 42 (3) of the Charter. 
Rule 44: General Pokers of the Chairman 
1. In addition to the pours entrusted to him under other provisions of the present Rules 
of Procedure, the Chairman shall have the responsibility to declare each session of the 
Camdssion opened and closed; he shall direct the debates, ensure the application of the 
present Rules of Procedure, grant the use of the floor, submit to a vote matters under 
discussion and announce the result'of the vote taken. Subject to the provisions of the 
Present Rules of Procedure, the Chairman shall direct the discussions of the Commission and 
ensure order during meetings. The Chairman may during the discussion of an agenda item, 
propose to the Cannission to limit the time accorded to speakers as well as the tumber of 
interventions of each speaker on the same issue and close the list of speakers. He shall 
rule on the points of order. He shall also have the power to propose the adjo utment and the 
closure of debates as well as the ad ourrment and suspension of a sitting. The debates shall 
deal solely with the issue submitted to the Commission and the Chairman may call a speaker, 
whose remarks are irrelevant to the matter under discussion to order. 
Rule 45: Points or Order 
I. During the debate of any netter a nurber nay, at any time, raise a point of order and 
the point of order shall be immediately decided by the Chairman, in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure. If a member appeals against the decision, the appeal shall imnediately be put 
to the vote and if the Chairman's ruling is not cancelled by the aisle rrjority of the 
members present, it shall be maintained. 
2. A member raising a point of order cannot, in his or her camnents deal with the 
substance of the matter under discussion. 
Rule 46: Adjournment of Debates 
During the discussion on any ratter, a manber may move the adjournment of the debate on 
the matter under discussion. In addition to the proposer of the nxtim one mwber may speak 
in favour of and one against the ni ticn after which the ncticn shall be immediately put to 
the vote. 
Rule 47: Limit of the Time accorded to Speakers 
The Cannission may limit the time accorded to each speaker on any matter, when the time 
allotted for debates is limited and a speaker spends more than one time accorded, the 
Chairman shall inmediately call him to order. 
Rule 48: Closing of the list speakers 
The Chairman may during a debate, read cut the list of speakers and with the approval 
of the Crnmission, declare the list closed. Where there are no more speakers, the Chairman 
shall, with the approval of the Camiission declare the debate closed. This closure shall have the same effect as the one decided by the Caunissicn. 
Rule 49: Closure of the Debate 
A nether may , at any time, move the closure of the debate on the matter under discussion, even if other n rbers of representatives expressed the desire to take the floor. The authorization to take the floor on the closure of the debate shall be given only to two 
speakers against the closure, after which the notion shall fim diately be put to the vote. 
Rule 50: Suspension or Adjourrment of the Meeting 
During the discussion of any matter, art rber may movie the suspension or adjou t of 
the meeting. No discussion on any such motion shall be permitted and it shall lmrediately be 
put to the vote. 
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Rule 51: Order of the tbticns 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 45 of the present Rules of Procedure, the following 
nDtions shall have precedence in the following order over all the other proposals or notions 
before the meeting: 
a) to suspend the meeting; 
b) to adjourn the meeting; 
c) to adjourn the debate on the item wider discussion; 
d) for the closure of the debate on the item under discussion. 
Rule 52: Submission of Proposals and M ncknents of Substance 
Unless the Ccmnissicn decides otherwise the proposals, amendments or notions of 
substance made by manbers shall be submitted in writing to the Secretariat if a rt fier makes 
the request, they shall be considered at the first sitting following their submission. 
Rule 53: Decisicns on Carnpetence 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 45 of the present Rules of Procedure, any moticn 
tabled by a menber for a decision on the carpetence of the Ccrrmission to adopt a proposal 
submitted to it shall immediately be put to the vote before the said proposal is put to the 
vote. 
Rule 54: Withdrawal of a Proposal or a Motion 
The sponsor of a motion or a proposal may still withdraw it before it is put to the 
vote, on condition that it has not been amended. A nation or a proposal this withdrawn may 
be submitted again by another member. 
Rule 55: New Consideration of Proposals 
When a proposal is adopted or rejected it shall not be considered again at the same 
session, unless the Camiission decides otherw? se. When a mmiber names the new consideration 
of a proposal only one member may speak in favour of and one against the notion, after which it shall immediately be put to the vote. 
Rule 56: Interventions 
1. No member may take the floor at a meeting of the Cammission without prior authorization 
of the Chairman. Subject to Rules 50,49,45 and 48 the Chairman shall grant the use of the 
floor to the speakers in the order in which it has been requested. 
2. The debates shall deal solely with the matter submitted to the Camtission and the 
Chairtmn may call to order a speaker whose remrks are irrelevant to the matter raider 
discussion. 
3. The ChairTmn may limit the time accorded to speakers and the mriber of interventions 
which each mather may make on the same issue, in accordance with Rule 44 of the present 
Rules. 
Only two manbers in favour of a motion and two against the motion of fixing such time 
limits shall be granted the use of the floor after which the wotion shall immediately be put 
to the vote. For question of procedure the time accorded to each speaker shall not exceed 
five minutes, unless the Chairman decides otherwise. When the time allotted for discussions is limited and a speaker exceeds the time accorded the Chairman shall immediately call him to 
order. 
Rule 57: Right of Reply 
The right of reply shall be granted by the Chairmen to any nether requesting it. The 
n rber mist try, while exercising this right, to be as brief as possible and to take the 
floor preferably at the end of the sitting at which this right has been requested. 
Rule 58: Congratulations 
The congratulations addressed to the newly elected nithers to the Camdssicn shall only be presented by the Chairrtnn or a mffTher designated by the latter. Those addressed to newly 
elected officers shall only be presented by the outgoing Chairuen or a manber designated by 
him. 
656 
Rule 59: Condolences 
Condolences shall be exclusively presented by the Chairman on behalf of all the mrni)ers 
the Chairman may, with the consent of the Carmission, send a message on behalf of all the 
mriers of the Ccnmission. 
CKVM XI: VOLE AND E1EMCNS 
Rule 60: Right to Vote 
Each manner of the Catmission shall have one vote. In the case of equal number of 
votes the Chairman shall have the casting vote. 
Rule 61: Asking for a Vote 
A proposal or a motion subnitted to the decision of the Caumissicn shall be put to the 
vote if a member so requests. If no rt fiber asks for a vote, the Commission may adopt a 
proposal or a notion without a vote. 
Rule 62: Required Majority 
1. Except in the cases the Charter or other Rules of the present Rules of Procedure 
otherwise provide, decisions of the Ccmnission shall be taken by the sixple majority of the 
members present and voting. 
2. For the purpose of the present Rules of Procedure, the expression 'trembers present and 
voting" shall mean members voting for or against. The members who shall abstain from voting 
shall be considered as non-voting nu bers. 
3. Nevertheless decisions may be taken by consensus before resorting to voting, subject to 
compliance with the provisions of the Charter and the Rules of procedure be and that the 
process for reaching that consensus shall not delay unduly the proceedings of the Cannissicn. 
Rule 63: Method of Voting 
1. Subject to the provisions of Rule 68, the Commission, unless it otherwise decides, 
shall normally vote by show of hands, but an y maºber may request the roll-call vote, which 
shall be taken in the alphabetical order of the names of the manbers of the Carmission 
beginning by the member whose name is drawn by lot by the Chairman. In all the votes by 
roll-call each member shall reply "yes", "no" or "abstention". The Camdssion may decide to 
hold a secret ballot. 
2. In case of vote by roll-call, the vote of each manber participating in ballot shall be 
recorded in the minutes. 
Rule 64: Explanation of Vote 
Members may make brief statements for the only purpose of explaining their vote, before 
the beginning of the vote or once the vote has been taken. The member who is the sponsor of 
a proposal or a notion cannot explain his vote on that proposal or motion except if it has been a handed. 
Rule 65: Rules to be Observed while Voting 
When the ballot shall begin, it nay not be interrupted except if a member raises a 
point of order relating to the manner in which the ballot is held. The Chairman may allow 
'members to intervene briefly, whether before the ballot begiming or when it is closed, but 
solely to explain their votes. 
Rule 66: Division of Proposals and Amendments 
The division of proposals and amendments shall be done if so requested. The parts of the proposals or of the anendments which has been adopted shall later be put to the vote as whole; if all the operative parts of a proposal have been rejected, the proposal shall be 
considered to have been rejected as a whole. 
Rule 67: Amendment 
An amendment shall simply comprise an addition to or a deletion of another proposal of 
a change in a part of the said proposal. 
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Rule 68: Order of Vote cn Amendments 
When an amendnant is moved to a proposal, the amendit shall be voted on first. When 
two or more amendments are moved to a proposal, the Ccmnissicn shall first vote on the 
amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the amendment 
next furthest removed therefrom and so until all the amendments have been put to the vote. 
Nevertheless when the adoption of an amendment shall necessarily irtply the rejection of 
another amendment, the latter shall not be put to the vote. If one or several amendments are 
adopted, the amended proposal shall then be put to the vote. 
Rule 69: Order of Vote on the Proposals 
1. If two or more proposals are ende on the same natter, the Carmission, unless it decides 
otherwise, shall vote on these proposals in the order in which they have been submitted. 
2. After each vote the Commission may decide whether it shall put the next proposal to the 
vote. 
3. However, the motions which do not require the opinion of the Carmission on the 
substance of the proposals shall be considered as previous issues and put to the vote before 
the said proposals. 
Rule 70: Elections 
The Elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Commission otherwise decides 
when the election concerns one post for which only one candidate has been proposed and that 
the candidate or the list of candidates has been agreed upon. 
Rule 71: Majority required to be Elected 
1. When one post rust be filled by elections the candidate who shall obtain in the first 
-ballot the majority of the votes cast and the largest nether of votes shall be elected. 
2. If the number of the candidates in majority are fewer than the cumber of vacant posts, 
another round of voting shall be conducted to fill the remaining vacant posts. 
' CHAPTER XII: PARTICIPATICN OF NON41EMBERS OF IliE Q? +USSI( 
Rule 72: Participation of States in the Deliberation 
1. the Camtissions may invite any State to participate in the discussion of any issue that 
shall be of particular interest to that State. 
2. A subsidiary body of the Caimissicn may invite any State to participate in the 
discussion of any issue that shall be of particular interest to this State. 
3. A State this invited shall have no voting right, but i nay submit proposals which tray be 
put to the vote at the request of any manber of the Cczrmissicn or of the subsidiary body 
concerned. 
Rule 73: Participation of National Liberation Mop its 
The Catmissicn may invite any National Liberation Movement recognized by the (Wi or by virtue of resolutions adopted by the Asserbly to participate, without voting rights, in the discussion of any issue which shall be of particular interest to this Movement. 
Rule 74: Participation of Specialized Institutions and Consultations with the latter 
1. Pursuant to the agreements concluded between the GAU and the Specialized Institutions, 
the latter shall have the right to: 
a) be represented in the public sessions of the Ccmnission and of its subsidiary bodies. 
b) participate, without voting rights, through their representatives in deliberations 
on issues which shall be of interest to than and to submit, on these issues, 
proposals which may be put to vote at the request of any rtr her of the Ccrtmissicn 
or the interested subsidiary body. 
2. Before placing in the provisional agenda an issue submitted by a Specialized Institution the Secretary-General should initiate such preliminary consultations as may be necessary, with this institution. 
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3. When an issue proposed for inclusion in the provisional agenda of a session, or which has been added to the agenda of a session pursuant to Rule 5 of the present Rules of 
Procedure contains a proposal requesting the Organization of African Unity to undertake 
additional activities relating to issues concerning directly one or several specialized 
institutions, the Secretary-General should enter into consultation with the institutions 
concerned and inform the Catmissicn of the ways and means of ensuring coordinated utilisation 
of the resources of the various institutions. 
4. When at a meeting of the Ccnmission, a proposal calling upon the Organization of 
African Unity to undertake additional activities relate to issues directly concerning one or 
several specialized institutions, the Secretary-General, after consulting as far as possible, 
the representatives of the interested institutions, should draw the attention of the 
Catmission to the effects of that proposal. 
5. Before taking a decision on the proposals mentioned above, the Carmissicn shall make 
sure that the institutions concerned have been duly consulted. 
Rule 75: Participation of other Inter-Governmental Organizations 
Representatives of Inter-Goverrmental Organizations to which OAU has granted pen t 
observer status and other Inter-Governmental Organizations pertinently designated by the QW 
or invited by the Crnmission, may participate, without voting rights, in the deliberations of 
the Commission on issues falling within the framework of the activities of these 
organizations. 
CHIAPIFR XIII: CQ1SULTATICN WITH CRGANIZATIQJS MID REPRESENTATION OF 
Rule 76: Representation 
Ncn-Governmental organizations may appoint authorised observers to participate in the 
public sessions of the Camiissicn and of its subsidiary bodies. The ncn-Covertmental 
Organizations on the list as established by the Carmission mey send observers to these 
sessions where issues falling within their area of activity are being considered. 
Rule 77: Ccnsultaticn 
1. The Cannissicn may consult the ran-Governmental Organizations either directly or 
through one or several committees set up for this purpose. In any case, these consultations 
may be held at the invitation of the Co mtission or at the request of the organization. 
2. Upon recc miendation of the Secretary-General and at the request of the Cormtission, 
organizations on the above-ff ntioned list r my also be heard by the Camiissicn. 
CHAPIIR XIV: PUBLICATION AND DISIRIBUfICN OF UE REPCRTS AA) OIHD OFFICIAL DOCUMW S 
Rule 78: Report of the Camnission 
Within the framwork of the procedure of canamicatia aog States, parties to the Charter referred to in Articles 47 and 49 of the Charter, the Ccmnissicn shall submit to the 
Assembly a report containing, where possible, reccmnendations it shall deem necessary. The 
report shall be confidential. However, it shall be published by the Chairman of the 
Camüssion if the Assembly so decides. 
Rule 79: Periodical reports of Manber States 
Periodical reports and other information submitted by States parties to the Charter as 
requested under Article 62 of the Charter, shall be docui nts for general distribution. The same thing shall apply to other inforngtion supplied by a State party to the Charter, unless this State shall request otherwise. 
Rule 80: Reports cn the activities of the Caimissicn 
1. As stipulated in Article 54 of the Charter, the C=nission shall each year submit to the Assembly, a report an its deliberations, in which it shall include a sumnry of its 
activities. 
2. The report shall be published by the Chairman after the Assembly shall have considered it. 
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PART IW : PRWiSIONS RELATIIC 10 11iE R NOTIONS OF ME Q}MISSIQJ 
GIAP'IEB XV: PRCM nCNAL ACTIVITIES 
Reports submitted by States Parties to the Charter Inder Article 62 of the 
Charter 
Rule 81: Contents of Rehorts 
1. 
, 
States parties to the Charter shall submit reports on measures they would have taken to 
give effect to the rights recognized by the Charter and on the progress made with regard to 
the enjoyment of these rights. The reports should indicate where possible, the factors and difficulties in eding the ilementation of the provisions of the Charter. 
2. Whenever the Commission shall request State parties to the Charter to submit reports as 
provided for by Article 62 of the Charter, it shall fix the date for the presentation of 
these reports. 
3. The Ccmnission may, through the Secretary-General inform States parties to the Charter, 
of its wishes regarding the form and the contents of the reports to be submitted under Article 62 of the Charter. 
Rule 82: Transmission of the Revorts 
I. The Secretary-General may, after consultation with the Carmission, camunicate to the 
specialised institutions concerned, copies of all parts of the reports which may relate to 
their areas of competence, produced by Maier States of these institutions. 
2. The Camiission may, invite the specialised institutions to which the Secretary-General has cct maiicated parts of the reports, to submit observations relating to these parts within 
a time limit that it may specify. 
Rule 83: Submission of Reports 
The Ccnmission shall inform, as early as possible, marber States parties to the Charter, through the Secretary-General, of the opening date, duration and venue of the 
Session at which their respective reports shall be considered. Representatives of the States 
parties to the (harter may participate in the sessions of the Camiissicn at which their 
reports shall be considered. 7he Catmission may also inform a State party to the Charter 
fron which it wanted ccaplementary information, that it may authorise its representative to 
participate in a specific session. This representative should be able to reply to questions 
to be put to him by the Ccmnissicn and make statements on reports already submitted to this State. He may also furnish additional information from his State. 
Rule 84: Non-Submission of Reports 
1. The Secretary-General, shall at each session, inform the Commission of all cases of 
non-submission of reports or of additional information requested pursuant to Rules 81 and 85 
of the Rules of Procedure. In such cases, the Commission may send, through the Secretary- General, to the State party to the Charter concerned, a report relating to the submission of the report or additional information. 
2. If, after the reminder referred to in paragraph 1 of this Rule, a State party to the 
Charter does not submit the report or the additional information requested pur avant to Rules 81 and 85 of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission shall point it out in its yearly report to the Assembly. 
Rule 85: Examination of information contained in reports 
1. When considering a report submitted by a State party to the Charter under Article 62 of the Charter, the Commission should first make sure that the report provides all the necessary 
information pursuant to the provisions of Rule 81 of the Rules of Procedure. 
2. If, in the opinion of the Cannission, a report submitted by a State party to the Charter, does not contain adequate information, the Commission may request that State to furnish the additional information required, by indicating the date on which the information 
needed should be submitted. 
3. If, following the consideration of the reports and the information submitted by a State party to the Charter, the Ccamission decides that the State has not discharged some of its obligations under the Charter, it may address all general observations to the State concerned 
as it may deem necessary. 
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Rule 86: Ad i ment and transmission of the reports 
I. The Ccrmiission shall, through the Secretary-General commnicate to States parties to 
the Charter for camients, its general observations made following the consideration of the 
reports and the information submitted by States parties to the Charter. The Commission may 
where necessary, fix a time limit for the submission of the camEnts by the States parties to 
the Charter. 
2. The Carmissicn my also transmit to the Assembly, the observations nmtioned in 
paragraph 1 of this Rule, accompanied by copies of the reports it has received from the States parties to the Charter as well as the ccmrents supplied by the latter, if possible. 
CHAPTER XVI: PROr1E, Cfl ACTNITIFS 
CMI NICAT1 S FROM 'II-IE STATES PARTIES IC) ilE CHARM 
Section 1: Procedure for the Consideration of Camu ications Received in Conforrnit with 
Article 41 r er 
Rule 87: "Procedure for Comialications-n otiations" 
=othe Procedure 
1. Any Ccamnication submitted under Article 47 of the Charter should be submitted to the 
Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Camiission. 
2. The commnication referred to above should be in writing and contain a detailed and 
comprehensive statement on the actions denounced as well as the provisions of the Charter 
alleged to have been violated. 
3. The notification of the cormtnlication to the State party to the Charter, the Secretary- 
General and the Chairman of the Camiission shall be done through a registered letter 
accompanied by an adaiowledgenent fron or through any known technical means. 
Rule 88: Register of carmmications 
The Secreta eral shall keep a permanent register for all ccmnmicaticns received 
raider r- icle 47 of the Charter. 
Rule 89: Reply and time limit 
1. The reply of the State party to the Charter seized of a written communication should 
reach the requesting state party to the Charter within 3 months following the receipt of the 
notification of the Camiaiication. 
2. It shall be acconpanied particularly by: 
a) written explanations, declarations or statements relating to the issues raised; 
b) possible indications and measures taken to end the situation denouriced; 
c) indications on the law and rules of procedure applicable or applied; 
d) indications on the local procedures for appeal already used, in process or still 
open. 
Rule 90: Non-settlement of the issue 
1. If within three (3) months fron the date the notification of the original ccmnnication 
is received by the addressee State, the issue has not been settled to the satisfaction of the 
two interested parties, through the selected channel of negotiation or through any other 
peaceful procedure selected by cannon consent of the parties the issue shall be referred to 
the Conmissioe, in accordance with the provisions of Article 
47 of the Charter. 
2. 'ibe issue shall also be referred to the Ca mission if the addressee State party to the 
Charter fails to react to the request made under Article 47 of the Charter, within the same 3 
months' period of time. 
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Rule 91: Seisin of the Camiission 
At the expiration of the 3 months time limit referred to in Article 47 of the Charter, 
and in the absence of a satisfactory reply or in case the addressee State party to the 
Charter fails to react to the request, each State Party may submit the communication to the Carmission through a notification addressed to its Chairman, to the other interested State 
party and to the Secretary-General. 
Section 2: Procedure for the Consideration of the Cammications Received in Conformity 
with ices 48 and or er 
Rule 92: Seisin of the Camiission 
1. Any carmnication submitted under Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter may be submitted to 
the Conmissicn by any one of the interested State parties through notification addressed to 
the Chairman of the Camiission, the Secretary-General and the State party concerned. 
2. The notification referred to in paragraph 1 of the present rule shall contain inforimtion on the following elements or accarpanied particularly by: 
a) measures taken to try to resolve the issue pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter 
including the text of the initial carmaiicaticn and arr future written explanation 
from the interested States parties to the Charter relatirg to the issue; 
b) measures taken to exhaust local procedures for appeal; 
c) any other procedure for international investigation or international settlement to 
which the interested States parties have resorted. 
Rule 93: Permanent Register of Cannmications 
The Secretary-General shall keep a permanent register for all comnmications received by the Cammissim tinder Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter. 
Rule 94: Seisin'of the manbers of the Commission 
The Secretary-General shall immdiately inform rrwbers of the Ccmnission of any 
notification received pursuant to Rule 91 of this Rules of Procedure and shall send to them, 
as early as possible, a copy of the notification as well as the relevant information. 
Rule 95: Private sessicn and Press Release 
1. The Cannissicn shall consider the camuiications referred to in Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter in close session. 
2. After consulting the interested States parties to the Charter, the Commission may issue 
through the Secretary-General, releases on its activities for the attention of the media and thelic at a close session. 
Rule 96: Consideration of the Camunication 
the Cannissicn shall consider a camunication only when: 
a) the procedure offered to the States parties by Article 47 of the Charter has been 
exhausted; 
b) the time limit set in Article 48 of the Charter has expired; 
c) the Ccamission is certain that all the available local remedies have been utilised 
and exhausted, pursuant to the generally recognized principles of international law, or that the process of achieving these remedies extend beyond reasonable time 
limit or has been unduly prolonged. 
Rule 97: Amicable settlement 
Except for the provisions of Rule 96 of the present Rules of Procedure, the Commission 
shall place its good offices at the disposal of the interested States parties to the Charter so as to reach an amicable solution on the issue based on the respect of human rights and fundamental liberties, as recognised by the Charter. 
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Rule 98: Additional information 
The Carmission may, through the Secretary-General, request the States parties concerned 
or one of than to canmmicate additional information or observations orally or in writing. 
The Catmission shall fix a time limit for the submission of the written information or 
observations. 
Rule 99: Representation of States parties to the Charter 
1. The States parties to the Charter concerned shall have the right to be represented 
during the consideration of the issue by the Carmission and to sihnit observations orally and in writing or in either form. 
2. The Ccmmissicn shall notify, as soon as possible, the States parties concerned, through 
the Secretary-General, of the opening date, the duration and the venue of the session at 
which the issue will be examined. 
3. The procedure to be followed for the presentation of oral or written observations shall be determined by the Carmissicn. 
Rule 100: Report of the Carmission 
I. The Commission shall adopt a report pursuant to Article 52 of the Charter within a 
reasonable time limit which should not exceed 12 months, folla+3ng the notification referred 
to in Article 48 of the Charter and Rule 90 of the present Rules of Procedure. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of Rule 99 of these Rules of Procedure shall not apply to 
the deliberations of the Commission, relating to the adoption of the report. 
3. The report referred to above shall concern the decisions and conclusions that the 
Camiission will reach. 
4. The report of the Catmissicn shall be com micated to the States parties concerned 
through the Secretary-General. 
5. the report of the Commission shall be sent to the AssaTbly through the Secretary- 
General, together with the recamEndaticns that it shall deem useful. 
CHAPIFR XVII: OHR Ca44JNTGATIODS 
PROCEDURE FCR Tim CMIDERATICN OF Z£ CCWLNIGTIQNS 
Section I: Transmission of Caºmmications to the Cannissim 
Rule 101: Session of the Ccnmission 
1. Pursuant to these Rules of Procedure, the Secretary-Cameral shall transnit to the Carmission the carmnicaticns submitted to him for caisideraticn by the Ccmnission in 
accordance with the Charter. 
2. No caTmaiication concerning a State which is not a party to the Charter shall be 
received by the Camiissicn or placed on a list under Rule 102. 
Rule 102: List of Cannmicaticns 
I. The Secretary of the Commission shall prepare lists of crnmnications suhnitted to the 
Camnissicn pursuant to Rule 101 above, to which he shall attach a brief sumary of their 
contents and regularly cause these lists to be distributed to arm bens of the Ccmdssion. 
Besides, the Secretary shall keep a permanent register of all these camix icatiocis. 
2. The full text of each comnmication referred to the Camiission shall be comnnicated to 
each member of the Ccnmissian on request. 
Rule 103: Request for clarifications 
1. The Cam issicn, through the Secretary-General, may request the author of a 
comunicaticn to furnish clarifications on the applicability of the Charter to his 
cammiications, and to specify in particular: 
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a) his name, address, age and profession by justifying his very identity, if ever he 
requesting the Caimissicn to be kept anany1ixxis; 
b) name of the State party referred to in the comnmication; 
c) purpose of the ccm micaticn; 
d) provision(s) of the Charter allegedly violated; 
e) "De facto" means of law; 
f) measures taken by the author to exhaust local remedies; 
g) the extent to which the sane issue is already being considered by another international 
investigating or settlerent body. 
2. When asking for clarification or information, the Secretary-General shall fix an appropriate 
time limit for the author to submit the cc nu icaticn so as to avoid undue delay in the procedure 
provided for by the Charter. 
3. The Ccmnissicn may adopt a questionnaire for use by the author of the conmmicaticx in 
providing the above mentioned information. 
4. the request for clarification referred to in paragraph 1 of this Rule shall not prevent the 
inclusion of the comnmication on the lists mentioned in paragraph 1 of Rule 102 above. 
Rule 104: Distribution of camimications 
For each con unication recorded, the Secretary-General shall prepare as soon as possible, a 
surnary of the relevant information received, which it shall distribute to the marbers of the Crnmission. 
Section II: General Provisions Governing the Consideration of the Ccmnrnicaticns by the 
Coaimissicn or its Subsidiary bodies 
Rule 105: Private session 
The sessions of the Camiission or of its subsidiary bodies during which the ca malications 
provided for in the Charter shall be considered private. The sessions during which the Canmissicn 
may consider general issues, such as the application procedure of the Charter, r my be public, if the 
Ommission so desires. 
Rule 106: Press releases 
The Ccmnission may issue, through the Secretary-General and for the attention of the media and 
the public, releases on the activities of the Carmission, in its private session. 
Rule 107: Incrnpatibilities 
I. No member shall take part in the consideration of a ccmnaticaticn by the Cannissicn: 
a) if he has any personal interest in the case; or 
b) if he has participated, in any capacity, in the adoption of any decision relating to the 
case which is the subject of the cication. 
2. Any issue relating to the application of paragraph 1 above shall be resolved by the Ummission. 
Rule 108: Withdrawal of a mmber 
If, for any reason, a member considers that he should not take part or continue to take part in the consideration of a camuücation, he shall inform the Chairman of his decision to withdraw. 
Rule 109: Provisional measures 
Before making its final views known to the Assembly on the carmnicaticn, the Carmissicn trey inform the State Party concerned of its views on the appropriateness of taking provisional measures to avoid irreparable prejudice being caused to the victim of the alleged violation. In so doing, the Ccnmission shall inform the State party that the expression of its views on the adoption of those provisional measures does not imply a decision on the substance of the ccmnnicaticn. 
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Rule 110: Information to the State party to the Charter 
Prior to any substantive consideration, every conmaiication should be ende {mown to the 
State concerned through the Chairman of the Ccnmissicn, pursuant to Article 57 of the 
Charter. 
Section III: Procedures to Determine Admissibility 
Rule 111: Tine limits for consideration of the admissibility 
The Camtissicn shall decide, as early as possible and pursuant to the following 
provisions, whether or not the ccmnmication shall be adnissible raider the Charter. 
Rule 112: Order of the Consideration of the Carmzicaticns 
I. Unless otherwise decided, the Ccnmission shall consider the camzaticaticns in the order 
they have been received by the Secretariat. 
2. The Ccmnissicn may decide, if it deems it good, to consider jointly two or several 
cosmuiications. 
Rule 113: Working Croups 
the Catmission may set up one or several working groups, composed of 3 of its marbers 
at most, to submit recommendations on the conditions of admissibility stipulated in Article 56 of the Charter 
Rule 114: Admissibility of the Corm iications 
1. Camunications egy be submitted to the Camiissicn by: 
a) an alleged victim of a violatiai by a State party to the Charter an one of the 
rights enunciated in the Charter or, in his name, when it appears that the latter is unable to submit the crnmmication himself; 
b) an individual or an organisation alleging, with proofs in support, a serious or 
massive cases of violations of hii n and peoples' rights; 
2. The Ccamission may accept such ccmnmications fron any individual or organisation 
irrespective of where they shall be. 
3. In order to decide on the admissibility of a cormaticaticn, pursuant to the provisions 
of the Charter, the Curmission shall ensure: 
a) that the camunication indicates the identity of the author even if he requests the 
Ccmnissicn to be anonymous, in which case the Camdssicn shall not disclose his 
name; 
b) that the author alleges to be a victim of a violation, by a State party of any one 
of the rights enunciated in the Charter and, if necessary, that the ccmnmicatic 
is submitted in the name of an individual who is a victim (or individuals who are 
victims) who would be unable to submit a ccrmu ication or to authorise it to be 
done; 
c) that the ccmmmication does not constitute an abuse of the right to suhnit a 
carmunication under the Charter; 
d) that the caºmmicaticn is not incaºpatible with the provisions of the Charter; 
e) that the crnmmicaticn is not limited solely to inforrmtion published or disseminated through the nass carmmication media; 
f) that the sane issue is not already being considered by another international investigating or settlement body; 
g) that the alleged victim has exhausted all the available local remedies or that the 
process of such remedies are unduly taking a long time; 
h) that the ca iiication has been submitted within a reasonable tine limit from the 
time the local remedies have been exhausted or fron a period decided by the Catmission. 
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Rule 115: Additional Information 
1. The omission or a working group set up under Rule 113, may, through the Secretary- 
General, request the State party concerned or the author of the cosmnication to suhnit in 
writing additional information or observations relating to the issue of admissibility of the 
ccmiu Ication. The Camission or the wort group shall fix a time limit for the submission 
of the information or observations to avoid issue dragging too long. 
2. A came ication may be declared admissible only on condition that the State party 
concerned has received the text of the ccmnmicaticn and that it has been given the 
opportunity to submit the information and observations pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Rule. 
3. A request node under paragraph 1 of this Rule should indicate clearly that the request 
does not meant that a decision whatsoever has been taken on the issue of admissibility. 
Rule 116: Decision of the Caimissicn on Admissibility 
1. If the Carmission decides hat a cc ainication is inadmissible under the Charter, it 
shall trwke its decision known as early as possible, through the Secretary-General to the 
author of the comnatication and, if the came ication has been transmitted to a State party 
concerned, to that State. 
2. If the Commission has declared a carnLnication inadmissible under the Charter, it may 
reconsider this decision at a later date if it is seized by the interested individual or on 
his behalf, of a written request containing the information to the effect that the grounds for the inadmissibility have ceased to exist. 
Section IV: Procedure for the Consideration of Camiriicaticns 
Rule 117: Proceedings 
I. If the Commission decides that a communication is admissible under the Charter, its 
decision and the text of the relevant documents shall as soon as possible, be submitted to 
the State party concerned, through the Secretary-General. fie author of the camunication 
shall also be informed of the Commission's decision through the Secretary-General. 
2. The State party to the Charter concerned shall, within the 4 ensuing months, submit in 
writing to the Ccftmission, explanations or statements elucidating, the issue raider 
consideration and indicating, if possible, measures it was able to take to remedy the 
situation. 
3. All explanations or statements submitted by a State party pursuant to the present Rule 
shall be communicated, through the Secretary-General, to the author of the comnanicatien who 
may submit in writing additional information and observations within a time limit fixed by 
the Cc fission. 
4. The Ccnrdssion my review the decision by which it has declared a communication 
admissible, in the light of the explanations and statements submitted by the State party 
under the present Rule. 
Rule 118: Final Decision of the Carmissien 
1. If the ccmnmication is admissible, the Commission shall consider it in the light of 
all the information that the individual and the State party concerned has submitted in 
writing it shall nuke known its observations on this issue. To this end, the Commission my 
refer tie cc matication to a working group, composed of 3 of its marbers at most, which shall 
submit recommendations to it. 
2. The observations of the Carmissicn shall be cc icated to the Assembly through the 
Secretary-General. 
3. the Assembly or its Chairman may request the Ccm mission to conduct an in-depth study an these cases and to submit a factual report acccnpanied by its findings and recomrendaticns, in accordance with the provisions of Article 58 sub-paragraph 2 of the Charter. 
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FINAL Ct1APIFR: AH I}ENT AND SUSPENSICN OF 1HE RULES OF THE RUES OF PROCEDURE 
Rule 119: Method of Aiumdnent 
Only the Camiission r my modify the present Rules of Procedure. 
Rule 120: Method of Suspension 
The Cumiission may suspend temporarily, the application of any Rule of the present 
Rules of Procedure, on condition that such a suspension shall not be inconpatible with any 
applicable decision of the Commission or the Assembly or with any relevant provision of the 
Charter and that the proposal shall have been submitted 24 hours in advance. This condition 
may be set aside if no n fiter opposes it. Such a suspension may take place only with a 
specific and precise object in view and should be limited to the duration necessary to 
achieve that aim. 
Deliberated and adopted by the Camdssion at its second session held in Dakar, Senegal, 
on 13 February 1988. 
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